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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

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FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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&c., &c., &c.

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OF
THE SIXTEENTH VOLUME.

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BOOK XLIX.

DRESDEN AND VITTORIA.

IN signing the armistice of Preisnitz, Napoleon's only intention was to gain two months' time, in which to complete his armaments, and to raise them to a strength sufficient to meet the new enemies he was about to create; but he had never for a moment entertained the idea of peace, being utterly unwilling to conclude it on the conditions dictated by Austria; which conditions, so frequently propounded during the last four months, sometimes by simple insinuations, but, also, by the recent and formal declarations of M. de Bubna, were, as we have seen, as follow;—The dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw; the reconstruction of Prussia, by means of the addition to it of a considerable portion of this grand duchy, and some portions of the Hanseatic provinces; the restoration to Germany of the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hambourg; the abolition of the confederation of the

Rhine; the restoration to Austria of Illyria and the portions of Poland which had formerly belonged to her. Although a continental peace on these terms, the sure precursor of a maritime peace, would leave to France, independently of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, to exist as French departments; with Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as royal vassals; Napoleon absolutely rejected it, not on account of the loss of territory which it would involve, and which would be very small, but because it would cast a cloud upon his glory. He unhesitatingly preferred, to its acceptance, therefore, war with the whole of Europe — a resolution which was, doubtless, remarkably bold with respect to his own fortunes, very cruel with respect to the many victims which it sacrificed on fields of battle, and a species of outrage against France, exposed to so many dangers simply on account of the pride of her ruler; but it was a resolution which he had now taken, and from which it was unlikely he would be turned. It would have been well had he had around him better counsellors, or, at least, counsellors possessed of more influence over him, and capable of inducing him to renounce the fatal resolutions he had adopted. In the meantime, although thoroughly resolved upon the course he intended to pursue, as is sufficiently evident from his orders, his diplomatic communications, and some confidential avowals made to the most intimate of his courtiers, he was, nevertheless, unwilling that it should be known, either to the powers with whom he had to negotiate, or to the general body of the agents of his government, of whose active zeal he had great need. In fact, the knowledge on the part of Austria of Napoleon's real intentions, could not but definitively array that power against us, increase her activity, already very great, in the completion of her armaments, spread a feeling of despair amongst our allies, who were even now dissatisfied at their alliance with us, and render impossible that prolongation of the armistice, which Napoleon considered so essential to his plans, and which he did not despair of obtaining by protracting the negotiations. His resolution not to accept or even acknowledge the men who composed his government, would have speedily become public, have increased the aversion so widely inspired by his policy, have extended this aversion to his person and his dynasty, have rendered the levy of troops a more difficult task, and both irritated and discouraged the army, which, seeing no limit to the effusion of its blood, would have indulged in still bolder and bitterer language. It seemed, in truth, as though the opposition, repressed on all sides, had found refuge in the camps, and that our soldiers

of all ranks had chosen as the price of the sacrifices demanded of them, the exercise of the inalienable liberty of the Frenchman's spirit. After having hurled themselves in the morning into the midst of dangers, they passed the evening in deploring in their bivouacs the fatal obstinacy which caused so much blood to flow, in support of a policy which began to be incomprehensible. They had admitted that the French arms had need, after Moscow and the Berezina, of some glorious vengeance; but when, after Lutzen and Bautzen, the prestige of our arms had been restored, they would have been shocked, and their zeal have been chilled, had they learned that Napoleon, having it in his power to retain possession of Belgium, the Rhenish Provinces, Holland, Piedmont, and Tuscany, could not be contented, but wished to bring destruction upon tens of thousands of men for the purpose of enabling him to retain Lubeck, Hambourg, and Bremen, and to keep that empty title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.—On account of all these reasons, then, Napoleon confessed to no one, except, perhaps, to M. de Bassano, his real intentions. Saying only to each just what it was necessary each should know, for the purpose of being able to accomplish his particular task, and reserving for himself alone the complete scheme of his fatal designs.

We have already narrated that M. de Bubna had repaired to the French head-quarters with the Austrian conditions, and that these conditions had been considerably modified, since, by deferring to the period of the conclusion of a maritime peace the sacrifice of the Hanscatic towns and the confederation of the Rhine, the only objection which could reasonably be raised against them had been removed. And Napoleon perceiving himself, therefore, to be now pressed closely, and fearing to have to declare himself immediately—the consequences of which would be to bring down upon him the weight of the Austrian arms before he should be sufficiently prepared—had signed the disadvantageous armistice of Pleiswitz, not for the purpose of gaining time in which to treat, but time for the completion of his armaments. He wrote secretly to Prince Eugene and the minister of war that he had signed this armistice, the danger of which he partly perceived, for the purpose of obtaining the necessary time for the completion of the armaments which he was preparing against Austria, upon whom he intended to impose the law, rather than receive it from her. He recommended them to neglect nothing which could tend to render the army of Italy (intended to threaten Austria by Carinthia), and the army of Mayence (intended to threaten her by Bavaria), ready to take the field by the end of July; but he

refrained from explaining to either the one or the other of these persons, what was this law laid down by Austria to which he was unwilling to submit, leaving them to believe that the demands of this power were excessive, and tended to nothing less than the ruin of the power of France, and the annihilation of her glory. He wrote to Prince Cambacérès, to whom on his departure he had entrusted the exercise of his authority, that the armistice which had been signed would, doubtless, lead to peace, *but that this was no reason for any relaxation in the preparations for war, being, on the contrary, a reason for redoubling them, since we could only hope to obtain a secure and honourable peace, by convincing our enemies that we were at all points well prepared.*—But to Prince Cambacérès, as to the others, he feared to explain what he understood by the term *a sure and honourable peace*; and he refrained, therefore, from avowing to him that he did not understand by it such a peace as, independently of the Rhine and the Alps, should resign to France, either directly or indirectly, Holland, Westphalia, Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, the Roman states, and Naples.

Only to M. de Bassano, whom he could not deceive, since this minister conducted, on the part of France, all the communications with the European powers, and because he had no reason to fear any objections in this quarter, he declared his real intentions, entrusting to him, also, the task of receiving M. de Bubna, whom, he told him, he was anxious to avoid seeing, that he might not be compelled to explain himself with respect to the Austrian conditions. He further directed M. de Bassano to carry this envoy to Dresden, whither the French head-quarters were about to return, and to retain him there until his return, by which means would be gained ten days, and the assembly of the plenipotentiaries delayed until the middle of June, when, by raising difficulties with respect to the forms of procedure to be adopted, it would be possible to defer any decision upon the matters actually in dispute until the month of July. And then, by showing at the last moment a disposition to treat, and thus increasing the little time which would still remain, it would be possible, he considered, to protract yet a month longer the duration of the armistice; by which means three months in all would be procured for the completion of the French armaments—three months of which the allied powers would, doubtless, take advantage for a similar purpose, but not to such good effect as France, since their administrative functions were carried on neither with so much activity nor skill as hers.

Having determined upon this plan, Napoleon made M. de Bassano set out for Dresden, directing him to announce

his own speedy arrival at that capital, and to seek out for him a fit and convenient dwelling in the suburbs, where he might be able to work free from interruption, breathing a pure air, and be near the *camps of instruction* established on the bank of the Elbe. He ordered to be conveyed thither a portion of his household, together with the *Comédie Française*, in order that he might display there a species of pacific splendour, which should breathe around him an air of tranquil confidence and inclination for repose — an inclination which had never been so alien to his heart as at this time. *It is as well*, he wrote to Prince Cambacérès, *that people should think that we are amusing ourselves here.*

According to his custom, Napoleon did not leave his troops until he had made due provision for their support, health, and instruction, during the suspension of arms. He had reserved, by the conditions of the armistice, lower Silesia, a country rich in every species of material, as well for the clothing as the provisioning of troops, and he had distributed his *corps d'armée* there, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Oder, in the following manner. He posted Reynier at Gorkitz with the 7th corps, Macdonald at Lowenberg with the 11th, Lauriston at Goldberg with the 5th, Ney at Liegnitz with the 3rd, Marmont at Buntzlau with the 6th, Bertrand at Sprottau with the 4th, Mortier in the environs of Glogau with the infantry of the young guard, Victor at Crossen with the 2nd, Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani on the Oder with the cavalry reserves; whilst Marshal Oudinot, with the corps intended to march upon Berlin, was cantoned on the boundaries of Saxony and Brandenburg, which formed, from the Oder to the Elbe, the line of demarcation stipulated for by the armistice. These various corps were to take up their quarters in the villages or in barracks, passing their time in the practice of military manœuvres and the enjoyment of repose. They were to be supported by means of requisitions levied upon the surrounding districts; the supplies thus obtained being so managed as to afford subsistence for the troops during three months at least, and a supply of provisions available at the period of the renewal of hostilities. Napoleon ordered, moreover, that levies of cloths and other woven fabrics should be made in that portion of Silesia which remained to him, and which produced them in abundance, for the purpose of renewing the already well-worn garments of his soldiers. As Silesia was, in all cases, to return into the possession of Prussia, since Austria would not have it, he had no need to bestow any greater care upon the management of its resources, than just such as would make them last as long as his need of them.

Glogau alone, of all his fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, having had the advantage of being free from blockade, he renewed its garrison and supplies of provisions, and gave directions for the completion of its means of defence. He sent officers to Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, to inform the garrisons of these places of the late triumphs of our arms, to convey to them rewards, and to take care that the provisions consumed each day, were immediately replaced by equal quantities, in conformity with the express conditions of the armistice. It had been agreed by one of the stipulations of the armistice, that the important fortress of Hambourg should go with the tide of war, and should remain in the hands of those who might occupy it on the evening of the 8th of June. It had fallen again into our possession on the 29th of May, by means of the arrival of General Vandamme at the head of two divisions, and would have done so at an earlier period, but for the singular, and, for a moment, inexplicable conduct of Denmark on this occasion. Up to this time Denmark had been faithful to us, and justly so, since it was for the purpose of preserving to her the possession of Norway that we were at war with Sweden. Immediately after the Moscow catastrophe, it had been urgently entreated by Russia and England to abandon Norway to Sweden; an indemnity at the expense of France being promised her should she yield, and the annihilation of her monarchy being threatened should she refuse. To these entreaties and menaces of Russia and England had been added gentler solicitations on the part of Austria, this power inviting Denmark to become her ally, and promising that the possession of Norway should be secured to her, if she would adhere to the Austrian mediatorial policy. In the midst of this conflict of suggestions of all kinds, Denmark, fearing that France would be no longer able to afford her support, had loyally demanded of Napoleon that he should authorise her to treat on her own account, in order to escape the perils with which she was threatened. To this request, Napoleon, touched by her candour, had generously consented; even dismissing the Danish sailors who served on board our vessels, that her position might be still more thoroughly neutral. The hope entertained by Denmark had been, that by making peace with England through the mediation of Russia, and then remaining neutral with all the world, she might render her possession of Norway secure; but it had been speedily intimated to her that she must not only immediately declare war against us—a proceeding which could not but be a severe blow to her feelings of loyalty—but must, moreover, renounce the possession of Norway, receiving in exchange, eventually, an indemnity of such a nature, as

would compel her to add spoliation of our territories to defection from our alliance. Disgusted by these demands, Denmark had definitively returned to us, and one of her divisions, which had occupied a position at the gates of Hambourg, in an equivocal and almost threatening attitude, had ultimately declared itself on our side. Vandamme had then driven out Tettenborn's mixed force, composed of Cossacks, Prussians, men of Mecklenbourg, and soldiers of the Hanseatic towns, and had set up once more the French eagles along the whole course of the lower Elbe. Napoleon had immediately sent orders to Marshal Davout to establish himself strongly in Hambourg, Bremen, and Lubbeck, reiterating his injunctions to punish the revolt of these towns with the utmost severity, and to draw from them the resources necessary for the support of his army, and directing him to create upon the lower Elbe a vast military establishment, which should complete the defences of this extensive stream, upon which we now had possession of Kœnigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Hambourg; and which important line, the object of such animated dispute in the course of the negotiation of the armistice, was, therefore, secured to us, independently of that of the Oder, of which we possessed the most essential portion — that which was opposite Dresden. Some hostile troops, had, it is true, passed the line of the Elbe, and overrun at this time, Westphalia, Hesse, and Saxony, spreading everywhere that terror of the Cossacks, which had become almost a superstition; but Napoleon had formed in his rear a corps of infantry and cavalry, whose duty it was to pursue these marauders to the utmost, and to sabre without mercy all those whom it should find on this side of the Elbe. The Duke of Padua, to whom it was intended to entrust the command of the 3rd corps of cavalry, when the two first, those of Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani should be completed, was now at Leipsic with the nucleus of his corps, which numbered about three thousand troopers, with a few pieces of artillery. Napoleon added to it the Polish division Dombrowski, the division Teste (Marmont's 4th), left in the rear for the completion of its organisation, a second Wurtemberg division, which had recently arrived, and some garrison battalions from Magdebourg; the whole forming a mass of troops numbering some eight thousand horse, and twelve thousand infantry. To this force he prescribed the performance of the functions of a police, throughout the country between the Elbe and the Rhine, that it might be restored to a state of order, and freed from the marauders; and gave orders that if any of these should be taken after

the 8th of June, the extreme limit assigned to hostilities, they should be treated as simple bandits, being, at least, made prisoners for the purpose of seizing their horses, which were excellent.

Having thus taken preliminary measures for the observance of the armistice, and the welfare of his troops during its continuance, Napoleon proceeded towards Dresden, where he intended to remain during the progress of the impending negotiations, and retrograded towards the Elbe with the cavalry and infantry of the old guard, making his own journey accord with that of the troops, by which means he did not reach Dresden until the 10th, which was fully in accordance with his design of delaying at long as possible his meeting with M. de Bubna. The King of Saxony met him upon his approach, and the inhabitants of Dresden itself, seeing with pleasure the war removed from their own thresholds, and their king treated with honour, gave him a reception such as could scarcely have been expected on the part of a German population.

Napoleon alighted at the Marcolini palace, which had been selected by M. de Bassano for his residence, and which, surrounded by a large and handsome garden, was situated in the Friedrichstadt faubourg, near the Oisterwise plain, where the numerous troops would be able to manœuvre on the bank of the Elbe. Napoleon found here his household already installed and ready to receive him; and here, without being at the charge of the Saxon court, or interrupted by it, he had all that he desired — a suitable establishment, fresh air, a rural aspect, and a field proper for the manœuvres of troops. He determined to have here a morning levee as at the Tuileries, to review and manœuvre his troops in the middle of the day, and to devote the evenings to dinners and receptions, and the *chefs-d'œuvre* of Corneille, Racine, and Molière, as represented by the French comedians. On the very day, even, succeeding that of his arrival at Dresden, his mode of life fell, with military precision, into that course of life upon which he had resolved. But in the meantime, M. de Bubna, who had been now a whole fortnight at Dresden, awaited an interview with him in vain, and at length reminded him of his presence by a formal note, couched in terms which rendered a prompt and explicit reply absolutely necessary.

To understand this note and its importance, we must be informed of the last series of events which had taken place in Austria, where, as elsewhere, events succeeded each other with prodigious rapidity, under the influence of the violent impulse given by Napoleon to the whole course of European

affairs. In employing M. de Coulaincourt in the negotiation of the armistice, for the purpose of procuring some opportunity for coming to a direct arrangement with Russia, Napoleon had furnished this power with a dangerous weapon, of which it was subsequently to make the most disastrous use. Had the Emperor Alexander, less hurt than he actually was by Napoleon's contemptuous treatment of him, and less fascinated by his new rôle of *king of kings*, been able to entertain Prince Kutusof's opinion that Russia should conclude the war with France by signing a separate peace, the sending of M. de Coulaincourt to him would have been a very happy measure, since he had been long his confidant and almost his friend. But as, intoxicated by the adulation lavished upon him by the Germans, Alexander had become, in spite of his natural gentleness, an implacable enemy, whom it was dangerous even to attempt to address, the sending to him of M. de Coulaincourt, so far from touching him, but furnished him with a means of putting an end to Austria's protracted hesitations. It was, in fact, to afford to Alexander an opportunity of saying to this power, "You must now decide upon the course you intend to pursue, for if, instead of aiding us, you leave us to struggle alone, as at Lutzen and Bautzen, we shall be forced to treat with our common enemy, to accept the advances he has made to us, to conclude with him a peace solely advantageous to Russia, and definitively leave you to the effects of his resentment; for if you have done nothing to help us, you have, nevertheless, done what is quite sufficient to inspire him with the greatest distrust of you;" language, of which the employment at the court of Vienna would be very apropos, on the morrow of the battle of Bautzen, when a fresh retrograde movement would remove the coalition forces from the Austrian frontier, and deprive them of all contact with her. It was now or never, therefore, the time for Austria to unite herself with the allies, for one step more, and the hands now outstretched towards each other, would be unable to clasp.

Such were the arguments which it had been resolved to use with the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich; and whilst MM. Kleist and de Schouvaloff negotiated at Presnitz the armistice of the 4th of June, the selection made by France of M. de Coulaincourt for this negotiation had been pointed out to M. de Stadion, a lie being even added to the truth, mention being made of certain insinuations, which it was falsely pretended this personage had permitted himself to make, to the effect that Napoleon was inclined to come to a direct understanding with Russia at the expense of Austria. Everything that could possibly be surmised from the mere

circumstance of M. de Coulaincourt's mission, was set forth by Russia as being an accomplished fact, and M. de Stadion was urged to declare to his government, that that which was refused to-day, would of necessity have to be accepted within a few days, under the pressure of circumstances and Napoleon's victories. M. de Stadion, who was hostile to France, and was much startled at the presence of M. de Coulaincourt, hastened to explain to his court, in exaggerated terms, the imminent danger of a direct arrangement between France and Russia. Distrusting, even, the effect of written words, the allies sent to Vienna, as has been already related, M. de Nesselrode, a minister who during forty years has never failed to urge upon his masters a policy which, profound by reason of its element of patience, was by no means always such as accorded with their irritable temperaments. At the period of which we treat he was still a young man, of a straight-forward and modest temperament, less dogmatic than M. de Metternich, and also less enterprising, but equally skilled in finesse, and precisely fitted to gain the confidence of an enlightened Prince like Alexander, over whom he had already gained a considerable degree of influence. The Czar, although he had left M. de Romanzoff in possession of the empty title of chancellor, in remembrance of the additions which had been made to the Russian empire of Finland and Bessarabia during his ministry, had summoned M. de Nesselrode to head-quarters, and consulted him with respect to the conduct of affairs. On the 1st of June he sent him to Vienna, with directions to make use of entreaties, prayers, and even threats, if necessary — unveiling the Medusa's head, or, in other words, pointing at the probability of an interview between Napoleon and Alexander; of the renewal on the Oder of the conference of the Niemen, and the renewal at Breslau of the alliance of Tilsit.

These proceedings were more than sufficient to produce a decided effect upon such far-seeing politicians as the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich. Austria, in fact, replaced by fortune in that position of importance from which she had been hurled twenty years since by the sword of Napoleon, was threatened, nevertheless, by a serious danger. Overwhelmed on all sides with caresses, she was besieged from every quarter with the most magnificent offers. Alexander proffered for her acceptance not only Illyria and a portion of Poland, but also Italy, the Tyrol, the imperial crown of Germany, which Napoleon had torn from her brow, and more than all, independence. France, on her side, also offered her Illyria and a portion of Poland, but instead of Italy, the Tyrol, and the imperial crown, offered her Silesia,

a possession which she had much prized in a previous age ; and refrained from offering her that independence upon which she set a higher value than upon aught else. She had, therefore, but to exercise her choice between these various offers ; but if, from a desire to play too long the rôle of an universally-courted power she should fail to decide at the right moment, it might very possibly happen that after having been flattered and caressed by all, she would end by being as universally outraged by all, and crushed under their common resentment ; for the result of a reconciliation between Napoleon and Alexander would be a peace exclusively Russian ; such a peace as would leave Austria without any portion of Poland, Illyria, or Italy ; as would ignore her desire for the reconstitution of Germany, except so far as this might be accomplished, by the bestowal of certain recompenses for her services upon Prussia ; and, so far from restoring to her her independence, would throw her back into the power of Napoleon, become a severer master than ever. For the accomplishment of all this a moment would suffice, for in the existing conjunction of circumstances, affairs were decided in the flashing of a sword—a sword of such a species, as in forty-eight hours was capable of changing the fortunes of the world.

Fully conscious of these truths, M. de Metternich had already taken care to conduct his master to Prague, that he might be near the scene of conflict and negotiation, be able, from Bohemia, as from an elevated and neighbouring post of observation, to watch the rapid torrent of affairs, and be ready to plunge into its midst at the right moment. The news that M. de Coulaïncourt had been chosen for the negotiation of the armistice had had an effect upon him which had not escaped the keen eyes of M. de Narbonne. The letters of M. Stadion had rendered any doubt upon the actual position of affairs impossible, and within four-and-twenty hours the emperor and his minister had resolved to set out from Vienna for Prague, a great source of astonishment for the public, which was surprised, not at the adoption of such a course, but at the promptitude with which it had been taken. In the existing state of the relations between Austria and France, the former power was under some degree of obligation to explain her movements to the latter, and M. de Metternich had hastened, therefore, to say to M. de Narbonne, that as negotiations were about to commence through the intervention of the Austrian government, it was necessary that it should be near the parties who had submitted to its arbitration, and that by its presence at Prague, six days, at least, would be gained upon each communication. This reason was a sufficient justification for the journey to Prague, but

not for the departure within twenty-four hours. Secret information, and the evident constraint of M. de Metternich's manner, revealed the whole truth to the French legation. M. de Narbonne had learned, by means of information on which every reliance could be placed, that the court of Vienna would hasten its departure on account of the fear entertained by it of the conclusion of a direct arrangement between France and Russia, and in this information had found an explanation of the new sentiments which he had discovered, he thought, to be entertained by M. de Metternich. M. de Narbonne, in fact, had found the manner of the Austrian minister manifestly colder, which was very natural, for if M. de Metternich had escaped from our alliance as a serpent escapes, by means of writhing alternately in opposite directions, from the clutch of a muscular hand, he, nevertheless, had not entirely deserted our cause, and in the very sage intention of putting an end to all existing difficulties, without recourse to arms, he had defended with the allies, with some difficulty, the adoption of a moderate peace, and he was now convinced that we had been endeavouring to negotiate a peace adverse to Austria, whilst Austria had been striving to obtain one advantageous for us.

M. de Narbonne, however, had scarcely had time to discuss the state of affairs with M. de Metternich, who, having set out in all haste, was, from the 3rd of June, with the Emperor Francis at Gitschin, a residence situated twenty leagues from Prague, and where, on his arrival he had found M. de Nesselrode, who, on learning the departure of the court from Vienna, had retraced his steps for the purpose of meeting it. The conversation which took place between these two statesmen, at that time of such high importance, may be readily imagined. M. de Nesselrode had, in the name of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, entreated M. de Metternich to put an end to the too protracted hesitations of his court, and to take care that the allies should not be still further vanquished in the field, since another defeat would compel them to submit to Napoleon, to come to terms with him at the expense of Austria, and to subject Europe to a hopeless state of dependence. M. de Nesselrode had endeavoured, above all things, to point out to M. de Metternich that Napoleon was acting treacherously towards the Austrians, since, whilst they were endeavouring to obtain for him a peace founded upon a moderate basis, he was entertaining the idea of sacrificing their interests by the conclusion of a peace, which should be entirely to their injury. He had then proceeded to urge, with the utmost earnestness, the Austrian minister to follow the example of Prussia, and to

unite his country by a formal treaty with the allied sovereigns. But M. de Metternich, whose merit it had always been to maintain, whilst his spirit was far from being a passionless one, a policy which no passion was allowed to sway, continued to adhere with even increasing firmness to the plan he had adopted of exhausting every attempt at arbitration, before passing from the mediatorial attitude to one of hostility; and this course, whilst it was well fitted to preserve from any slur the honour of the Emperor Francis, as well in his imperial as in his paternal character, had the advantage, moreover, of procuring for Austria the time of which she had need for the purpose of arming, and, above all, of preserving the possibility of a peaceable arrangement.

M. de Metternich's profound political foresight, rendered him anxious to avoid not only the danger of seeing the contending parties, weary of his protracted hesitations, settle their disputes at the expense of Austria, but also the danger of defeat before the arms of France, a possibility which he still greatly dreaded, in spite of the events of the preceding year; and for these reasons, therefore, he was desirous of holding Prussia and Russia with one hand in such a manner that they might not escape him, whilst with the other, drawing Napoleon to the acceptance of a peace such as the other European powers would accept. Entertaining this plan, therefore, he had said to M. de Nesselrode that he had undertaken the post of arbitrator, that he would frankly fulfil the duties of this position during the two following months, and that it was absolutely necessary that Austria, with respect to France, should assume the rôle of a mediator before passing to that of an enemy, but that if reasonable conditions of peace should be absolutely rejected by the latter country, he would then advise his master, the armistice being concluded, to join the allied powers in making one supreme and last effort to rescue Europe from subjection to Napoleon.

In reply to the expression of these views, it was absolutely promised on the part of Russia, that it would not permit itself to be seduced by the temptation of a direct arrangement between herself and France; Austria at the same time promising to declare war at the time above stated, should France reject the bases of peace proposed by her. In the meantime M. de Metternich, taking advantage of the vicinity of Prague, summoned thither M. de Bubna, for the purpose of explaining to him the position of affairs, and whilst positively declaring to him that Austria was not as yet in any way committed to the allies, authorised him to declare this truth, adducing in support of it the honour of the Austrian Emperor himself, but also authorised him to intimate

in the most decided manner that Austria would certainly join them, if the period of the armistice were not employed in the negotiation of a moderate peace. He was at the same time directed to announce to the French cabinet that the mediation of Austria had been formally accepted by Prussia and Russia, and that the former power, being now, therefore, the re-organised arbitrator, had to demand of each of the belligerents the conditions on which they would severally accept peace, and especially of France, who was now, accordingly, requested to explain herself on this head. Whilst making this demand, M. de Bubna was to take the opportunity of expressing M. de Metternich's desire to pay a brief visit to Dresden, for the purpose of solving all difficulties at once, in a cordial interview with Napoleon.

Such were the matters, and matters of high importance they were, which M. de Bubna on his return to Dresden was anxious to communicate to Napoleon, and of which he communicated but one portion to M. de Bassano, well knowing the inutility of entering into any explanations with this minister, who adopted the ideas of his master, instead of inspiring his master with his own. Napoleon having arrived on the 10th of June, M. de Bubna sent in a note on the 11th, to the effect that Russia and Prussia had formally accepted the arbitration of Austria, that she was now demanding of them the conditions which they proposed as the bases of a peace, and that she awaited the enunciation on the part of France of hers; the object of this note being, not to obtain the immediate enunciation of the terms on which Napoleon would make peace, but to give rise to those preliminary discussions and confidential intimations, which would necessarily precede any official and definitive declaration.

If Napoleon had been willing to accept peace on those terms alone on which it was obtainable, and which he well knew, he would now have lost no time, since there remained but forty days, at the most, in which it could be negotiated. It was now, in fact, the 10th of June, and the armistice would expire on the 10th of July. With his accustomed ardour he would have invited M. de Metternich to Dresden, endeavoured to induce him to make some modifications in the Austrian propositions, and sent him again and again to the head-quarters of the allies, for the purpose of solving the difficulties, arising from matters of detail, which are necessarily attendant upon the negotiation of any treaty, and which would naturally be more than usually numerous, upon the negotiation of a treaty which was to have reference to the interests of the whole world. But the evident proof (independent of the irrefutable proofs to be found in his correspondence), that

he was not unwilling to accept such a peace, is to be found in the fact, that he now wasted, and continued to waste, the time during which its negotiation would have been possible. His plan was, as has already been explained, to defer the period of explanation by multiplying the difficulties respecting matters of form, to show a sudden disposition, at the moment when the armistice should be about to expire, to give way upon these points, to obtain by this sign of a desire for peace, a prolongation of the suspension of arms, to obtain thus a period of leisure up to the 1st of September for the completion of his armaments, to break off the negotiations at that time on some plea well calculated to deceive the public, to fall suddenly with the whole weight of his arms upon the forces of the coalition, to crush them utterly, and to re-establish upon a firmer basis than ever his disputed domination—a pardonable calculation, and one for which the history of conquering princes might afford too much support, had it been founded on realities! Such being his views, he did not consider it yet the right time to receive M. de Bubna, and to accept by a decided yes or no, conditions which were few in number, and the meaning of which could admit of but little doubt. He resolved, therefore, to let three or four days elapse before receiving M. de Bubna, or replying to his note; a delay which would have been very natural had no precise limit been fixed to the continuance of the negotiations, and if, as at the treaty of Westphalia, they could have been allowed to extend over months and even years. But to lose four or five days out of forty on account of a mere matter of form, any hesitation respecting which was to presuppose discussion respecting a thousand others, was only a too manifest means of expressing his, Napoleon's, real wishes, or of pointing out, rather, what his wishes were utterly opposed to.

As Napoleon, however, arrived at Dresden much fatigued, doubtless, and overwhelmed with all kinds of cares, his not granting an audience to M. de Bubna on the first day of his arrival might be readily understood, had it not been the fact, as it was, that when Napoleon was really pressed, day and night, fatigue and repose, were matters of which he was equally regardless. His not being hurried with respect to the conclusion of the peace at this moment, was equivalent, in short, to his not desiring it. M. de Bassano received M. de Bubna's despatch, affected to regard it of extreme importance, and said that an answer would be given to it within three or four days, when Napoleon would grant a personal interview to M. de Bubna, and explain himself with respect to the matters which it contained.

During this interval the answer was prepared and drawn up; and was of a nature more fitted, even, than the voluntary loss of time, to manifest the real designs of the French government. In the first place, it was objected to M. de Bubna that he possessed no official character, which could authorise him to submit a note to the French court; and, in fact, this minister, whom Napoleon had officially received, and who had been sent to him as being more agreeable to him than any other, and as being more *spirituel* than the Prince of Schwarzenberg, whose character was rather the reverse, had never been formally accredited, either as plenipotentiary or ambassador, and he had no qualification, therefore, for the transmission of a diplomatic note; but to make a difficulty with respect to this matter was an absurdity, since the French court had already exchanged with this personage the most important communications. A preliminary reply to M. de Bubna was drawn up, in which it was maintained that it was necessary that the note presented by him should be signed by M. de Metternich, before it could be placed in the French archives, since he himself possessed no diplomatic character which could give it authenticity.

After this difficulty with respect to form, difficulties were raised with respect to the substance of the note itself. The first of these related to the mediation. France had, doubtless, it was said, appeared disposed to accept the arbitration of Austria, and had even promised to accept it, but so important a resolution could not, of course, be deduced or supposed from what might take place in the course of an ordinary interview, and could only be formally agreed to at an official meeting, at which the object, form, method of procedure, and duration of this mediation should be duly determined. And how, again it was further asked, could this arbitration be made conformable to the treaty of alliance between France and Austria, if the latter power were to assume the position of an armed mediator ready to declare war against the disputants, either on the one side or the other? And, finally, what was to be the form of the mediation? A question of form, respecting which the honour of France would not permit her to be silent; for the arbitrator assuming his office with a certain rude haste, had already declared a method of carrying on the negotiations which could not be agreeable to the French court; a method which consisted in permitting the negotiators to discuss the various matters in hand only through the intervention of the arbitrator. Such a method, it was urged, was quite inadmissible on the part of France, since she could not permit anyone to assume the right of taking out of her own hands, the privilege of treat-

ing with respect to her own affairs, and as to submit to such a course would be to subject herself to the terms of a peace concerted amongst foreign powers — a degradation to which France, so long victorious, and able to dictate conditions to Europe, was not yet reduced, especially at a time when victory had just returned to her arms. She was willing, for the purpose of contributing to that peace of which all the world had such great need, to refrain from stating conditions; but she would never, although the whole of Europe should combine against her, submit to have them dictated to her.

These quibbles were made the subject of many notes, and of a long interview also, between Napoleon and M. de Bubna. This interview took place on the 14th of June, and the notes were signed and despatched on the 15th. M. de Bassano accompanied them by a private letter for M. de Metternich, the tone of which was opposed to the end in view, for Napoleon wished to gain time, and the indulgence in frank language was not the means by which this object could be attained. In this letter the loss of time, which had already taken place, was attributed to M. de Metternich, and complaint was made that the armistice having been signed on the 4th of June, so little progress had been made now that it was the 15th; a complaint which was somewhat maladroit, as M. de Bubna had been, since the latter days of May, at the French head-quarters, demanding an interview in vain, and since Austria had shown herself unceasingly impatient, both to receive and to give explanations on all points. Finally, with respect to the desire expressed by M. de Metternich to pay a visit to Dresden, M. de Bassano, not even eluding it, replied, in a manner which was scarcely polite, that the questions under discussion were, as yet, in too indeterminate a shape to receive from an interview between M. de Metternich and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, or Napoleon himself, all that light which, at a somewhat later period, it might well be expected to shed upon them.

Such were the replies with which M. de Bubna had to be contented, and which were sent to M. de Metternich at Prague. As the distance to this city could not be traversed under a day, and as three or four days might be employed by M. de Metternich and his master in determining upon their next step, Napoleon could hope that the 20th. of June would have arrived before he should be compelled to make any further communications. As, moreover, it would be fairly allowable to the French diplomatists to spend on their side, three or four days in determining upon the text of the agreement by which they should accept the Austrian arbitra-

tion, and as some additional days would necessarily be employed in assembling the plenipotentiaries, the 1st of July would have arrived before the negotiations had begun; and then it would be only necessary to display a conciliatory disposition for a short period, as for example, from the 1st to the 10th of July, to be successful in a demand that the conclusion of the armistice should be deferred from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, which, with six days for the declaration of hostilities, would defer the recommencement of them until the 26th of August, or almost as long as Napoleon desired.

But whilst he was thus anxious to waste time in negotiations, he was equally anxious to employ it to the greatest advantage in the accomplishment of his vast military designs. His first project, when he had reckoned on the alliance or neutrality of Austria, had been to advance as far as the Oder and the Vistula, for the purpose of driving back the Russians vanquished and separated from the Prussians upon the Niemen. But the supposition of a war with Austria compelled an alteration in his plans, since, in that case, by advancing only to the Oder he would leave the Austrian armies upon his flanks and rear. He had, therefore, to choose his future line of defence between the Elbe and the Rhine, or the Maine, at the most. He preferred the Elbe, for profound strategical reasons, which are generally little known or appreciated. Let us observe, in the first place, that to have advanced upon the Rhine or the Maine would have been much the same thing, since the little stream of the Maine, flowing in a serpentine course across the mountainous country of Franconia, and falling, after a very short course, into the Rhine at Mayence, would serve very well as a defence to the approaches of the Rhine in a campaign fought with armies of sixty or eighty thousand men, but would not serve for this purpose in one fought with masses of five or six hundred troops, since it would, in this case, be outflanked either on the right or the left within a fortnight. The chance lay, therefore, between the Rhine and the Elbe; and to raise the question as to which should be selected was almost to answer it. To fall back upon the Rhine was to make a sacrifice of territory, far more humiliating than any sacrifice which had been demanded as a condition of peace. It was to abandon not only the alliance of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, &c., but the Hanseatic towns, the possession of which we had so vehemently disputed, Westphalia, and a portion of Holland. And how would it be possible to demand for France the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, when declaring, by a retrograde movement, that

France was unable to defend it? And how assert a right to the possession of the Hanseatic towns, Westphalia, and Holland, whilst acknowledging an inability to occupy them? The acceptance of the conditions of peace proposed by Austria, would, indeed, have been far preferable to the choice of this ground as a battle-field, for in the former case, whilst renouncing the confederation of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, France would have, at least, retained indisputable possession of Westphalia and Holland; Napoleon's sovereignty, and, which was of far more importance, the territorial grandeur of the French empire, being at the same time definitively rendered secure. Independently of these reasons, which were, in a political point of view, decisive, there was another which could not but be, both morally and politically, regarded as of great weight, and this was, that to fall back upon the Rhine was to carry the theatre of the war to France itself, since, although, of course, as long as the enemy had not crossed the Rhine, the war might be considered to be carried on out of France, it would, nevertheless, be so close, that the sufferings resulting to the frontier provinces would be almost the same as though it were waged within it. Moreover, by obtaining victories on the upper Rhine, between Strasbourg and Mayence for example, Napoleon could not be certain that one of his lieutenants might not suffer his position to be forced below him, the result of which would be that the war would, henceforth, be waged upon French ground, and the position of its emperor be changed from that of a conqueror endeavouring to bring the world under his subjection, to that of a monarch compelled to fight in defence of his own kingdom. Those, therefore, who blame him for having chosen the line of the Elbe, should rather reproach him for not having accepted the peace which was offered him, since the acceptance of this peace would have involved far fewer sacrifices of all kinds, than would have been incurred by an immediate retreat upon the Rhine. The deplorable plea of continuing the war for the sake of the Hanseatic towns, and the confederation of the Rhine, having been once adopted by him, it was evident that the only course open to him was the occupation and defence of the line of the Elbe.

This was a point on which Napoleon's lofty military genius could not be deceived, and after brooding, as an eagle, over the map of Europe, he had swooped down upon Dresden as upon a rock, from whence he might hold at bay the whole number of his enemies. The narrative of the events which subsequently took place will show us, that if he was forced from this position it was not on account of any weakness in

the position itself, but on account of the extraordinary extension of his combinations, the exhaustion of his army, and the patriotic fury aroused against him throughout the whole of Europe. Six years sooner, at the head of the army of Friedland, he might have maintained his ground there against the world.

The line of the Elbe, although presenting in its upper portion a line of defence less formidable than that of the Rhine, had the advantage, on the other hand, of being less long and less accidentée, of offering interior facilities for the transmission of succours from one point to the other, and of being, from the mountains of Bohemia to the sea, furnished with solid points of support, such as Königsstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Hambourg. To render these points serviceable, some of them required to be strengthened by military works, and it was for this reason, that Napoleon, whose military calculations were always more profound than his diplomatic schemes, was so anxious to prolong the armistice—and thus repair the fault of having signed it. The important question was, whether the line of the Elbe resting on its extreme right, on the mountains of Bohemia, and Bohemia affording to Austria the means of debouching on the rear of this position, it would be possible to defend it against an attempt of the enemy to turn it? And the answer to this question was a matter of grave doubt to many enlightened minds. Napoleon, however, treated with disdain any observation intimating that his position of Dresden, might be turned by a descent of the Austrians upon Freyberg or upon Chemnitz, replying with good reason that the best gift he could ask of Heaven, would be that the principal mass of his enemies should, whilst he was posted on the Elbe, debouch behind this stream, that he might fall upon and completely envelope it between the Elbe and the forest of Thuringia. The disaster suffered by the allies at Dresden speedily proved the justness of his previsions; and if his line were subsequently forced upon the Elbe, it was not by Bohemia, but by the lower Elbe, which his lieutenants did not know how to defend, and which many accidents had much enfeebled. His plan, then, was to establish himself on the various points of the Elbe so strongly, as to be able, if necessary, to withdraw from this line during several days without fear, should it, on the one hand, be advisable to advance to meet the mass of hostile troops moving down upon him in front, or, on the other, to fall back rapidly upon that which might have debouched by Bohemia upon his rear; to repeat, in short, with five hundred thousand men against seven hundred thousand, the achievements he had accom-

plished in his youth with fifty thousand Frenchmen against eighty thousand Austrians. But the glory of realising upon so vast a scale the prodigies of his youth, was to be withheld from him, as a punishment for having been wasteful as well of human lives as of worldly advantages—of the bodies of his subjects as well as of their affections.

To obtain of the line of the Elbe all its advantages, it was necessary to employ the period of the armistice in fortifying the principal points, and to proceed with the utmost expedition in this work, whether we should succeed or not in prolonging the suspension of arms. The first of these points was that of Kœnigstein, at the spot where the Elbe flows from the mountains of Bohemia and enters Saxony. Two rocks, the Kœnigstein and the Lilienstein, posted as two advanced sentinels, the one on the left the other on the right of the stream, guard and narrow the channel of the Elbe on its entrance into the German plains. On the Kœnigstein rock, which was situated on our side, that is, on the left bank of the river, stood the fortress of the same name, commanding the celebrated camp of Pirna, rendered illustrious by the wars of Frederick the Great. Its military works required no addition, but as its garrison was composed of Saxon troops, Napoleon gradually replaced them by Frenchmen. He also ordered that there should be collected within this citadel ten thousand quintaux of flour, and that ovens should be constructed there, that it might contain, for reasons which will hereafter be seen, the means of providing food for a hundred thousand men during nine or ten days. On the rock situated on the opposite bank of the river, that of Lilienstein, there existed scarcely any military resources, and Napoleon accordingly commanded the rapid prosecution of works which would afford secure shelter for two thousand men, and entrusted their due execution to the care of General Roguet, a distinguished general of his guard. He then collected a number of boats sufficient for the construction there of a spacious and solid bridge, capable of affording a passage for a considerable army; and which, fortified as it would be, by the Lilienstein and Kœnigstein forts, would be protected from every attack. Napoleon's profound military foresight had led him to calculate that if a hostile army, realising the prognostications of more than one alarmist, should debouch from Bohemia on his rear, for the purpose of attacking Dresden, whilst he should be, it might be, at Bautzen, he would by means of this bridge be able to cross the Elbe at Kœnigstein and take the imprudent hostile army in reverse.

After the fortresses of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein came that of Dresden, which was to be the central point of the

impending operations, and to become what Verona had been in the wars of Italy. During his last Austrian campaign, being unwilling to expose Dresden to the fate of becoming the point against which should be directed the enemy's operations, and desiring to spare his gentle ally, the King of Saxony, the trial of a siege, Napoleon had advised the Saxon government to demolish the fortifications of Dresden, and replace them by those of Torgau; whereupon, by a species of negligence which was too common, the military works of Dresden had been destroyed, before those of Torgau had been more than just commenced. This was a circumstance much to be regretted, but Napoleon took measures for obviating its disadvantage, by works which, although hastily constructed, would serve for the purpose he had in view; giving directions for the repair of such portions of the fortifications of Dresden as still remained, and having the suburbs of this city surrounded by palisades and well-armed redoubts. On the right bank of the river, however, at Neustadt (new town), he ordered the construction of a series of works of a more formidable nature, and such as would form a vast tête-de-pont almost completely fortified. Two bridges, of wood-work, built the one above and the other below the stone bridge, were to serve, in addition to the latter, as the means of communication between the opposite banks of the stream. Duly executed, these various works would enable thirty thousand men to defend themselves in Dresden during a fortnight against two hundred thousand enemies, if under the command of a general of great military genius. To these means of defence Napoleon added immense magazines, the method of supplying which we shall presently see, and hospitals sufficiently extensive for the wants of the largest army.

After Dresden Napoleon devoted his attention to Torgau and Wittenberg. His principle, with respect to fortifications, was that they may always be erected where an abundant supply of wood is available, and that earthworks, provided with wooden palisades, are capable of furnishing the means of a most prolonged resistance. It was in this way that Napoleon determined to supply the deficiencies in the fortifications at Torgau and Wittenberg, and he gave the necessary orders for the completion of these works in the course of six or seven weeks. Thousands of well-paid Saxon peasants worked day and night at Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, and Wittenberg; at these latter places, as at the two former, the establishment of magazines and hospitals proceeding simultaneously with the construction of defensive works. At Magdebourg, which was one of the strongest fortresses of Europe, there was no need of any addition to the solid defences; it was only

necessary, therefore, to complete its armament and furnish it with a garrison; and Napoleon determined to devote to it a corps d'armée, which, without being entirely immobilisé, should serve both as a garrison and as a flying corps, to form a link between our two principal bodies of troops in the field, that of the upper and that of the lower Elbe. He resolved also to transport to Magdebourg, almost the whole of his wounded and the cavalry dépôt of General Bourcier, for at this fortress they would not only be sheltered from attack, and in a position where they would not clog the movements of our active troops, but would also find there extensive hospital buildings and open spaces for the construction of barracks; situated, as it was, moreover, at an almost equal distance between Hambourg and Dresden, it would form a most valuable dépôt between the two extreme points of our line of battle. Napoleon appointed to be its governor his aide-de-camp, General Lemarois, an intelligent and energetic officer, and gave directions to convert the whole of Magdebourg into hospitals and barracks. He calculated that by sending to Magdebourg all the sick and wounded who were in his way at Dresden, and the cavalry dépôts of General Bourcier, now in Hanover, there would always be there sufficient convalescents and dismounted troopers to supply a garrison corps of seven or eight thousand men, whilst the *corps mobile* of twenty thousand men, which he intended to establish at Magdebourg, for the purpose of forming a link between the armies of the upper and lower Elbe, would add to this number five or six thousand more, and thus raise the whole strength of the garrison to about fifteen thousand men; the remainder of the column mobile being at liberty to manœuvre around the fortress to a considerable distance, without compromising its safety.

From Magdebourg to Hambourg the course of the Elbe was entirely undefended, no single point between these two cities being fortified. This subject had occupied Napoleon's attention from the day of the signature of the armistice, and after having entertained many projects with respect to it, he had at length sent General Haxo, to discover by personal inspection what would be the best method of supplying the deficiency. After patient consideration he had determined to construct at Werben, a place situated nearer Magdebourg than Hambourg, at the top of the angle formed by the course of the Elbe as it turns from a northerly to a westerly direction, and its nearest point to Berlin, a species of citadel formed of earthworks and palisades, and furnished with barracks and magazines, in which three thousand men might be able to hold their ground for a considerable time.

The last and most important object of his solicitude was Hambourg; and this great commercial city, which was one of the chief reasons on account of which he had rejected a peace of which there was so much need, he had not only to defend by force of argument against hostile diplomatists, but also by force of arms against hostile armies. Want of time, however, unfortunately, in this case, as in others, prevented the construction of any other than temporary works. Ten years and forty millions of money would have been required to make Hambourg a fortress, as capable of resisting an enemy as Dantzic, Magdebourg, or Metz. In such time and with such resources as were at his disposal, however, Napoleon formed of Hambourg a vast military establishment, which was partly a fortress and partly an entrenched camp, and which offered the means to a resolute man, such as Marshal Davout speedily proved himself, of opposing to an enemy a protracted resistance.

There remained below Hambourg at the very mouth of the Elbe, the fort of Gluckstadt, the defence of which was confided to the Danes, whom unworthy treatment had driven to the necessity of sharing our fortunes.

Thus from the mountains of Bohemia to the northern ocean, the line of the Elbe would be studded with a series of fortified posts, of strength proportionate to the importance of their several positions, and provided with bridges which would be in our exclusive possession, and would enable us to move our forces from one bank to the other with the utmost facility. Napoleon's maxim that the course of a river should only be defended on the offensive, so to speak, that is, by securing all the points at which it may be passed, and keeping means of effecting its passage always available — this maxim, we say, was now in the case of the Elbe to receive its most distinguished illustration.

It still remained, however, to provide for the expenses of the works which, if they were to be executed with the necessary rapidity, would require ready money; whilst, moreover, immense depôts of provisions had to be added to the military establishments already enumerated, for the purpose of supplying the vast bodies of men who were about to be manœuvred along this line of the Elbe. And with respect to these matters, Napoleon showed as much ingenuity as determination to make the heavy charges of the war, fall on the populations of the countries in which it would be waged.

We have seen that he had ordered Marshal Davout to exact a cruel retribution for their revolt from the inhabitants of Hambourg, Lubeck, and Bremen, directing him to shoot immediately the old senators, the officers or soldiers of the

Hanseatic legion, and the persons who had acted as the officials of the insurrectional movement, and then to draw up a list of five hundred of the principal merchants for the purpose of seizing their possessions. He had relied, when giving these orders, upon the inexorable rigour of Marshal Davout, but, also, we may add, for the honour of both of them, upon this marshal's good sense and probity. But the fact was that when the latter had reached Hambourg he found no delinquents to shoot, the frontier of Denmark, which was at the very gate of the city, having served as the means of escape to almost the whole of them. Some much-to-be-regretted executions had, indeed, taken place before his arrival, but that was during the first movement of the insurrection, in the month of February, and as a punishment for the disgraceful treatment to which had been subjected the French officials.

As the marshal was fortunate enough to have to put no person to death, it only remained for him to draw up a list of persons who were not to lose their lives but their goods; and this project appeared to him to be as ill-advised as the other. The Hambourg citizens, who were, or were supposed to be culpable, were collected, *en masse*, in the little town of Altona, really a suburb of Hambourg itself, and Marshal Davout represented to Napoleon that the most advantageous course would be to promise pardon to such of them as should return to their own dwellings within a certain time, punishing them only by the imposition of a heavy fine, which they would at first declare themselves incapable of paying, but which they would, certainly, eventually pay, and which would be a species of punishment they would feel very acutely, whilst at the same time, it would procure for the use of our troops a large supply of money. Large resources instead of bloodshed was the résumé of the policy which he advised the emperor to adopt.

Napoleon, who was fond of having large resources at his command, and who had no taste for bloodshed, accepted the marshal's proposal, and wrote to him—"If you had had a few persons shot on the morrow of your arrival, it would have been as well; it is now too late; and pecuniary punishments will be the best." It is thus that despotism and war teach men to speak, even those who have no cruelty in their hearts. It was determined, then, that every Hambourg citizen who should return within a fortnight should be pardoned, that the others should suffer sequestration of their property, and that the city of Hambourg itself should pay, in money or goods, a contribution of fifty millions. A small portion of this contribution was, however, to be levied on

Lubeck, Bremen, and the districts of the 32nd military division. Ten millions were to be paid in money and twenty millions in bills; whilst the remainder was to be set off against such requisitions of matériel and provisions as the French commissariat might demand of Hambourg, Lubeck, and Bremen. The value of the houses which might be demolished for the purpose of constructing the Hambourg defences, was also to be taken into account, as in part payment of these fifty millions. The Hambourg citizens complained bitterly at the fine thus imposed upon them, and were anxious to present a petition to Napoleon on the subject, but he refused to receive them, and as the marshal, who a few days before had defended them from the rigour of the sentence, was now perfectly inflexible, they were compelled to pay down that portion of the fine which was to be paid immediately, and the payment of which was of most importance to the necessities of the army. About ten millions of money were sent to Dresden, and great quantities of grain, cattle, and spirits, were embarked on the Elbe for the purpose of being carried up its stream.

As soon as Napoleon found himself in possession of these resources, he made arrangements for their disposal in such a manner, as might render them available on all the points of the Elbe, and especially at Dresden, for the support of the numerous troops which he was about to concentrate upon it. He was desirous of having at Dresden, the chief central point of his operations, sufficient provisions for the supply of three hundred thousand men during two months, and especially a large reserve of biscuit, which, carried by the troops themselves, would render it possible for them to execute manœuvres occupying seven or eight days without being checked by considerations with regard to provisions. For the attainment of this object it would be necessary to have a hundred thousand quintaux of grain or flour at Dresden, and eight or ten thousand at Kœnigstein. There were already at Magdebourg about seventy thousand, which had been collected there during the winter, to serve either as provisions in case of siege, or for the support of troops on their march; and Napoleon now ordered that these seventy thousand quintaux should be transported by the Elbe to Dresden, and replaced immediately by an equal quantity drawn from Hambourg. An arrangement which shortened, by one half, the space over which these immense quantities of provisions had to be conveyed. As it had been perceived that rations of rice were a very effective means of cure for the dysentery to which the young soldiers were liable, when overcome by fatigue and the heat of the weather; possession was taken of all the rice

to be found at Hambourg, Bremen, and Lubeck; the same places being also made to contribute supplies of spirits, salted meat, cattle, horses, leather, and woven fabrics.

But whilst Napoleon was thus rendering the line of the Elbe both a powerful line of defence and an inexhaustible depôt of provisions, he did not confine his attention to this line alone. He was anxious to have beyond Dresden, at Liegnitz, and on the nearer side of Dresden, at Erfurt, magazines as well-furnished as those on the Elbe; and taking advantage of the richness of lower Silesia, in which was encamped the army which had fought at Bautzen, and the resources of which he cared little to husband, he ordered that the period of the armistice should be employed in this district, in the collection of twenty days' provisions for each corps. With respect to the districts behind Dresden, as at Erfurt, Weimar, Leipsic, Nuremberg, and Wurzburg, these being Saxon or Franconian, and, consequently, friendly countries, he could not make use of any of their resources but by means of purchase; but here also he ordered the formation of vast stores of provisions, which were to be duly bought. With respect to the city of Leipsic, on the other hand, this city having displayed open hostility towards him, he showed less moderation, compelling it to afford contributions of woven fabrics, grain, and spirits, goods with which its magazines were abundantly supplied, taking possession of its public buildings for the purpose of converting them into hospitals, and adding to all this, a threat that at the first sign of revolt he would burn the city to the ground. The cities of Erfurt, Naumburg, Weimar, and Wurzburg, were equally filled with hospitals. Erfurt, of which he had retained possession since 1809, and Wurzburg, which was the capital of the grand duchy of Wurzburg—places which were capable of offering a certain amount of resistance to an attacking enemy, were armed, that there might be a series of fortified points along the Mayence route, should events, which were not then anticipated, render a retreat necessary; for as we have already remarked, Napoleon, whilst unwilling to admit the possibility of a defeat as an element in his political calculations, never failed to provide for it in his schemes of military tactics. But whilst Napoleon was devising these means for rendering his line of battle, at the renewal of operations, both well-defended and well-provisioned, he did not neglect to render the number of his troops proportionate to the probable extent of the war in which they were to be engaged, for his vast intellect was equal to the simultaneous consideration of every subject.

We have already seen, that whilst flattering himself with

the idea that Austria would probably accede to his plans, he had, nevertheless, taken his measures in accordance with the contrary hypothesis, and had prepared in Westphalia, on the Rhine, and in Italy, three armies of reserve; and he resolved, during the three months through which he hoped to extend the armistice, to complete their formation.

In Westphalia, were, as we have already said, the reorganised regiments of the grand army of Russia, which were intended to form two large corps under Marshals Victor and Davout. The other regiments of the grand army had been sent to Italy. As the battalions of each regiment could not be all reorganised simultancously, the second battalions had been first reconstituted, then the 4th, and, finally, the 1st, according to the period of the return of the staffs; and the divisions had been successively composed of 2nd, 4th, and 1st battalions, so that each regiment was divided into three divisions. Napoleon, anxious to put an end to so vicious an arrangement, desired to unite the three battalions already organised, and to form the divisions by regiments instead of battalions; an arrangement to the execution of which there was no cause for delay but the absence of the 3rd battalions, which, however, would be speedily available, when all the regiments would amount to four battalions. Marshal Davout formed of the regiments placed under his command, four excellent divisions, and Marshal Victor three, and whilst their organisation was being completed, Napoleon determined the several positions they were to occupy, and duties they were to perform. That of Marshal Victor, which had hitherto remained in the rear, he marched upon the frontier line, determined by the terms of the armistice, and cantoned it along the Oder in the environs of Crossen; but with respect to that of Marshal Davout, considering that when reinforced by the Danes, it would be more than sufficiently strong for the Hanscatic departments and the lower Elbe, he determined to divide it into two parts, leaving two of its divisions under Marshal Davout, and posting two under General Vandamme at Wittenberg, from whence he might bring them under his own immediate command, if necessary, or march them upon the lower Elbe should Marshal Davout require them.

The other corps destined to reinforce the mass of the active troops were being reorganised at Mayence, and the reorganisation of four divisions which Napoleon intended to place under the command of Marshal Saint Cyr, had already made considerable progress. There were, consequently, three corps d'armée, Marshal Victor's, General Vandamme's, and Marshal Saint Cyr's, comprising about

eighty thousand infantry, with which Napoleon intended to swell the mass of his troops in Saxony, ready to meet the forces of Austria, should they appear on the theatre of war. Besides the four divisions already almost organised at Mayence, Napoleon had assembled the elements of two others, which were to be organised under the care of Marshal Augereau, and be joined by the two Bavarian divisions. The Bavarian court, which had for a moment inclined, as had also Saxony, towards the mediatorial policy of Austria, had immediately renounced it when required to make on the banks of the Inn, sacrifices for which it was to receive no compensation. It had hastened to renew its armaments, and it could be relied on to furnish two serviceable divisions—serviceable, however, only in case victory should come to keep in check the excitement of the popular mind, and encourage the monarch to preserve his fidelity towards us. These four divisions, two French and two Bavarian, were to threaten Austria in the direction of the *haut Palatinat*.

Finally, Napoleon had watched with his accustomed attention the execution of the orders given to Prince Eugene; by means of which he hoped to effect the reorganisation in Italy of an army of sixty thousand men, to whom he desired to add twenty thousand Neapolitans. Murat, always oscillating between the most opposite opinions, deeply hurt by the manner in which he had been treated by Napoleon, anxious to save his crown at any price, but unable to determine whether an alliance with France or with Austria would most conduce to the attainment of this object, had hitherto delayed to send his contingent; but Napoleon had scarcely entered Dresden, when he had summoned him to decide upon the course he intended to pursue, at the same time directing M. Durand de Mareuil, the French minister at Naples, to withdraw, should the Neapolitan corps not receive immediate orders to march. There remained in the dépôts what would suffice to furnish six or seven thousand light cavalry to the future army of Italy; and the arsenals and dépôts of this country still contained the elements of an excellent artillery. Napoleon flattered himself, therefore, that by the 1st of August he would have an army of eighty thousand men, accompanied by two hundred pieces of cannon, threatening an invasion of Austria by Illyria.

The three corps of Victor, of Vandamme, and of Saint Cyr (without taking into account that of Augereau, which was not intended to act upon the Elbe), appeared to him to be in themselves almost a sufficient protection against the appearance of Austria on the theatre of the impending struggle. But Poniatowski's corps, after many vicissitudes, brought across

Gallicia and Bohemia to Zittau, on the line on which was encamped our Silesian corps, was an additional resource, of which the real importance was less due to the number than to the quality of the troops of which it was composed. Of all our troops, none were braver, more warlike, more devoted to France. Of their country, there remained but the remembrance and the desire to avenge it; and Napoleon was resolved to give them a new country by making them the children of France, and taking them into her service. In the meantime, whilst awaiting their definitive incorporation with the French army, he placed them under the direct administration of M. de Bassano, directing this minister to satisfy their arrears of pay, to provide them with clothing, arms, and all, in short, that they might require. Independent of Dombrowski's corps, or the various detachments of their countrymen distributed amongst the fortifications, they numbered about twelve thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, and were a fresh addition to the forces which had fought at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Finally, amongst the resources created for the purposes of the autumn campaign, and for the eventuality of a war with Austria, must be reckoned the development now given to the imperial guard, which had been composed at the commencement of the campaign of but two divisions, the one the old, and the other the young guard; but which was increased at the moment of the signature of the armistice by a 3rd division, whilst a 4th and a 5th were about to join it. It would thus, with twelve thousand cavalry and one hundred pieces of cannon, form a corps numbering almost fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand would be young infantry, whom Napoleon intended to expose much more freely than the old guard, making use of them in all the great battles, of which there were to be, unfortunately, both many and sanguinary ones.

It remained to provide for the reorganisation of the cavalry, of which there had been a great want at the commencement of the campaign, and which had been one of Napoleon's reasons for signing the armistice. The two corps of Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani did not number at the beginning of June more than eight thousand horsemen. Four thousand might be drawn from the depôts of General Bourcier, and about twenty-eight thousand from France; and by this means the cavalry arm of the army in Germany would be raised to the number of forty thousand, without taking into account the cavalry of the imperial guard and the allies, the Saxons, Wurtembourgiens, and Bavarians. Of the twenty-eight thousand expected from France, however, some would arrive

on foot, and would have to be provided with horses; and with respect to the supply of horses required for his cavalry, Napoleon had an article inserted in the treaty of alliance by which Denmark became definitively attached to France; by which article France engaged on her part to keep a body of twenty thousand troops always at Hambourg, for the purpose of being ready to hasten when it might be necessary to the defence of the Danish provinces, whilst Denmark on her side undertook to furnish the French army with ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse, all of whom were to be paid by the French treasury, and to procure for it ten thousand horses, receiving, immediately, their value in ready money. Napoleon had reason to suppose, therefore, that by these means he would be able, within two or three months, to form a body of cavalry which, including the ten or twelve thousand troopers of the guard and the eight or ten thousand of the allies, would number sixty thousand. Of the light cavalry, or cavalry of the line, Napoleon annexed about two thousand to each corps of the army, to serve the purpose of a corps of observation, and formed the remainder, as was his custom, into several reserve corps, intended to fight in line. Of these corps, Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani were already in command of two, which had made the spring campaign. The 3rd, which was now employed in pursuing the Cossacks, was under the command of the Duke of Padua, and at the head of the 4th was the Count de Valmy, the son of the old Duke de Valmy.

To these four corps Napoleon was anxious to add a 5th, to be formed of the regiments recalled from Spain. As the principal occupation of the cavalry in Spain—that of connecting together the several bodies of French troops—had become much less necessary since he had ordered the evacuation of Madrid, and the concentration of all the French forces in the north of the Peninsula, he had now recalled from thence the cadres of ten regiments of dragoons, four of chasseurs, and two of hussars, directing that they should be immediately conveyed to Mayence, where they were to be filled up with men of the last conscriptions, now already tolerably well disciplined. Napoleon hoped by this means to obtain about four or five thousand more cavalry, and thus to raise the strength of this arm of his forces to a total of sixty-five thousand men. Nor did he, whilst thus making these exertions to complete the organisation of his infantry and cavalry, neglect to bestow equal care upon the artillery, of which he hoped to be able to carry a thousand pieces actually into the field.

Established, by means of the measures above narrated

the line of the Elbe, Napoleon flattered himself that he would have at his disposal, without taking into account the troops in garrison, four hundred thousand soldiers, besides twenty thousand in Bavaria and eighty thousand in Italy, which would raise his total force to five hundred thousand active troops, and seven hundred thousand, if we include those not actually in the field—an enormous force, which was quite sufficient in his powerful hand for the subjection of the coalition, even if strengthened by the addition of Austria, and for the development of which he had consented to an armistice, which afforded to the allies time to escape his pursuit, and also, unfortunately, time to augment considerably their forces.

The answer sent to M. de Metternich on the 15th of June had been interpreted rightly, the clever Austrian diplomatist understanding perfectly well that when, of forty days which remained for the negotiation of a general peace, five had been lost in replying to the note constitutive of the mediation, independently of those which would be lost in settling mere questions of form, it might fairly be concluded that there was no very earnest desire to arrive at a pacific conclusion of the existing complications. Nevertheless, as it was possible that Napoleon might be merely unwilling to declare his real intentions until the last moment, or might really be sincere with respect to some of the difficulties which he had raised, M. de Metternich did not yet resign the hope that peace might still be obtained, either on the basis of the conditions proposed by Austria, or on others which should be moulded upon them. In either case he considered that he ought to await Napoleon's movements, whilst, at the same time, employing some method by which they might be stimulated. The two monarchs of Prussia and Russia were eager for an interview with the Emperor Francis, hoping that it might be the means of enabling them to engage him to what they called the cause of Europe; but the latter, considering himself bound, as well in his paternal as in his mediatorial character, to maintain extreme reserve with respect to two sovereigns who had become the implacable enemies of France, was unwilling to enter into any personal communication with them so long as circumstances should leave him at liberty to refrain from declaring war against this country. The same reasons did not apply, however, to the case of M. de Metternich, and he had, accordingly, proceeded to Oppontschna for the purpose of conferring with the two allied sovereigns; intending to make use of this opportunity to persuade them to adopt his own views. He set out on this journey with all publicity, being certain, as the event proved, that Napoleon, as soon as

he should hear that the Austrian minister was engaged in personal conference with the two allied sovereigns, would experience a strong feeling of jealousy, and, so far from objecting to his paying a visit to Dresden, would rather earnestly press him to do so.

Whilst M. de Metternich was on his journey, Prussia and Russia were entering into a *subsidy treaty* with England. By this treaty, concluded on the 15th of June and signed by Lord Cathcart, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Hardenberg, England undertook to furnish, immediately, to Russia and Prussia, two millions sterling, and to liquidate the moiety of an emission of paper money, known by the name of *papier fédérative*, and intended to have currency through all the allied states. As this paper money would amount to five millions sterling, the total sum furnished by England to the two powers would amount to four and a half millions sterling (one hundred and twelve millions five hundred thousand francs), these powers engaging in return to maintain constantly in the field, in Russia one hundred and sixty thousand, in Prussia eighty thousand, active troops, to carry on a vigorous war against the common enemy of Europe, and to refrain from entering into any treaty with him without having first concerted with England. The Russian and Prussian sovereigns having informed Lord Cathcart that they were summoned by Austria to accept her mediation, and that they were disposed to do so, provided it would not be an infraction of the *subsidy treaty*, Lord Cathcart replied, that he did not consider that their acceptance of the mediation of Austria would be any infringement of this treaty, and added his opinion that it was necessary to comply with the views of Austria, since it was very probable that the conditions of peace proposed by her would be rejected by Napoleon, and she would thus be led into declaring war against him, by the very act of mediation by which she had endeavoured to bring about a general peace.

On his arrival at Oppontschna M. de Metternich was overwhelmed by carresses and solicitations on the part of the allied sovereigns and their ministers; who declared to him that their forces were immense, that if Austria should join them they would be irresistible, that Napoleon would be vanquished and Europe saved. Peace with Napoleon, they added, was impossible, for he was evidently unwilling to make it, and even if he did, it would only be with the intention of taking the field again as soon as he should have recruited his strength. These points of view, however, were not, and could not be those from which Austria regarded the existing state of affairs. She was neither, as Russia, intoxicated with

the idea of being the liberator of Europe, nor reduced, as Prussia, to the alternative of victory or destruction, nor driven, as was the case with England, to the shelter of all the consequences of a disastrous war. Her political and domestic relations with France, moreover, were strong motives for not entering into a state of hostility with this country without the most urgent motives for so doing. She was anxious to re-establish the independence of Europe without having recourse to a war, which she regarded as full of perils, even if waged against Napoleon when enfeebled, and was of opinion that it was necessary to seize any opportunity of concluding an advantageous and secure peace, and to avoid the risk of losing all by endeavouring to gain too much at a single stroke. If, for example, Napoleon should be willing to renounce his Polish dream (as was styled his grand duchy of Warsaw), if he should consent to re-establish Prussia in her former condition, to restore independence to Germany, by the abolition of the confederation of the Rhine, and to restore her commerce, by resigning the Hansatic towns, it would be better to accept a peace based on these conditions than to encounter the risks of a formidable war. Should England be disinclined to adopt this view it would be necessary to force her to do so, by intimating that she would, otherwise, be left to carry on the war alone. Such were the opinions of Austria; opinions which Prussia and Russia, under the influence of the passions of the moment, were far from sharing; desiring, as they did, that far harder terms should be exacted from France. She should be deprived of Westphalia and Holland, they said, and a portion of Italy, at least, should be taken from her and bestowed upon Austria. M. de Metternich rejoined, that whilst considering these views perfectly reasonable, Austria would confine herself to demanding the abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, the reconstitution of Prussia, the abolition of the confederation of the Rhine, and the restoration of the Hansatic towns, and would only declare war in case these conditions were rejected.

The result of the conferences between the Austrian minister and the allied sovereigns was, that the latter accepted the Austrian mediation, agreeing to enter into negotiations with Napoleon, through the Austrian minister; that it was arranged that Austria should submit to the French court the conditions she proposed as the basis of peace, that she should only declare war in case they were rejected, that until then she should remain neutral, and that—with respect to England—she should be informed of the existing position of affairs, but that the question of peace between her and

France should be adjourned for the purpose of simplifying the negotiation of a continental peace, which would necessarily and immediately be followed by a maritime one.

These bases of negotiation having been agreed upon, M. de Metternich returned to Gitschin, to his master, and found on his arrival there that his anticipations had been completely verified. Napoleon, in fact, full of anxiety with respect to what was taking place in Bohemia, knowing that continual communications were taking place between Gitschin, where his father-in-law was residing, and the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns, and knowing also that there was every probability of personal interviews taking place between them and M. de Metternich at Oppontschna, began to consider that it was not altogether necessary, in his anxiety to procure delay, to afford the opportunity for the formation of a formidable coalition, which, by interfering at the right moment, he might be able to prevent. By means of a personal interview with M. de Metternich, he flattered himself that he should be able to discover what were the designs of the coalition, which would be an advantage of no slight importance, and, more especially, to contrive a fresh prolongation of the armistice. He had an intimation, therefore, given to M. de Bubna through M. de Bassano, that he would willingly receive M. de Metternich at Dresden, and that he even considered his presence necessary for the complete comprehension of the questions which now had to be solved. M. de Bubna immediately transmitted this intimation to Gitschin, and M. de Metternich found it there on his return from his interview with Alexander and Frederick William. As this was precisely what both he and the Emperor Francis desired, M. de Metternich determined to accept the invitation without delay, and immediately set out for Dresden, bearing with him a letter written by the Emperor Francis to his son-in-law, in which he declared that he had authorised his minister of foreign affairs to sign all articles relating to the negotiation of the treaty of alliance, and the acceptance by France of the Austrian mediation; at the same time reiterating his entreaties, that Napoleon would adopt a peaceful policy, and thus crown himself with the best species of glory, and the only kind which he had not yet grasped.

M. de Metternich arrived at Dresden on the 25th of June, and on the following day, the 26th, had a first interview with M. de Bassano, since it was with this minister that he was ostensibly to treat. Two days were spent by the two ministers in discussing empty quibbles respecting the treaty of alliance—which was to continue unbroken but was to be temporarily suspended, so that the rôle of mediation might be

rendered consistent with that of ally ;—respecting the form in which the arbitration was to be conducted, respecting the claim set up by the arbitrating power to be the sole channel through which the arbitration was to be conducted. As, however, M. de Metternich had not visited Dresden for the purpose merely of having interviews with a minister who had no real influence, and as he had, moreover, to deliver a letter from the Emperor Francis to the Emperor Napoleon, it was necessary that he should see the latter, and that without any further delay ; and Napoleon was on his side equally ready for an interview, although the presence of M. de Metternich raised the heat of his wrath against Austria to a raging fever. The interview was appointed to take place on the afternoon of the 28th of June.

As M. de Metternich traversed the ante-chambers of the Marcolini palace, he found them filled with foreign ministers and officers of all ranks ; amongst them being Prince Berthier, who was extremely anxious for peace, and who, afraid to express his real feelings to Napoleon, was too prone to make them known to just those persons from whom it might have been wiser to conceal them. On the appearance of M. de Metternich, a species of anxiety was visible on the countenances of all those present ; and Prince Berthier, whilst conducting him to the emperor's apartment, said to him—“ Well ! Is it peace ? Pray be reasonable, and put an end to this war, for assuredly both you and we have equal need of repose ! ”—By these words M. de Metternich could judge that his spies had reported truly, when they said that throughout France peace was earnestly desired, and was longed for even in the ranks of the French army. When M. de Metternich entered Napoleon's cabinet, he found him standing, his sword by his side, his hat under his arm, and wearing an air which was formally polite and seemed to be that of a man who was restraining his passion for a moment, but would be unable to do so much longer.—“ You have come at last, then, M. de Metternich,” he said, as the Austrian minister entered, “ you have come at last, but it is somewhat late, is it not ? ”—And then, adopting at once the tone agreed on in the French cabinet, he endeavoured, by being the first to describe the existing posture of affairs, to attribute to Austria the causes of the delay which had already taken place ; at the same time complaining bitterly of the manner in which the Austrian court had behaved towards him, considering the relations which existed between them, and enlarging at great length upon the little dependence which it was possible to place upon Austrian good faith.—“ I have thrice,” he said, “ restored his throne to the Emperor

Francis, and have even committed the error of marrying his daughter, in the hope, which has proved to have been but too vain, of rendering him my sincere ally. Last year, relying upon his good faith, I concluded a treaty of alliance with him, by which I guaranteed to him the possession of his states, and he guaranteed to me the possession of mine. Had he expressed any unwillingness to enter into this agreement, I should not have insisted upon his doing so, and I should have refrained from engaging in the Russian war. But now, after having signed this treaty, because a single campaign has been rendered disastrous to me by the unpropitious state of the elements, he begins to withdraw from the course he appeared to have warmly adopted, and interferes between me and my enemies, not, as he would have it supposed, for the purpose of negotiating a peace, but in reality, to check me in a career of victory, and to rescue from my grasp the enemies I am about to destroy. . . . —If you are anxious to renounce my alliance," he continued, throwing more and more animation into his voice and manner, "if it is injurious to you, leading you against your will into a state of hostility with the rest of Europe, why not have said so at once? I should not have insisted upon your adopting a course to which you were opposed; your neutrality would have sufficed me, and at this moment the coalition would have been already dissolved. But the fact is, that under the pretence of bringing about peace by adopting the rôle of arbitrator, you have taken up arms; and now that your armaments are completed, or nearly so, you assume the right of dictating to me conditions which are those of my enemies themselves; and behave, in short, in the manner of persons quite ready to declare themselves my enemies. Be frank. Do you wish to wage war with me? . . . If it be so, men are, indeed, incorrigible, and incapable of deriving any advantage from experience! The Russians and Prussians, in spite of many bitter lessons, have dared, emboldened by the events of last winter, to come forth to encounter my arms, and I have vanquished them, thoroughly vanquished them, although they have told you the contrary. And now you, also, wish to have your turn? Well! be it so, you shall have your wish. . . . I will meet you in Vienna, in October——"

The strange and contemptuous manner in which Napoleon alluded to a marriage, with which in his private character he appeared to be by no means displeased, offended and irritated M. de Metternich, without, however, having as much impression upon him as would have been produced by a tone of cold firmness. "Sire," replied he to Napoleon, "we do not desire to be at war with you, but we do desire to put an

end to a state of things, which has become intolerable to the nations of Europe, to a state of things which threatens all of us with some overwhelming destruction at any moment. Your majesty is as much interested as we can be in removing the evils which now prevail, for it is quite possible that fortune may some day be unpropitious to you, and should that be the case whilst affairs are in their present state, it is far from impossible that you should meet with some terrible misfortune."—"But what is it," said Napoleon, "that you demand of me?"—"Peace!" replied M. de Metternich, "that peace which is absolutely necessary, of which you have as much need as we, and the conclusion of which must afford as much safety to you as to us." And having said this, the Austrian diplomatist proceeded with infinite skill, rather insinuating than enunciating, to enumerate the conditions with which the reader is already acquainted. But as each condition reached his ears, Napoleon, as it were with a lion's spring, dashed into the midst of the diplomatist's discourse, as though he had just uttered some blasphemy or insult.—"Oh!" he said, "I perceive what you mean. . . . You only ask of me just now, Illyria, that Austria may gain some ports; some portions of Westphalia and the grand duchy of Warsaw for the purpose of reconstituting Prussia; the cities of Lubeck, Hambourg, and Bremen, that the commerce of Germany may be re-established; and the renunciation by me of the protectorate of the Rhine,—an empty title, as you call it—that German independence may once more exist! . . . But I know very well what all this really means. . . . You Austrians want the whole of Italy; your friends, the Russians, are anxious to get hold of Poland; the Prussians long for the possession of Saxony; the English for that of Holland and Belgium; and if I yield to what you ask to-day, you will not fail to-morrow to demand these objects of your several desires. To obtain them, however, you must first raise an army of a million of men, spill the blood of many generations, and demand them at the foot of the heights of Montmartre!" . . . —Whilst uttering these words, Napoleon lost all control over himself, and even permitted himself, it is said, to address M. de Metternich in the most insulting manner; but this the latter has always denied.

M. de Metternich now endeavoured to explain to Napoleon that such ideas were by no means now entertained, although it was by no means improbable that they might arise should the war be imprudently prolonged, that there were, doubtless, some excitable persons in St. Petersburg, London, or Berlin, whom the events of 1812 had induced to indulge in them, but that there were none such in Vienna. "Justice,"

he said, "was all that was desired, and the best means of putting an end to the pretensions of the foolish persons just alluded to, would be the conclusion of peace, of an honourable peace; of such a one, in fact, as that which Napoleon was now offered, and which would be to him both honourable and glorious." Somewhat soothed by these words, Napoleon replied, "That if the abandonment by him of a certain amount of territory had been alone required, he would have consented to make the sacrifice; but the coalition had been formed for the purpose of dictating conditions to him, and forcing him to accept them, and thus depriving him of his prestige."—And then, with a burst of military pride which well became him, he added, "your sovereigns, born to their thrones as they have been, cannot comprehend the sentiments which animate my breast. Vanquished, they return to their capitals, and are but little affected by what has taken place. But I am a soldier; honour and glory are necessities of my life; I can never suffer myself to appear humiliated in the midst of my people, I must, and will remain great, glorious, and admired!" "What end, then," interrupted M. de Metternich, "is there to be to the present state of affairs, if defeat and victory are equally to be reasons for continuing these calamitous conflicts?" "What I do," replied Napoleon, "is not for myself alone, but for that brave nation which so readily sheds its noble blood at my summons. Such devotion forbids me to entertain any weak considerations with regard merely to my own welfare; it is my duty to preserve for France the greatness she has purchased by such heroic efforts." "But sire," rejoined M. de Metternich, "this brave nation, whose courage all the world admires, has need, itself, of repose. I have passed through the ranks of your regiments, and seen that your soldiers are mere children. You have anticipated your conscriptions, and called to arms a generation which has not yet arrived at manhood; and when this generation shall have been destroyed by the present war, will you levy that which shall be younger still?" These words, which repeated the reproach which was most frequently in the mouths of his enemies, touched Napoleon to the quick. Panting with an anger which distorted his features and deprived him of all control over himself, he threw, or let fall, his hat to the ground, which M. de Metternich did not attempt to pick up; and stepping close up to him, said, "You are not a soldier, sir; you have not, as I, a soldier's spirit; you have not lain in camps; you have not learned to regard as naught the lives of others as well as your own. . . . What do I care, do you suppose, for the lives of two hundred thousand men?" This outburst,

the soldierly roughness of which we have suppressed, produced a great effect upon M. de Metternich, who exclaimed, "Let us open, sire, let us open all the doors and windows, that all Europe may hear you, and the cause I am defending with you may have the benefit of your words!" Recovering his composure to a certain extent, Napoleon said, with an ironical smile, "After all, the Frenchmen whose lives you are so anxious to defend, have not so much reason to complain of me. I have lost, it is true, two hundred thousand men in Russia, of whom one half were the finest French troops, whose loss, I regret . . . oh! bitterly regret. . . . But with respect to the others, they were Italians, Poles, and chiefly Germans." . . . And as he concluded these words, he made a gesture which implied that their destruction was a matter of the most perfect indifference to him.—"That is all very well," replied M. de Metternich, "but you must acknowledge that that is scarcely a reason to give to a German."—"You spoke for the French and I have answered you for them," replied Napoleon.—The conversation having reached this point, the emperor employed an hour in relating to the Austrian diplomatist how he had been surprised and overcome in Russia by bad weather, and by bad weather alone. Not having seen M. de Metternich till now since the catastrophe of 1812, he took pains on this occasion to re-assume in his eyes the prestige of invincibility, and to prove that all his losses had been simply due to the opposition of the elements. Walking quickly to and fro, whilst he spoke, his foot happened to strike against his hat, which lay in one corner of the room, and he recurred to the fundamental idea of his discourse—which was, that Austria, in whose behalf he had so often remitted the punishment she had justly incurred, and from whom he had demanded—"thereby committing," he said, "a great fault"—an archduchess in marriage, had, nevertheless, dared, in return for these favours, to take up arms against him.—"A fault," interrupted M. de Metternich, "if the Emperor Napoleon were simply a conqueror, but not if he were a far-sighted politician and the founder of an empire."—"Fault or no fault," exclaimed Napoleon, "the fact is, that you wish to declare war against me! Be it so, then. But what resources have you which will enable you to carry it on? Two hundred thousand troops in Bohemia, you say, as though you could make me believe such nonsense. At the very most you have no more there than one hundred thousand, and I am strongly inclined to believe that of those no more than eighty thousand are in a state to take the field."—He then led M. de Metternich into his cabinet, showed him his memoranda and maps, told him that M. de Narbonne

had covered Austria with his spies, that it was in vain, therefore, to attempt to frighten him, Napoleon, by mere fables, and that he knew for certain that the Austrian forces in Bohemia did not even amount to a hundred thousand. Passing from this subject, Napoleon said to M. de Metternich—"In truth, you had better refrain from mixing yourselves up with this quarrel, for the danger you would incur by so doing, would far exceed any advantage you could hope to derive from it. You want Illyria? Well! I will let you have it. You are anxious for the conclusion of an European peace? I will conclude one that shall be perfectly just towards all. But as for the peace which you endeavour to bring about through your mediation, it is, in fact, a peace which you are striving to force me to accept, and submission to which would make me appear in the eyes of the world as one who had been vanquished, and was forced to accept such terms as might be offered him. And this, too, when I have just obtained two brilliant victories!"—M. de Metternich referred once more to the plan of arbitration, endeavouring to point out to Napoleon, that it was not proposed with a desire to place any constraint upon Napoleon's will, but simply in the friendly spirit of an ally, a friend, a father; and that it was tolerably certain that when the conditions suggested by it became generally known, they would be considered to show great partiality in the arbitrator for his son-in-law.—"Oh! you persist, then;" interrupted Napoleon, with anger, "you are determined to lay down the law to me? Well! We will have war, then! But remember! *We meet at Vienna!*"

This memorable interview, which did not, as we shall presently see, decide the question of peace or war, but which did display, in the most inopportune manner, what were Napoleon's real feelings on the subject, lasted five or six hours; the evening being so far advanced when it concluded, that the speakers could scarcely distinguish each other's countenances. Unwilling to dismiss M. de Metternich as in the midst of a quarrel, he added a few words in a much gentler tone, and then appointed fresh interviews for the following days. In the meantime, the habitués of the imperial ante-chamber had been much excited by the length of the interview; and the traces of anxious expectation on their countenances became still more visible, when M. de Metternich reappeared amongst them. Major-General Berthier ran up to him to learn some tidings of what had taken place during the interview, and asked whether he were content with the emperor? "Yes!" replied the Austrian minister, "I am content with him, for he has set my conscience at rest, and, on my oath, I believe your master has lost his reason."

It was not from the violence displayed during this interview that arose its injurious effect upon the fortunes of the empire, but from the sad conviction which it could not fail to leave upon the mind of M. de Metternich, that Napoleon would never consent to accept the moderate conditions which were the ultimatum of the Austrian cabinet. Fortunately, however, M. de Metternich, considering it indispensable to his own glory and security to obtain, by means of a peace, the conditions which he thought necessary, was ready to sacrifice his pride to his policy, and to restrain any display of passion so long as he should appear to have any chance of succeeding in his aim. Napoleon was at full liberty, therefore, to give way to his ill-humour, provided he should, ultimately, adopt a wise course and accept the favourable peace which was offered him. And we may add, moreover, that when any one had suffered from an outburst of his temper he received some prompt recompense, for whenever Napoleon had given way to a fit of ill-humour, he was ever ashamed of having done so, and speedily recovering himself, hastened to caress those whom he had just before insulted, and made every effort to induce them to forget what had taken place.

His interview with the Austrian minister had scarcely concluded, when Napoleon was already filled with regret, at having allowed to his passionate disposition such unrestrained sway, and thus failed to obtain from this interview any of the advantages he had hoped to make it afford. In fact, so far from having discovered the secrets of the Austrian minister, he had simply revealed his own, by making apparent the immovable obstinacy of his pride, and frustrating his chief design, that of procuring a prolongation of the armistice, by showing too clearly that the armistice would not lead to peace. He immediately, therefore, ordered M. de Bassano to hasten to M. de Metternich and enter into conversation with him on that essential topic, of which but little had been said during the late interview, the Austrian mediation, its form, conditions, and the period at which it was to be exercised. And as M. de Metternich might even suppose, from Napoleon's language, that he had rejected it, M. de Bassano was now directed to draw up, in concert with him, a convention with respect to the manner in which it was to be executed.

The following day was, accordingly, devoted by M. de Metternich and M. de Bassano to a discussion respecting the mediation, nothing having been said respecting the treaty of alliance, the most important articles of which Austria had so ill-advisedly been furnished with the opportunity of renouncing. The communication between the two diplomatists was solely upon the mediation, the manner of its execution, and

the disposition which Austria would display towards France. An attempt was made to draw up a convention with respect to the form of the mediation, but no agreement could be come to, because M. de Bassano was anxious to surcharge it with precautions which M. de Metternich considered inconvenient. The details, however, were debated without bitterness, and in the tone of persons resolved to come to an understanding. The articles of the proposed convention agreed on between them were sent to the emperor, and it was arranged that on the 30th of June he should grant M. de Metternich another interview, for the purpose of coming to an agreement with him with respect to the still disputed points.

On the 30th, accordingly, M. de Metternich, accompanied by M. de Bassano, had a second conference with Napoleon, and found him as changed as a sky which a storm had just left serene. He was frank, cheerful, and full of amiable repentance. "You are determined to quarrel with us, then?" he said to M. de Metternich, in a tone of the most gracious familiarity; and then, taking the proposed convention out of the hands of M. de Bassano, he read the disputed articles, one after the other, exclaiming at the conclusion of each, without regard for the feelings of his minister, and as though M. de Metternich's opinions were his own, "but that is not common sense!" Then turning to M. de Bassano, he said to him, "sit down and write;" and dictated to him a form of convention which was as simple and clear as it could be, and entirely removed all the difficulties which had been raised. "Does this form satisfy you?" he then asked M. de Metternich. "Yes, sire," replied the illustrious diplomatist, "with the exception of some expressions." "Which?" asked Napoleon; and M. de Metternich having pointed them out, Napoleon altered them to his entire satisfaction. And thus, at length, the terms of this convention (which declared that with the desire of re-establishing at least a continental peace, the Emperor of Austria had offered his mediation to the Emperor Napoleon; that the latter accepted it, and that the plenipotentiaries of the various powers were to meet at Prague, on the 15th of July at the latest), being settled, Napoleon, still speaking in the frank tone he had adopted from the commencement of the interview, said to M. de Metternich, "But this is not all; there must be a prolongation of the armistice; for how can we bring to an issue between the 5th and 20th of July, a negotiation which must refer to the interests of the whole world, and which, to be thoroughly satisfactory, should rather be the work of years?"—This question, which was an embarrassing one, would appear at

first sight to admit of an answer only in the affirmative, and M. de Metternich, who was not unaffected by Napoleon's display of condescension throughout the interview, and was unwilling to compromise the mediation to which he attached so much importance, for the sake of a few days, more or less, in the duration of the negotiations, replied, "That he hoped to be able to prevail upon the Prussians and Russians to agree to the prolongation of the armistice, although they were convinced that the armistice itself was injurious to them, and of service only to Napoleon; but he objected to allow it to be extended, as Napoleon wished, to the 20th of August, with six additional days for its *denunciation*, declaring that if the negotiations were conducted with good faith, they might be completed in a single day." To this Napoleon replied, "That forty days at least were necessary to enable him to judge of his adversaries' real intentions, and to declare his own.—As for myself, you may be sure," he added, "that I shall not make known my real intentions until the fortieth day."—"In that case," replied M. de Metternich, "the thirty-nine days preceding the fortieth will be useless." The conversation having taken this jocose turn, a settlement of the disputed point was evidently not far distant, and after some further discussion, M. de Metternich appeared disposed to prolong the armistice to the 10th of August, with six days' notice of the renewal of hostilities, which would be a prolongation of twenty days—from the 26th of July to the 16th of August. Napoleon would have been glad to have obtained a still longer period in which to complete his preparations, but considering it prudent to make sure at least of the delay now offered, he declared that he accepted M. de Metternich's proposition, and a last article was added to the convention, to the effect that in consequence of the short time which now remained for negotiation, according to the terms of the armistice signed at Pleiswitz, the Emperor Napoleon engaged to refrain from denouncing this armistice until the 10th of August (the 16th of August including the six days' notice), and that the Emperor of Austria undertook to obtain a similar engagement on the part of the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia. As Napoleon was anxious that this agreement should be signed immediately, he at once dismissed, overwhelmed with caresses, the Austrian minister whom he had thus, by changing his lion-like for his siren aspect, known how to lead into compliance with his views, and induce to consent to the only arrangement he really desired, which was a prolongation of the armistice.

The true policy of the Austrian court, which so passionately desired the success of the mediation, would now have con-

sisted in keeping Napoleon without a single pretext for loss of time, and with this view, informing him immediately that the convention constituting the mediation, and the prolongation of the armistice were accepted, and that the negotiators, as had been agreed, would meet punctually on the 5th of July. But, unfortunately, this course was not adopted. M. de Metternich setting out from Dresden on the 30th of June, the very day of the signature of the convention, arrived at Gitschin on the 1st of July, giving great delight to his master by announcing to him that the mediation was accepted, since this circumstance removed the Austrian court from the very embarrassing position of an ally of France, to the independent and powerful position of arbitrator between her and her enemies. M. de Metternich had no difficulty, therefore, in obtaining from the Emperor Francis the immediate ratification of the convention; but either because he had not clearly perceived Napoleon's purpose of procuring delay, or because he was unwilling to submit to actual difficulties, M. de Metternich himself now furnished pretexts for loss of time, by demanding that the meeting of the plenipotentiaries should be deferred from the 5th to the 8th of July. Having demanded this delay, he then addressed the sovereigns assembled at Reichenbach, for the purpose of announcing to them the acceptance of the mediation, as well as for the purpose of prevailing upon them to agree to the prolongation of the armistice, and to send without delay their plenipotentiaries to Prague.

The allied monarchs at Reichenbach had not, when signing the armistice of Pleiswitz, fully comprehended its nature. They had seen in it at first simply an advantageous means of avoiding the immediate consequences of the battle of Bautzen, without taking into consideration the advantages which it would also afford to Napoleon; but now that they had escaped from the peril of the moment, and beheld the daily development of Napoleon's armaments, they began almost to regret a suspension of arms which had saved them, and were by no means inclined to consent to its prolongation. There was another circumstance, moreover, which rendered them averse to the prolongation to which M. de Metternich had agreed, and that was, that whilst Napoleon had the most fertile portion of Silesia from which to procure provisions, they had only the least fertile portion, and had reason to fear a failure of the means of subsistence for their troops. Moreover, amongst the Germans, and especially amongst the Prussians, every adjournment of hostilities was considered an additional step made by Austria in her pacific policy, and a species of treason. There would naturally, therefore, be some difficulty in inducing the allied sovereigns to consent

to a protraction of the armistice; but as, on the other hand, they could not at this moment refuse anything that Austria might desire, they could not, by rejecting the prolongation of the armistice, declare that her engagement with Napoleon to procure thus its prolongation had been imprudent and fruitless. They consented, therefore, to this measure, but at the same time, desired, in consideration of the time already lost, and the distances their plenipotentiaries would have to travel, that the day for their meeting at Prague should be the 12th, instead of the 8th. M. de Metternich informed M. de Bassano of these arrangements, but with respect to the prolongation of the armistice expressed himself as though it were a matter of course, and refrained from communicating its official acceptance by the Prussian and Russian sovereigns.

Nothing could be more agreeable to Napoleon's plans than delays of which he was not himself the cause; but he replied to M. de Metternich on this occasion, as though he rather submitted to than rejoiced at the further delay which the latter had just informed him; directing M. de Narbonne, who filled at Prague as at Vienna the office of French ambassador, to express his regrets on this subject, and also to complain of the want of any official notification of the consent given to the prolongation of the armistice. He authorised him, also, to declare that when the Russian and Prussian negotiators should have set out for the place of meeting, France would appoint and despatch hers, and to hint that they would probably be MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaincourt.

Whilst making these communications Napoleon resolved to obtain by means of these delays, which the Austrian court had consented to aid him in obtaining, fresh delays, which he intended to make appear natural consequences of those of which he was not the cause. He had long since proposed to make several excursions, for the purpose of making himself acquainted, as was his wont, with the places which were to be the theatre of war, and he was anxious, if time would allow, to traverse the banks of the Elbe from Kœnigstein to Hambourg, and to go, even, to pass a few days at Mayence with the empress, who was impatient to see him, and on whom he wished, moreover, to bestow public testimonies of affection, as a means of increasing the Austrian Emperor's difficulty in ignoring the paternal bonds which united him with France. He now resolved to commence these excursions by that one of them which would enable him to inspect the important points of Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg, and by setting out before he could receive from Prague the communications which he complained of not having received,

before he could be informed of the names of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the allied powers, the precise period at which they were to meet, and the formal acceptance of the prolongation of the armistice, to avoid the necessity of making his own reply until his return, and thus gain a delay of four or five days, which would appear to be the consequence of the loss of time from the 5th to the 12th of July. He suddenly declared, therefore, that having deferred his departure to the 9th, without having received any message from Prague, he found himself compelled by the urgent necessities of his army to set out from Dresden on the 10th. At the same time, however, that he might not afford his enemies the opportunity of carrying him off, in spite of the armistice, by a troop of Cossacks, he refrained from stating the direction in which he should proceed, and forbore also to say how long he should be absent, but intimated that he would not be away more than three days at the most.

On the morning of the 10th of July, accordingly, he set out in all haste for Torgau, and at the very moment of his departure, arrived in Dresden news of the latest events in Spain — events which, although they might have been foreseen, could not but be a surprise as agreeable for our enemies as painful for us, and have a disastrous influence upon the general posture of our affairs. And of these events it is proper that the reader should here be informed, so intimate is their political connection with those of which Germany was at this time the theatre.

After the junction of the three armies of the centre, Portugal, and Andalusia, the situation of the French in the Peninsula still offered fair chances of success. Marshal Suchet maintaining his position, by his most advanced corps at Valencia and by two other corps in Catalonia and Aragon, was master of that portion of Spain the possession of which was most essential to us; whilst Joseph was at Madrid with the army of the centre, having in front of him, spread along the Tagus from Tarançon to Almaraz, the army of Andalusia, and in his rear, on his right, between the Tormès and the Douro, the army of Portugal. In this position there was no reason for fear, if the forces recently concentrated should remain so, and thus be always ready to fall en masse upon the English upon their first appearance. In January, 1813, these three armies numbered about eighty-six thousand men.

Had it not been for the disastrous effect produced by the late events in Russia, the position of Joseph would have now been a tolerably favourable one; but these events had excited the public mind of Spain in a most remarkable manner, and renewed throughout the country the hope of being speedily freed from our rule.

The cortès of Cadiz continued to direct, in a manner which was very wanting in method, indeed, but with the utmost enthusiasm, the affairs of the insurrectional movement in Spain, whilst Lord Wellington conducted in a manner which was as well ordered as it was firm, that of Portugal. The cortès had, as has been already narrated, put an end to their constitution, and, copying exactly that which had been adopted by France in 1791, had arranged to have but a single government assembly, and a king whose power should consist only in a suspensive veto. In the meantime, until this king should be restored to them, the cortès assumed that in themselves was embodied the entire sovereignty, adopted the title of majesty, and bestowed that of highness upon an elective regency composed of five members, and invested with the executive power in the absence of Ferdinand VII. And now the cortès had opposed to them besides the French and Joseph's few adherents, all the friends of the old régime which they had abolished, and found themselves engaged in a continual contest with the regency, which they regarded with suspicion, because it had been composed of the exalted personages of the church and the army; circumstances which explain the fact that when Seville and the whole of Andalusia had been abandoned by the French, the cortès still preferred to remain in Cadiz, having more confidence in the population of this city than in that of any other. Had the Russian disasters, had the defeat of Salamanca not occurred, Joseph, less thwarted and better provided with money, might have succeeded after a time in obtaining a large party, through the divisions amongst the Spaniards themselves.

At this moment the disunion existing amongst them was much aggravated by the rise of a question relative to the command of the armies. The success of Lord Wellington and the qualities which the Portuguese army had displayed under his command, had suggested to certain members of the cortès, the idea of offering him the command-in-chief of the Spanish troops, and this project, although at first receiving some degree of opposition from Spanish pride and jealousy, was ultimately adopted, and the post of generalissimo was conferred on Lord Wellington, who, having received the sanction of the English government to its acceptance, proceeded in the course of the winter to Cadiz, for the purpose of conferring with the regency upon all the questions which would naturally arise from his future command. But although received on his arrival with great distinction, he was at the same time attacked in such a manner by the journals, the organs of the national jealousy, that he more than once

regretted having exposed himself to such treatment, and would even have resigned the command he had accepted, had he not feared that such a step would have been a disastrous blow to the insurrection. He had been endowed with almost all the authority he required, but he much feared that he should be unable to raise an effectual Spanish army from the want of money and officers. Money, indeed, he was promised by the Spanish officials, but they had no resources from which to supply it; and with respect to officers, it would have been useless for him to have attempted to supply this want by Englishmen, for the Spanish army, notwithstanding the example of the Portuguese army, would never have permitted foreigners to command them. He resolved, therefore, to devote his attention almost exclusively to the Spanish army of Galicia, which was to serve under his immediate orders.

Returning to Fresnada, on the northern frontier of Portugal, he employed all the winter in making preparations for the approaching campaign. His intention was to have about forty-five thousand English troops, thoroughly disciplined; twenty-five thousand Portuguese; and thirty thousand Spaniards; as well organised and equipped as circumstances might permit, and with this force to advance upon the north of the Peninsula, for the purpose of making a blow at the very root of the power of the French in Spain. As, however, the concentration of the three armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, had assembled at Madrid a force of eighty or ninety thousand French troops, he regarded his proposed enterprise as a very hazardous one, and was unwilling to attempt it save with the utmost circumspection, and on condition that the insurgents of Catalonia and Murcia, supported by the Anglo-Sicilian army, should make a strong diversion in his favour upon Valencia, whilst the English fleets, seconding the efforts of the guerillas of the Asturias and the Pyrenees; should afford continual occupation to our army of the north. Being consulted with respect to the project of an invasion of the south of France, whilst Napoleon should be engaged with the war in Saxony, he replied that the first care of the English should be to force the French to repossess the Pyrenees, and to propose to enter France only in their track.

These opinions of the British General Commanding-in-Chief, sufficiently indicate that the course to be pursued by the French to render this campaign more fortunate than those which had preceded it, was to keep their armies concentrated, and then to determine on the position upon which it would be best to establish them. Unfortunately, the deci-

sion on the latter point was not very wisely made. Marshal Jourdan's opinion was, that since it was necessary to make head against the Anglo-Portuguese army in old Castille, between Salamanca and Valladolid, it would be advisable to advance to Valladolid, retaining there only such matériel as might be requisite, despatching to Vittoria the sick and wounded, prisoners, and munitions of war. But although this opinion was thoroughly wise, it was urged by him, unfortunately, with but too little energy, and much was required to overcome Joseph's repugnance to evacuate Madrid. Since he had seen Lord Wellington fly before him and had been able to re-enter his capital in triumph, he had persuaded himself that he was still King of Spain; and to propose to him now to leave Madrid, was to propose to him to become once more a vagabond king, to restore to the Spaniards all the hopes they had lost, to drag once more along the highways a crowd of unhappy wretches, whose fortunes were bound up with his own, and to deprive him of his revenue, which consisted of the octroi of Madrid, and of what could be collected from the two or three surrounding provinces. Nevertheless, Joseph's mind was too clear-sighted to have absolutely refused to contemplate the idea of quitting Madrid when Marshal Jourdan proposed it, and it is probable that if the latter had insisted upon it more strenuously this measure would have been adopted. In the meantime, the proposal remained in abeyance until the arrival of despatches from Paris, which would contain Napoleon's precise instructions relative to the conduct of the campaign.

We have already intimated Napoleon's feelings with respect to Spain in 1813. Disgusted at an enterprise which had deplorably divided his forces, he would have gladly withdrawn from it had he been able, but having drawn the English to the Peninsula, it was not in his power to relieve himself of them at his pleasure. By opening the gates of Valençay, for example, to Ferdinand VII., he would but have had the English at Toulouse or Bourdeaux instead of at Burgos or Valladolid. It was necessary, therefore, to continue to contend with them beyond the Pyrenees, for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of having to carry on the struggle on this side of them. But, nevertheless, Napoleon had, as we have already seen, reduced this task to its narrowest limits for the campaign of 1813, by diminishing his armies in Spain, and confining his plans to the preservation only of old Castille, the Basque provinces, Catalonia, and Aragon. His secret intention was to treat with England on the basis of the restoration of Spain, minus the provinces of the Ebro, to Ferdinand VII., making compensation for this diminution

of territory by the gift of Portugal, which the house of Bragantia could afford to lose since it had found an asylum in the Brazils; and it is in this intention that may be discovered the secret cause of his having consented for the first time, to admit the representatives of the Spanish insurrection to a congress.

In the meantime, disgusted at the fact that his couriers could not make the journey from Paris to Madrid under thirty or forty days, he resolved to re-establish a regular line of communications between the two countries at any price, and with this view gave orders that measures should be taken for the destruction of the guerilla bands which infested Navarre, Guipascoa, Biscaye, and Alava; and that these measures might be the more effectually carried out, desired that Joseph should evacuate Madrid, for the retention of which he cared little, since he had resolved to yield the Spanish crown to Ferdinand VII., and transfer his court to Valladolid, that he should then reclaim the French troops in old Castille, bring up the army of Portugal from Burgos, and supply General Clausel with a large portion of it for the purpose of destroying the guerillas; that he should move back the army of Andalusia from Talavera to Salamanca, and the army of the centre from Madrid to Segovia, leaving at the most, but one detachment in that capital, and that only that it might not appear to be definitively abandoned. And, finally, he directed that an offensive attitude should be given to the army of Andalusia, for the purpose of leading the English to believe that we still entertained designs upon Portugal. In making these arrangements, with the hope that they would be the means of destroying the guerilla bands, and preventing the English from attempting any invasion of the south of France, Napoleon allowed himself, unfortunately, to fall under the influence of several illusions. In the first place, it was not probable that Lord Wellington could be induced to suppose that we had designs upon Lisbon, at a time when we were compelled to evacuate Madrid; and, moreover, there was no necessity to render him anxious with respect to Portugal, for the purpose of retaining him in the Peninsula, since by vanquishing him in Castille, at Salamanca, at Valladolid, at Burgos, it mattered little where, we should at once throw him back once more behind the lines of Torres Vedras. But this great object was evidently compromised, by placing the army of Portugal at the disposal of General Clausel, for the purpose of the destruction of the guerilla bands of the north of Spain, whilst at the same time it was very doubtful whether the troops thus placed at this general's disposal, would be sufficient to enable him to carry into effect the proposed design.

Napoleon's instructions, transmitted through the minister of war in the month of January, and reiterated in February, could not reach their destination the first time until the middle of February, the second until the beginning of March, that is, thirty days after they had been despatched, a loss of time which was much to be regretted, and which was a necessary consequence of the occupation of all the routes by the bands of insurgents. It was very painful to Joseph, as we have before said, to abandon Madrid, but his own reason and Marshal Jourdan's advice had already shown him that it was necessary to make this sacrifice, when Napoleon's orders arrived, and they did but serve to lead him at once to put into execution a resolution already adopted.

When the removal from Madrid to Valladolid had been effected—which was not until the beginning of April—the troops were distributed in the following manner. The army of Portugal was transferred from Salamanca to Burgos, and was reduced by the dismissal of all but the actually effective troops, from eight divisions to six, of which three were sent to General Clausel to aid in putting down the guerilla bands, whilst one was retained at Burgos, and the remaining two were échelonné in advance of Palencia, ready to support the cavalry posted along the Esla, and in a position to watch the Spanish army of Galicia. The army of Andalusia, transported from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Douro, and connecting itself by its right with the army of Portugal, occupied the Douro and the Tormès, ready to make head against the Anglo-Portuguese army encamped in Le Beira. Its divisions occupied Zamora, Toro, Salamanca, and Avila; but one of them, that of General Leval, was left at Madrid, for the purpose of continuing an apparent occupation of the capital, and receiving its revenues. Finally, one of the two divisions of the army of the centre was established at Valladolid itself, and the other at Segovia, in order to afford support to the division Leval which remained *en l'air* in the midst of new Castille.

Had these three armies, which in January had numbered eighty-six thousand, but now numbered no more than seventy-two thousand men, been united into a single one under a single commander, such as General Clausel, who was as active in the battle-field as he was obedient to the royal staff; and had it been concentrated between Valladolid and Burgos for the purpose of repose, the repair of the matériel, and the establishment of magazines, all might yet have been saved. But, unfortunately, this course was not adopted. The three armies were left separated, because Napoleon was unwilling that so large a force as that which they would have formed

when concentrated, should have been at Joseph's immediate disposal; the consequence was that the staff of each army resolved to maintain its independence, and would not obey the orders of the general staff with respect to the formation of magazines, until they received positive orders to do so from Paris; and as there was a month's delay in awaiting these orders, the most valuable time for the formation of the magazines was lost. Finally, after three divisions of the army of Portugal had been sent to General Clausel, to aid in the destruction of the guerilla bands, it was found necessary to send him a fourth, and to march a fifth as far as Briviesca. Only one division, therefore, was left under the command of General Reille, and even that had to be divided, one of its brigades being posted at Burgos, the other at Palencia, behind the cavalry which guarded the Esla. There were, consequently, should the Anglo-Portuguese troops suddenly arrive, but two of the three armies ready to oppose them; the advantages of the concentration of these armies, after the unfortunate battle of Salamanca, which might have led to the re-establishment of our fortunes in the Peninsula, being already almost annulled. Had the reinforcements which were thus sent to General Clausel been sufficient, indeed, to enable him to destroy the guerilla bands, the ill effects of this fresh dispersion of our troops would not have been without compensation, but this Spanish Vendée was as difficult to put down as had been the French Vendée, and it had become evident that that object could never be effected by mere force, without the aid of additional influences, as well moral as political.

Supported by the English vessels of war, Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Mina, and Merino, sometimes united, sometimes separated, but always well informed of all they could require to know, avoided our columns when they were in force, attacked them when they had separated in the hurry of pursuit, and manœuvred in such a manner, that although General Clausel had fifty thousand men with whom to oppose them, and pursued them with the greatest activity, he could seldom come up with them, and scarcely ever succeeded in keeping open the communications.

Whilst the troops, which were the last means of making head against the English, were exhausted in the useless pursuit of these guerillas, the months of April and May passed by, and the moment for extensive operations having arrived, Lord Wellington quitted his cantonments; entering upon the campaign with forty-eight thousand English troops, twenty thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand Spaniards, the latter being better armed and equipped than usual.

His intention was to cross the Esla with his left, which was under the command of Sir Thomas Graham, and to refrain from attacking with his centre and right the line of the Douro, until his left should have gained a position, by crossing the Esla, in the rear of the French troops by whom the Douro was defended.

On the 11th of May, his left executed its first movement and spread along the Esla, and as General Reille's cavalry, being supported but by one brigade of infantry, was not in a position in which it could display either hardihood or vigilance, it could neither know of nor prevent the passage of this river by the English troops, which, however, did not hasten to advance against us, since one wing was unwilling to march without the other; and it was not till the 20th of May, that Lord Wellington moved with his right upon Salamanca and the Tormès. On the 24th, General Gazan was informed of his advance at the head of considerable forces.

The French army which ought to have been prepared and concentrated on the 1st of May in the environs of Valladolid, now found itself surprised in the most unfavourable of positions. Had Marshal Jourdan been a younger man, and Joseph a more active and determined one, it is probable that they would have kept themselves more clearly informed of the movements of the English, have recalled, at the first approach of danger, in spite of the imperial orders, which after all were rather instructions than orders, those divisions of the army of Portugal which had been sent to General Clausel, or at least have concentrated more thoroughly the troops actually at their disposal. And finally, in spite of the opposition of the several staffs, have formed at Burgos those magazines without which it was impossible, in such a country as they now were, to manœuvre with any degree of freedom. But Jourdan, disgusted with a régime and a war of which he had long since foreseen the deplorable consequences, bending beneath the effects of old age, and anxious only to return to France, did little more than point out the faults which were committed; whilst Joseph, perceiving clearly the error of the existing system, and frequently enraged at the course his brother pursued, still knew not how to disobey him, or to assume, as general and king, that authority for the assumption of which he certainly could not have been punished.

And thus it was that Lord Wellington, advancing on the 11th of May with his left, and on the 20th of May with his right, found the army of Andalusia dispersed from Madrid to Salamanca; that of the centre from Segovia to Valladolid; that of Portugal from Burgos to Pampeluna.

On the 25th orders were sent to the division Leval to evacuate Madrid, and to fall back upon Valladolid, orders at the same time being sent to all the troops on the lines of the Tormès, the Douro, and the Esla, to retreat slowly, so as to afford time to the division Leval to fall back; and as General Reille had only one of the two brigades of the division Maucune for the support of his cavalry, one of the divisions of the army of the centre (Darmagnac's), was now placed at his disposal. The remainder of the army of the centre was left échelonné upon Segovia, for the purpose of awaiting the division Leval. The army of Andalusia, the most complete of the three, was to retreat from Salamanca upon Tordesillas, falling back very slowly, so as to afford time for the concentration of all our dispersed troops. To these measures, which were rendered necessary by the posture of affairs, was added the despatch of a message to General Clausel, informing him of the approach of the English, desiring him to send back the five divisions of the army of Portugal, and urging him to come to Valladolid himself, with some troops of the army of the north, so as to raise the force by which the English were to be opposed to eighty thousand men. Finally, a despatch was sent to Clarke, the minister of war, informing him of the state of affairs, and entreating him to exert himself to the utmost for the concentration of the French forces. This minister, remaining alone in Paris since Napoleon's departure for Germany, contented himself with blindly repeating Napoleon's orders, and but a few days before the appearance of the English, had ordered that another division of the army of Portugal should be sent to Aragon, for the purpose of keeping open the communications with Marshal Suchet. But little assistance, therefore, was to be expected of the Duke de Feltre, save the transmission by him to General Clausel of information of the approach of the English — a service which might possibly be of no little value, since the interrupted state of the communications between the army of the north and Valladolid, might prevent his receiving the news from thence until after the lapse of three or four weeks.

Having rallied his cavalry, General Reille retreated in good order upon Palencia, and with the infantry divisions Maucune and Darmagnac, secured from attack the route from Valladolid to Burgos, which was our army's line of retreat; at the same time General Villatte, posted on the Tormès, defended it valiantly, and by these means, and by Lord Wellington's prudent slowness of movement, General Leval was enabled without loss to evacuate Madrid and repass the Guadarrama in safety, carrying with him the last remains

of our establishment in the capital, and joining the army of the centre at Segovia. On the 2nd of June our troops held the following positions;—General Reille was between Rio-Seco and Palencia with his cavalry and two divisions; the army of Andalusia at Tordesillas on the Douro, with its four divisions; and finally, the army of the centre at Valladolid, with a French division and a Spanish division — a total force of about fifty-two thousand men.

Our troops being now grouped around Valladolid, there were three courses open to them. The first, to await and engage the enemy, which would have been imprudent, since the latter were ninety thousand strong, and since every retrograde step on our part, added to our chance of being joined by one or more of the divisions of the army of Portugal. The second, to retreat upon Burgos, Miranda, and Vittoria, until joined by the army of the north. The third, to remain on the line of the Douro, and to manœuvre on this stream, ascending it as far as Aranda, or even as far as Soria, from whence a route which Marshal Ney had followed in 1808, would lead us to a point between Tudela and Logrono at which we might be certain of meeting with General Clausel and even Marshal Suchet, should extraordinary events require the general concentration of all our forces. These projects were taken into consideration and discussed, and the choice fell upon the second, which consisted in a peaceable retreat upon Burgos, letters being at the same time despatched to General Clausel, requiring him to restore the divisions of the army of Portugal which had been placed at his disposal.

This retreat, accordingly, commenced, and as Madrid had been abandoned, so now it became necessary to abandon Valladolid, that second capital which we had created in old Castille. As we had, fortunately, ten thousand excellent cavalry, and as the enemy was not very enterprising, we were enabled to effect our retrograde movement without any disastrous incident. Lord Wellington, indeed, awaiting but not pursuing fortune, knew that a general engagement was inevitable, but at the same time resolved, as was his wont, not to fight except on ground favourable to himself, and appeared to be content for the present with driving us back towards the Pyrenees. It is difficult to understand, however, how so keen-sighted a general should hasten, on his own part, to drive us upon our reinforcements, rather than endeavour to engage us, when instead of seventy thousand men our army numbered but fifty thousand.

On the 6th of June our troops reached the environs of Palencia, and a reconnaissance executed by Joseph and

Jourdan, made them thoroughly aware that the plan of the English, was to make their reinforced left press continually upon our right. On the 9th the retreat had continued as far as Burgos, which place the failure of provisions had made it desirable to reach as speedily as possible, but from which a similar cause made it equally necessary to retreat without delay; for the numerous convoys of sick, of *expatries* and artillerymen accumulated at Burgos, had eaten up the scanty supplies of provisions which had been formed there, and scarcely sufficient remained for the support of the troops even for a few days. These convoys were now again removed, being carried to Miranda and Vittoria; and this was a mistake, for the resolution to retreat to the Pyrenees having been once adopted, all that could embarrass the army should have been sent to Bayonne. A delay of a few days was made at Burgos, for the purpose of consuming the provisions which still remained there, and of affording time for the concentration of the scattered troops; and, indeed, as the division Lamartinière, which was the largest division of the army of Portugal, and had been lent to the army of the north, was found here, and increased General Reille's troops by six thousand men, he was enabled to restore to the army of the centre the division Darmagnac, which had been temporarily borrowed from it.

Before quitting Burgos the course which should be pursued was again discussed, and it was debated whether the army should follow the great Bayonne route, in accordance with the orders which had directed the re-establishment of the communications with France, or whether it should not rather effect a transverse movement, so as to debouch upon the Ebro at Logrono instead of arriving there by Miranda—a course which would almost certainly lead to a junction with General Clausel. This plan was earnestly supported by Generals Reille and d'Erion; but Marshal Jourdan and Joseph persisted in proceeding directly upon Miranda and Vittoria; and as no news had been received with respect to General Clausel, they sent him, this time under the escort of fifteen hundred men, information of the approach of the army in the direction of Vittoria. The course which was adopted was, then, that of retreating upon the Ebro by Briviesca, Pancorbo, and Miranda.

On the 12th of June, General Reille finding that the English were again attempting to outflank our right, wished to force them to deploy their forces, and kept in the rear of the Rio Hormaza. The English displayed a force of about twenty-five thousand men, but General Reille, who had not half that number, manœuvred with so much *aplomb* and vigour, that

he succeeded in slaying three or four hundred of them, with a loss to himself of not more than fifty, and repassed the Rio Hormaza, and even the Arlanzon, in perfect order. It was evident that the English, without being anxious to give us battle, were determined to make us yield ground by continually outflanking one of our wings. On the 13th it was resolved to march from Burgos, and as it was known that Lord Wellington was now provided with a powerful siege-train, and as, moreover, our army could not afford to leave two or three thousand men behind for its defence, it was determined to destroy this fortress, together with the munitions of war with which it was filled, and which it would be impossible to carry away. On the 13th, accordingly, whilst on its march upon Briviesca, the army was saddened by hearing a terrible explosion, which was the sign of a definitive retreat, and which being executed without the necessary precautions, caused, as well to our own troops as to the city, a considerable amount of injury.

On the 14th the French army arrived at Briviesca, on the 15th at Pancorbo, on the 16th at Miranda, at which last point it was on the brink of the Ebro, and within a step of Vittoria at the very foot of the Pyrenees. In the meantime, the enemy had advanced by its left as far as Villarcajo, continuing its manœuvre of outflanking our right; but news was also received that General Clausel, immediately after receiving information of the approach of the English, had hastened to move towards the army the divisions Sarrut and Foy; and had himself advanced by Logrono with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, and two divisions of the army of the north.

As General Clausel was expected to arrive at Logrono by the 20th, the most simple course to have now pursued would have been to have descended the Ebro from Miranda to Logrono, which would have involved a *détour* of a few leagues at the most, and have ensured the junction with the troops under this general's command. But Joseph and Jourdan were filled with fears lest the direct Bayonne route should be intercepted by the enemy; and two distinct opinions held possession of the staff, the one party proposing to direct the army by a transverse movement upon Logrono and Navarre, for the purpose of rallying General Clausel, without paying any attention to the movement of the English against our right, since it was not probable that they would entertain the idea of crossing the Pyrenees, before they had gained over us some decisive victory; whilst the other party proposed, on the contrary, that extreme attention should be given to the movement by which the English threatened our

communications, and to meet this movement by remaining on the great Bayonne route, and desiring General Clausel, who was every moment expected, to march his troops thither also. The first opinion was that of General Reille and the Count d'Erlon, the second that of Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, who were fatally influenced by the orders sent from Paris.

The conflict between these two opinions was very vehement at Miranda, for the moment had arrived when it was necessary to choose between them. General Reille maintained that it was necessary to descend the Ebro as speedily as possible. He also maintained that as General Clausel had announced his arrival on the Ebro in the environs of Logrono, it was necessary to hasten to descend thither for the purpose of joining him, and that every consideration should yield to the great object of effecting the concentration of our forces, and repeated the opinion he had always held, that the movement by which the English endeavoured to outflank us was not a serious menace, so long as they should not have really vanquished us. Marshal Jourdan and Joseph, on the contrary, feared above all things a movement on the part of the English, which by leading them by Orduna upon Bilbao and Tolosa, should place them between us and Bayonne, on the other side of the great chain of the Pyrenees. Moreover, as the convoy comprising the sick and wounded, and the Spaniards who accompanied our retreat from Madrid, was now at Vittoria, to descend upon Logrono would be to leave it unprotected, and to surrender it into the hands of the enemy; and finally, as Vittoria had been named to General Clausel as the place of rendezvous, he might very probably proceed thither without visiting Logrono, in which case our descent upon this latter place would leave him as much exposed to danger as the convoy.

It must be acknowledged that the advice given by General Reille and the Count d'Erlon, although the better, as we shall presently see, had lost much of its apparent merit since the convoy had been sent to Vittoria, and General Clausel had been directed to proceed thither, for, setting aside the alleged fear of being turned by Orduna, the danger of leaving the convoy, and even General Clausel himself, entirely exposed, by descending obliquely upon Logrono, was a very specious inducement to continue to march directly upon Vittoria.

Whilst adopting the direct line of march upon Vittoria, Joseph and Marshal Jourdan were also anxious to preserve themselves from any danger of being turned by Orduna and Bilbao, and ordered General Reille to advance by Puente-

Larra upon Osma, and by Osma upon Orduna and Bilbao, whilst the rest of the army advanced immediately upon Vittoria. They hoped to be joined at Vittoria by General Clausel, the junction of whose troops would afford an accession of strength, greater than that which had been lost by the departure of General Reille, and resting thus upon the Pyrenees, with Generals Gazan, d'Erlon, and Clausel, whilst General Reille should be on the other side of these mountains, to oppose the enemy in every direction with a barrier of fire. But whilst making these arrangements, care should have been taken to forward communications to General Clausel, not merely by peasants or single officers, but by a regiment of cavalry, and also, to send positive orders to hasten the departure of the convoy from Vittoria, in order to avoid an encounter with it on its road, and the dangerous confusion which would necessarily ensue.

On the 18th, General Reille advanced upon Osma with the divisions Sarrut, Lamartinière, and Maucune, and had scarcely set out when he was assailed by a cloud of enemies, from whom he escaped only by the exercise of the utmost vigour and presence of mind. Arriving at Osma, he found numerous hostile troops, Spaniards of the army of Galicia, posted towards Barbarossa, at all the approaches of the mountains, in a manner which seemed to show that they were about to cross the Pyrenees at Orduna for the purpose of cutting off the Bayonne route; but this they did not do, their real object being merely to arrive at the foot of the mountains before us, so as to be able to take commanding positions on our flank, in case we should have resolved to fight a defensive battle at the foot of the Pyrenees, or to precede us to the *col de Salinas*, for the purpose of cutting us off before we should have regained the French frontier.

General Reille finding the Orduna route intercepted, readily renounced an operation which he considered ill-advised, and determined to regain by a lateral movement, the great route from Miranda to Vittoria. In the meantime, Joseph on his side, set out during the night of the 18th of June for Vittoria, and on the morning of the 19th all our troops were in full march upon this city, which, situated at the foot of the Pyrenees on the Spanish side, rises in the midst of a pretty plain which is entirely closed in by mountains. If we take up a position with the Pyrenees behind us, we have upon our right mount Arrato, separating us from the valley of Murgnia, whilst in front of us lies the sierra *de Andia*, and on the left stand the hills across which passes the route from Salvatierra to Pampeluna. A little river named the Zadarra waters the whole of this plain, flowing at

first along the Pyrenees from amongst which it has its source, and then skirting the base of mount Arrato to the right, for the purpose of escaping by an extremely narrow defile across the sierra de Andia.

The bulk of our army, coming from Miranda and the banks of the Ebro, traversed the great Bayonne route, which runs directly into the plain of Vittoria, by the defile traversed by the Zadarra. General Reille arrived at it by a lateral direction, and entered it by the various *cols* of the mount Arrato. The corps with which Lord Wellington had always attempted to outflank us, and which was composed of Spanish and English troops, might have anticipated our arrival at the passes of mount Arrato, and thus have occupied the plain of Vittoria before us, had not General Reille held it in check by the vigour with which he disputed the ground during the whole of the 19th, on the evening of which day our three armies had safely effected their junction.

It now became a matter of urgent necessity to determine what should be the course of future resolutions. As it was not to be supposed that Lord Wellington would permit us to re-pass the Pyrenees without giving us battle, unless, indeed, we fled before him from Vittoria across the *col de Salinas* in a manner which, besides the shame attendant upon it, would necessitate the abandonment of General Clausel to the greatest perils, since he would in that case be left alone upon the other side of the Pyrenees, and which would, moreover, although in a less degree, compromise the safety of Marshal Suchet and all the troops under his command, distributed from Saragossa as far as Alicante. To preserve, therefore, the honour of our arms, and the troops of General Clausel, as well as to secure the safety of those of Marshal Suchet, it was absolutely necessary that we should engage the enemy in battle at the foot of the Pyrenees, in the basin of Vittoria, where the junction was to be effected with General Clausel. As, however, it was possible that a delay of one or two days might intervene before this junction could take place, and as the total available force of our army at this time amounted only to about fifty-four thousand men, care should have been taken to obtain as many advantages of ground as possible, to relieve the army of the presence of the immense convoy by which it was accompanied, and to send to General Clausel, not merely by ill-paid peasants but by means of a regiment of cavalry, fresh and precise information with respect to the place of rendezvous.

But of these various precautions none were taken; the 19th being allowed to pass by without the removal of the convoy, or the despatch of any messengers to General Clausel besides

peasants, on whom no reliance could be placed, and who, even if they had been faithful, would have been in great danger of being stopped. On the following day, the 20th, instead of mounting their horses and proceeding to reconnoitre the country, Jourdan and Joseph remained quietly in Vittoria; the former labouring under a violent attack of fever, whilst the latter, able to see only with his master's eyes, deferred making any reconnaissance until the morrow. With respect to the convoy, however, its presence with the army being a source of continual embarrassment, it was resolved that its departure should take place immediately, under the protection of the division Maucune.

The only measures taken on our side during the 20th, consisted in sending to Tolosa the convoy, which ought to have been despatched thither on the 19th, in posting General Gazan with the army of Andalusia opposite the defile (La Puebla), by which the Zadarra flows across the sierra de Andia; Count d'Erlon, with the army of the centre behind General Gazan; and in the rear to the right, along the Zadarra, General Reille, with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, for the purpose of holding in check the *corps tournant* of the English, which was approaching by the Murguia route; to all the other pieces of negligence being added the neglect to cut a single one of the bridges of the Zadarra. Between our several infantry corps were placed our fine cavalry, which, unfortunately, could be of but slight service on the ground which we now occupied, the basin of Vittoria being seamed by numerous canals. It numbered nine or ten thousand troopers, and our infantry, consequently, numbered no more than forty-three or forty-four thousand combatants; a force about half that of the enemy.

On the following day, the 21st, as General Clausel had not yet appeared, and as the enemy could not be supposed to be much longer inactive, Joseph and Jourdan wished to reconnoitre the ground for the purpose of preparing for the struggle which was evidently impending. Marshal Jourdan, somewhat recovered from his fever, although still suffering under it, managed to mount his horse and proceeded with Joseph to reconnoitre the plain of Vittoria. On the right of our position, in the rear, General Reille with the French divisions Lamartinière and Sarrut, and the remains of a Spanish division guarded the bridges of the Zadarra; the *pont de Durana*, situated in the mountains on the side of the Pyrenees, being guarded by the Spanish division, whilst the *pont de Gamarra-mayor*, situated at the entrance of the plain, was occupied by the division Lamartinière, and that of

Arriagua, which was situated in the midst of the plain, and above Vittoria, was defended by the division Sarrut. Behind these divisions were posted, besides the light cavalry, several divisions of dragoons, ready to pour down upon any of the enemy's troops which might cross the Zadarra. But better than all these measures would have been the destruction of the bridges of this little stream, and the defence of its fords by artillery.

Advancing in a direct line towards the entrance of the plain, at the *débouché* of the Puebla defile, Jourdan and Joseph ascended an eminence named Zuazo, which cut the Vittoria basin transversely, and commanded the outlet of the defile, and then Marshal Jourdan's practised eye immediately perceived that it was there that should be posted General Gazan, at the head of the whole of the army of Andalusia, that the height should be fortified with artillery, and that Count d'Erlon should be posted on the right upon the Zadarra, for the purpose of effecting a junction with General Reille and guarding the *pont de Trespuentes*, which débouched upon the flank of the Zuazo height.

Officers of the staff were immediately sent to General Gazan, directing him to execute these various measures; but it was too late, for the battle at that moment began. Lord Wellington, as could be readily foreseen, was unwilling, after having accompanied us so far, to allow us to cross the Pyrenees without first giving us battle, so as to be able, if possible, to cross them himself in the track of a vanquished army. He had sent forward General Graham with two English divisions, with the Portuguese and Spanish troops forming his left, on the Murguia route, across the passes of mount Arrato, for the purpose of endeavouring to force General Reille upon the Zadarra. He had moved his centre, composed of three divisions under Marshal Beresford, across the other passes of mount Arrato, that it might thus débouch upon the Zadarra, towards the middle of the plain close to the *pont de Trespuentes*, opposite General d'Erlon, and on the flank of the Zuazo height. Finally, his right, composed of two English divisions, under General Hill, and of the Spanish division Morillo, which had followed our army along the Miranda route, was to penetrate the Puebla defile, and débouch at the very foot of Zuazo. All these corps were already on their march, when Marshal Jourdan and Joseph sent to General Gazan the order to retreat towards the Zuazo height, from whence it would be possible to crush any troops which might force the Puebla defile, or any which might cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes.

When the aide-de-camp, who was the bearer of these orders,

reached General Gazan, the latter, who was already engaged with the enemy, declared that it was impossible that he should execute them. Upon this, Joseph hastened up to his position, and at once perceived the posture of affairs. On the right were to be seen Beresford's troops, which, having crossed the nearest *cols* of mount Arrato, were attempting to pass the Zadarra at Trespuentes; whilst in front, in the Puebla defile, was General Hill, who had thrown to the right upon the heights of the sierra de Andia, the Spanish division Morillo, in order to support the English troops which sought to force the passage.

Jourdan and Joseph now ordered General Gazan to send a brigade, to endeavour to dislodge the Spanish troops from the heights of the sierra de Andia, and to support it by a whole division should it be necessary; and as soon as the height should have been retaken, to crush the Spaniards in the Puebla defile, and following them in their flight, to throw himself upon General Hill's flank. In the meantime, he was to bar the defile with the divisions Darricau and Conroux, to hold the division Villatte in reserve on the left, and to employ the division Leval on his right, in observation of the troops under Beresford, which threatened to cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes. Count d'Erlon, in position behind General Gazan, was to watch the Zadarra, and to be ready to fall upon the troops which should attempt to pass it, at any point between himself and General Reille.

Scarcely had these orders been issued, when the firing extended in a vast circle on our left, front, and right. General Gazan's first attempts to drive the enemy, in accordance with the orders he had received, from the heights on our left, which formed the extremity of the sierra de Andia, being made with insufficient force, were ineffectual, the rocky and wooded ground enabling the Spaniards to offer a vigorous resistance. Pressed by Marshal Jourdan to act with greater vigour, he sent first one brigade and then another from his front, to support the brigade which had first been sent to take the heights; but the result was, that these two brigades which would have been more than sufficient if they had been advanced *en masse*, and simultaneously upon the height which was on our left, remained half-way, exchanging fire at a disadvantage with the well-posted Spaniards, and affording no support to the brigade of the advanced-guard, which suffered considerable loss. Two hours were thus lost without the acquisition of any decided advantage; a loss of time which was so much the more to be regretted, because had it been well employed, the Spaniards might have been driven from the heights of the sierra de Andia into the Puebla defile, the

English troops which were endeavouring to cross this defile equally repulsed, and immediate succour carried to General Reille, who was soon to be vigorously attacked.

The king and the marshal reiterating these orders, General Gazan resolved at length to advance the division Villatte, which was posted a little in the rear on the left, against the heights which he had now so long and fruitlessly attacked. The division Villatte rapidly climbed the slopes of the sierra de Andia, under a plunging fire of the most murderous description, in spite of which they drove back the Spaniards from the lower part of the slopes to the upper, and thrust them into the woods with which the heights were crowned. But in the meantime, the English divisions under General Hill, perceiving that our front was enfeebled by the absence of the brigades which had been removed from it (being those of Generals Conroux and Darricau), and perceiving, moreover, that an important village situated on our right, and named Subijana de Alava, had been completely exposed by the departure of the division Villatte, threw themselves upon this village, debouching vigorously from the defile, and succeeded in taking it. At the same moment, the English forces broke into the plain, and it became very difficult to repulse them. Marshal Jourdan considered that it would be advisable to throw upon them one of the divisions of Count d'Erlon, whose troops had been posted in reserve in the rear on the right. But Count d'Erlon, perceiving that Beresford's troops threatened to cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes, had sent his two divisions in succession in that direction; there remained, consequently, no reserve, and to add to the embarrassment, heavy firing began to be heard in the direction of the lower part of the plain.

Yielding to these various circumstances, the king and the marshal now ordered a retrograde movement upon the Zuazo height, from whence it would be possible by means of a powerful artillery fire, to check the advance of the enemies who had invaded the plain by all its avenues, some passing the Zadarra at Trespuentes, some entering it in front of us by the Puebla defile, and others descending into it on our left from the heights of the sierra de Andia. At the same time, Marshal Jourdan ordered General Tirlet, who had the chief command of our artillery, to establish a battery on the Zuazo height.

These orders being more accurately executed than those which had been given to General Gazan, produced a result which might have been decisive; for if, at the moment when the English troops, advancing from the Puebla defile and crossing the Zadarra at Trespuentes, were thrown into con-

fusion by the fire of the forty-five pieces of cannon, which General Tirlet had without loss of time established on the Zuazo height,—if at this moment, we say, four or five thousand men had been available, and hurled upon the broken masses of the English troops, it is most probable that they would have been driven back into the defile, suffering a severe check and considerable loss. Unfortunately, General Gazan, instead of falling back upon the transversal height of the Zuazo, had gone towards the left to take up a position half-way up on the flank of the sierra de Andia, near the division Villatte, by which means an open space was left between his troops and those of Count d'Erlon, who did his best with his two divisions, to defend the passes of the Zadarra above and below Trespuentes. There remained, therefore, on the Zuazo height, on which all depended, but an unsupported force of artillery. At the bottom of the plain, General Reille, attacked at Durana, at Gamarra-mayor, at Arriagua, defended himself most valiantly, and now losing one, now another of the three bridges, ever retook them by the exercise of the utmost vigour; but at the same time he intimated that if he were not speedily reinforced, he should be compelled to give way. And now Marshal Jourdan, clearly comprehending the existing state of affairs, advised Joseph to order a retreat along the great Bayonne route, by Salinas and Tolosa, for the purpose of saving the artillery; for if the adoption of the route by Salvatierra and Pampeluna would lead to a junction with General Clausel, it was also tolerably certain that it would lead to the loss of all the cannon on account of the bad state of the roads.

The order for a retreat had scarcely been given when it was executed, but without that concert and *l'ensemble* which would have obviated the inconveniences attending a retrograde movement. Count d'Erlon, not seeing the English on his left, and perceiving the English cavalry ready to pour down upon the plain, fell back in the direction of the Zadarra, and thus left Vittoria exposed. The enemy's cavalry threw itself in this direction, and created there an almost indescribable confusion. The convoy, to the defence of which a division had been devoted, had not yet wholly departed. There remained a park of artillery numbering a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, a great amount of baggage, and a large number of fugitive families, as well as of soldiers who had been sent out in foraging parties. The appearance of the English dragoons filled these persons with an extreme terror, which they expressed by an immediate flight, and the utterance of loud cries. Their first movement was in the direction of the great Bayonne route and the *col de Salinas*; but General

Reille, disputing with varying fortune, but the utmost determination, the upper Zadarra, covered this route with fire and blood. The fugitives betook themselves in the next place to the Pampeluna route by Salvatierra. General Tirlet, who had hastened to Vittoria to conduct the retreat, knowing the bad state of the Salvatierra route, and knowing also that the arsenals of the frontier were well stored, gave orders that the artillery should be abandoned, care being taken only for the preservation of the men and horses.

The retreat which had at first been in the direction of Salinas and Bayonne, was now towards Pampeluna, or in other words, in the direction of Navarre; and at this moment the position of General Reille became one of great peril; for this general, having maintained his position as long as possible on the Zadarra, driving back the English and Spanish troops to its farther bank, whenever they had succeeded in forcing one of the three bridges which he had to defend, had determined, when he saw that the retreat had taken a direction towards Salvatierra, to fall back in this direction also. But to escape in safety from the position he held, it was necessary that he should hold in check, on the one side, the hostile troops which had crossed the Zadarra before him, and on the other, those which had debouched from Vittoria on his rear. In spite, however, of incessant attacks on the part of the enemy's cavalry, whose charges he received in square and repelled with considerable slaughter, he succeeded in conducting his troops in safety to the Salvatierra route, along which were hurrying, in headlong confusion, the various corps of our army, and the straggling line of the vast convoy which we had conducted with so much trouble from Madrid to Vittoria.

Our loss during this fatal day amounted to about five thousand in killed and wounded; that on the side of the English being almost as great. But it must be added that we left in the hands of the enemy about fifteen or eighteen hundred prisoners, as well as two hundred pieces of cannon, not lost in action but abandoned on account of the want of a road by which they could be carried away; more than four hundred caissons, and an infinite number of baggage waggons. Joseph failed to save even his own carriage which contained all his papers.

It will naturally be asked, where at this moment was General Clausel with his fifteen thousand men, and what was being done on the other side of the mountains by General Foy, who, reinforced by several small garrisons and the soldiers of General Maucune, had also under his command fifteen thousand men, the presence of whom would have been

of the greatest use on the fatal plain of Vittoria? These thirty thousand men, added to the fifty-four or fifty-five thousand under Joseph, would have been able to defeat the English and drive them back into Portugal—a result which would have facilitated the conclusion of a peace, and on such terms, probably, as would have completely satisfied Napoleon's pride. But on this occasion, as on so many others, there was a want on our side of proper management. General Foy, who was only separated from Joseph by the mountain of Salinas, had only learned the presence of the army at Vittoria by the appearance of the division Maucune, escorting the convoy; and had the movement, now executed by this division, been executed two days earlier, the convoy might have been placed in safety, and a reinforcement marched upon Vittoria of ten or twelve thousand men. As for General Clausel, as soon as he had received information of the advance of the English and the retreat of our army, he had assembled his divisions in all haste, had reached Logrono on the 20th, and sought on all sides to obtain news of Joseph, and, although unable to procure direct information, was led by various circumstances to conclude that the French army had marched from Miranda upon Vittoria. On the 21st he determined to advance by Penacurada to the other side of the sierra de Andia, thinking it probable that this movement might lead him to Joseph's army. He accordingly advanced, and at the close of the day learned that a battle had taken place, which had not had for us, alas! a fortunate result; and on the morning of the 22nd, being anxious to learn the real state of affairs, he had the boldness to ascend the sierra de Andia to obtain a view of the plain of Vittoria. Perceiving, from the summit of this sierra the extent of our disaster, and that he was separated from Joseph by the victorious English, he found that it was necessary to take measures for his own safety, and regaining the banks of the Ebro, descended as far as Logrono; and then, the English, who had pursued us into Navarre, being always between himself and Joseph, he took the resolution—as wise and bold an one as any to be found in the history of military tactics—of marching towards Saragossa, not only for the purpose of saving his own *corps d'armée*, but also for the purpose of covering Marshal Suchet's rear and securing his retreat.

In the meantime, Jourdan and Joseph had reached Pampeluna with an army terribly discontented with its leaders, but still undemoralised, and capable, especially with the aid of the natural strength afforded by the Pyrenees, of offering a formidable resistance to the English. Acting under the advice of Marshal Jourdan, Joseph now sent, after

leaving a garrison in Pampeluna, the army of Andalusia into the valley of *Saint Jean-pied-de-port*, that of the centre into the valley of *Bastan*, and that of Portugal into *la Bidassoa* valley, so as to close up all the avenues, and gain time for the re-establishment of the artillery, and the reorganisation of the three armies into one. Whilst he was making these arrangements, General Foy, aided by General Maucune, skilfully and bravely made head against the English, who endeavoured to descend from Salinas upon Tolosa, and drove them back to some distance.—Spain was lost, but the frontier was still our own, and the empire which had long been an invader, was not yet, although too soon to be, invaded.

Such was the campaign of 1813 in Spain—a campaign rendered famous by the disastrous battle of Vittoria, and by its being the conclusion of our occupation of this country, in which during six years we had uselessly spilled the blood as well of our own troops as of the Spaniards; and should we be willing to examine its events dispassionately, we can have no great difficulty in discovering the true causes of the reverse which for us was its result. And the chief cause of this result, as of so many others similar to it, must be looked for in the orders given by Napoleon himself, who, regarding Spain as but an accessory of his immense enterprises, failed to devote to the operations conducted in it the necessary forces, and permitted himself to indulge in calculations which were unfitted to secure their success. The forces which he had this year left in Spain, amounting as they did to eighty thousand men, would have been sufficient to maintain a position in Castillo against the English; but with the twofold object of preserving the northern provinces, which he intended to reserve to himself on the conclusion of peace, and of alarming the English for the safety of Portugal, for the purpose of deterring them from undertaking any enterprise against the south of France, Napoleon had again involuntarily caused the dispersion of our lately-concentrated troops from Salamanca to Pampeluna; a result of the battle of Vittoria, for which it is impossible to find any other cause, than the orders sent from Paris, issued by Napoleon at a great distance from the scene of the events to which they were to apply, before he could receive information of the events themselves, and reiterated by the minister of war with an obstinacy which was quite inexcusable, when the course of affairs and the remonstrances of Marshal Jourdan had pointed out the danger which must result from them. But to this principal cause must be added another, an old and fruitful source of disaster to our arms in the Peninsula, and which

was the want of unity in the command of our troops there. The existence of this defect must be attributed to Napoleon, who always refused to grant to his brother Joseph the necessary authority, whilst the latter knew as little how to assume it as the generals under him knew how to accord it.

Unable to follow in detail the course of events in Spain, absorbed as he was by the war which he personally carried on in Saxony, Napoleon, trusting implicitly to the despatches sent to him by the minister of war, who, whilst writing in the most friendly tone to Joseph, sent the most unfavourable reports to Dresden;—Napoleon, we say, had now a double cause of irritation; the deplorable results, and the errors which had led to them, and which could not but disgust his keen military genius. The results were, that Spain was lost, that the French frontier was threatened, that the most efficacious means of negotiating with England were annulled; that, as Spain was no longer ours to yield, new sacrifices must be added to those which Austria already demanded; that the arrangement of a peace, must, consequently, be more difficult than ever, and that, finally, all those who believed that the moment had come for the destruction of France, must necessarily be inspired with a large degree of confidence. With respect to the faults, they were gratuitously aggravated in Napoleon's eyes by the minister Clarke, who concealed the fact that Jourdan had earnestly remonstrated against the orders reiterated from the bureaux of Paris; that the resistance offered by the individual staffs of the several armies to the commands issued from head-quarters, had proved a serious inconvenience; that the English forces numbered almost a hundred thousand, and the French, at the most, no more than fifty thousand. Indeed, with respect to this last circumstance, he stated the numbers of the English as forty or forty-five thousand, entirely ignoring the Portuguese or Spanish troops, and set forth the French army as, consisting not of the troops which were actually on the field of battle, but of those which might have been there, if the orders from Paris had not dispersed them, and made it appear as though, whilst the enemy's troops numbered only forty-five thousand, ours had amounted to some eighty or ninety thousand.

We may well understand that Napoleon, considering on one side the results, and on the other the faults, real and imputed, of Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, who had already gravely displeased him, and having by his side a formidable accuser in the person of Marshal Soult, fell into a state of excessive irritation on receiving information of the events in Spain. And this excessive irritation burst forth in a feeling of anger against his brothers generally; whilst he should, on

the contrary, in justice, have recognised the fact, that his own ambition, rather than that of his brothers, had led to the adoption of that policy which had produced the existing state of affairs, and that after having given them thrones or placed them in the command of armies, he had omitted nothing which could tend to render their task more difficult than it naturally was. He had, in fact, required of them that they should entirely ignore the interests of their subjects, and that they should effect all that he required of them, without any, or with scarcely any, resources; a course of conduct which was excessively cruel on his part, and had caused more than one family scandal, such as was the abdication of the King of Holland. With respect to Joseph, especially, after having brought this prince from Naples, where he held a position suited to his character and his talents, and transferred him to Spain, with scarcely a reference to his own feelings on the subject, throwing him into the midst of a frightful war, to carry on which he afforded him some momentary assistance, but in the midst of which, when he himself became wholly engrossed in the Austrian war in 1809, and the Russian war in 1812, he left him without reinforcements or money, exposed to the hatred of his subjects, and the disobedience, or even arrogance, of his generals; at the same time refusing to listen to his suggestions, which were generally justified by the event, only replying to them by uttering mockeries respecting his pretensions to military skill, and his manners—mockeries of which the echo had spread from the French court to that of Spain, and tended to aggravate the disregard testified towards the new monarch. Napoleon really loved the several members of his family, but, spoiled by the possession of unlimited power, he held the rights of his brothers in as little account as those of peoples.

He now treated Joseph with extreme severity.—“I have too long compromised my own affairs for the sake of serving the interests of these *imbéciles*,” he wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, to the minister of war, and to the minister of police; and after this preamble proceeded to give orders, with reference to Joseph, of a character as severe as they were humiliating. In the first place, he selected as his successor in the command of the armies of Spain, a man the choice of whom could not fail to be in the highest degree offensive to Joseph, being no other than Marshal Soult, who was at this time in Dresden, and on whom Napoleon now conferred the title of his lieutenant in Spain, with extraordinary powers; directing him to set out immediately for Bayonne, for the purpose of rallying the army, and making head against the English. In the next place he ordered

Joseph to quit Spain immediately ; to refrain from visiting Paris ; to retire to Marfontaine, and to remain there in a state of complete seclusion ; and sent directions to Prince Cambracères to forbid all the high state functionaries from visiting him, and to arrest him should he not obey his, Napoleon's, orders.

Become distrustful with respect to the fidelity of men, since he had been compelled to acknowledge the fickleness of fortune, he suspected in every direction the existence of plots against the regency of his wife and the succession of his son. This was the real reason of his having been unwilling to leave the Duke of Otranto and Marshal Soult in Paris, and of his having under various pretexts left him without employment at Dresden ; this was the reason which had led him to give orders for the arrest of his own brother.

Had the events of Spain, whilst they caused his enemies to be more *exigeants*, at the same time rendered him more reasonable and conciliatory, a great evil would have been productive of a great good ; but, unfortunately, it was not so. After having visited Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg, after having passed in review the corps which he was desirous of inspecting, and ordered the execution of the works he had projected on the Elbe, Napoleon returned to Dresden to continue the terrible game of losing time, endeavouring to delay making any explanation with respect to the conditions of peace until the conclusion of the armistice, and to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice by feigning at the last moment to negotiate in good faith. Prussia and Russia had chosen their plenipotentiaries, and had sent them to Prague, where they had arrived on the 11th of July, the day before that on which it had been determined that the congress should meet. It had been supposed that Prussia would have chosen as her representative on this occasion, the Chancellor de Hardenberg, and that the representative of Russia would have been M. de Nesselrode ; but each of these powers being anxious, on account of England, to appear to be induced to take part in this congress only by the solicitations of Austria, had avoided sending to it any representative who should be of equal prominence with M. de Metternich. Prussia had chosen M. de Humboldt, whose name was already illustrious in the scientific world, but was as yet unknown in that of politics, and who was the brother of the *savant* who is one of the glories of the age. Russia had chosen the Baron d'Anstett, an Alsatian (consequently a Frenchman), a member of an emigrant family, a man of some mind, but possessed of little personal influence, and inspired with sentiments of extreme hostility towards France.

As soon as these two negotiators had arrived in Prague, they *communicated their powers* to the mediator, and speedily began to utter complaints of the disrespect shown to them by the non-arrival of the French plenipotentiaries, and the absence of even any intimation with respect to the time at which they might be expected. M. de Narbonne, who had returned to Prague as ambassador, and who, it had been hinted, was to be one of our plenipotentiaries, had been furnished with neither powers nor instructions; and to all the remonstrances which M. de Metternich transmitted to Dresden, M. de Bassano replied that the fault lay with the Austrian cabinet, which had permitted the emperor to set out for Magdebourg without officially communicating to him the ratification of the new convention, prolonging the armistice to the 16th of August. To this reproach M. de Metternich had replied, "That as the French court had actually received information of this ratification, it might, whilst awaiting the arrival of the official communication of it, have nominated the plenipotentiaries and made them set out for the place of meeting; a course which would have satisfied those duties of politeness, which are as much an obligation upon one state with respect to another, as they are upon individual members of society with respect to each other." M. de Bassano, however, without paying any attention to this answer, again declared that M. de Metternich was alone the cause of the delay.

Napoleon having returned to Dresden on the 15th, after a journey of five days, and having at length received the ratification of the new convention by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, could no longer defer the nomination of his plenipotentiaries, and he now, accordingly, entrusted MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaincourt with the duty of representing him at the congress of Prague; and he could not have selected wiser or more enlightened men, or any inspired with sentiments of a higher order. In nominating M. de Coulaincourt, Napoleon acted in accordance with the secret hope which he always entertained, of coming to a direct understanding with Russia, and of concluding a peace which, sacrificing Germany to the two great empires of the east and west, should at the same time be equally satisfactory to Russia and to France—truly a sad kind of peace, which might, possibly, have flattered Napoleon's own self-conceit, but could have been in no way serviceable to the true interests of his empire. M. de Coulaincourt, on whom these illusions were partly founded, was far from being deceived by them himself, and as he was one of those rare persons who are at the same time courtiers and honest men, he had plainly declared to Napoleon that it was vain to indulge in the hope of

obtaining a species of surreptitious peace, by the defection of one of the allies from the others. He added entreaties that he might not be sent to Prague without being entrusted with full powers to seize the occasion which offered, of serving and saving his country, and even went so far as to intimate that if this latitude were not granted him, he would not accept the mission which it was intended he should fulfil. Napoleon, who was anxious that M. de Coulaincourt's name should give an air of reality to a feigned negotiation, promised that he should have full powers, and the illustrious negotiator, relying upon this promise, submitted to his master's will.

The selection of plenipotentiaries which Napoleon had thus made was universally approved, and produced an impression at Prague which in some degree corrected the effect of our continual delays. Although it was now the 16th of July and no more than thirty days remained for the completion of the negotiations, it was still possible even now, that all might be saved, when an unhappy incident occurred to give Napoleon the specious pretext which he required for the loss of still more time. There were assembled at Neumarkt, commissioners of the several belligerent powers, in permanent commission, for the daily regulation of all matters appertaining to the armistice. And when the French member of this board communicated to the others the last convention, which prolonged the armistice to the 10th of August, with a delay of six days between the denunciation of the armistice and the renewal of hostilities, the Prussian and Russian commissioners appeared to be now informed of it for the first time, and to hear of it with considerable astonishment. Having communicated on the subject with head-quarters, they received from the Commander-in-Chief, Barclay de Tolly, the confirmation of the convention, and at the same time were informed that hostilities were to recommence, not on the 17th of August, but the 10th. And this was a declaration as strange as it was unexpected; for according to the real meaning of the convention, the armistice could not be denounced before the 10th of August, and if it were denounced at that time, there would still, according to the terms of the first convention and all the rules usually observed in such cases, be a certain period of delay in the actual resumption of hostilities; and this period of delay, which was fixed at six days in the first convention, would naturally, in accordance with custom, the intention of the contracting parties, and the terms in which it was drawn up, be an essential item of the second convention. But from hence arose the misapprehension which was to furnish Napoleon with the unhappy pretext above alluded to. The Prus-

sian and Russian sovereigns were surrounded by persons, whose patriotic ardour had scarcely permitted them to agree to the first armistice, greatly as they needed it, and whilst they had been unwilling to refuse the second to M. de Metternich's earnest remonstrances, they had scarcely dared to announce that they had done so; and the Emperor Alexander, accordingly, as he was on the point of setting out for Trachenberg, where there was to be held a general conference of the members of the coalition, had mentioned to General Barclay de Tolly, without entering into details, that he had consented to a prolongation of the armistice until the 10th of August, but that he had refused to allow it to continue a day longer. In expressing himself in this manner the Emperor Alexander had alluded only to the principal delay, and had not intended to exclude that of six days, which was to intervene between the conclusion of the armistice and the recommencement of hostilities. But Barclay de Tolly, exact to excess in the minute observance of forms, refused to accept any explanation to this effect, and declared that he would not venture to take upon himself to decide upon a point of so much difficulty, and that it must be referred to the Emperor Alexander himself.

When Napoleon was first informed of this strange misunderstanding, he was much displeased, regarding it as founded in an attempt to deprive him of those additional days before the recommencement of hostilities, which he considered of so much value, at a time when every hour was fruitful for him in valuable results. But as, on recalling to mind the discussions which had taken place between himself and M. de Metternich, and the calculations which they had made together respecting this subject, he could not suppose that the second convention would not receive its correct interpretation, he ceased to feel any anxiety on the subject, and resolved to turn it to his own use, by making it the source of a new and quite plausible pretext for the loss of still more time. He immediately directed M. de Narbonne to declare at Prague, that as the meaning of the convention in virtue of which the belligerent powers were about to meet and negotiate was contested; it was conformable neither to his (Napoleon's) dignity nor to his safety, to treat with persons who were so regardless of their engagements, and that he should refrain from sending M. de Coulaingcourt until he should receive a categorical explanation, on the subject of the objection which had been raised by General Barclay de Tolly.

When information of this new difficulty arrived at Prague (on the 18th of July), it produced an impression which was

as vehement as it was natural. The Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries affected to be irritated and offended to a much greater extent than they really were; M. de Metternich was filled with consternation, and the Emperor Francis deeply wounded; for the Austrian monarch and his minister were not only sincerely grieved, as they saw the chances of the conclusion of a peace fade away, but also felt humiliated at the part which they had been made to play, and which now exposed them to the jeers of those who were opposed to their mediatorial policy.

M. de Metternich had an interview with M. de Narbonne, and showed every sign of being profoundly vexed; declaring that the fresh difficulty raised by Napoleon was merely frivolous, that it was one which might have been set at rest at the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries, and that Napoleon might have obtained with respect to it, not only the favourable opinion of the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries, but also the decisive opinion of the mediator, which was, in fact, already known to him. There was no valid reason, therefore, for the loss of more time, when scarcely twenty days still remained to the 10th of August; and it was impossible to avoid seeing in this conduct, a determination on the part of Napoleon, to avoid taking any genuine measures towards the conclusion of a peace during the whole period of the armistice. "But let him not suppose," continued M. de Metternich, "that he will succeed by this means in procuring the further prolongation of the suspension of arms for a single day. As soon as the 10th of August shall have arrived, there will be no longer time for the negotiation of peace, for war will be immediately declared. And let him not suppose that with respect to this war Austria will be neutral. No! After having endeavoured to the utmost of her power to bring about a peace on reasonable conditions, the only course open to her, should the Emperor Napoleon reject these conditions, will be to array herself in arms against him. Should she remain neutral (which he so much desires), the allies would, doubtless, be vanquished by him; but Austria's turn would come next, and she would have well deserved the blow which would then fall upon her. We shall not, then, commit this fault; but on the other hand we are as yet—I pledge you my word and that of my sovereign—free from engagements with any Power whatever. At the same time I can also pledge you my word that at midnight on the 10th of August we shall have entered into engagements with all the world except France, and that on the morning of the 17th you will have a force of three hundred thousand Austrian soldiers added to your enemies. It has

not been readily, it has not been without grief—for he is a father and loves his daughter—that my master has taken this resolution; but his duty to his people, to himself, and to Europe, demands that he should seize the opportunity of putting an end to the existing state of affairs; and, moreover, the only alternative open to him is to become himself, at some future period, victim to a state of subjection to you, worse than that under which you made Prussia suffer. Of course, we know very well how great a risk we run, however numerous our armies, when we venture to encounter the Emperor Napoleon at the head of the soldiers of France; but having well considered this risk, we prefer it to dishonour and slavery. Let it not be said hereafter that we have in any way deceived you! Until midnight on the 10th of August all may be arranged; but when that hour shall have passed by, there will no longer be the possibility of any respite, and your lot will be war—war with all the world—even with us!” “What,” said M. de Narbonne, “not one moment’s delay, even if negotiations should have already commenced?” “Only on one condition,” replied M. de Metternich, “only on condition that the proposed bases of peace should be accepted in their entirety, and that details alone should remain to be arranged.”

M. de Narbonne, who thoroughly comprehended the present posture of affairs, now wrote to M. de Bassano that it was absolutely necessary to determine upon a war with the whole of Europe or to negotiate seriously; and that this latter course would be necessary, even if the only object were to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice. He urged, therefore, that M. de Coulaingcourt should be immediately sent to the congress, as the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries were constantly threatening to withdraw (and they had a right to do so, since it was now the 20th of July, and they had been waiting since the 11th), and if they quitted Prague all would be at an end.

This wise advice, however, founded though it was on a most perfect acquaintance with the real state of affairs, received but little attention from M. de Bassano, and still less from Napoleon. But the latter was, nevertheless, anxious to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice, and as he doubted very much the possibility of obtaining it from Prussia and Russia, inspired as they appeared to be by a spirit of passionate hostility, he considered that a still better means of attaining the object he had in view would be, to allow hostilities to recommence with Prussia and Russia, whilst at the same time deferring yet for a time their commencement with Austria, by which means he would gain

time for effecting the destruction of the two first, before engaging with the third, *whose turn would then come*, as M. de Metternich had said. To enable him to succeed in this scheme, it would be requisite that towards the close of the armistice, he should open a negotiation in such a manner as to inspire M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis with some hopes that peace might still be concluded, to continue the negotiation concurrently with an actual state of hostilities, and thus, probably, retard Austria from taking an active part in them, since it was manifest that she would be very unwilling to be at war with France, so long as there should be any probability of the acceptance of her conditions. Intending, therefore, to pursue this course, he now sent to M. de Narbonne his powers and instructions, which had been hitherto withheld, together with the authority granted to each of the two plenipotentiaries of acting the one without the other. There could be no longer, therefore, any good ground for saying that the negotiations were suspended, since M. de Narbonne was perfectly competent to carry them on on the part of France, even to their conclusion. But although the merits of M. de Narbonne were duly appreciated, not only in Austria, but throughout Europe, M. de Coulaingcourt was regarded as the only one of the two French plenipotentiaries who was really acquainted with Napoleon's views, and so long as he was absent from Prague, there was a general tendency to consider the negotiation as simply futile. With reference to this idea, Napoleon declared that as soon as the Neumarekt enigma should have been cleared up, he would despatch M. de Coulaingcourt to the congress.

At the same time, M. de Bassano, incessantly endeavouring to model his behaviour upon that of his master, and to imitate his culpable but heroic indifference in the midst of danger, wrote to M. de Narbonne—"I send you more *Powers* than power, and you will have your hands tied, whilst your legs and mouth will be free, so that you will still be at liberty to walk about and cat." This was the tone of the French minister at that fateful moment, when the destinies of his master and his country were to be decided for ever.

Having indulged in this joke, M. de Bassano proceeded to inform M. de Narbonne that he might now exchange powers with those of the other plenipotentiaries, but that he was still to adhere to that method of conducting the negotiation upon which France had already insisted. He was, consequently, to offer that the exchange of powers should take place in a common conference, and when this formality should have been fulfilled, to propose the discussion of the

subjects of the negotiation, in conferences in which all the plenipotentiaries should take part, in the presence of the mediator, who should thus be both present at and participate in the negotiations, but should not be their *intermédiaire exclusif*.

When all these questions of form should have been settled, M. de Narbonne was to submit as the first basis of negotiation the *uti possidetis*, that is, that each power should retain what it held at the present stage of the war, as though none of the events of 1812 and 1813 had occurred.

When M. de Metternich learned that M. de Narbonne had received his powers, he was but little consoled by that fact for the absence of M. de Coulaingcourt, especially when he knew that M. de Narbonne wished to present and exchange his powers in a general meeting of the plenipotentiaries, at which the mediator should preside, but in which the plenipotentiaries should freely discuss the matters on hand, without regarding the mediator as the only channel by which the negotiation was to be conducted. This latter point, as we have seen, had acquired much importance since Napoleon had clearly indicated by his selection of M. de Coulaingcourt, that he was desirous of coming to a direct understanding with Russia at the expense of Austria; and from the moment this selection had been made, Prussia and Russia, in order that they might not be suspected of being willing to favour Napoleon's intention, affected to be more resolved than even Austria herself, to adhere to that form of negotiation, by which the mediator would be made the sole channel of discussion. Thus MM. Humboldt and d'Anstett, and especially the latter, had hastened to place their powers in the hands of M. de Metternich, and the latter, accordingly, declared to M. de Narbonne, that as far as he was concerned, he should be willing enough to consent to an exchange of powers at a general meeting, but that the plenipotentiaries of Prussia and Russia had already placed their powers in his hands, that they were thus legitimated, and that it was very unlikely, if only from natural *amour-propre*, that they should be willing to undo what they had thus done. He proposed to them, in fact, that they should yield on this point, but they refused, and the negotiation, therefore, notwithstanding that M. de Narbonne had received his powers, could not proceed a single step.

In the meantime, Napoleon, ceasing to entertain the illusory idea that it might be possible to enter into a separate negotiation with Russia, was the more anxious to retain Austria in a state of inactivity some days after the 17th of August. For peace itself he was by no means anxious, being unwilling for any consideration to abandon the Hanscatic

towns constitutionally annexed to the empire, to renounce the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, or to re-establish Prussia on the very morrow of her defection. Each of these sacrifices would be, doubtless, a cruel blow to his pride, but he should have considered himself fortunate, after the disasters he had suffered, that his pride alone was to be punished for the errors which produced them, and that he was required to sacrifice nothing that France could really regret; for, as we have already said, and must now repeat, when there were left to him beyond the Alps and the Rhine, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, as French departments, with Westphalia, Lombardy, Naples, as family principalities, more was yielded to him than France could desire, or could firmly grasp. And, indeed, it is difficult to understand how, when the chief portion of that chimerical greatness which he desired had been granted to him, he should compromise it for Hambourg or Lubeck, or for an empty title, such as that of protector of the confederation of the Rhine! . Doubtless, if the honour of his arms had been at stake, we might conceive that he should be unwilling to yield, for it is better to lose provinces than the honour of our arms — better, as well for the safety as the dignity of a vast empire. But after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, in which children had avenged the misfortunes of our veterans, the honour of our arms was safe, our real greatness was secure, and even, also, that exaggerated and useless greatness which Napoleon desired. Napoleon's pride alone remained unsatisfied, and to this personal feeling, it is sad to say, he was ready to sacrifice not only the real greatness of France, that which she had acquired without his aid during the Revolution, but also that factitious and fabulous grandeur with which he had crowned her by his prodigious exploits. To this personal feeling was he also about to sacrifice his wife, his son, and himself.

In the meantime, these subjects occupied Napoleon's mind both seriously and constantly, whatever serenity his countenance might wear, by reason of that faculty which he enjoyed in so high a degree, of employing his thoughts upon a thousand matters of business of every variety; and whatever might be the feelings of confidence with which he might contrive to inspire himself by the magnitude of his military projects. Constantly engaged, as he now was, in making excursions around Dresden, which frequently extended to thirty or forty leagues a day, and which, as they were made partly on horseback, his growing *embonpoint* rendered the more laborious, he never lost sight of these serious subjects; and whilst studying on the Bohemian frontiers the battle-

fields which were so soon to be covered with blood, he discussed them with the persons of every profession who accompanied him on his campaigns. Absolute as he was by reason of his power, his clear-sightedness always made him in some degree dependent on the ideas of those who might be around him, for he could not see disapprobation expressed on their countenances without feeling a strong desire to argue against and dissipate the ideas from which it arose.

The prevalent feeling, indeed, with respect to the dangerous character of the existing posture of affairs, unloosed the tongues of the courageous, and saddened the countenances of the timid. The military men who had regarded the position on the Elbe as a most excellent one, when the war had to be waged only against the Prussians and Russians, were terrified, now that the Austrian forces were also to be in the field against us, to find themselves on the Elbe with the possibility of being turned by these latter forces on the side of Bohemia, and of thus having the enemy in our rear, between us and Thuringia. At the same time, the politicians saw very clearly that Austria, constrained by the public opinion of Germany, and urged on by an anxiety to secure her own interests, was ready to imitate Prussia, and thus to leave France, now in a state of exhaustion, to struggle against the whole of Europe, rendered vigorous by passion. Both politicians and military men, therefore, were of opinion that the mediation and its conditions should be accepted, even if less advantageous than they really were. Doubtless, neither soldiers nor diplomatists would have wished that France should have resigned, for any consideration, her natural frontiers, but if they had been told that she was offered the possession, either direct or indirect, of Mayence, Cologne, Antwerp, Flushing, Amsterdam, the Texel, Cassel, Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples, they would on their knees have besought Napoleon to accept the conditions which granted him such territories as these. They were, however, left in ignorance of the real state of affairs, vague statements being made to them of the demand of sacrifices which could not be submitted to without dishonour. Still, although left in ignorance of what these sacrifices really were, they supposed that France was still too much feared to render it probable that any conditions should be proposed in which she was offered less than her natural frontiers, and in this supposition of conditions which were far less favourable than those really offered us, they were anxious to submit to sacrifices of mere pride, rather than encounter the danger of a struggle with the whole of Europe.

Politicians and military men discussed these subjects in the

ante-chambers of the palace, or in their bivouacs, closing their lips at Napoleon's approach, but sometimes so tardily as to afford him the opportunity, of which he seldom failed to take advantage, of continuing and taking part in the discussion, should he condescend to do so. When discussing the state of affairs with military men, answers to their objections did not fail him, for if they were right when they remarked that our position on the Elbe would be exposed to being turned, in the case of our being at war with Austria, they were equally in error, on the other hand, when they proposed, as many of them did, that he should adopt the line of the Saale; a line which was very short, might be easily forced at all points, and was exposed to being turned by Bavaria as that of the Elbe by Bohemia. To have adopted this line, would have been to have exposed our armies to be driven back upon the Rhine within a week; and it would, moreover, have been strangely inconsistent to abandon in the field; what had been so obstinately clung to in the cabinet. There was no middle course between accepting M. de Metternich's conditions, or defending the territory they would deprive us of in the field, and this could only be done on the Elbe. But whilst Napoleon's keen logic was sufficient to silence the objections of those around him on this point, the case was far otherwise when the discussion turned upon the political question of peace or war. For on that point, Napoleon, perceiving that he was in the wrong, suppressed the truth, and making vague remarks to the effect that the sacrifices at present demanded of him would, if granted, speedily attain the most immoderate bounds, hinted that Austria would soon even venture to demand the restoration of Italy. And at this point of the discussion he would become excited, expatiate on the honour of the empire, and exclaim that it would be better to perish than to submit to the conditions now proposed; the more especially as they were proposed by the Austrian court, which after having given him an archduchess in marriage, and accepted his alliance in 1812, took advantage of the first disaster which had come upon him, to turn against him. To these objections the opponents of his policy rejoined, by admitting that it was disagreeable to have to make sacrifices, especially to those who were to a certain extent traitors against us, but at the same time falling back upon the urgent necessity of peace.

Amongst the most indefatigable supporters of a peace policy, was M. de Coulaingcourt, who never ceased to entreat Napoleon to endure a temporary vexation, for the purpose of saving France, the army, and his own dynasty, and in the performance of this bold and patriotic task, he had met with

a singular auxiliary in the person of the Duke of Otranto, M. Fouché, who, although endeavouring to regain the imperial favour which he had lost, did not hesitate to obey the inspiration of his good sense, and also, perhaps, of an idea that the fall of the emperor would not be without danger to the men of the Revolution, and boldly maintained that it was absolutely necessary to conclude a peace. In one of the conversations to which we are here alluding, at which had been present M. Daru, M. de Coulaincourt, M. de Bassano, and even the King of Saxony, M. Fouché went so far as to say to Napoleon that if he did not speedily conclude a peace, he would render himself odious to France, and would thereby endanger not only his own fortunes, but those also of his son and his dynasty. "France," he added, "had been compelled, as a matter of honour, to make one final effort, because she could not withdraw, as though vanquished, from her great duel with Europe, but that after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, she had a fair right to consider her honour vindicated, and on the sole condition that she should be allowed to retain possession of the Rhine and the Alps, her right to which none of her enemies disputed, she might remain satisfied. And if," he continued, "in spite of the evident possibility of now concluding a peace, war should still be continued, she could not but regard herself as sacrificed to an extravagant system, which had no other foundation than Napoleon's personal feelings, and which she detested as much as Europe, because she suffered as much as Europe from its effects."

To these bold declarations, which irritated Napoleon excessively, he could only reply by repeating, that the sacrifices demanded of him by the allied powers were excessive, that his submission to them would only lead to other demands still more extravagant, and such as none of those who objected to his policy could wish him to yield; that the refusal to resign what was not absolutely necessary was the only means of retaining what was; and that one or two more battles must yet be fought, a few more days of warfare yet be endured, for the purpose of preserving a greatness acquired by twenty years of bloodshed, and of procuring a genuine and substantial peace. In short, in this conversation as in all the others on this subject in which he took part, his art consisted in concealing the real state of affairs, and in leaving his hearers in ignorance that the only sacrifices required of him, were Hambourg and the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine. But whilst he contrived by his eloquence and address to embarrass his disputants, who were, moreover, ignorant of the real state of the negotiations, he

could not convince them, or remove from their minds the fears inspired by the fatal resolution which it was but evident he had adopted. One only amongst them, appearing to be free from any apprehension of peril, ventured to affirm that the genius of the emperor, ever fertile in resources, would enable him to triumph over all his enemies, and replace him in, at least, as exalted a position as that which he had occupied in 1810 and 1811. This was, as the reader will have readily guessed, M. de Bassano; and his conduct in expressing himself in this manner was the less excusable, in as much as he alone knew the real state of affairs, and that it was only for the sake of Hambourg and the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, that the fortunes of the empire were about to be endangered. At the same time we must add, for the purpose of reducing this minister's responsibility, which would otherwise be so fearfully heavy, to its proper limits, that he had very little influence with Napoleon, who seemed to be but slightly affected by his magnificent prognostics.

And in Paris as well as in Dresden, Napoleon met with this opposition to his policy. The minister of police, the Duke of Rovigo, who heard more clearly than any other man the murmurs of public opinion, and who, by disregarding, had become so habituated to Napoleon's anger that he no longer feared it, frequently ventured to write to him what none of his other ministers dared to say to him, namely, that the conclusion of peace was an urgent, an indispensable necessity, that all the enemies of the government, who had been hitherto hopeless and dispersed, were now taking courage as well as hope, that the revolutionists who had so long lain crushed beneath the memories of '93, and the Bourbons who had so long and so entirely been forgotten, were again attempting to attain a political existence, and that the latter were even issuing manifestoes which were read without indignation, and with a certain degree of interest. All these assertions were true, and it was quite certain that the idea of a government for France other than that of Napoleon, an idea which during fourteen years had been entirely forgotten, failing to be entertained even at the time of the retreat from Moscow, began now, in the protracted continuance of an unsettled state of affairs, to be forced into the minds of so many persons, that there was every prospect that it would be generally entertained should the war continue; and that as in 1799 General Bonaparte had been sought as a refuge from anarchy, so the Bourbons would now be sought as a protection from a perpetual state of war. These were the reflections and opinions which the Duke of Rovigo, more or less openly, more or less

adroitly, attempted to bring before Napoleon's attention with a courage which does him honour, but which would have been both more meritorious and more useful had Napoleon's respect for his advice been greater than it really was. Prince Cambacérès could not have ventured to have said as much on these subjects as the Duke of Rovigo, although he regarded them with even more serious attention, for the reason that Napoleon would have regarded similar opinions from his lips of more authority, and would have listened to them, consequently, with even less patience. Becoming tired, at length, of the Duke of Rovigo's letters, Napoleon directed Prince Cambacérès to inform the duke that they annoyed him, that he, Napoleon, was alone capable of judging what was the right course to pursue, for the purpose of obtaining for France a peace which should be at once safe and honourable; that the Duke of Rovigo, in meddling with this matter, was busying himself about affairs of which he was entirely ignorant; and that, in short, he was in future to be silent with respect to them.

Having thus stopped the mouth of the Duke of Rovigo, Napoleon's next step was to give some employment to the Duke of Otranto; an opportunity for so doing arising from an accident which was as strange as it was singular. The unfortunate Junot had never, since he had been wounded in the head in Portugal, recovered either his physical or moral strength. In the Russian campaign he had failed to display his accustomed ardour, although he had been less to blame than was asserted, and the reproaches with which Napoleon overwhelmed him had had the effect of destroying his reason. Sent to Laybach as governor of Illyria, he had there suddenly shown such manifest signs of madness, that it had been found necessary to convey him under restraint to Bourgogne, his native country, and he had there died. Napoleon, thereupon, appointed M. Fouché governor of Illyria—a post but little in accordance with his political eminence, but which he had accepted because he was glad to re-enter the public service in any way. On his road to his new government he would meet with M. de Metternich at Prague, and be able to take advantage of former relations, to urge upon this diplomatist the propriety of the views of the French court. But the slight advantage which might thus be derived from this appointment, would be more than counterbalanced by the bad effect which it could not fail to produce in Austria, as being a sign that we were very far from being willing to resign Illyria to her.

Still persisting in his plan of gaining time, Napoleon resolved, as one means of effecting this object, to set out,

upon the opening of the negotiations, upon a second journey, the object of which would be a visit to the empress at Mayence, and which would, doubtless, cause fresh delays in the progress of the negotiations. He accordingly set out, leaving behind the necessary powers for M. de Coulaincourt, who was to proceed to Prague as soon as a satisfactory answer should have been received from the commissioners assembled at Neumarekt, with respect to the precise period during which the armistice was to continue.

It was now the 24th of July, and it was not probable that an answer could arrive from Neumarekt before the 25th or 26th. On the day after its arrival M. de Coulaincourt was to set out; on arriving at Prague he was to lose a day or two in making the acquaintance of the plenipotentiaries, and to employ five or six more in discussing the exchange of the powers, and the method in which the conferences should be conducted. By these means it would be easy to cause a delay which should extend unto the 3rd or 4th of August, and then, as Napoleon would most probably have returned to Dresden, he would be able to give fresh directions with respect to the course to be adopted.

In the meantime, the two months which had been lost, as far as respected the negotiations, had by no means, as may be readily imagined, been lost with respect to the military preparations. The infantry, encamped in good quarters, well fed and well disciplined, had greatly improved in all points during this space of time, and in none more than in that of number; whilst the cavalry had gained an entirely new aspect, being now both numerous and well mounted. In addition to the light cavalry attached to each army, Napoleon had four fine reserve corps of cavalry, under the Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, de Padoue, de Valmy. The guard, which consisted of five infantry divisions, also comprised twelve thousand troopers; together with two hundred well-served pieces of cannon. Fifteen hundred *guards of honour* had arrived in Dresden under General Dejean; and having lost, *en route*, the unsatisfactory disposition with which they had been at first inspired, had arrived full of aspirations to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the grand army. General Vandamme's corps, which Napoleon had expected at Magdebourg, was in excellent condition; and so, also, were the four divisions organised at Mayence, which were now marching towards Königsstein, where they were to take up their quarters. The supplies of provisions which had been ordered from every direction were arriving at Dresden by the Elbe, and more than fifty thousand quintaux of grain and flour had already been collected there. The energy of Marshal

Davout had succeeded in causing the resurrection, so to speak, of the defences of Hambourg, and they already carried two thirds of the three hundred pieces of cannon with which it was intended that it should be armed. All his military preparations, in short, were being carried out in due accordance with Napoleon's designs, and the successful manner in which they progressed, whilst it by no means tended to render Napoleon more inclined for peace, authorised M. de Bassano to spread abroad declarations that his master's forces were immense, his genius more exalted than ever; and that Europe had cause to tremble, since it was not for the strong to submit to the feeble.

At this time, for the purpose of giving some animation to the camps, in which the young troops had now, with the exception of the hours employed in drill, for two whole months lain idle, Napoleon gave numerous and liberal prizes to be contended for by shooting at marks; the advantages of which proceeding were, in addition to the incalculable one of rendering the troops much more skilful in the use of their weapons, that it gave the men occupation and amusement, and furnished many of them with the opportunity and means of regaling their comrades. He also had the officers supplied with their pay, that they might be enabled to enjoy the last few days of repose, which were to be for many, alas! the last of their lives. At the same time, he arranged that the *fête de Napoléon*, which would properly fall on the 15th of August, should be celebrated on the 10th, in order that its festivities might not be in too close proximity to the fresh scenes of carnage, which he foresaw would attend the renewal of hostilities, which was to take place on the 17th.

On the 26th a satisfactory reply arrived from the Neumarck commissioners, with respect to the precise period during which the armistice was to continue; it being admitted that although it might be *denounced* on the 10th of August, it would not expire until the 16th (inclusive), and that hostilities, accordingly, could not be resumed until the 17th. The misunderstanding with respect to this matter had been caused, as we have already seen, by the vague manner in which the Emperor Alexander had announced a concession so repugnant to the inclinations of the war party which surrounded him. He was now at Trachenberg, a little town of Silesia, to which he had proceeded from Reichenbach with the King of Prussia and the greater number of the generals of the allied forces, for the purpose of conferring with the King of Sweden upon the plan of future operations. This reunion, which had been much desired by the two sovereigns, who were anxious definitively to enlist Bernadotte in their

cause, and to put an end to his protracted hesitation, was far from being relished by the Russian and German officers; for it was said that an important command was about to be conferred upon the Prince Royal of Sweden, and extraordinary honours had already been prepared along his route, for the purpose of touching him in his most sensitive point—his vanity; and all this display of attention towards a man who, in the eyes of the Russian and German officers, was no more than a French general, and far from having a right to be numbered in the foremost ranks of French generals, excited, in the highest degree, the national jealousy of the two staffs; the prospect of being placed under his orders being especially disagreeable to them.

Unfortunately, these staffs had reason to experience similar feelings with respect to another French general, a great warrior, endowed with the most genuine civic and military virtues, who, unlike Bernadotte, whose moderate services had been rewarded by a crown, had received exile as the reward for services of the greatest value, and who, overcome by *ennui* and the feelings of irritation inspired by a rival's good fortune, had allowed himself to be persuaded to leave America for Europe. We allude to the illustrious Moreau, who, induced to visit Stockholm by Bernadotte, who seemed anxious to lead others into imitating his example, had permitted himself to be lead blindly into an abyss, under the influence of feelings which he believed to be honest, because the genuine indignation which filled his heart, prevented him from seeing how great a share the craving for occupation had in producing them. His arrival produced a great sensation at the present time, and, as it was rumoured that he was about to become the Emperor Alexander's adviser, the jealousy of the Russian and German officers received fresh fuel, bursting forth into exclamations that these sovereigns "seemed to believe that French generals could be overcome only by French generals."

However this might be, Bernadotte had come to Trachenberg, travelling, not as the Russian and Prussian monarchs had, with extreme simplicity, but with all the ostentation of a monarch traversing his states, on some solemn occasion. After having reviewed some of his troops, which had already taken advantage of the armistice to pass into Prussia, he had advanced close to Stettin, in which was posted a French garrison, with a brain inflamed with the idea that, Napoleon having become odious to Europe and a burden to France, and the Bourbons being entirely forgotten, it remained for him to replace the former upon the French throne. But whilst he was displaying himself on horseback under the

walls of Stettin, in the sight of its French garrison, some guns were fired at him, and when his officers complained of this to the brave General Dufresse, the governor, of this violation of the armistice, he ironically replied, "It is nothing. The guard have discovered a deserter and are firing at him; that is all!"

Arriving at Trachenberg in the midst of a numerous escort, and accompanied by a magnificent retinue, the Prince of Sweden was received there by the Russian and Prussian monarchs with a display of respect which could not have been greater, had he possessed the genius of Napoleon himself, or of the great Frederic. The real cause of this display, however, was not so much any talent he might himself possess as the fears which these monarchs entertained with respect to his fidelity, and their desire to be able to show to the world a lieutenant of Napoleon's, so weary of his tyranny as to be ready to turn his arms against him. After protracted hesitations he had agreed at length, when the allies had broken with Denmark and had definitively adjudged Norway to Sweden, to join them with twenty-five thousand Swedish troops, in return for whom he was anxious to be appointed generalissimo of all the armies which should not be under the immediate command of the two sovereigns. He was persuaded, however, to modify his pretensions, and after discussions which lasted from the 9th to the 13th of July, the following plan of campaign was determined on; the Austrian troops assembled in Bohemia, Bavaria, and Styria, being regarded as certain to co-operate with the Russian and Prussian armies.

Fully appreciating the danger of encountering Napoleon in the field, the allies proposed to vanquish him by the overwhelming number of their troops, which would amount, they hoped, to eight hundred thousand. From the position which he occupied at Dresden, and which he evidently intended to make the central point of his operations, they determined to drive him by means of three great armies; the first of which, consisting of a hundred and thirty thousand Austrians, and a hundred and twenty thousand Prussians and Russians, should operate by Bohemia upon Napoleon's flank, whilst the second, composed of a hundred and twenty thousand Prussian and Russian troops, under the command of General Blucher, should march directly upon Dresden by Liegnitz and Bautzen, and the third, numbering a hundred and thirty thousand, and entrusted to the Prince of Sweden, and composed of Swedish, Prussian, Russian, German, and English troops, should move from Berlin upon Magdebourg. According to the plan which had been laid down, these armies

were to act with great caution, to avoid direct encounters with Napoleon himself, to fall back when he advanced, to attack any one of his lieutenants whom he might leave on his flank or in his rear, again to fall back at Napoleon's approach to support the threatened lieutenant, and to continue this system until he should appear to be so far enfeebled as to render probable the success of a direct attack upon himself. And if, in spite of the advice given to each of the commanders-in-chief of these armies to be guilty of no rashness, to act cautiously with respect to Napoleon and boldly with respect to his lieutenants, they should expose themselves to and suffer defeat, this would not be any cause for despair, since there remained a reserve of three hundred thousand men ready to recruit the armies in the field, and to render them indestructible by continually renewing them.

This plan, which proved that Napoleon's adversaries had taken advantage of the lessons which he had given them, was formed, not by the Swedish Prince, but by the Russian and Prussian generals, who were accustomed to our mode of warfare. Bernadotte, who was now placed in command of one hundred and thirty thousand men, and who had never before been at the head of more than twenty thousand, was much discontented with the position accorded to him, considering it due to his royal rank and military talents, that, in addition to the army entrusted to him, he should have the command of the army of Silesia, and that Blucher should be subject to his orders. To such an arrangement, however, there were insurmountable objections, for Blucher was surrounded by the most distinguished and patriotic of the German officers, and the very idea of serving under Bernadotte, whom they hated as a Frenchman and a traitor to his country, filled them with disgust. He had been induced, therefore, to give up his strange pretensions, by the representation that the three armies would act so far apart, that it would be impossible that they should be under a single command, and on the condition that if ever it should be necessary for the army of the north (as Bernadotte's army was named), to act with the army of Silesia, he should then have the chief command of both of them.

These arrangements having been made, Bernadotte departed, intoxicated with the incense offered to him by royal hands, and the two monarchs returned to Reichenbach to await the issue of the negotiations. It was on their return, that the commissioners at Neumarckt had sent the reply which has been mentioned above, and which left Napoleon without any pretext for delaying any longer to send to M. de Coulaincourt to Dresden.

On the 26th, this worthy and courageous person received

from M. de Bassano, the instructions which Napoleon had left for him before his departure for Mayence, and the difficulties which he was to raise on matters of form, were so complacently detailed and so manifestly set forth as a means of causing the loss of time, that M. de Coulaincourt was filled with consternation. He had accepted, only that he might be able to arrange a peace which he considered absolutely necessary, the post of plenipotentiary at Prague, which could not but be more painful to him than any other, since after having enjoyed the particular favour of the Emperor Alexander, he must now expect to be treated by him, either personally or through his agents, with distressing coldness; and to have to expose himself to such treatment for no good purpose, and to take part in an empty farce, was as offensive to his self-respect as to his patriotism. He set out, however, supported by the solitary hope that he might obviate to some extent, at least, the effects of his master's unfortunate disposition, and on leaving Dresden addressed to Napoleon the following letter, which history ought to preserve.

“To the Emperor Napoleon,

“Dresden, 26th of July, 1813.

“Sire,

“I am fain, ere I quit Dresden, to give some expression to the feelings which surcharge my heart, that I may be able to proceed to Dresden with a mind entirely devoted to the duties with the performance of which your majesty has entrusted me. It is two o'clock. M. the Duke of Bassano has just placed in my hands the instructions, which 'the absence of the reply from Neumarckt, and your majesty's orders, have hitherto compelled him to withhold; and they are so different to the arrangements to which your majesty appeared to consent, when I took upon myself to accept this mission, that I should not hesitate even now to decline the honour of fulfilling it, if it were not that, so much time having been already lost, even hours are reckoned up at Prague, whilst your majesty is at Mayence and I am still at Dresden. This being the case, unwilling as I am to take part in negotiations so illusory as those which are about to commence, I am anxious above all things to fulfil my duty, and I obey. Tomorrow I shall be *en route*, and the following day at Prague, as I have been ordered; but permit, sire, that your faithful servant should now frankly express his opinions on the present state of affairs. So dark a cloud hangs over the whole political horizon, that I cannot resist the desire of entreating your majesty to take, in time, some prudent resolution. Pray let your majesty be convinced that there is no time to lose,

that the public feeling of Germany is irritated to the utmost, and that this popular exasperation, even more than the fears of cabinets, gives to the progress of events a movement which is at once swift and irresistible. Austria is already too deeply compromised to draw back, should not a continental peace reassure her. Your majesty will understand very well that it is not in behalf of this power that I wish to plead, that it is not for any recompense for her abandonment of us in the hour of our adversity that I now ask, that my anxiety is not even for the withdrawal of her hundred and fifty thousand bayonets from the field of battle, although this is certainly an object of consideration; but it is that general rising of Germany against us, which the old ascendancy of this power renders her capable of exciting, that I entreat your majesty at any price to avoid. All the sacrifices which at the present moment you may make for this purpose, and which, consequently, must tend to the prompt conclusion of peace, will render you, sire, more powerful than your victories have rendered you, and will at the same time make you the idol of your subjects, &c."

The manner in which M. de Coulaingcourt was received at Prague was worthy of him, and of the estimation in which he was held throughout Europe. As soon as information was received of his approach, all conferences were suspended until he should have arrived, and they were resumed by him with the revival of the question already raised by M. de Narbonne, respecting the interchange of powers and prosecution of the negotiation by the plenipotentiaries in a common meeting, over which the mediator should preside, but in which the plenipotentiaries should be at full liberty to confer freely the one with the other. M. de Metternich repeated what he had already said to M. de Narbonne; to the effect, that as the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries, as well from *amour-propre* as from interested views, were resolved not to consent to yield to Napoleon's views on this subject, all discussions with them upon it must be perfectly useless; that as, moreover, it was very evident that Napoleon was resolved that the negotiations should have no effectual result, it would be vain, indeed, to make any great exertions to obtain concessions as mere matters of form. That as it was possible, however, so unaccountable was Napoleon's character, that he might, even at the last moment, send orders to his plenipotentiaries to treat upon acceptable bases, Austria would refrain until midnight on the 10th of August from entering into any engagements with other powers; but that from that moment Austria would be irrevocably numbered amongst our enemies, and would be of all of them the one most resolved to vanquish us or to perish in the attempt.

Convinced by M. de Metternich's tone and manner, of his sincerity, M. de Coulaingcourt immediately wrote to M. de Bassano and to Napoleon, informing them yet once again of the real state of affairs, and the imminent danger which existed that Austria would almost immediately join the coalition, and thus render complete and definitive the coalition of Europe against us. So convinced, indeed, was M. de Coulaingcourt of the peril of our position, that he endeavoured to enlist M. de Bassano in support of what he considered the only true policy, by touching his ambition, entreating him to hasten to Prague clothed with full powers to sign a peace, the conclusion of which would render him, M. de Bassano, the object of universal gratitude, and would save innumerable victims, and amongst them, probably, France herself.

M. de Bassano, however, who had no will but his master's, and would as soon have thought of defying that of God as his, contented himself with replying to M. de Coulaingcourt's earnest remonstrances by granting him some latitude with respect to the question of form, permitting the two French plenipotentiaries to give a certified copy of their powers to the mediator, who might transmit it to the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries, so that this preliminary communication might take place in the manner our opponents desired; but insisting, at the same time, that the definitive exchange of powers should take place in a common conference. With respect to the form of the negotiation itself, he consented that the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries should proceed by means of written notes, but on condition that the French plenipotentiaries should be at liberty to discuss these notes in conferences at which all the plenipotentiaries should be assembled. Miserable subtleties these, and unworthy of the serious posture of affairs; but M. de Bassano wrote to Napoleon, informing him that he had granted them, in order that all the questions relating to the form of the negotiations, might be completely arranged before his return to Dresden, when, if it should suit his views to render the negotiation a genuine one, he would find all the preliminary discussions concluded.

Napoleon was at this moment at Mayencè, whither he had gone, as we have said above, for the purpose of passing a few days with the empress and of inspecting with his own eyes the progress of his military preparations. Setting out on the night of the 24th of July, he had arrived on the evening of the 26th at Mayence, where he was awaited by a brilliant court which had accompanied the empress from Paris, and a great

number of his agents who had proceeded thither to receive his personal orders. He found the empress much distressed and somewhat terrified by the existing state of affairs, and she gave way in his presence to the tears which she concealed from the public gaze. But the secret of the interview between Napoleon and his empress at Mayence has remained unknown—probably because there was none. Napoleon's object in seeking this interview was not to burden his empress with the performance of any task, but to see and console her, and to discover whether she had received from Vienna any clandestine communication which might throw some light upon the designs of the Austrian cabinet. As, however, Austria had already candidly declared her intentions through the mouth of M. de Metternich, it was impossible that Napoleon should procure any additional information with respect to them from Marie Louise.

The Duke of Rovigo had expressed a strong feeling of anxiety to meet the emperor at Mayence, for the purpose of enlightening him with respect to the state of public opinion, which had assumed a very serious aspect since it had begun to be suspected that the congress, the assembly of which had been so long delayed, would have no real result. In fact, the majority of the country was full of chagrin and gloomy apprehensions; whilst hate was taking the place of the affection with which Napoleon had once been regarded, and smothering the feeling of admiration. In lower Germany and Holland the cry was "*Vive Orange!*" whilst throughout the whole of Germany were to be heard cries of "*Vive Alexandre!*" And if in France none dared to cry "*Vive les Bourbons!*" it was no less certain that they were gradually resuming a place in the popular mind, and from hand to hand was transmitted the manifesto which Louis XVIII. had published at Hartwell, and which would, doubtless, have produced a general effect, had it not contained too many traces of the prejudices of the emigration. These were the details which the Duke of Rovigo was anxious to communicate to the master to whom he was so faithful a servant, but Napoleon, unwilling to be annoyed by what he called the *grumbings* of the interior, refused to receive him, and ordered him to remain in Paris, on the pretext that his presence there was necessary.

In accordance with the usual custom of a government which is obstinately resolved to persist in its errors, and sees in the manifestation of public opinion something which it ought to repress, rather than a lesson upon which it ought seriously to meditate, Napoleon now took measures against the clergy of the most extraordinary and vigorous character. The clergy

naturally neglected no opportunity of multiplying its manifestations of hostility towards his government, especially in Belgium, and thus, by its own errors, called into existence others on the part of Napoleon. Ignoring the concordat at Fontainebleau, they persisted in refusing to acknowledge the new prelates whom Napoleon had nominated, and whom Pius VII., after having promised to do so, had refused to institute. The more prudent of these prelates had refrained, in order to avoid giving occasion for scandal, from visiting their new sees; but the new bishops of Tournay and de Gand, who both proceeded to their dioceses, attempted to officiate publicly in their cathedrals, and provoked by so doing, a species of rebellion amongst their clergy and their flocks, who on the appearance of the prelates at the altar, simultaneously fled, leaving the latter almost alone.

Napoleon met this proceeding by ordering that the *béguines* who had taken part in it should be dispersed, that certain members of the chapters of Tournay and Gand should be imprisoned, the other being removed to distant parts of the country; that the same course should be pursued with respect to the professors of the seminaries of Tournay and Gand, who had led their pupils into a participation in the disorder, and that of the pupils themselves, those who were eighteen years of age should be sent to Magdebourg as conscripts, whilst those who were under this age should be restored to their families.

Placing no limits to the exercise of his will, Napoleon soon added to these proceedings one which was still more extraordinary; for, on receiving information that certain public functionaries, who had been prosecuted by the government, on the charge of having made very serious defalcations in the taxes of the city of Antwerp, had been acquitted by the juries before whom they were tried, he gave way to a violent fit of passion, and directed, in spite of the remonstrances of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and the other officers of the administration of public justice, that the decision of the Antwerp jury should be annulled by a *senatus consultum*, and that another court should try not only the accused persons who had just been acquitted, but also certain members of the jury which had acquitted them, who were suspected of having allowed themselves to be bribed. He alleged, in support of this course, an article of the constitution of the empire, which empowered the senate to annul such verdicts as should be of a nature calculated to effect the safety of the state, but it, nevertheless, involved almost as many irregularities as possible, for even admitting that the 55th article of the constitution of the 16 Thermidor, year ten (4th of

August 1802), was still in force, it was evident that the judgment in question was not one of those which had been referred to as of a nature to affect the safety of the state, and also, that although this article of the constitution might grant the right of abrogating certain verdicts, it in no way authorised the prosecution of those by whom they had been passed. To these objections, however, which were duly submitted to him, Napoleon refused to pay the slightest attention, not only ordering that the *senatus consultum* should be drawn up as he desired, and immediately submitted to the senate, but even signing and publishing a letter in which he took the whole responsibility of the step upon himself. The report of the counsellor of state, who was charged with the presentation of the *senatus consultum*, contained the following phrase, which completely expresses Napoleon's opinion with respect to the royal power, and contains views which certainly would never have been admitted to be correct, even before 1789;—"As our ordinary laws afford no means of annulling such a decision as this, it is necessary that the sovereign's hand should interfere; and as the sovereign is the very fountain of the law, he is endowed with all the powers necessary for securing the welfare of his kingdom, for defending it from injury, or relieving it from any actual evil."

But whilst thus arrogating to himself the possession of unlimited power, he did not fail to mingle with his arbitrary acts others which were in the highest degree benevolent. And amongst these latter may be mentioned the case of M. Muraire, the first president of the court of cassation, a distinguished magistrate, who had fallen from certain circumstances into great pecuniary difficulties, from which Napoleon, as soon as they were brought before his notice, immediately relieved him, by the grant of some hundreds of thousands of francs from his private treasury, which was, as has been already shown, the army's last resource.

Napoleon took advantage of his sojourn at Mayence, to bestow some attention upon the state of his finances. He had taken on account of his private treasury seventy-two millions, on account of the bank ten millions, and on account of the *caisse de service* sixty-three millions, of the new bills issued upon the communal property, the alienation of which had been resolved on, and was now sanctioned by law; and thus was formed a resource of one hundred and forty-five millions, realised in advance, and which caused no emission of these bills, since the treasuries in which they were deposited retained them *en porte-feuille*. In the meantime, however, the expenses of the treasury during the past six months, had exceeded the ordinary receipts by two hundred millions; an ex-

cess which M. Mollien did not dare to meet, by making use of the bills drawn on the *caisse d'amortissement*, lest they should suffer an excessive depreciation. A few, indeed, had been issued for the purpose of introducing them to the notice of the public, and had been negotiated at a discount of not more than five or six per cent., but to have extended the issue of them to any considerable extent, would have been both difficult and dangerous. A further portion might have, however, been paid away in exchange for the goods supplied by the great army and navy contractors, who, anxious to continue the immense transactions they were carrying on with the state, were not over particular with respect to the manner in which they were paid, and were, moreover, in such want of money, that they would have been glad to receive it, even in a form which they could not realise except at a loss of ten or fifteen per cent. By these new bills, also, might have been paid those persons who were compulsory contractors, so to speak, to the government, being the landed proprietors, farmers, or merchants, upon whom requisitions had been levied of produce, manufactures, or horses, which they were to supply for ready money. But M. Mollien, who was averse to any but the regular methods of conducting business, preferred to make the contractors and the persons on whom requisitions had been levied wait for their money, rather than issue paper which would be exposed to be qualified as *assignats* as soon as its introduction into circulation, should appear to be in the least forced. The consequence was that the contractors began to murmur, uttering complaints of the delay made in satisfying their claims, and making the delay a reason for dilatoriness in the execution of their contracts; and it was on this account that Napoleon now turned his attention to the matter, at a time when he could only find time to listen to matters referring to the army.

Addressing M. Mollien, Napoleon argued with him that a fall of nine or ten per cent. in the market value of the new securities would be a matter of little moment, since a heavy rate of interest punctually paid, would maintain their real value, and that such a depreciation certainly could not be equal to the inconvenience of delaying the payment of those persons, whose claims it was so urgently necessary to satisfy. By the issue of the new bills to the government contractors, those of them who had no urgent need of ready money would be thus placed in possession of an advantageous security, whilst those to whom it was an immediate necessity would be able to obtain it at a discount; the only inconvenience of which would be, that the market value of the new bills would suffer a depreciation of nine or ten per cent.,

which the exact payment of the rate of interest which they carried would soon render a matter of indifference to the regular holders.

This specious argument would have been almost completely founded on truth, if the depreciation in the value of the new securities could have been limited to ten, to twelve, or even to fifteen per cent. But who could say to what discount they would next fall if once they were issued in any considerable quantity? This was what M. de Mollien feared, and what Napoleon refused to consider, for he ordered that about thirty millions of the bills of the *caisse d'amortissement* should be issued in Paris in payment of the government contractors, and about eighteen or twenty millions in the provinces, in payment of the *requisitions*. Fifty millions worth were thus to a certain degree forced into circulation; and at the same time, that the realisation of the communal property might be expedited, Napoleon directed the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to make arrangements for the speedy conclusion of this business by means which should be at once summary and uninterrupted.

Having thus afforded a somewhat violent relief to his finances, Napoleon, whose mind was constantly occupied with the subject of the levy of troops, devised a conscription of a new species which he hoped to render bearable, by giving to it an air of urgent necessity and local importance. As the frontier of the Pyrenees, for example, was by the late events in Spain rendered liable to danger, he proposed to raise thirty thousand men, of the four last classes, in the departments lying between Bordeaux and Montpellier, for the purpose of securing this portion of the empire from invasion. As the soil which these new recruits would be called upon to defend would be their own, Napoleon considered that the urgency of the necessity which induced him to levy them must silence all complaints; and he resolved to apply the plan to the departments of the north and east, demanding of them sixty thousand men, under the pretext of a local and imminent danger. But as these conscriptions would speedily take the form, and have the effect, of a general conscription, he determined to defer the second of them for two or three months, only levying at once the thirty thousand men required of the departments bordering on the Pyrenees.

Occupied as he was with the formation and developement of these various measures, as well as with the review of his troops and the constant inspection of matériel Napoleon had not much time to bestow upon the empress, but, nevertheless, he did not fail to bestow upon her testimonies of the greatest affection, testimonies which were very sincere,

and at the same time had a political aim, since he was anxious that the new war into which he was about to enter with Austria, should not cast any shadow upon a marriage which he ever regarded as an important element of his policy, and since, also, he was desirous, by being a good husband, to place the Emperor Francis under an obligation, as it were, to be a good father. But in manifesting these signs of affection he did but yield, we must repeat, to the inclinations of his own heart, for he was touched by the affection with which he appeared to have inspired this noble daughter of the Cæsars, and he returned it with as much ardour as the other engrossing and exciting matters which occupied his attention, permitted. Anxious to preserve her from anxiety as far as possible, he forbore to tell her how inevitable was the approaching war, and how serious would be its character; and with this object of saving her from the pressure of the heavy cares of the moment, he directed her to make a voyage on the Rhine, from Mayence to Cologne, during which she would receive the homage of the populations on each bank; and arranged, further, that after having spent a few days in Paris, she should undertake a journey into Normandy, for the purpose of presiding at Cherbourg at an imposing ceremony—being that of the admission of the waters of the ocean into the celebrated basin which was commenced in the reign of Louis XVI. and had now been completed in his own.

Having been from the 26th of July to the 1st of August with Maria Louise, he embraced her in the presence of his whole court and, leaving her in tears, set out for Franconia. He had already inspected at Mayence the divisions of Marshal Augereau; and at Wurzburg he found those of Marshal Saint Cyr, which were now actually on their march towards the Elbe, where they were to take up the position of Königsstein. After having inspected the citadel, the magazines, and in short, the whole military establishment of Wurzburg, which he wished to make one of the important points of his line of communication, he proceeded to Bamberg and Bayreuth, where he saw successively the other divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, and the Bavarian divisions which were intended to form a portion of the corps of Marshal Augereau. After inspecting everything with great minuteness, and giving such orders and encouragements as he considered necessary, he set out on his return to Dresden, where he arrived on the evening of the 4th of August.

The sight of the troops which he had inspected on his route, and his incessant meditations on the plan of the approaching campaign, had redoubled his confidence as well

in his army as in the resources of his own genius. Watching the approach of the terrible struggle which was so soon to take place, considering his chances of success, reminding himself how brave his soldiers were, and how he, himself, on a time, had plucked victory from the very midst of danger, from positions in which his opponents had only found opportunities of error--allowing his thoughts, we say, to be engrossed with such reflections as these, whilst he failed to take into due account the patriotic passions which he had aroused against himself, and the strength of which might very probably compensate for the want of military skill, he felt within himself a species of ardour which gave an air of animation to his whole person, and beamed in his eyes with the light of hope and courage. Those who were around him at this time were struck with it, and to the wiser of them it appeared to be a subject rather for disquietude than satisfaction.

On the very day of his return to Dresden, he received despatches from M.M. Coulaingcourt and Narbonne, in which they entreated more earnestly than ever for permission to carry on the negotiation in good faith, to which, annoyed, apparently, by their importunity, he replied, by reproaching them with having permitted M. de Metternich to address them with too little reserve, as though he were offended by the frankness of the latter, in stating that under certain circumstances Austria would join his enemies. But having given this undeserved reprimand, he devoted his attention to a matter which was far more serious, and which was the retention of Austria from actually taking the field, until he should have been first able to crush the Russians and Prussians. And now, since this object could only be attained by appearing to negotiate in good faith, Napoleon resolved to realise M. de Metternich's prognostic, that matters might be happily settled even at the last moment. Napoleon resolved to direct M. de Coulaingcourt, secretly and exclusively, to make a confidential communication to M. de Metternich, in which he, Napoleon, would offer to consent to conditions, which would involve the sacrifice of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and the restoration of Illyria, whilst still refraining from giving up the Hanseatic towns, or the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine; for he thought that at the last moment Austria would consent to yield on these points, or that she would, at least, by the commencement on his part of a sincere negotiation, be induced to refrain from entering the field against him, even after hostilities should have been renewed with the allies.

Putting this resolution into execution, he directed M. de Coulaingcourt (who was to keep the matter a profound secret

from M. de Narbonne, so that it might wear a more confidential aspect), to seek an interview with M. de Metternich, to address him on the matter in hand without preface, to declare that he, Napoleon, was anxious that advantage should be taken of the five days which still remained, for the purpose of arriving at a mutual good understanding with respect to the subjects of the negotiation, and that Austria should now, since the shortness of the time remaining available for negotiation forbade any indulgence in vulgar *finesse*, finally and precisely announce her real wishes, so that they might receive immediately an equally precise and equally decisive answer.

Unfortunately, whilst making to Austria this overture, which, although tardy, had still some chance of success, Napoleon added to it a note, referring to the official negotiation, of a very offensive character, since it declared, with considerable plainness, that the difficulties with respect to the form of the negotiation which had been raised by the representatives of the belligerent powers, revealed their real intention, which was no other than a design to involve Austria in the war against France at the expense of any amount of bad faith or trickery. And this strange note, MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaincourt were jointly to present to M. de Metternich; just before M. de Coulaincourt, taking M. de Metternich aside, was secretly to make to him the proposition above described.

The despatches containing these contradictory instructions reached Prague on the 6th of August, and whilst causing M. de Coulaincourt considerable surprise, filled him with a mingled feeling of joy and sadness, for the period still available for the purpose was so short, that he despaired of bringing this negotiation, *in extremis*, to any good issue, and he feared moreover that the official note would create an effect most prejudicial to his efforts.

Offended at the official note, M. de Metternich was in the highest degree astonished, when, a few minutes after the two French plenipotentiaries had left him, M. de Coulaincourt returned to make to him Napoleon's secret communication. It arrived at so late a moment, and he was so accustomed to despair that Napoleon would ever be inclined to enter upon a course leading to peace, that he could scarcely believe that he was now sincere, and for this reason alone failed to experience and to manifest that pleasure on the occasion, which he otherwise would have had. He expressed his regret that this step had not been taken some days earlier, as in that case, without violating the secrecy which Napoleon insisted should be observed with respect to this secret communi-

cation, it would have been possible to sound the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries with respect to certain delicate points, and to settle the questions on which the belligerent courts were at issue. However, as Napoleon desired to be informed by the Austrian Cabinet of the conditions which she was prepared to support, and the adoption of which by Prussia and Russia she was ready to demand, he would go, he said, to consult his master, and would be able, he hoped, within twenty-four hours to give a reply.

M. de Metternich proceeded accordingly to Brandeiss, where the Emperor Francis was at present residing, found him as indignant, as everyone had been at Prague, at the official note of the 6th of August, and inspired him with a feeling of astonishment, which was at least equal to his indignation, by making him acquainted with the unexpected step taken by the principal French plenipotentiary. Although the character of this proceeding was perfectly in accordance with Napoleon's brusque and undisciplined character, it was yet impossible but that a step towards peace made by him thus at the last extremity should be regarded with suspicion. But whether it were made in good faith or simply as a *ruse*, both the Emperor Francis and his minister at once agreed that it was necessary to reply to his demand without hesitation, since if he really desired peace, it was right to come to a frank explanation with him, and if his purpose were only to provoke some inadmissible proposition, it was of importance to frustrate this project by submitting to him those conditions to which Austria had so long adhered, and which, certainly, France could not regard as dishonorable.

They were, as we have already so frequently said, the division of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and the bestowal of the larger portion of it upon Prussia; the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine; and the re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns; and, finally, the restoration of Illyria to Austria. The fulfilment of these conditions was so absolutely necessary, if Germany was to be re-endowed with any portion of independence, that it was impossible to devise or propose any others; and, therefore, as the adhesion of Prussia and Russia to those bases was quite certain, whilst it was equally certain that the renunciation of Spain by Napoleon, and the re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns would so far satisfy England as to render her unwilling to continue the war alone, it was resolved to communicate these conditions to Napoleon, who was already well acquainted with them, and with the same stipulation for secrecy, which he had himself made, to demand an answer within forty-eight hours.

M. de Metternich returned to Prague on the 7th, but was

suddenly recalled to Brandeiss by his master, who was all at once seized with a feeling of disinclination to carry on these secret communications. After a fresh examination of the subject, however, M. de Metternich proceeded to convey to M. de Coulaingourt the answer which had been agreed on, telling him that his, M. de Metternich's, master had demanded whether this unexpected and tardy communication now made by Napoleon was a step of necessity, or of fraud ; that it pleased him to imagine that it was the former, but that in either case he considered it right to answer it, since the conditions which he proposed were such as might freely be avowed to the whole world, and especially to France. He then made, verbally, the following declaration, authorising the French minister to transcribe it immediately from his dictation.

*Instructions to the Count de Metternich, signed by the
Emperor of Austria.*

“ M. de Metternich will require an assurance from the Duke of Vicentia, on his word of honour, that his government will preserve the most profound secrecy with respect to the matter in question.

“ Having become acquainted, by means of confidential preliminary communications, with the conditions on which the courts of Russia and Prussia are prepared to negotiate a peace, and having accepted these conditions as my own, because I perceive that they are necessary to the well being of my states and those of the other powers, and that they are the only ones which could really lead to a general peace, I do not hesitate to declare the terms which form my *ultimatum*.

“ I shall expect an answer either in the affirmative or negative on the 10th.

“ I am resolved, as are also the courts of Russia and Prussia, to declare, on the 11th, that the Congress is dissolved, and that I unite my forces with those of the Allies for the purpose of obtaining a peace compatible with the interests of all the powers ; and I now declare in brief the final conditions which, if not now accepted, must be referred to the decision of arms.

No proposal made after the 11th can have any connection with the present negotiation.

*The conditions regarded by Austria as those on which it would
be possible to arrange a peace.*

“ The dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, and its re-division between Austria, Russia, and Prussia ; Dantzic being accorded to Prussia.

"The re-establishment of Hambourg and Lubeck as free Hanseatic towns; and an arrangement to be eventually come to as one of the terms of a general peace, with respect to the other portions of the 32nd military division, and the renunciation of the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, so that the independence of all the actual sovereigns of Germany should be guaranteed by all the great powers.

"The reconstruction of Prussia with a tenable frontier on the Elbe.

"The cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria. A reciprocal guarantee that the possessions of the greater and lesser states, as settled by the terms of the peace, should severally suffer no injury or alteration at the hands of any of them."

After this highly important communication, which confounds all the falsehoods which, in certain quarters, have been set forth upon the subject, M. de Metternich made some explanations, which were also of great moment. He said that up to the evening of the 10th of August, Austria would remain free from any engagement with the belligerent powers; that up to that time she would be able to treat confidentially with Napoleon, as she had hitherto; be free to adopt some of his propositions, and even compel their acceptance by the allies, to whom she was at present bound by no treaty; but that after that time she would be so bound; would be compelled to communicate to them every proposition which might be made to them, and be able only to accept such conditions of peace, as they should be willing to receive.

These observations deserved the most serious attention, for the difference between negotiating before the close of the 10th of August, and after that time was, that in the former case we should have to depend only on Austria, who longed for peace because it feared war; and in the latter case, we should have to depend on the will of the Allies, who were averse to peace, because they expected to obtain more from war, and were under the sway of the passionate influences of the time.

The Duke of Vicentia reported with great exactness the communication which had been thus made to him, and, at the same time, renewed his remonstrances in words which were as well chosen as they were touching.

"Sire," he said, addressing Napoleon, "this peace will cost you, perhaps, some pain to your vanity, but will detract nothing from your glory—for it will take nothing from the real greatness of France. Grant then, I conjure you, this peace to France; grant it in consideration of her sufferings, of the noble devotion she feels towards you, and of the stern neces-

sities of the moment. Allow time for the subsidence of the fever of irritation against us with which at present all Europe is convulsed, and which even the most decisive victories in our favour would rather still further excite than calm. And this demand for peace I make, not for the mere honour of signing it, but because I am certain that in concluding it you would perform an act than which nothing could be more useful to your country, or more worthy of yourself and your exalted reputation!" What was to be the effect of these noble prayers of a noble heart we shall hereafter see!

Napoleon received M. de Metternich's reply at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, and should have sent his own answer on the evening of the same day, submitting to the very moderate sacrifices demanded of him and forwarding at the same time such powers to M. de Coulaingcourt as would enable him to sign the basis of peace before midnight of the 10th. But, unfortunately, he did not take this step, for regarding, in the first place, the determination expressed by Austria of joining the Allies on the 11th, as mere diplomatic language intended to intimidate him, and hasten his movements; being unwilling, in the next place, to avoid war at the price of such sacrifices as those which were demanded of him, and placing, also, a blind confidence in the strength of his arms, he was in no haste to adopt or communicate his final resolutions, and thus neglected to take advantage of that moment which, in a political sense, was the most important of his reign. And what was M. de Bassano's course during those fatal hours? Did he not pass them at his master's feet, repeating with his utmost energy the ardent, the patriotic prayers of M. de Coulaingcourt.

It was not to such prayers as these, but to echoes only of his own thoughts, that Napoleon listened during the hours which were to bear away with them his greatness and ours! After having passed the night with M. de Bassano in considering and reconsidering the state of his armies, he became convinced that he was powerful enough to meet every danger, and to persist in his own views. He resolved, therefore, to consent only to the following conditions:—He was willing that a portion or even the whole, if Russia and Austria were willing to resign it to her, of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw should be annexed to Prussia; but as, whilst thus granting her some increase of territory, he was most unwilling that she should be rewarded for what he called her treason; he was anxious to drive her back beyond the Oder, to take from her, for the purpose of bestowing them upon Saxony, Brandenburg, Berlin, and Potsdam, to remove her to a position between the Oder and the Vistula, to make her thus

a Polish rather than a German power; to permit her to choose as her capital either Warsaw or Königsberg, and, withholding Dantzic from her, to make of it once more a free town. He wished to place Saxony in the position Prussia at present held between the Oder and the Elbe, and to bestow upon the former kingdom all the territory extending from Dresden to Berlin. With respect to Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, considering these cities as essential portions of the Empire, he would not even speak of their separation from it. He was equally resolved not to resign the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine; since it was acknowledged that it was a mere title, and his enemies desired to deprive him of it only for the purpose of humiliating him. With respect to Illyria he was ready to yield it to Austria, but was at the same time determined to retain Trieste, which was all that Austria really coveted. He affected, also, to be resolved to keep in his own hands several positions beyond the Julian Alps, such as Villach and Goritz, and, in fact, all the gates through which a descent might be made into Illyria.

Such were the propositions which were the result of the meditations of this fatal night. But as, however, there was no probability that Austria would be able to obtain of her future allies the abandonment of Berlin on the part of Prussia, for the purpose of annexing it to Saxony, and thus forming of this latter kingdom a species of feigned Prussia, he authorised M. de Coulaingcourt to give up this first proposition, should it not be accepted, and to consent that Prussia should possess, besides such part of the Duchy of Warsaw as should be granted to her, all the territory which she held between the Oder and the Elbe.

On the morning of the 10th, Napoleon sent for M. de Bubna, who was sincerely anxious for the conclusion of a peace, and who, unfortunately, from a desire to conciliate him, lent himself somewhat too readily to the views of his powerful interlocutor. Having informed him of the secret negotiations carried on with M. de Metternich, Napoleon communicated to him the state of his troops, openly displayed to him the strong inclination he felt to make this campaign of Saxony, his confidence that its results would be in his favour, and his consequent carelessness as to whether peace or war should be the result of the negotiations at Prague. He then proceeded to lay before the Austrian minister his conditions, to which the latter could not, of course, assent, but to which he did not object with sufficient peremptoriness to dispel the illusions entertained by Napoleon. On two points especially, those of the Hanscatic Towns, and the Confederation of the Rhine, as he had never found his Court so

resolved with respect to them: as to the others, he now appeared very undecided, and Napoleon indulged in the hope that he might be able to conclude a peace without submitting to those two conditions which he found so especially repugnant.

Having dismissed M. de Bubna with directions to communicate to his Court the particulars of the above interview, he sent a dispatch to M. de Coulaingcourt containing his final resolutions; caring little for the fact that this dispatch could not reach its destination until the 11th, and, whilst awaiting its answer, whatever it might be, continuing his preparations for the renewal of hostilities.

The 10th of August passed, therefore, at Prague, without the arrival of any dispatch from Dresden, to the great satisfaction of the Prussian and Russian negotiators, the great grief of M. de Coulaingcourt, and the great regret of M. de Metternich, who could not but tremble at the prospect of a fresh war between Austria and France. Several times in the course of the day he visited M. de Coulaingcourt for the purpose of learning whether any reply had been received from Dresden, and each time, finding M. de Coulaingcourt sad and silent, because he had nothing to say, he repeated that, as soon as midnight should have passed, Austria would no longer be an arbitrator, but one of the belligerent powers, and no longer able, consequently, to dictate to the Allies conditions of peace.

After having vainly waited during the whole of the 10th, M. de Metternich signed, at length, Austria's adhesion to the coalition, and, on the morning of the 11th, announced to MM. de Coulaingcourt and Narbonne (the latter of whom had remained in ignorance of the secret negotiation)—announced, we say, with evident chagrin, that the Congress of Prague was dissolved, and that Austria, impelled to do so by the duty she owed to Germany and to herself, found herself forced to declare war against France. At the same time, the Prussian and Russian Plenipotentiaries announced that they were about to depart, throwing the responsibility of the failure of the negotiations upon France; and left Prague accordingly with an undissembled joy, which was shared by all Austria; the only exceptions being in the case of M. de Metternich, who foresaw the possible consequences of a fresh rupture with Napoleon, and of the Emperor Francis, who was full of anxiety on account of his child.

In the course of the 11th, M. de Coulaingcourt received at length the dispatch so earnestly expected on the previous evening, and although he could not flatter himself with the expectation that he should be able to obtain all that

Napoleon desired, he thought it not impossible that even now he might be able to procure a certain degree of assent to his propositions. Hastening to the Austrian minister, he found him distressed that the dispatch had not arrived sooner, vexed that M. de Bubna should have been made acquainted with the secret negotiation, and convinced that Napoleon's propositions could not be accepted; but at the same time disposed to admit, that if France should agree to the views of Austria, with respect to the restoration of Trieste, the re-establishment of Prussia, and the abolition of the protectorate of the Rhine; it might be possible to defer the decision of the question of the Hanseatic towns, until the conclusion of peace with England. He added, however, that although Austria would have been able twenty-four hours earlier to have imposed those conditions on the Allies, it could now only propose them, and could not be at all certain that they would be accepted.

As the Congress was now broken up, and war was formally declared by Austria against France, the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries left Prague, and the French plenipotentiaries could not with propriety remain there. It was agreed, however, that if Napoleon should consent, M. de Narbonne should be allowed to depart alone, and that M. de Coulaingcourt should remain to await the result of the overtures which M. de Metternich was to make to the Sovereigns of Prussia and Russia, who were to arrive at Prague within two or three days. It could not but be very disagreeable to M. de Coulaingcourt, to prolong his residence in Prague, at a time when the Emperor Alexander would be also there, and circumstances would render it impossible that they should meet. But as everything which could afford a chance of the conclusion of a peace appeared to him to be not only supportable, but even highly desirable, he willingly consented to remain. Informing Napoleon of what had taken place between himself and the Austrian minister, he repeated his representations in favour of peace, urged him to grant him some latitude in conducting the negotiations, and to send him authentic powers for the signature of any agreement which might be made, since at this last moment the least defect in any matter of form might be regarded as a fresh pretext, and cause his, M. de Coulaingcourt's definitive dismissal.

These communications reached Napoleon at the time when he was fully prepared for war, and as little distressed as surprised at the dissolution of the Congress. On the very day on which the Congress had been dissolved, the armistice had been denounced by the commissioners of the belligerent

powers—a measure which fixed the 17th August as the day on which hostilities were to be resumed; and as there was but a very slight probability that the negotiations broken off in this public manner could be resumed by means of any private communications, Napoleon acted as though he had no expectation that they would. However, whilst ordering M. de Narbonne to leave Prague immediately, he authorised M. de Coulaincourt to remain there, and consented that his last propositions should be transmitted to Prussia and Russia, and not in his own name, but in that of Austria, since he did not consider it, he said, consistent with his dignity to submit propositions to the belligerent powers. He sent M. de Coulaincourt the formal powers he had requested, but refrained from granting him any latitude in conducting the negotiations, his conditions being unalterable with respect to the Hanseatic Towns, the protectorate of the Rhine, and even Trieste, which he wished to retain, notwithstanding the restoration of Illyria to Austria.

On the 10th of August he celebrated his fête, which was usually held on the 15th, and endeavoured, so far as possible, to preserve the light and facile spirits of his troops from the oppression of gloomy images. His corps d'armée were all prepared, and from the 11th began to leave their cantonments for the purpose of becoming concentrated under their appointed leaders, and advancing to their several positions on the line of battle. The works which he had ordered to be executed at Kœnigstein, Lilienstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, Werben, and Hambourg, were completed, or nearly so; and the vast stores of provisions which he had had conveyed by the Elbe from Hambourg to Magdebourg, and from Magdebourg to Dresden, were already at the required points. He determined that he would himself set out on the 15th or 16th of August, when he would proceed to Silesia and the frontier of Bohemia, where he expected to see the commencement of hostilities. In the meantime he wrote to General Rapp, at Dantsic, reassuring him with respect to this new struggle, conferring on him extraordinary powers, recommending him to defend the fortress entrusted to his charge to the utmost, and promising to release it from blockade almost immediately. To the Governors of Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin, he wrote in similar terms; and to Marshal Davout, at Hambourg, and General Lemarois, at Magdebourg, that they were to be on their guard, that the war was about to recommence in terrible earnest; but that he was prepared to meet all his enemies, even though they should include Austria, and that he hoped, before three months were over, to have punished

them for their impertinent propositions. He did not, however, for he dared not, tell to any one on what terms he might have concluded a peace; but contented himself with intimating to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who was the real head of the Government of the Regency, that he would speedily be informed of the Austrian demands; that for the moment it was necessary to keep them secret, but that they were in the highest degree extravagant and offensive. To the Duke of Rovigo, whom he respected somewhat less, he ventured to tell a downright lie on this subject, writing to him that his opponents wished to deprive him of Venice; founding this untruth, apparently, on his usual declaration, that to demand Trieste was to demand Venice, which was as true as it would be to say, that to demand Magdebourg was to demand Mayence, because the one is on the road to the other. Being anxious to preserve the Empress from anxiety, he directed the Arch-Chancellor to make her set out for Cherbourg, in order that she might not become informed of the renewal of hostilities until after some great battle had been gained, and the greatest dangers had passed by.

At this moment arrived in Dresden one of those of his lieutenants, whom Napoleon found most useful on the battlefield—namely, the King of Naples, whose presence at this time was desirable, as well with respect to matters of war, as with reference to politics. We have seen how, weary of Napoleon's yoke and alarmed, also, with respect to the fate of the Imperial dynasty, Murat had taken care to attach himself to Austria and her mediatorial policy, and that, distrusting even his wife, he had ended by concealing himself from her, and had fallen into a state of febrile agitation. We have seen, also, that Napoleon, for the purpose of completing the army of Italy, and making trial of the good faith of the Neapolitan court, had demanded of it a division of its troops, and that Murat, carrying on an intrigue with Austria, and anxious, moreover, to keep his own army in his own hands, had refused compliance with his brother-in-law's request. When, however, Napoleon, in accordance with his usual mode of operations, summoned Murat to comply with his requisitions under pain of a declaration of war, Murat, tormented with doubts with respect to Napoleon's destiny, had fallen into a state of perplexity which was little removed from madness, but was ultimately induced by the counsels of his wife and the letters of the Duke of Otranto, with whom he was once more in secret correspondence, to obey his brother-in-law's commands: and as he was anxious that the reconciliation, if it were to take place at all, should be complete, he set out to place himself at the head of the

cavalry of the grand army, and arrived in Dresden on the eve of the commencement of the campaign. Napoleon received him graciously, feigning to ignore the past, but still permitting himself to express a certain degree of contempt for his conduct, which Murat perceived very plainly, and in silence.

Accompanied by Murat, then, Napoleon set out on the night of the 15th August for Bautzen, so as to be at the advanced posts twenty-four hours before the recommencement of hostilities, and evidently without any expectation that peace would result from the united efforts of MM. de Coulaingcourt and Metternich. The French plenipotentiary could, in fact, only offer but very unsatisfactory propositions, since Napoleon had persisted in almost all his pretensions; but yet, had Austria been still free she would probably have yielded to them, in preference to braving the chances of war for the sake of Trieste and Hambourg, the latter of which places was of far greater moment to Prussia and England than to herself. Unfortunately, however, she was no longer free to act as she chose, being able only to tender her advice to her allies, and no longer able to threaten them with the refusal of her alliance should they reject it; and M. de Metternich, discussing the subject with more than usual freedom, and under the influence of evidently sincere feelings of regret, showed very plainly that he despaired of compliance on the part of the Allies.

It was agreed that as soon as the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia should have arrived in Prague, M. de Metternich should submit to them in the name of his master, the overtures in question, and give a reply to them before the 17th of August. In the meantime it was arranged, for the purpose of giving an air of propriety to the position of the Duke of Vicentia, who was uniformly treated with the respect which was his due, that he should await M. de Metternich's reply at the Chateau de Königsal, situated near Prague, and belonging to the Emperor Francis. He would thus be relieved from the necessity of actually residing in the same town with the Emperor Alexander, and of witnessing the demonstrations of joy with which the Allies received the news of the approach of hostilities and the adhesion of Austria to the European coalition.

From the 11th of August a portion of the Prussian and Russian staffs had begun to arrive in Prague, for the purpose of concerting military operations with that of the Austrian army. At the same time an army of a hundred thousand Prussians and Russians entered Bohemia for the purpose of joining the Austrian troops; and the officers of the three

countries embracing each other, uttered exclamations of joy, because they were about to fight, side by side, in what they called the cause of European liberty. In all directions, indeed, there prevailed what may be called a convulsive gladness, for it was a feeling compounded of hope, of fear, and the resolution of despair.

On the 15th the Emperor Alexander made his entry into Prague, and was received there with the honours due to his rank, and to that position as the liberator of Europe, which was universally accorded to him by all except the Austrian Government, which was offended at the enthusiastic demonstrations of which he was the object; and which was by no means disposed to exchange the domination of France for that of Russia. As soon as he had arrived M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis informed him of the secret negotiation which had arisen from the official negotiation during the last days of the Congress of Prague, and demanded his opinion with respect to it.

Intoxicated with success, and an ambition which he was resolved to satisfy at any risk, and at any expense of conciliatory demonstrations towards his allies both new and old, the young Russian Emperor affected an air of great humility, and with every testimony of respect for the Emperor Francis, and without hinting at any desire for the dethronement of Napoleon, which would involve that of Marie Louise, intimated a hope that he would be speedily able by means of his arms to obtain better conditions than those at present offered, and an independence for Germany which should be infinitely better guaranteed. He was able, moreover, to bring forward a reason which could not fail to be all powerful with Austria; and this was, that if the abandonment of the Hanseatic Towns by Napoleon were not insisted upon, it would be impossible to obtain the adhesion of England, with whom they were bound in strict alliance; and in addition to this reason he was also able to dazzle the eyes of the Austrian Government with a very seducing bait in the form of the possibility that, should the Allies be victorious, it might regain a portion of Italy. Consequently, without awaiting the arrival of the King of Prussia, Alexander replied in writing to M. de Coulaingourt, through the hands of M. de Metternich, that their Majesties the Sovereign Allies, after having duly conferred with each other, considering that any genuine idea of peace could only be such as was consistent with that plan for a general pacification which their Majesties had hoped to mature by means of the negotiations of Prague, could not regard the article now proposed by His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as

likely to conduce to the great end which they had in view, and that, consequently, their Majesties considered them unacceptable. A statement which was equivalent to a declaration that they considered them unacceptable in respect to England.

Although expecting this reply M. de Coulaincourt was much distressed on receiving it; his good sense leading him to expect that the greatest evil must result from the continuance of the war; and in a final interview with M. de Metternich he exchanged expressions of regret with that minister at the close of events; but at the same time agreed with him, that it might be possible to open a congress even during the progress of actual hostilities. Writing to M. de Bassano, he expressed in bitter terms his indignation at having been employed in an altogether illusory negotiation, and on meeting Napoleon, displayed respectfully, but firmly, his serious distress, that this last opportunity of concluding a peace should have been neglected.

Such was this celebrated and unfortunate negotiation with Austria, which, commenced as it was under the influence of the most disastrous illusions, was conducted with a want of tact which, when we consider the natural keenness of Napoleon's intellect, can only be explained as being the result of passion.

And now the roar of the cannons was heard along a line of one hundred and fifty leagues in extent, stretching from Königstein to Hambourg; and Napoleon, aroused by the clamour of arms, speedily forgot in the consideration of the vast military plans from which he expected far more effectual results, the meetings and messages of diplomatists. We have now reached the point in our narrative at which it will be advisable to examine the plan and the nature of the force with which he was prepared to enter upon the second part of the campaign of Saxony; but to enable us to enter upon this inquiry with the greater readiness, it will be necessary in the first place to consider what were the plan and forces of his enemies.

It will be remembered that it had been agreed by the Allies at Trachenberg, that three principal armies should march against Napoleon, acting on the offensive, but with great caution; and that that one of the three against which Napoleon might direct his own movements should slacken its march, whilst the two others should endeavour to throw themselves on his flank and rear, and crush the lieutenants to whom he should have entrusted their defence. These three armies, which were to be severally, the Bohemian, the Silesian, and the army of the North, would number, it

was hoped, including the Italian and Bavarian corps, five hundred and seventy-five thousand active troops, accompanied by one thousand five hundred pieces of cannon, without taking into account two hundred and fifty thousand men who were to form a reserve, stationed at various points in Bohemia, Poland, and Old Prussia. And these enormous numbers had now been almost realized, for the armistice of Pleiswitz, in addition to its having been the means of leading Austria to join them, had enabled the Allies to double the number of their troops.

The forces of the Coalition had been distributed as follows. About one hundred and twenty thousand troops, half of whom were veterans, were posted in Bohemia at the foot of the mountains which separate this province from Saxony, and ready to penetrate their defiles. Seventy thousand Russians under Barclay de Tolly, and sixty thousand Prussians under General Kleist, had passed, as soon as war had been declared by Austria against France, from Silesia into Bohemia, and formed with the Austrian troops the great army which was intended to turn the French position at Dresden by a march into Saxony. The *point de mire* of this army, which was called the Bohemian army, was Leipsic, and the Allies supposed that it would be impossible for Napoleon, attacked in front on the Elbe by two other armies, to resist so formidable an assault as that which they were prepared to make on his rear with two hundred and fifty thousand men. Out of deference towards Austria, and in accordance with the plan of conciliating her as much as possible, the command-in-chief of the army of Bohemia was entrusted to Prince Schwarzenberg, who had negotiated the marriage of Marie Louise, had commanded the Austrian auxiliary corps in 1812, and had been but recently sent on a mission to Paris; and who was somewhat embarrassed by having filled offices of so opposite a character, as well as much terrified at the idea of encountering such an opponent as Napoleon, although he had spoken much in the Aulic Council of the weakness of the French army, and consoled himself for the annoyances of any false position by the pleasures of gratified pride. It was indeed a distinguished honour for him to be entrusted with so great a command in the presence of the Allied Sovereigns; and to a certain extent he was not unworthy of it; for he was prudent, had some experience in warfare on a large scale, and was endowed with a tact which qualified him for dealing with the various elements which composed the Coalition.

To the flattery of the Austrian Court involved in this

appointment, was added another act of respect, which was equally well calculated to gratify it. By a secret article of the *traité de subsides* concluded with the British Government at Reichenbach, it had been agreed that it should be afforded certain pecuniary assistance should it take part in the war, and Lord Cathcart, who had already arrived in Prague, had already drawn bills upon London for the purpose of supplying it as speedily as possible with the financial resources which it required.

Next to this, the principal army, came that of Silesia, which was composed of the Russian corps of Generals Langeron and St. Priest, amounting together to more than forty thousand men, the Prussian corps of General d'York, which numbered almost thirty-eight thousand men; and, lastly, another Russian corps; of some seventeen or eighteen thousand men under General Sacken. This army, commanded by the impetuous Blücher, and numbering almost a hundred thousand men, was to cross the boundary line which had separated, during the armistice, the hostile forces, to pass the Kazbach and the Bober, and to drive us back upon Bautzen, should Napoleon himself not be in the field in that direction. Blücher was strongly recommended to act with the greatest prudence; but surrounded as he was by the most ardent Prussian officers, besides having as the chief of his staff, General Gneisenau, a man of an excitable and impulsive temperament, he was not accompanied by persons in the least likely to remind him of these wise instructions.

The army of the North assembled around Berlin was the third of the active armies, and was to be commanded by the Prince Royal of Sweden, numbering altogether about one hundred and fifty thousand men of all nations: it comprised, twenty-five thousand Swedes and Germans under General Steding; eighteen thousand Russians under Prince Woronzow; ten thousand light horse, partly Cossacks, under Wintzingerode; forty thousand Prussians, under General Bulow; thirty thousand more Prussians, under General Tauenzien, the latter being intended, more especially, to blockade fortresses; and finally a mixed body of twenty-five thousand troops under General Walmoden, composed of Englishmen, Hanoverians, Germans, men from the Hanseatic Towns and from all the provinces subject to our rule. One portion of this numerous army was to remain before the fortresses of Dantzic, Custrin, and Stettin, whilst another was to watch Hambourg, and a third, which was to be the most considerable one, and numbered eighty thousand men, was to move upon Magdebourg, pass the Elbe there, if possible,

and threaten Napoleon's left flank ; the army of Bohemia at the same time threatening his right.

To these three active armies, which numbered five hundred thousand men, and were accompanied by fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, were added a body of twenty-five thousand troops, intended to watch Bavaria ; and another of fifty thousand which was to make head against Prince Eugene on the side of Italy. And we may here mention, that whilst Austria attached but little importance to what took place in this latter region, considering, and with reason, that the fate of the world would be determined on the Elbe between Dresden, Bautzen, Magdebourg, and Leipsic, she nevertheless considered it quite possible that Prince Eugene's troops might enter her capital, and removed from it, therefore, what it contained of value in the way of archives, arms, and objects of art.

To the troops above enumerated must be added the reserves which Austria possessed to the amount of sixty thousand men, between Presbourg, Vienna, and Lintz ; the Russian troops, to the number of one hundred thousand men, under General Benningsen, and Prince Labanoff, in Poland ; and the ninety thousand Prussian recruits who had now completed their drill.

We may now judge how far Napoleon had been in error, when he accepted the armistice of Pleiswitz, which he had signed, in the first place, in compliance with the urgent entreaties of the Austrian Court, and because he believed that whilst the two months during which it lasted, would enable him to increase his armies by two hundred thousand men, they would have the effect of swelling the ranks of the Allies by only half that number. The contrary had been the result ; for whilst he had but added one hundred and fifty thousand men to his troops, the Coalition had added to theirs, if we include the Austrian forces, almost four hundred thousand. He had not failed, however, to make active and admirable use of these two months, and his plans were well calculated to defeat those of his enemies.

The position of the Elbe had been selected by Napoleon, as we have already stated, as the best, and, indeed, the only advantageous one. Dresden, as well fortified as it could be since its walls had been thrown down, was to be the centre point of his operations, and his principal establishment. Seven or eight leagues to his right, at the point where the Elbe flows through the mountains of Bohemia into Saxony, he possessed the fortified posts of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, together with a solid bridge and magazines, which enabled him to manœuvre at will on either bank of the river. On his left at Torgau, fifteen leagues below Dresden, he had fortified works, provisions, and bridges ; and the same at

Wittenberg and Magdebourg; the latter being a vast fortress, regularly fortified, in which he had placed, besides a great mass of ammunition and provisions, all the sick and wounded of the spring campaign. The improvised post of Werben protected the gap between Magdebourg and Hambourg; and, lastly, Hambourg covered the lower Elbe. It was, doubtless, possible for the enemy to cross the Elbe between Magdebourg and Hambourg; because the space between these two places was but imperfectly defended by the works at Werben; but this was an enterprise which no enemy could accomplish so long as the great army commanded by Napoleon in person, should not have lost its *point d'appui* of Dresden.

Divining the projects of the enemy as thoroughly as though he had been present at the Trachenberg conferences, Napoleon had perceived very clearly that he would have to encounter three separate armies: one on his right in Bohemia, one in front in Silesia, and one on his left, threatening the Elbe, between Magdebourg and Hambourg; and the arrangements which he had made to meet those several attacks, were such as left nothing to desire. The new corps of Marshal St. Cyr, numbering thirty thousand men, and composed of four divisions, had been recently brought from Mayence to Dresden, and was now posted at Königsstein, on the left bank of the Elbe, in such a manner as to close the avenues by which the chief army of the Allies might descend from Bohemia into Saxony, on our rear. The corps of General Vandamme, which also numbered thirty thousand men, detached from the army of Marshal Davout, and brought from Hambourg to Dresden, had been posted above the corps of Marshal St. Cyr, but beyond the Elbe, so as to guard on the right of this river, the defiles of the mountains of Bohemia opening into Lusatia. Somewhat further in Lusatia, but still at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, at the defile of Zittau, were posted the corps of Poniatowski and that of Marshal Victor, the formation of which had been completed during the suspension of arms: Finally, still further, in Silesia, on the line which had divided the belligerent troops during the armistice, on the Katzbach and the Bober, were the four corps of Macdonald (the 11th), of Lauriston (the 5th), of Ney (the 3rd), of Marmont (the 6th), numbering together a hundred thousand men. In the rear, close to Bautzen, were the Imperial Guard, which had been raised during the armistice from twelve to forty-eight thousand men, and the three cavalry corps of reserve of Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, and Kellerman, composed of twenty-four thousand well mounted troops.

On the left, three corps, those of Oudinot (the 12th), of Bertrand (the 4th), of Reynier (the 7th), were charged with the task of opposing the army of the North, commanded by Bernadotte.

His troops having been thus posted, Napoleon resolved to prepare in the following manner for all the eventualities of this formidable campaign. The army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, which was by much the most numerous and the one which threatened our right flank, might descend by two paths—namely, in our rear by the great Peterswalde route, or in front of us by the road leading from Bohemia into Lusatia and passing through the Zittau defile. It could only approach by one of these two paths, and Napoleon was equally prepared for its appearance by either. Marshal St. Cyr with his four divisions occupied on this side of the Elbe the Peterswalde causeway; one of his divisions being *de garde* at the bridge thrown across between the rocks of Königsstein and Lilienstein, whilst two others occupied the *camp de Pirna*, which commanded the great Peterswalde road, and the fourth with General Pajol's light cavalry, watched all the inferior roads by which the Dresden position might be turned. Should the enemy, therefore, attempt to descend on the rear of Dresden, either for the purpose of attacking that city or of moving upon Leipsic, Marshal St. Cyr, after having taken due advantage of the facilities offered by the nature of the ground to delay the march of the Allies as much as possible, would throw garrisons into the forts of Königsstein and Lilienstein, and then fall back upon Dresden, when there was every reason to suppose that he would be able to maintain his ground for at least a few days in an entrenched camp already sedulously prepared. In any case, arrangements had been made so as to provide him with prompt and decided support; for within forty-eight hours, General Vandamme would be able to carry to his aid his three divisions severally posted at Stolpen, Rumbourg, and Bautzen; and in forty-eight hours more, that is four days after the appearance of the enemy, Napoleon himself would be able to march to Dresden from Górlitz with forty-eight thousand men of the Guard, twenty-four thousand of the cavalry reserve, and twenty-four thousand of the corps of Marshal Victor, and thus raise the number of our troops at Dresden to some one hundred and seventy thousand.

Should the enemy, on the other hand, descend from Bohemia into Lusatia, not on this side of the Elbe but beyond it; not in Napoleon's rear but in front of him; and debouch by Zittau upon Górlitz or Bautzen, the same arrangements would render a prompt concentration of troops equally easy.

Napoleon had resolved to post at the Zittau defile, Poniatowski's corps, which numbered twelve thousand men, ready to support the corps of Marshal Victor, whose troops it would raise to thirty thousand, posted in a strong and carefully selected position; when, within twelve hours they could be joined by the cavalry which were at Gorlitz, and the division Vandamme which was at Rumbourg; and where, within twelve hours more they could also be joined by Vandamme's two other divisions, and one of the four corps established on the Bober.

Should neither of the two hypotheses, however, in respect to which these precautions were taken, be realized, and should the army of Bohemia, leaving a corps in Bohemia, join its principal mass to that of Silesia, and attack us in front with two hundred and fifty thousand men on the Bober, the four corps of Ney, Lauriston, Marmont, and Macdonald, forming a total of one hundred thousand men, might either maintain their ground on the Bober, or fall back on the Neisse and the Sprec, and be there reinforced by the Guard, the cavalry reserve, and the troops under Victor, Poniatowski, and Vandamme. And thus, in the event of the realisation of the third proposition, which was the only imaginable, one after the other two, we should meet the enemy with a force equal to his own, even without making use of the troops under Marshal St. Cyr.

There still remained, indeed, one other hypothesis, for which Napoleon had purposely refrained from taking any precautionary measures, and this was, that the enemy determining to turn him in a still bolder manner, should descend by the Leipsic route, and daringly endeavour to place themselves between the grand army and the Rhine. This was an hypothesis which caused Napoleon little anxiety, and at which, indeed, he smiled. "*It is not from the Rhine, but from the Elbe,*" he observed with rare penetration, "*that I have to take care that I am not cut off.*" The enemy, he said, who should venture to advance between him and the Rhine, would never return; whilst the hostile army, which should succeed in establishing itself between him and the Elbe, would cut him off from his real base of operations. Who, indeed, would dare to march upon the Rhine, leaving Napoleon behind him unvanquished and at the head of four hundred thousand troops?

Having thus prepared on his right and front, to meet the two armies of Bohemia and Silesia, Napoleon had also made preparations on his left for holding in check the army of the North, and also for accomplishing an object which he considered of great importance; and which was

to enter the capital of Prussia in triumph, in the person of one of his lieutenants, and to exact there a vengeance which, avoiding cruelty, should be of the most humiliating nature to the public feeling of Germany. He had directed Marshal Oudinot to march, with his own corps, those of Generals Bertrand and Reynier, and the cavalry reserve of the Duke of Padua, from Luckau upon Berlin; and as this force, which was about sixty-five or sixty-six thousand strong, might be reinforced *en route* by General Girard, who was posted in advance at Magdebourg, with about eight or ten thousand men of the garrison of that place and five thousand of the division Dombrowski, it would number nearly eighty thousand men, and have nothing to fear, either from the skill or the forces of the Prince Royal of Sweden, who could not bring actually on the field of battle more than ninety thousand men; and who, moreover, would soon have to face another formidable enemy in the person of Marshal Davout, who was ready to issue from Hambourg at the head of twenty-five thousand French and ten thousand Danish troops, and threaten Berlin by Mecklenberg, whilst Oudinot should advance towards it by Lusatia. There was the greatest probability, therefore, that Napoleon, whilst holding in check in his front and right the gigantic forces of the Coalition, would be able to enter Berlin by his left, and thus have the opportunity of punishing Prussia for her desertion, and the Prince of Sweden for his treason, and of effecting a communication with his garrison on the Oder and the Vistula;—a result which would be, doubtless, of the most illustrious nature, and might well inflame Napoleon's imagination; but the movement which he had directed to be made by his left, was of a very extended one: the various corps by whom it was to be executed, were widely distant from each other, and their co-operation depended upon a number of circumstances which could scarcely result without exception in our favour. His generals, without having lost their wonted courage, had yet lost that feeling of confidence which is so powerful an ally in critical situations; his troops were young and mixed and Bernadotte's troops, whom they would have to encounter in the field, although of various nationalities, were bound together by that most powerful of all ties, a common feeling. When we add that, should one of his lieutenants be vanquished, he would have to march a considerable distance to his aid, we must admit that at this point, and this only, Napoleon's skillful plan was faulty.

A natural result of the defect here pointed out was, that the four corps which guarded his front in advance of the

Elbe, were removed too far from Dresden. From the banks of the Bober, where were posted the corps of Ney, Marmont, Macdonald, and Lauriston, to the banks of the Elbe, or, in other words, from Lowenberg to Dresden, was a distance equivalent to six days' march; a distance too great to allow Napoleon time to support with his reserve the corps which were at Lowenberg, and also those which were at Dresden; for should he be summoned to the one place, some great disaster might happen to one of his lieutenants at the other, during the six days which must elapse before he could arrive to his support. In fact, to manœuvre with success concentrically around Dresden, as he had formerly manœuvred around Verona with a reserve posted at the central point of the circle of operations, and carried as it might be required to all the points of its circumference, the circle should have been smaller, and its radii consequently of less extent. And this defect was not the result of inadvertence on the part of Napoleon, but of that over-eagerness to lay his grasp upon Berlin and the Vistula which had already perverted his policy, as it now spoiled his military combinations.

Napoleon's forces were far from being equal to those of the Coalition. The corps of St. Cyr, Vandamme, Victor, Poniatowski, grouped on his right; those of Ney, Marmont, Macdonald, Lauriston, ranged on his front, together with the Guard and cavalry reserve posted in his centre, would form an army of two hundred and seventy-two thousand men of all arms ready to take the field. The troops of Oudinot, Girard, and Davout, marching upon Berlin, formed another of one hundred and ten or one hundred and fifteen thousand, and thus raised to three hundred and eighty thousand, at most, the total number of troops with whom we were able to meet the Coalition. And if we even add the twenty thousand men in Bavaria, the sixty thousand in Italy, and the ninety thousand men posted in the principal fortresses, we shall only enumerate a force of five hundred and fifty thousand troops, which is still very inferior to the eight hundred thousand at the service of the Coalition. The reserves of the Allies were, it is true, comprised in this force of eight hundred thousand men; but as Napoleon could not, at the most, draw more than fifty thousand men from his reserves for active service in the field, he could not, in any case, meet the eight hundred thousand men of the Coalition with more than six hundred thousand. This difference of strength, however, would not have prevented him from being victorious had the moral strength been on his side instead, as was unfortunately the case, against him.

But the fact was, that his adversaries, exasperated to the utmost, were resolved either to conquer or to die; and his own troops, heroic as they were, were inspired only by feelings of honour, and were led by generals whose confidence had been destroyed, and who began to feel that we were in the wrong, not only with respect to Europe but also with respect to France and good sense.

Having inspected the Kœnigstein and Lilienstein positions, and that taken by St. Cyr and Vandamme on his rear and right, Napoleon proceeded, on the 15th, to Gœrlitz, where he found the Guard and the cavalry reserve. From thence he had proceeded to visit the Zittau gorge, the defence of which was entrusted to Poniatowski and Victor; and after he had established Poniatowski upon a mountain, named Eckartsberg, which was opposite the mouth of the defile, and offered means of barring its passage, he advanced some leagues, escorted by the light cavalry of his Guard, for the purpose of reconnoitring a country which it was quite possible he should, at a future time, have to traverse; and to learn what was the direction pursued by the enemy, of whose movements he knew nothing, because the thick wall of mountains which separated him from them on his right, was in the nature of a curtain which it was extremely difficult to penetrate. He listened, therefore, with extreme attention to the slightest rumours afloat, and, as is usual in such cases, received only the most contradictory reports. All accounts, however, agreed in stating that a corps of the Prussian and Russian army had passed from Silesia into Bohemia, for the purpose of co-operating with the Austrian army. This was the corps which, together with the Austrian troops, was to form the grand army which was to be under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg.

On receiving this information, Napoleon entertained for a moment the idea of throwing himself into Bohemia at the head of a hundred thousand men, by the Zittau route, and attacking the Prussian and Russian troops before their junction with the Austrians. By advancing rapidly on the right, towards Leitmeritz, he would have been able to cut in two the long line which the Coalition troops would occupy before being assembled around Commotau; and it would have been then quite possible for him to strike, at the very opening of the campaign, some terrible blow; but it was quite possible, on the other hand, that when he had entered Bohemia he might miss the troops of the Allies, already concentrated on his right between Tœplitz and Commotau, and consequently able not only to resist his attack, but also, by descending upon it by Peterswalde, to reach Dresden before

he could return thither himself; whilst, should he find them, and give them battle upon his road, he would have to engage them in a position which, whether he were victorious or vanquished, must be highly disadvantageous to him: for if he should vanquish the enemy he would be unable to pursue them into the interior of Bohemia; and should they vanquish him, he would have to repass the Zittau defile in their presence. Napoleon, therefore, had little inclination to carry out the idea above mentioned, although it was warmly supported by Marshal St. Cyr, and would only have done so had he received most reliable information that sixty or eighty thousand Prussians and Russians were within distance still separated from the hundred and twenty thousand Austrians whom they were to join.

Mounting his horse on the morning of the 19th of August, Napoleon entered Bohemia at the head of some thousands of cavalry, and plunging into the gorges beyond Gabel showed himself at the entrance of the fair *bassin* of Bohemia to its astonished inhabitants. The result of the inquiries which he now made was to inform him that the Prussian and Russian troops, coming from Silesia, traversed the foot of the mountains in the interior of Bohemia, for the purpose of joining the Austrians and of descending, probably, into Saxony, in the rear of Dresden. In executing this movement the Allies would traverse the Elbe between Leitmeritz and Aussig; and everything tended to show that they were already either on the banks of the river, or beyond it in the environs of Töplitz. The moment, therefore, for throwing himself upon them, even had such a measure been at any time advisable, being now past, it was necessary that Napoleon should return to Saxony as speedily as possible, for the purpose of combating the enemy around Dresden on the battle field which he had selected with so much care. Napoleon, however, took pains to make the fact of his presence amongst them thus known to the inhabitants, in order that the rumour of it might reach the head-quarters of the Allies; his reasons for this course being as follows.

It was evident that the plan of the Allies, after they should have crossed the Elbe in Bohemia, was to enter Saxony and to descend upon Dresden, and after they should have gained possession of this city, to advance upon Leipsic, for the purpose of taking up a position between the Rhine and the French army. The adoption of this course by the Allies would be in every way favourable to us, for by acting thus in Napoleon's rear, they would expose themselves to the danger of having him upon their lines of communication, and would be in a position in which the loss of a battle must

involve almost certain destruction. This being the case, it was important that Napoleon should make a vigorous attack upon the army of Silesia which was before him, in order to render it incapable for a time of active operations, and then to return to devote his whole attention to the operations around Dresden. To ensure the success of such a project, it would be advisable to delay the onward march of the Allies for a day or two, since he had to hasten upon the Bober before returning to the Elbe; and there could be no better means of causing this delay than Napoleon's presence in Bohemia, since his presence there could not fail to excite the Allies to a thousand disquieting, or at least embarrassing conjectures.

Having returned to Zittau by the defiles of the *Riesen Gebirge*, Napoleon employed the following day, the 20th, in posting the corps of Poniatowski and Victor at the entrance of the Zittau defile in such a manner, that those corps might be able to maintain themselves for three days at least against the most violent attacks. Napoleon also took care to secure their line of communication with General Vandamme, who had been posted between Zittau and Dresden in the direction of Stolpen, that he might be able to move in a single day either upon Zittau or Dresden. Having completed these several measures, Napoleon resolved to await during one more day the complete manifestation of the enemy's designs; being at the same time entirely free from any sentiments of fear, the precautions which he had taken in all directions, being such as to relieve him of all anxiety. In fact, the eighty thousand men on the side of Berlin, marching under the command of Marshal Oudinot, and supported by the thirty-five thousand of Marshal Davout; the troops lying in wait under St. Cyr and Vandamme on the two banks of the Elbe; the two corps which guarded the gorges, leading into Bohemia at Zittau; the hundred thousand men who awaited on the Bober under Marshal Ney, the moment when the enemy should attempt to cross it; and, finally, the Guard and cavalry reserve, posted at Gorlitz in such positions as to be immediately ready to defend the threatened points, formed altogether an admirably woven web, in the midst of which its contriver was ready at any moment to pounce upon any who might venture to touch its extremities.

On his return to Gorlitz, Napoleon received information there, that the army of Silesia had invaded on the 15th the neutral territory which it should have respected as such until the 17th, and that it was advancing in the direction of Bohemia, Napoleon immediately set in motion the cavalry

and three divisions of his guard, leaving the others at Gorlitz, and made arrangements for being on the Bober on the following day, the 21st.

Hostilities having commenced in Silesia before the period assigned for their resumption by the armistice, the four corps under the command of Ney had scarcely left their cantonments when they found themselves in the presence of the enemy. Two of these corps, those of Macdonald and Marmont, were on the Bober, the first on the right towards Lowenberg, the second on the left, in the direction of Buntzlau. The two others were beyond these, on the Katzbach, and in a position of still greater danger, that of Lauriston being in the environs of Goldberg, and that of Ney between Leignitz and Haynau. Being almost turned by the sudden appearance of Langerou's corps on their right flank, those two corps were, indeed, in a state of extreme peril; but Lauriston's corps falling back from the Katzbach on the Bober with great coolness and energy, rejoined Macdonald at Lowenberg without accident; and Ney, who was the most advanced towards our left, instead of simply falling back upon Buntzlau for the purpose of passing the Bober at that point, boldly deployed between the Katzbach and the Bober, and braved the attack of Blücher, who was moving onward against Lowenberg. On perceiving his position Blücher turned his forces against him, and, Lowenberg being thus freed from the danger of imminent attack, Ney descended upon Buntzlau, and passing the Bober there joined his forces to those of Marmont.

On the 20th, our four corps were behind the Bober, and Napoleon, who arrived on the morning of the 21st, was anxious to engage the enemy without further delay. Blücher's forces, including those of the Russian General, Sacken, who had remained a little in the rear on his right, numbered about one hundred thousand. Napoleon, who had more than one hundred and thirty thousand, employed the morning in directing the construction of wooden bridges across the Bober, and giving the necessary orders to ensure the execution by his army of a prompt and vigorous march, since he had no time to lose, expecting, as he did, to be speedily recalled to his rear by the movements of the Grand Army at Bohemia. He consequently resolved to debouch from Lowenberg with Macdonald and Lauriston, passing the Bober at that point, and drawing Ney and Marmont, who were to cross the Bober at Buntzlau, upon his left.

Towards the middle of the day our troops crossed the Bober at Lowenberg, and moved rapidly forward; the division Maison, which formed our *tête de colonne*, driving

before it the troops under General d'York without allowing them a moment's respite. The whole of Lauriston's corps followed, supported by that of Macdonald. On our left, the Marshals Ney and Marmont debouched from Buntzlau, closing in upon our centre. And now Blucher, finding himself thus vigorously attacked, and suspecting that Napoleon was in his front, acted in accordance with the instructions given to him to run no risk when there was a prospect of encountering his formidable adversary in person, and fell back behind a small stream named the Haynau, and flowing between the Bober and the Katzbach.

On the 22nd, Napoleon continued his march on the offensive; the corps of Lauriston and Macdonald advancing directly upon Goldberg, for the purpose of driving Blucher beyond the Katzbach, whilst Ney and Marmont still moved on our left with the same object. Animated by the presence of Napoleon, the troops were inspired with the utmost ardour, and speedily compelled the enemy to abandon with considerable loss, the little stream behind which they had taken refuge, to repass the Katzbach, and to take up a position at Goldberg.

It had now become evident that it was not with the troops under Blucher that the principal action would take place; and, in fact, on that very evening, Napoleon received from Marshal Saint-Cyr information which showed very evidently that the main army of the Allies was debouching by Peterswalde, upon the rear of Dresden, with the intention either of seizing this town, or of advancing upon Leipsic with the audacious idea of placing themselves between the French and the Rhine. And thus was realised that one of Napoleon's two hypotheses which was the most desirable of the two, and for which he had most carefully prepared. He immediately stopped his guard, which was still on its march, and which, fortunately, had not yet passed Lowenberg, in order that it might, after a brief halt, take the road to Dresden. He also sent in the same direction the corps of Marshal Marmont, and a great portion of the cavalry reserve; and at the same time wrote to General Vandamme and Marshal Victor directing them to fall back upon the Elbe, leaving Prince Poniatowski at the Zittau gorges.

Having given these orders during the evening of the 22nd, Napoleon was desirous that on the following morning the corps of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Ney, which with the cavalry of General Sebastiani, composed a mass of eighty thousand men at least, should once more attack the enemy and drive it beyond the Katzbach; and at daybreak, accordingly, Lauriston's corps on the right, that of Macdonald in the centre, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg on the left,

deployed along the Katzbach, whilst Ney, three leagues lower down, advanced with his own corps and Sebastiani's cavalry in front of Leignitz. Blucher had posted the Russian troops under Langeron, and the Prussian troops under d'York, behind the Katzbach and on the heights of Wolfsberg. The division Girard, throwing itself upon the banks of the river, in the direction of Niederau, had a desperate conflict with the Prussian division under Prince Mecklenbourg, and eventually compelled them to fall back beyond the Katzbach, which it crossed in their wake. In the meantime, General Lauriston having effected his passage in the direction of Seyfau, attacked the Wolfsberg heights, which he three times succeeded in wresting from the Russians, and as many times was forced to resign. But a final effort, made by the 135th of the division Rochambeau, gave them into our hands and decided the action in our favour. And Blucher, finding himself to be outflanked two or three leagues on his right, by the movement of Marshal Ney upon Leignitz, fell back in all haste towards Jauer.

This useless violation of international law cost the Prussians a loss of some eight thousand men; and ourselves about half that number; but this result did not, unfortunately for us, shake the courage of our enemy, who was fighting with all the vehemence of despair. Napoleon, who had experienced the inconvenience of leaving several Marshals together when he was not himself present amongst them, and who foresaw the imminence of desperate battles for which it was well to have Marshal Ney at hand, resolved to make this Marshal accompany himself; to confide the command of the third corps to General Souham, and to leave the troops on the Bober under the command in chief of Marshal Macdonald, whom he directed to leave his light troops in observation between the Bober and the Katzbach, but to encamp with the bulk of his forces behind the Bober itself, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, and to establish posts of communication on the right in the Bohemian mountains, on the left in the plains of Lusatia, so as to be constantly informed of the enemy's movements. The principal tasks entrusted to him were, in the first place, to defend the Bober against Blucher, and, in the next, to intercept the routes leading from Bohemia into Prussia, so as to check the advance of the detachments which the enemy might possibly throw in the direction of Berlin, against the corps of Marshal Oudinot. And in adopting these measures Napoleon was led by his anxiety to expedite Oudinot's march on Berlin, to make the most injudicious sacrifices; for Macdonald, left at forty leagues distance from Dresden, although free for a moment

from the enemy, might be once more attacked by him, with renewed vigour, and even incur great danger, before aid could possibly reach him.

Having taken these measures, and seen Blücher in full retreat upon Jauer, Napoleon set out, about noon, for Górlitz, where he found an abundance of news from Dresden, and learned that the King of Saxony, the inhabitants, and the generals to whom the defence of this important post had been entrusted, were terrified at the immense masses of hostile troops which were advancing from Bohemia, and descending the mountains in the rear of the Saxon capital.

The Grand Army of the Allies, which, composed of Prussian, Russian, and Austrian troops, to the number of two hundred and fifty thousand men, was to turn the position of the Elbe by Bohemia, had, in fact, executed the plan arranged at Trachenberg, and had debouched into Saxony by all the defiles of the *Erz-Gebirge*. But the troops had scarcely, however, set out on their march, when the instability which was incident to the military tactics of the Allies, and which resulted from the want of any real commander-in-chief amongst their generals, led to a modification of the plan determined upon at Trachenberg. The nominal command-in-chief had been conferred upon the Prince Schwarzenberg as a means of propitiating Austria; but the Emperor Alexander regretted in his heart that he had not taken it himself, and the more so when Generals Moreau and Jomini arrived in his camp with reinforcements which would, he believed, carry the affairs of the Allies to a glorious issue.

General Moreau, who, as we have already said, returned from America on hearing the rumour of Napoleon's disasters in Russia, without any other object save such as might be involved in a vague hope of honorably re-entering his country, had formed a plan which was not without some chance of success. Having learned that the Emperor Alexander had more than a hundred thousand French prisoners, all deeply exasperated against the author of the expedition to Moscow, he had conceived the plan of arming forty or fifty thousand of them, transporting them in English ships to Picardy, and marching them upon Paris, the result of which would be, he maintained, the overthrow of the Imperial throne, provided the Allies would furnish him with a treaty of peace, which should leave France free to choose her own form of government, and secure to her the possession of a territory extending to her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine. Entirely without any connexion with the Bourbons, or any sympathies in their favour, he never-

theless admitted that endeavours should be made to reconcile this ancient family with the French Revolution, and that it should be recalled for the purpose of establishing a government which should be at once firm and liberal, and should put an end to the protracted troubles with which France had been afflicted. It was under the influence of these ideas that he had come to Stockholm, where his old comrade, Bernadotte, had covertly excited still further his feelings of exasperation, and then sent him to the Russian head quarters. Alexander received the exile with every testimony of respect and friendship, and calmed the scruples which he still felt by declaring to him that the Allies had no desire to deprive France of any portion of her greatness; that they were quite ready to offer her the fair conditions of the treaty of Junéville; and that they had no intention of imposing upon her any particular form of government, being anxious, on the contrary, to acknowledge that which it might itself choose, even supposing it were that of a Republic. Rejecting as impracticable the plan of arming the French prisoners, he cautiously led the unhappy Moreau to adopt the resolution, not indeed of serving against France, but of remaining with the sovereigns who were fighting against her; an apparent difference which was sufficient to deceive Moreau, but which had no real foundation. To complete his seduction to the cause of the Allies, Alexander made use of his sister, the grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenberg, a princess of remarkable spirit and personal attractions; and she, as well as her brother, treating Moreau as a friend, and overwhelming him with adroit flattery, assisted in inducing him to enter a path on which he was to meet with the cruellest of all deaths, being that which was to take from him with his life, if not his glory, at least his innocence.

From the time that Moreau had been by his side, Alexander regretted that he did not himself possess the commandership-in-chief of the allied forces; in which case he would have made Moreau the chief of his staff, and with his aid have conducted the operations of the war. But as it was impossible to make Prince Schwarzenberg receive Moreau, either as a superior or a subordinate, the latter found himself in the camp of the Allies in the character of a private friend of the Emperor Alexander's, and already cruelly punished for the fault which he had committed by having to endure a position, in the midst of the enemies of his country, which was false, awkward, and almost humiliating.

General Jomini, a Swiss by birth, an excellent military writer, and possessed of no slight merits as a staff officer, had rendered to the French army at Ulm, the

Berezina, and Bautzen, services for which he had been very poorly recompensed at Bautzen, especially, after having pointed out to Marshal Ney the line of march which it was most advisable to take, he had received, instead of a reward, a punishment which he owed to the Prince, Major-General, whose susceptibilities he had frequently wounded. Sensitive and irritable, and having frequently desired to pass from the French service to that of Russia, which had not failed to show considerable readiness to receive him, he had at length, on the occasion of this last insult, given a loose to his anger, and during the armistice passed over to the Russians, without, as has been said, betraying to them plans of which he was ignorant, or failing in his duty to his country, since he was a Swiss, but committing, nevertheless, an error in not subjecting his private causes of offence, even if well founded, to the claims of an association in arms, and preparing for himself by the course which he adopted griefs which were destined to embitter his life. Received with all honour by Alexander, he gave free expression to his opinions, displeasing the Generals of the Allied forces by speaking in praise of Napoleon and the French, whom he was already almost sorry to have quitted, and censuring without reserve all the plans which had been formed at Trachenberg. He had not much trouble in proving to Alexander that the plan of marching upon Leipzig, was, for many reasons, unadvisable; and General Morcau coinciding in his views on the subject, it was resolved to renounce this project, and instead of leaning to the left to incline to the right, and to move upon the banks of the Elbe. The two first columns, being that which had passed by Peterswalde, and that which had passed by Zinnwald and Altenberg, had marched close to Dresden, but it was necessary to draw back the third by Marienberg and Sayda, upon Dippoldiswalde, and the fourth by Zwickau, and Chemnitz upon Tharandt. The Allies had thus moved towards Dresden without having any very precise ideas what they were to do in this new position, which, however, had the advantage of enabling them at any time to advance to the capture of Dresden, the loss of which could not fail to be of the greatest possible detriment to the French cause. Whilst they were executing this transverse movement from left to right, along the foot of the *Erz-Gebirge*, the Allies received information of the appearance of Napoleon in Bohemia; a circumstance which gave rise to an apprehension that he might be about to march upon Prague, and rendered more evident than ever the advantageousness of a retrograde movement on the part of the Allies along the road towards the Elbe.

It was thus that the grand army of the Allies came to

deploy its imposing masses around the fair capital of Saxony: the column which was first perceived being the Russian column, under Wittgenstein, which, descending the nearest to the Elbe by the Peterswalde route, encountered Marshal Saint-Cyr in front of the Camp de Pirna. What is called the Camp de Pirna, consists of a very elevated plateau, the sides of which are at almost every point perpendicular, and which, resting on the Elbe, is supported on the left by the fort of Kœnigstein, and on the right by the château de Sonnenstein and the town of Pirna. The great Bohemian route running by Péterswalde, passes this plateau at such a distance, that although almost, it is not quite, commanded by it; and, therefore, although itself impregnable, it does not form in itself an absolute means of shutting up the Péterswalde route. At the same time, it is a position from whence the operations of any enemy following the Péterswalde route may be effectually harassed, if not entirely frustrated.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, after having thrown the first of his two divisions into the forts of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, between which a bridge was thrown across the Elbe, had placed the second on the Péterswalde route in such a manner as to delay the enemy's march, and at the same time be able to fall back upon Dresden as had been ordered. In the meantime the third of Marshal Saint-Cyr's divisions watched the second débouché, being that which opens from Toeplitz upon Zinnwald, Altenberg, and Dippoldiswalde, and the fourth, posted on the right of Dippoldiswalde, and watching the great Freyberg route, served as a support to General Pajol, who was skirmishing with the advanced guards of the Austrian cavalry, as it came up by the more distant débouchés.

On the 23rd August, Marshal Saint-Cyr having confided to his first division, as we have already said, the defence of the Kœnigstein and Lilienstein forts, and all the posts on the banks of the Elbe, fell back in good order upon Dresden, where there were now, therefore, besides the garrison, three divisions of infantry, together with the cavalry under Lheritier and Pajol. And this force, supported by field works and the fortifications of the city itself, and well provided with artillery, was amply sufficient to afford Marshal Saint-Cyr the means of disputing the possession of Dresden with the enemy, and to give Napoleon time to execute his manœuvres around it.

It was on this state of things that Napoleon founded his calculations, on receiving at Gorlitz the details of what had taken place on the side of Dresden. Aware, from the presence of considerable masses of troops in the rear of Dresden, that the Allies had adopted the plan which con-

sisted in turning him, advancing upon the left bank of the Elbe, and descending into Saxony from Péterswalde, and having foreseen and provided against this movement by posting at Dresden a force sufficient to repulse a first attack, and to hold in check Prince Schwarzenberg's army for some days at least, he now devised one of the most excellent and formidable combinations which were the fruits of his genius, and one which, had it been executed according to his views, might have brought the whole war to a sudden termination.

Napoleon returned from Silesia preceded or followed by the most moveable portions of his army, which he made fall back towards the Elbe. The enemy, wishing to turn him, had crossed the Elbe in the interior of Bohemia, under the shelter of the mountains which separate this country from Saxony, and, that he might punish them for this rash movement, Napoleon now resolved to ascend as far as Kœnigstein, and after having effected there the passage of the Elbe, to establish himself at Pirna, to intercept the Péterswalde road, to descend on the enemy's rear with one hundred and forty thousand men, to drive him to Dresden, and thus to have him between the French army and the Elbe.

Inflamed by this idea, Napoleon hastened to explain to M. de Bassano, by a letter written in cypher, the formidable plan which he had devised, directing him to keep it secret, but to exert himself to the utmost to conduce to its success. He wrote also to Marshal Saint-Cyr, pointing out to him once more all the means of defence presented by the city of Dresden, and then took up his quarters, on the 25th of August, at Stolpen, on the right bank of the stream, and an equal distance from Kœnigstein and Dresden.

Established at Stolpen, Napoleon made all those arrangements which he considered necessary for the success of his new plan. Vandamme's corps, three divisions strong, had already fallen back upon Kœnigstein, at the first appearance of the grand army of the Allies; the half of one of its divisions, that under General Teste, having spread along the Elbe, from Kœnigstein to Dresden, for the purpose of preventing the enemy from repassing the river, and confining them to the left bank; whilst the two others passed over by the bridge thrown across the stream between Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, to attack the camp de Pirna, under which the enemy had defiled without occupying it in force, to take possession of it, to effect a junction there with the first division of Saint-Cyr, which had been left at Pirna, and to take up a position, *à cheval*, on the Péterswalde road. That Vandamme might have four whole divisions at his disposal, Napoleon borrowed of Marshal Victor the brigade of the

Prince de Reuss, and adding to it Corbineau's cavalry, thus raised the forces at Vandamme's disposal, to more than forty thousand men, of whom thirty-six thousand were infantry, and almost five thousand cavalry. He posted in the next place, the whole of his guard, and Marshal Victor, who had returned from Zittau, around Stolpen in such a manner that they might be able to follow General Vandamme as soon as he should be master of the Camp de Pirna, hastened the march of Marshal Marmont, and had as many boats as possible gathered together for the purpose of throwing three additional bridges between Kœnigstein and Lilienstein. When these bridges should have been constructed, he would have at his immediate disposal one hundred and twenty thousand men to throw on the enemy's rear; and his intention was, whilst he should himself repass the Elbe at Kœnigstein, to send Latour-Maubourg's cavalry to cross it at Dresden, so as to deceive the Prince de Schwarzenberg, and induce him to suppose that the whole French army was about to debouch by that city. In order that the Elbe, which he desired to make an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of the enemy, might be more securely guarded, he ordered Marshal Saint-Cyr, Lheritier's cavalry, and two battalions of infantry to defend the Meissen, situated eight leagues from Dresden; and, finally, as he considered that the troops might enjoy a day's repose without danger, since all appeared calm around Dresden, he determined that Vandamme should not pass over the bridge thrown across the Elbe between Lilienstein and Kœnigstein to attack the Camp de Pirna until the evening of the 26th.

Unfortunately, the population of Dresden began to be much excited as it beheld the approach of the coalition troops. From the 23rd to the 25th, only the first column, that which had followed the Peterswalde route, was visible; but during the following days, the other columns had appeared in their turn and covered the heights which overlooked the city. The last Austrian column was alone absent, for having passed by Carlsbad and Zwickau, its road to Dresden had been longer than that of the others. Alexander's advisers, with Jomini at their head, were eager to attack immediately Saint-Cyr's three divisions, which they beheld upon the plain, and by entering Dresden in pursuit of them, to destroy at a single blow our whole establishment upon the Elbe. But Moreau, on being consulted, objected that it was improbable that Saint-Cyr would await in that exposed position, the attack of overwhelming masses, had he not behind him some support in the shape either of reserves of troops, or defensive works, and that it would be highly injudicious to risk a repulse at the

very commencement of hostilities. Prince Schwarzenberg declaring, however, in the midst of the discussion, that in any case it would be necessary to defer the attack for a day, since his fourth column had not yet arrived; the decision on the course to be adopted was remitted to the following day.

The accumulation of the troops of the allies around Dresden, did not fail to inspire the inhabitants with terror, and message after message was sent to Napoleon urging him to hasten up in person with all his reserves, to repulse the formidable attack with which the city was threatened. In reply to these entreaties, Napoleon sent Murat to execute a reconnaissance, the result of which was simply to confirm the fact of the presence of a considerable hostile army around Dresden, which it was apparently about to attack; and upon his being still further urged to proceed thither in person, he wrote to Marshal Saint-Cyr, detailing anew the means by which Dresden might be defended, and to this letter the Marshal contented himself with replying that he would do his best, but that in the presence of such masses of hostile troops as were then around him, he could not answer for what might be the issue. The necessity, however, of preserving Dresden from the enemy's grasp was so great, that Napoleon, discontented with the Marshal's extreme reserve, sent his officer *d'ordonnance*, Gourgand, to this city that he might be able to give him complete information of the actual state of affairs.

Gourgand, who was a brave and spirited officer, but unendowed with a judgment sufficiently cool to enable him to fulfil successfully the mission with which he had been entrusted, arrived in Dresden on the 25th, at a moment when the populace and the court were equally overcome by alarm, when the generals themselves began to lose their ordinary sang-froid, and when the inhabitants, withdrawing en masse from the principal portion of the city, called the Old Town, and exposed, from being situated on the left bank of the Elbe, to the enemy's attack, proceeded to the faubourg on the right bank, called the New Town. In the meantime, Marshal Saint-Cyr and General Durosnel, who were entrusted with the defence of the city, the one as commander of the 14th corps, and the other as Governor of Dresden, on being closely interrogated by Gourgand, gave such answers as led him to suppose they had but little confidence in the strength of the position, and induced him, on his return to Stolpen, which took place at eleven o'clock on the same evening, to draw such a picture of the dangers which threatened Dresden as to overcome Napoleon's usually firm judgment, and made him forget the important considerations which he had him-

self explained to Marshal Saint-Cyr. Believing, in fact, that he could carry out his first plan only at the expense of sacrificing the old town of Dresden—a sacrifice not only opposed to the dictates of humanity, but also of those of policy, since it could not fail to render our alliance a source of disaster to Saxony—Napoleon now determined, instead of throwing the whole mass of his forces by Königsstein upon the enemy's rear, to effect this movement with only the forty thousand under Vandamme, and with a hundred thousand others to debouch directly upon Dresden. And this new plan, although offering fewer advantages than the former, was nevertheless calculated to have very effectual results, and was at the same time less hazardous, since Napoleon, by concentrating a hundred thousand men upon Dresden, would save it from the enemy, and have the means of vanquishing the enemy under its walls, whilst Vandamme would be posted at Königsstein ready to obtain from his victory the greatest possible advantage.

Having determined at midnight, with a promptitude which never ceased to be one of his characteristics, upon his course of action, he immediately gave the necessary orders; moving upon Dresden his old guard, which had already arrived in the environs of Stolpen, the cavalry under Latour-Maubourg which had arrived there, and the half of the division Teste, which remained on the bank of the Elbe, commanding that they should march throughout the night, so as to reach Dresden by day break, and that they should take up a position behind that of Marshal Saint-Cyr. He gave similar instructions to the guard and to Marshal Marmont, who were yet on the Lowenberg road, and to Marshal Victor, who had quitted Zittau on his way to Königsstein; and at the same time explained to General Vandamme what he would have to do during the following day, the 26th, directing him to march his forty thousand men across the bridge which had been first thrown over the river, between Lilienstein and Königsstein, debouch on the left bank of the Elbe, attack and take possession of the Camp de Pirna, and establish himself across the chaussée de Péterswalde. To these instructions he added the assistance of an enlightened counsellor, in the person of General Haxo, whom he directed to become the excitable Vandamme's guide and mentor. Having made these arrangements, he took a few hours' repose, and at daybreak set out at a gallop for Dresden, where he arrived at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 26th of August, the first of two justly celebrated days.

The enthusiasm excited amongst the troops and inhabitants

on Napoleon's arrival in Dresden was ardent in the extreme; the former receiving him with a species of military fanaticism, and the latter hailing him as the deliverer of their wives and children from the horrors of war. Visiting the King of Saxony for the purpose of supporting his drooping courage, Napoleon exhorted him to banish his fears, and then went to the front of the entrenched camp in order to join Marshal Saint-Cyr, who was at the head of his troops, and handling them with his accustomed ability.

The principal portion of Dresden being situated on the left bank of the Elbe is that, of course, which we first arrive at on coming from the banks of the Rhine. A series of heights, detached from the mountains of Bohemia, envelope the city, and form around it a species of amphitheatre. It was on this amphitheatre that the allied troops were arrayed, having France behind them as though they had come from it, as our troops had Germany behind them. Our line of defence, resting on the old town, presented a semicircle, while the two extremities rested on the Elbe, the left extremity being at the Pirna faubourg; and the right at the Friedrichstadt faubourg; and it was at the exterior line of this series of defensive works that Marshal Saint-Cyr had placed his troops. His first division having remained with Vandamme, he had posted the second on the first half of the circumference of the city, extending from the Pirna barrier to the Dippoldiswalde barrier. He had ranged his fourth division on the other half of the circumference, terminating in the faubourg de Friedrichstadt. In front of the Pirna faubourg was a vast public garden, called the Gross-Garten, which was, in relation to the arrangements of the day, a strong point in advance of our left; and there Marshal Saint-Cyr had established his third division, but with the precaution of leaving only simply posts in the advanced portion of the garden, and placing the bulk of the division in the rear, that it might not be cut off from the enceinte of the city, with which the Gross-Garten was not immediately connected. He had distributed his posts with infinite skill, in such a manner that they should afford each other mutual support; and between the redoubts had placed field artillery, to fill up the spaces which were not sufficiently covered by the fire of the fixed artillery. The Russian troops under Wittgenstein, Miloradovitch, and Barclay de Tolly, which had descended from Péterswalde and fronted our left, would attack between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten, by the Pirna and Pilsnitz barriers; whilst the Prussians, under General Kleist, would attack the Gross-Garten, and the Austrians, who formed the enemy's left and consequently fronted our right, would con-

duct the attack between the Dippoldiswalde and Freyberg barriers. So, at least, the distribution of the enemy's forces, under the semicircle of the heights, gave reason to suppose.

Having reconnoitred this line under a heavy fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, Napoleon approved of all Marshal Saint-Cyr's arrangements, and communicated to him his own plans. The cuirassiers and the old guard were already at hand, but the young guard could not reach Dresden until late in the day, whilst Marshals Marmont and Victor were at a still greater distance; Napoleon determined, therefore, to post a portion of the old guard at the various barriers, retaining the remainder in the rear, at the principal point of the city, and to place Murat, with the whole of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain, which extends in front of the faubourg of that name, and which formed the extreme right of our line of defence, so as to occupy the space which the fourth division of Marshal Saint-Cyr was not sufficient of itself to fill. As the portion of the line between this division and the second, in other words the centre, appeared insufficiently provided with troops, Napoleon sent to this point a portion of the garrison of Dresden, consisting of Westphalian troops; and at the same time ordered General Teste to re-enter the city with his brigade, which had been left at the Elbe for the purpose of supporting Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain.

It was thus that Napoleon awaited the onset of the two hundred thousand hostile troops in front of him, and which, when it was past midday, had made no other attack than such as consisted in a fire of sharpshooters on our left, and which was answered by Marshal Saint-Cyr's third division (44th). And the cause of this delay on the part of the enemy was, as might be easily imagined, the result of a fresh difference of opinion amongst the members of the staff. It had been agreed on the previous evening to defer all discussion until the following day, the 26th, when the fourth column would have arrived, and the plans of the French would be more apparent. But when the morning of the 26th was come it was seen that the state of affairs was entirely altered, Marshal Saint-Cyr having prudently fallen back upon the works defending the city, and thus taken a position, in attempting to drive him from which five or even ten thousand men might be uselessly sacrificed. Under these circumstances General Jomini, whose spirit was as just as ardent, declared himself of General Moreau's opinion, and as the Emperor Alexander supported their views it appeared to be decided to fall back upon the Dippoldiswalde

heights, for the purpose of taking up a position which should be at once safe and menacing. But the King of Prussia, completely under the sway of the passion which inspired his troops, said in a tone of cold determination, that after having made so ambitious an attempt in Napoleon's rear, to retire without having made a demonstration against Dresden would be to show both fickleness and weakness, and would be a course especially calculated to chill the patriotic ardour of his soldiers. To this General Jomini replied that war was not an affair of sentiment but of calculation; that had an attack been ventured upon on the previous evening, that of the 25th, it might have had some chance of success, but that now its result must be doubtful, even with the sacrifice of six thousand men. Moreau supported these views, whilst Alexander, according to his usual habit, appeared in a state of doubt, and the King of Prussia manifested a spirit of cold discontent, when an inhabitant of Dresden, taken prisoner at the advanced posts, and required to tell what he knew, declared that Napoleon had entered Dresden, and not alone, and gave such details as precluded the possibility of entertaining any doubt on the matter. As, moreover, the Russian column, which had descended by Péterswalde, had perceived beyond the Elbe the masses of the French army hastening towards Dresden, in such a manner as showed that its defence would be most determined, there was no longer room to doubt that the most advisable course would be to take up, without loss of time, the Dippoldiswalde position. The Austrian Generalissimo, however, had on the previous evening issued the order which had been agreed on for a vigorous demonstration against Dresden, and now, either from the difficulty of countermanding with sufficient quickness orders issued to a mass of two hundred thousand men; or from the repugnance of the troops themselves to withdraw without giving the enemy battle, the order to attack was not countermanded in time, and at the moment the bells of the Dresden churches sounded the hour of three a tremendous cannonade resounded from the lines of the allied troops, to the astonishment of the allied sovereigns, who were only intent upon a movement of retreat. The attack having now begun, however, it was too late to stop it, and it soon raged on all sides of the city against which it was directed.

Wittgenstein's corps, forming the Allies' right, and consequently opposed to our left, advanced between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten, in front of the Pirna faubourg, in spite of the desperate resistance of the men of the 43rd division, and aided by the progress of the Prussians in the Gross-Garten, of which, with great difficulty, their numbers

enabled them to take possession. The 43rd division, in fact, consisting of but six or seven thousand men, and being attacked by more than twenty-five thousand of the enemy, was unwilling to persist in maintaining its ground so far as to incur the danger of being cut off from the city itself, and it gradually retreated, therefore, falling back between the Pirna and Dohna barriers, and obstinately disputing Prince Antoine's garden, which was situated in the rear of the Gross-Garten, and joined the 43rd division (Saint-Cyr's fourth) which was entrusted with the defence of the remainder of the enceinte.

Such was, about five o'clock in the evening, the state of affairs at this point of our line, where the enemy had approached our redoubts with vigour, but had not taken any. In the centre the attack had made greater progress, for the Austrians, perceiving an immense mass of cavalry, which already covered the Friedrichstadt plain on their left, had directed all their efforts against our centre, and attacking each of two redoubts in this portion of our line with fifty pieces of cannon, succeeded in forcing our soldiers to evacuate one of them, situated in the Mocziński garden, and occupied it with their own troops. This was the only one of our redoubts of which they had gained possession, but they were on the point of carrying two others, and the Russians on their right were already at the foot of two more. Although it was now late, and the enemy had but little time left in which to act, the danger of the moment was very serious. In spite of the orders given him to reserve the old guard, Friant, who was in command of the grenadiers of this corps, and was posted in reserve in the Pirna faubourg, had ventured to carry some companies of these brave troops into action, leading them through the Pilnitz and Pirna barriers, and driving back before them, at the bayonet's point, the Russian columns which had approached too closely. In the meantime, at the opposite extremity, that is to say, at the *Porte de Freyberg*, the fusiliers had acted in the same manner, and driven back the Austrians. But these proceedings, bold as they were, had not, fortunately, cost any great degree of loss to the old guard, which Napoleon was anxious to reserve, whilst according to the young guard the honours and experiences attending posts of great peril.

But at this moment the columns of this young guard arrived, impatient to measure their strength with that of the enemy, and filling Dresden with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* They consisted of four excellent divisions of eight or nine thousand each, two under Marshal Mortier, and two under

Marshal Ney. Immediately on their arrival, Napoleon hastened to send two of these divisions (those of Decouz and Roguet) to the Pilitz barrier, for the purpose of driving back the Russians, who had continued to gain ground; and the two remaining ones (those of Barrois and Parmentier) to the Pirna barrier, that they might overmaster the Prussian troops, which, after having taken the Gross-Garten, were supporting the Austrians near the redoubt of the Mocziński garden. At the same time, he ordered Murat, who had been rejoined by General Teste's infantry, to charge with all his cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain.

In an instant the whole aspect of affairs underwent a change; for the four divisions of the young guard issuing from the Ziegel and Pilitz barriers with the force and fury of torrents, in conjunction with the 43rd and 44th divisions, drove back the enemy at every point, and retaking the redoubt situated at the end of the Mocziński garden, made prisoners there of six hundred Austrian soldiers. At the same moment, General Teste with the brigade which remained at his disposal, issued from the Freyberg gate and took possession of the village of Klein-Hamburg, whilst Murat, deploying with twelve thousand horse at our extreme right, drove the Austrians from off the Friedrichstadt plain, and compelled them to regain the heights. And now, repulsed in every direction, and recognizing in these vigorous measures the strength and skill of Napoleon's own hand, the allies retreated, leaving in our hands three or four thousand of their troops in killed or wounded, and two thousand prisoners; the loss of our own troops, which had fought under cover, being only two thousand altogether.

Delighted with the successes he had obtained during this first day, Napoleon anticipated that he should gain still more brilliant ones on the morrow. He had ascended several times during the day one of the city towers, and gazing from thence upon the semi-circle of heights by which Dresden was surrounded, suddenly conceived the idea of a manœuvre not inferior to any he ever executed. On our left the Russians forming the extreme right of the allied army, were posted between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten. A little less to the left, towards the centre, were the Prussians under General Kleist, who had been driven from the Gross-Garten and had fallen back under the Strehlen heights. Quite at the centre were a portion of the Austrian troops, opposite the Dippoldiswalde and Freyberg barriers, on the Racknitz and Plauen heights; and there, between the centre and our right, was a narrow and deep gorge, through which flowed a little river, the Weisseritz, which falls into the Elbe between

the Old Town and the Friedrichstadt faubourg. It was beyond this gorge, called the valley of the Plauen, on the extreme left of the allies, and on our extreme right, that were posted the greater part of the Austrian troops, who were thus separated from the rest of the allied army by a species of gulf, across which it was impossible to advance to their support. This side of the field of battle was, moreover, more suitable than the other for the manœuvres of cavalry; and Napoleon, comprehending at a glance the advantages which were offered by this circumstance, determined to reinforce the King of Naples, to throw him by a détour to the right, in a sudden and unexpected manner, upon the Austrians, who must inevitably, as they could receive no aid, be driven into the Plauen gorge; and after having thus destroyed the allies, left, to send Ney with the whole of the young guard, against their right, to drive them back en masse upon the heights from which they had attempted to descend. From this double movement would result a double advantage, for in the first place it would enable our troops to snatch from the enemy on our right, the grand Freyberg route, which was in every way the most convenient for their retreat; and in the second place, it would drive them on the left, upon what Péterswalde route, on which Vandamme awaited them at the head of forty thousand men, and thus reduce them to the necessity of returning to Bohemia by scarcely formed roads, in traversing which they could not but suffer enormous losses.

Having formed these plans with the most marvellous promptitude, Napoleon gave the necessary orders on the spot, before taking either food or sleep. On the right he posted General Teste, under Marshal Victor, and both under Murat, who would thus have at his disposal twenty thousand infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry, with orders to turn the Austrians by their left, and to pursue them vigorously towards the Vallée de Plauen. He ordered Marshal Marmont, who at this moment arrived, to establish himself at the centre, at the Dippoldiswalde barrier, near the Moczinski barrier, with the old guard and the artillery reserves behind him. To Marshal Saint-Cyr he gave orders to concentrate his three divisions, to range them in close column between the Dippoldiswalde and the Dohna barriers, their right resting on Marshal Marmont's troops, and their left on the *Gross-Garten*. These two corps posted near Napoleon, who intended to take up his position at the centre, (as he made known to all his lieutenants, that they might go there to him for his orders) were to receive their instructions on the ground, and from his own mouth. Finally, at the extreme left, Ney with the whole of the young guard, and a portion of the cavalry under

Nansouty, was directed to defile behind the Gross-Garten with forty thousand men, to turn round this garden, to expel the Russians from the plain which extends from Striesen to Döbritz, and to drive them back upon the heights, when the allied army should have been sufficiently disordered on the left. Unless circumstances should demand a different course of action, Napoleon's intention was to act on the offensive by his two wings, and to remain immoveable at the head of fifty thousand men in the centre of the line, which he had strengthened by more than a hundred additional pieces of artillery.

Napoleon was now, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, about to engage two hundred thousand, which was the number the allied army had attained after the arrival of Klenau's Austrians. Of these two hundred thousand there were one hundred and eighty thousand before Dresden, and twenty thousand before Pirna under Prince Eugène of Wurtemberg. But to counterbalance this inequality in numbers, Napoleon had the advantage of his combinations, and the forty thousand men under General Vandamme posted at Pirna, where they would be much more useful than they would have been before Dresden.

After he had given the most precise directions for the execution of the measures on which he had determined, Napoleon went to sup with the King of Saxony and his Marshals; and then, without revealing his plans, announced his expectation of a decisive battle on the morrow, which would be disastrous to the allies, and surrendered himself throughout the evening to an unusual spirit of mirth, retiring only at a late hour for the purpose of enjoying a little repose between two battles.

In the meantime, in the camp of the allies, where the day did not end thus gaily, it was resolved, after some deliberation, to remain on the hills surrounding Dresden, where they held a most excellent position. But no one thought of the Plauen Gorge, beyond which was a portion of the Austrian army, in a position in which it would be impossible to afford it any succour should it be imperilled. Indeed, Prince Schwarzenberg, from fear of a deficiency of strength at the centre, withdrew a portion of the troops which he had beyond the Plauen vale, and thus enfeebled his left wing, which he should have reinforced, and which, it is true, he thought would have been compensated for the loss of the troops of which he deprived it by the arrival of the second half of Klenau's corps.

On the following day, the 27th of August, it rained heavily, and during the intervals between the showers a

thick mist enveloped the field of battle, a circumstance which was distressing to the soldiers of the two armies, but favourable to Napoleon's plans. The early hours of the morning were passed in manœuvres, which, on our side, commenced by General Teste establishing himself, with the eight battalions which were under his command, in front of the village of Löbda, and at the entrance of the Plauen gorge, for the purpose of preventing the Austrian grenadiers under Bianchi from debouching from it, as they had done on the previous evening. Marshal Victor formed his three divisions, of which one was reduced to a brigade, in columns, at the foot of the heights, awaiting the execution of Murat's turning movement on the left of the Austrians; and Murat himself, leading Latour-Maubourg's heavy cavalry along the Priesnitz road, hastened to ascend, unperceived by the enemy, to the plateau on which he was to manœuvre. At the centre, Marmont, having the old guard behind him, and a strong force of artillery in front, took up a position at the foot of the Racknitz heights, ready to receive the instructions which Napoleon, whose own position was close at hand, should give him by word of mouth. A little to the left, but still in the centre, Saint-Cyr, having concentrated his three divisions, which on the previous evening had been distributed around the city, took up a position in advance of the Gross-Garten, where he would be ready to attack the Strehlen heights. Finally, at the extreme left, Ney, with the young guard and Nansouty's cavalry, defiled in columns behind the Gross-Garten, for the purpose of turning it and advancing to encounter the Russian troops between Gruna and Döbritz.

The positions of the allied troops were the same as those occupied by them on the previous evening, with the exception of certain rectifications, and they awaited almost immovably the attack for which they perceived across the mist the French troops preparing.

As soon as the troops had taken up their respective positions, and it became possible to discern objects across the mist, a cannonade was exchanged between the opposing forces, which soon became violent, the two armies having together not less than twelve hundred pieces of ordnance in position. In the meantime General Teste, on the right, took possession of Löbda, from which he drove the Austrian sharpshooters, and penetrated as far as the entrance of the Plauen gorge; whilst Marshal Victor, having formed his troops into several columns, commenced climbing the heights in the direction of the villages of Töltschen, Rosthal, and Corbitz, which he had been instructed to seize; and whilst

Murat deployed his sixty squadrons on the right of the *chaussée de Freyberg*, threatening the Austrians' left.

At the centre, Saint-Cyr, posted a little to the left of Marmont and the Old Guard, quitted the walls of the *Gross-Garten*, against which he had rested, took Strehlen from the Prussians, and engaged them in a terrific combat between this place and the Leubnitz heights; whilst Ney, having deployed between Gruna and Döbritz, advanced towards Reieck, driving before him Wittgenstein's advance guard.

With the exception of the serious engagement which took place between Saint-Cyr and the Prussians, in the direction of Strehlen, little took place up to eleven o'clock in the morning, save a violent cannonade, and the execution of manœuvres on the two wings. The allies, however, being unable to perceive what was taking place on their left, beyond the valley of Plauen, and perceiving on their right the steady and imposing march of Marshal Ney, were in doubt as to what course they should now pursue; when an idea conceived by General Jomini, and which consisted in throwing the Prussian troops upon Ney's flank, as soon as he should have arrived at Prohlis, whilst Barclay de Tolly should at the same time attack him in front with the Russian reserves, was proposed to and accepted by Alexander, and messengers were sent to the cold and methodical Barclay de Tolly, to persuade him to concur with all his forces in the execution of a manœuvre which was to be, it was thought, decisive.

But whilst this danger, more or less real, threatened Marshal Ney, the left of the allies was menaced by a danger about which there could be no doubt. About half-past eleven, Murat and Victor arrived in line beyond the Plauen gorge, and having well concerted their attack, began to execute it with promptitude and vigour. Marshal Victor carried to his left the division Dubreton, the division Dufour, reduced to one brigade, to his right, and held the division Vial in reserve. In the meanwhile, Murat, continuing to manœuvre, endeavoured, by advancing as far as Comptitz, to outflank the Austrians' left, formed by the division Meszko. When Murat appeared to have gained sufficient ground on the left of the Austrians, Marshal Victor gave the signal, and our troops advanced at quick march upon the three villages, Töltschen, Rosthal, and Corbitz. Led by energetic officers, our young soldiers pushed forwards with the utmost eagerness, in spite of a murderous fire of cannon and musketry, which the Austrians directed against them, and having first taken possession of the enclosed gardens which preceded them, threw themselves upon and

took the three villages, and then followed the Austrians who had fallen back upon the rising ground behind them. Suddenly the division Aloys Lichtenstein, perceiving a vacant space between two of our divisions,—that of Dubreton, which had advanced somewhat to the left towards Töltschen, and the division Dufour which was at Corbitz,—endeavoured to penetrate it, whereupon it was charged at a gallop by Bordessoulle's cuirassiers, who instantly broke and sabred two of its squares. The division Dufour then continued its advance along the Freyberg road, whilst on the left Dubreton's two brigades drove the Austrians towards the Plauen gorge, and overpowering them, took more than two thousand prisoners. At the same time Bordessoulle's cavalry renewing its assaults upon the division Aloys Lichtenstein drove it to the summit of the heights between Altfranken and Pesterwitz, and then thrust it down upon Potschappel, in the deepest part of the Plauen gorge, with the loss of many men and cannon. In the meantime, Murat, who had continued to watch the division Meszko, for the purpose of preventing its junction with Aloys Lichtenstein, now pushed it vigorously in the direction of Comptitz, for the purpose of driving it beyond the heights. Having repulsed with loss, the charge of three thousand Austrian horse, he attacked Meszko's infantry with his cuirassiers, and drove it before him with continued slaughter, for more than a league along the Great Freyberg road; until at length being outflanked and surrounded by our squadrons, the six or eight thousand men of which it was composed were compelled to lay down their arms. In two hours Murat had slain or wounded four or five thousand men, made twelve thousand prisoners, and taken rather more than thirty pieces of cannon. The rout of the enemy's left wing was in fact complete; and it may be fairly said, that it no longer existed.

Whilst these events were taking place on the allies' left, a strange accident occurred at the centre, where Napoleon was exchanging a vigorous cannonade with the Austrians, and where he himself directed the operations of his batteries in the very thickest of the fire. At the same time, the Emperor was at a point exactly opposite, at Racknitz, accompanied by General Moreau, who seeing the danger of the position, advised him to withdraw somewhat further back. This advice had barely been given, and was on the very point of being executed, when a bullet from the batteries of which Napoleon was personally directing the fire, struck the general on his legs, and hurled him and his horse to the ground. A strange stroke of fortune, this!

which made the instrument of his death, a ball from a French cannon, fired, as it were, by Napoleon's own hand.

As the news of this incident spread throughout the allied army, together with information of the disasters suffered on its left wing, and the refusal of Barclay de Tolly to execute the manœuvre against Ney which had been proposed to him, an officer came from Pirna to announce that Vandamme, debouching from Königsstein, had taken this post from Prince Eugène of Wurtemberg. And now, alarmed at the misfortunes suffered on their left, exposed to a violent cannonade in the centre, and threatened with being outflanked on their right by the movement of Marshal Ney, who advanced uninterrupted from Reick upon Prohlis, and fearing that the Péterswalde route would speedily be in the hands of Vandamme, the generals surrounding Alexander and the King of Prussia betook themselves to the consideration of the plan it would now be desirable to pursue, and as Prince Schwarzenberg, frightened at the loss of twenty thousand men on his left, and in want of ammunition by reason of the dilatoriness of his transports, peremptorily refused to continue the battle, it was resolved to retreat towards the Bohemian mountains by which the allied troops had entered Saxony.

As column after column of the enemy was perceived retreating behind the crest of the hills by which Saxony is surrounded, the most vehement delight spread throughout the ranks of our army; and Murat's horse, still following the Freyberg route, every moment took large numbers of prisoners, together with baggage waggons and artillery. At the same time the cannonade at the centre was directed against the enemy with even increased vigour, and Saint-Cyr and Ney *s'ebraulant* on the left climbed the heights in pursuit of the Russians. At six o'clock in the evening we had taken fifteen or sixteen thousand prisoners and forty pieces of cannon, whilst ten or eleven thousand of the allied troops lay killed or wounded on the earth. Our own loss during the day amounted to eight or nine thousand men, the greater number of whom had been struck down by the enemy's fire.

Napoleon returned to Dresden at even fall in the midst of the most enthusiastic cries from the populace, who were delighted at having been relieved from the presence of the two hundred thousand troops of the allies, who would not have released them from the French until they had previously made Dresden endure all the horrors which attend the taking of a town by assault. Having been exposed for more than twelve hours to incessant rain, the brim of his hat

hung down upon his shoulders, and he was covered with mud; but he did not the less beam with satisfaction. He went to the King of Saxony, who expressed the most lively gratification at the events of the day, and in the midst of the congratulations, sincere or affected, which met him on every side, he continued to repeat one question. At the moment when the bullets which had struck Moreau fell into the midst of the Emperor Alexander's staff, Napoleon had clearly perceived from the splendour of the uniforms that the group must be the staff of one of the sovereigns, and was never tired of asking throughout the day—"And who is it, then, whom we have killed?" A few minutes after his return to Dresden the question was answered in the most remarkable manner. The illustrious man who had been wounded had a dog which had remained in the cottage where his master had been carried to receive the first attentions required by his wounds, and this dog was now brought to Napoleon, bearing upon his collar the inscription; "*I belong to General Moreau.*" And thus it was that Napoleon became informed of Moreau's presence and death in the allied army!

The allies having retreated to the summit of the heights which surround Dresden, deliberated upon the line along which it would be advisable to conduct their retreat; some advising the adoption of a position at the debouching of the Bohemian mountains—advice which had also been given by General Moreau before the battle; and others, amongst whom was Prince Schwarzenberg, expressing a wish for an immediate retreat into Bohemia, beyond even the Eger. To remain on the slopes of the mountains in the presence of a victorious enemy so accustomed as Napoleon was to turn a victory to the greatest possible account, was not to be thought of, and it only remained to decide by what roads the passage across the mountains should be effected. And with reference to this subject it had to be considered on the one hand, that the Péterswalde route was much endangered and might possibly be completely barred by Vandamme, who occupied a position on the Pirna plateau, and on the other, that if the retreat were not conducted by this route Prince Eugène de Wurtemberg and the Count Ostermann, who had been sent to his aid, would be left unsupported, and almost inextricable confusion would be caused on the secondary roads by which the retreat must then be conducted. It was ultimately decided that the bulk of the Russian troops under Barclay de Tolly should follow Count Ostermann by the Péterswalde route, re-opening it by force if necessary, and that the Prussian and a portion of the Austrian troops should take the route passing by Altenberg, Zinnwald, and Tœplitz;

and, finally, that the remainder of the Austrian army should proceed by the Freyberg road for the purpose of gaining the great road running from Leipzig to Prague by Commotau. The result of these arrangements was, that the allied army would return to Bohemia in three columns instead of the four of which it had been previously composed.

On the following morning the troops of the allies proceeded on their march as had been arranged on the previous evening, pursued by the French corps, which, however, were kept at some distance from the enemy by the bad state of the roads. At every step the allied troops left behind them wounded, stragglers, and baggage waggons, which fell into our hands, and continued their march overwhelmed by dismay. The King of Prussia saw in the events of the last few days the continuance of his ordinary bad fortune, and Alexander asked himself whether the gleam of success on which he had relied had not been a sad illusion, and if he had not hoped too much in flattering himself that he should vanquish Napoleon.

Barclay de Tolly finding the Péterswalde route much encumbered, and perceiving that he should be soon close pressed, began to fear that he should be unable to strike the Altenberg route sufficiently soon, and suddenly resolved to take a new direction with the bulk of the Russian army, and to turn to the right for the purpose of regaining the same Altenberg route which was being traversed by the Prussians and a portion of the Austrian army, at the risk of producing upon it the most frightful state of confusion. He sent orders to Count Ostermann to fall back upon himself, and to leave Prince Eugène to return alone by the Péterswalde route to Bohemia.

These orders gave rise to a vehement dispute between Prince Eugène de Wurtemberg and Count Ostermann; for the former, who was struggling with General Vandamme for the possession of the Péterswalde route, was reasonably unwilling to remain without support, exposed to the danger of finding Vandamme on his flank, in his rear, or even in front. Besides, he remonstrated, if Vandamme's corps should be permitted freely to enter Bohemia, it would probably post itself at Tœplitz, at the very neck of the roads which the retreating columns were following, and cause them no little embarrassment, Count Ostermann, on the other hand, unwilling to compromise the safety of the troops of the guard which had been entrusted to him, refused for a time to yield to the Prince's urgent remonstrances; but ultimately, persuaded by the convincing reasons brought forward by the latter in support of his views, he determined at length to

follow the Péterswalde route, and even to fight his way along it, if necessary, so as to arrive before General Vandamme at the Tœplitz debouche.

On the morning of the 28th, accordingly, Prince Eugene and Count Ostermann began to advance along the Plateau de Gieshübel, which is situated below that of Pirna, and separated from it only by the Gotcube rivulet, and having succeeded with some loss in reaching its extremity, issued by the Gieshübel slope, and thus gained the Péterswalde route. But although Vandamme had been prevented by the difficulty attending the conveyance of artillery over roads broken up by the inclemency of the weather, from checking the progress of the Russian troops, he pursued them with the utmost vigour, engaged their rear-guard at Gieshübel, where it lost a thousand men, and pursued them closely as far as Hollendorf, where he impatiently awaited orders from Napoleon, as to his future movements.

Such were the operations of the enemy during the 28th, and in the meantime, Napoleon, who had risen at a very early hour, sent orders in writing, to the effect that Marshal Mortier with the young guard, and Marshal Saint-Cyr with the 14th corps, were to advance to Gieshübel, one of the defiles of the Péterswalde route, for the purpose of effecting a junction with Vandamme; that Marshal Marmont should follow the allies by the Altenberg route; and that Murat, who was accompanied by Victor's corps, should pursue them with the utmost vigour along the great Freybourg route. Having ridden at daybreak with Marshal Marmont, and observed with his own eyes the enemy's retreat, Napoleon had beheld, on arriving at the heights of Dresden, the various columns of the allied troops, directing their course towards the wooded mountains of the Erz-Gebirge. Struck by the transverse movement from left to right, executed by the Russian troops of Barclay de Tolly, and perceiving that Marshal Marmont's corps was manifestly insufficient to deal with the masses of hostile troops which this movement would have the effect of throwing upon the Altenberg route, he ordered Marshal Saint-Cyr to fall back from Dohna to Maxen, for the purpose of approaching Marshal Marmont, and pursuing the enemy in concert with him.

Having given this order by word of mouth, Napoleon proceeded to Pirna, where he arrived about noon, and where, after having partaken of a slight repast, he was seized with a pain in the stomach, to which he was subject after exposure to damp. The attack was not, however, of a nature to prevent him from giving orders, and taking such measures as circumstances rendered necessary. But at this moment

he received the despatches which he awaited with impatience from the environs of Berlin, and the banks of the Bober; and which informed him that Marshal Oudinot having, in the first place, been prevented entering Berlin by the inundations, had, in the next place, failed to attack the enemy in sufficient force, and had his corps severely handled; whilst Marshal Macdonald, on the Bober, had allowed Blucher to surprise him, and had suffered considerable loss. And thus the horizon of Napoleon's fortunes, after having been so perfectly serene, began to be overcast with shadows. He had always regarded the march upon Berlin as of great importance, both politically and as a matter of military tactics; and now, the reverses suffered by Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot having rendered the execution of this march as well more difficult as of more doubtful issue, it appeared to him that he ought immediately to return to Dresden to direct the measures which the posture of affairs demanded. Convinced, as he was, that the Russian columns had had time to regain the Péterswalde route, and that all that Vandamme could now do was to pursue them vigorously, he thought that it would be sufficient to leave at Vandamme's disposal all the divisions he had already confided to him, and making him descend into Bohemia by the Péterswalde route, to move him upon Tœplitz, where he would strike the line of retreat of the allied troops. It was very probable that Vandamme, posted at Kulm or at Tœplitz, would make more than one good capture, and would be able, by falling back between Tetschen and Aussig, to carry off a great portion of the matériel of the allied troops whenever they should endeavour to recross the Elbe. And in this position Vandamme would render another service by occupying the direct Prague route, to which Napoleon attached the highest importance, in accordance with the idea which he had conceived since he had received Oudinot's and Macdonald's despatches, of executing an overwhelming march upon Berlin or Prague, for the purpose of falling unexpectedly on the army of the north, or completing the defeat of that of Bohemia. Considering, then, the position of affairs under this new aspect, he left at General Vandamme's disposal not only his two first divisions, Philippon and Dumonceau, with the brigade Quytot, forming the half of the division Teste, but also the first division of Marshal Saint-Cyr, which had been lent to him, and a brigade of Victor's corps, to recompense him for the loss of the half of the division Teste. As he added to these troops General Corbineau's cavalry, Vandamme would have under his command what was equivalent to four divisions of infantry and

three brigades of cavalry, the whole amounting to at least forty thousand men. Having given Vandamme his orders, Napoleon posted Mortier at Pirna, with four divisions of the Young Guard, that he might, if necessary, afford support to General Vandamme, from whom he would not be more than seven or eight leagues distant; and then, having sent directions to Saint-Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, to pursue the allied troops with the utmost vehemence, he set out for Dresden, where he ordered the old Guard to join him.

Saint Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, continued to pursue the enemy very closely throughout the 28th, taking altogether about five or six thousand prisoners, and a large quantity of matériel. The loss which the allies had suffered on the previous day to about twenty-five thousand men, and as this number was now raised to thirty-two or thirty-three thousand, they began to give such evident signs of discouragement as could not but excite hopes in our army of important results, should the enemy be vigorously pursued.

On the following day, the 29th, Vandamme, excited by the orders which he had received on the previous evening, resolved to make the Russians expiate their success in passing before him on the Pirna plateau. Having long suffered under a sense of bitterness at not having been raised to the rank of Marshal, whilst it had been bestowed upon some whose merit was inferior to his own, this general, whose genuine military talents were unfortunately somewhat blemished by manners too redolent of the camp, and an excessive violence of temper, now found circumstances bringing him under the Emperor's notice, and flattered himself that he should at length obtain the rewards which he considered that he had long deserved, and felt inspired by a zeal which, serviceable as it might have been at any other time, was too calculated at the present moment to hurry him beyond the bounds of prudence. He boldly advanced, then, on the morning of the 29th, on the Russian rear guard, and attacking between Hollendorf and Péterswalde a Russian column, which attempted to check his progress, utterly routed it, with the loss of two thousand men.

After this exploit, Vandamme continued to pursue the Russians with the utmost vigour; and having crossed the mountains, and descended into the plain in their track, arrived about noon at Kulm, from whence he commanded a view of the vast basin in which the enemy's columns, closely followed by our troops, now began to débouch. As soon as he appeared at this point, the troops under Eugene de Wurtemberg and Ostermann's guards took up a position in front of him, for the purpose of covering the débouché de Tœplitz,

of the importance of which they were fully aware, and where Vandamme had desired to bar the road to the enemy's columns, which had taken the routes parallel with those of Péterswalde. Unfortunately, however, the French general had at his immediate disposal only his advanced guard, the remainder of his troops following in a long line through the gorges; and as the Russians were in force, and appeared to be resolved to maintain their ground, he resolved to halt until the remainder of his troops should have come up.

Taking advantage of this interval to learn what had been the proceedings of the allies, we shall find that Alexander had passed the night of the 28th at Altenberg, at the foot of the Erz-Gebirge mountains, and having crossed the one known as the Geyersberg, had arrived on the other side early on the morning of the 29th, when he immediately perceived the necessity of offering a determined resistance to Vandamme, for the purpose of securing the retreat of the allied army. He had lost the counsellor in whom he had placed so much confidence, General Moreau, for he was now being carried dying on his soldiers' shoulders; but there still remained to him Jomini, whom, in spite of his impetuosity, Moreau had pointed out as very capable of giving good military advice. And now General Jomini, supported by many others who were strongly disposed to decry the Austrians, and especially Prince Schwarzenberg, animadverted bitterly on the plan of retreating beyond the Eger, declaring such a movement to be not only unnecessary, but even dangerous; and the Emperor Alexander, who began to understand the art of war somewhat better, appreciated the force of the objection, and was very disposed to modify his plans accordingly. Ever eager at the least gleam of hope to engage the French troops in battle, all the generals by whom Alexander was now surrounded, were of opinion that the moment had now come when they should resume the hand to hand struggle with the enemy, and that, instead of retreating beyond the Eger, it was necessary to maintain their ground. As Barclay de Tolly and General Diebitch, who had become chief of the staff, coincided with their opinion, orders were given to Prince Eugene de Wurtemberg and d'Osternann to remain firm in front of Kulm; and at the same time M. de Metternich, who was at Duchs, the château of the celebrated Wallenstein, where the allied sovereigns were now assembled, was persuaded to give orders that all the Austrian troops should converge on the left, for the purpose of forming in line with the Russian troops, which had descended from Péterswalde.

Some hours must necessarily elapse, however, before any

considerable amount of forces could be brought into line in accordance with these orders; and Vandamme finding the fugitive troops halting and becoming rapidly more numerous, resolved to dislodge them at once from the position in which they appeared inclined to establish themselves, for the purpose of protecting against us the Geyersberg débouchés. He had at this moment at his immediate disposal only the brigade de Reuss, but with that alone he now drove the Russians from Kulm, where they had attempted to maintain their ground, and from the village of Straden, upon which they retreated. Beyond the village of Straden, however, there was a second position situated behind a ravine, and, apparently, of considerable strength. Resting on the side towards our right on the mountains, it was supported in the centre by the village of Priesten, which stood on the Tœplitz route, and was flanked on its left by wide grass lands, intersected by canals and the village of Karbitz. Vandamme was anxious by an immediate attack on the village of Priesten to prevent the Russians from establishing themselves there, but he now for the first time encountered an obstinate resistance, and was repulsed by a charge of the Ismailow guards. As he had neither his heavy artillery nor masses of infantry at hand, he was compelled to await the arrival of the division Monton-Duvernet; and it would evidently have been better to have deferred further operations, until the presence of his whole corps had enabled him to engage the enemy with sufficient forces. As however, a considerable time must necessarily elapse before his other divisions could be at hand, his anxiety to cut off the enemy's retreat led him to attack the enemy with the nine battalions, which alone were present at this moment, of the fourteen of which General Monton-Duvernet's division was properly composed. Carrying these nine divisions to the right towards the wood, he renewed the combat, and drove the Russians upon Priesten; but being suddenly assailed by forty squadrons of the Russian guard, our troops again found themselves in a position in which, instead of advancing, they could only with some difficulty keep the ground they had already gained. At two o'clock in the afternoon appeared the first brigade of Vandamme's first division (Philippon), and the second brigade followed under General Fezensac. But although the troops of these brigades entered into action immediately with the utmost vigour, Vandamme perceived too late that this desultory mode of attack could have no effectual results, and determined to establish himself on the Kulm height, which, situated at the débouché of the Péterswalde causeway, commanded the plain. After one vain attempt to

drive us from this position, the Russians fell back in their turn, and resumed their position at Priesten.

General Vandamme's intention was to remain at Kulm, until Mortier, who had remained in his rear at Pirna, should come to his aid; and that Saint-Cyr and Marmont, who were on his right on the other side of the mountains, crossed them in the track of the allies. As these movements might be easily executed in twelve or fifteen hours, he hoped, by making active use of all the forces at his command, to be able to lay before the Emperor on the following day, the 30th, results which should be not wholly contemptible. He wrote that same evening to Napoleon, informing him of his position, requesting reinforcements, and announcing that he should remain immovable at Kulm until they arrived.

As letters sent from Kulm on the evening of the 29th could not reach Dresden until the morning of the 30th, the orders issued in accordance with demands made in such letters could not be executed in time to afford Vandamme the aid he required sufficiently early on the 30th. But the fact was, that Napoleon, supposing from the information he had already received that the allies were in a state of complete rout, and that whilst the unslacking vigour with which they would be pursued by Saint-Cyr, Marmont, and Murat, would drive them across the mountains in disorder, Vandamme, posted on the other side, would be enabled to take large bodies of them prisoners, and, perhaps, close against them entirely the Altenberg débouché. He was, moreover, at this moment, entirely absorbed by a vast combination, which would enable him, he hoped, to advance upon the Berlin route five marches from Dresden, to crush the army of the north, to humble by one and the same blow Prussia and Bernadotte—to revictual the fortresses on the Oder—to send *encouragements* to those on the Vistula, and thus to give a new aspect to the war, the theatre of which would be transferred for a time to the north of Germany. And thus Berlin, and the fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, which had already caused him to give too wide a scope to the circle of his operations, once more engrossed his attention, and turned it from the direction in which, for some hours at least, it should have been concentrated. Entirely carried away by the singularly great but singularly ill-timed idea by which his mind was now occupied, he sent orders in the course of the morning of the 30th, to Marshal Mortier, then at Pirna, to send to Dresden two of the divisions of the young guard, and with the two others to proceed to the aid of Vandamme; to Murat, to place at the disposal of him, Napoleon, half the heavy cavalry, and with the remainder to continue the

pursuit of the enemy along the Freyberg road; to Marshal Marmont, to push the enemy with the utmost vigour upon the Altenberg and Zinnwald *débouché*; and to Marshal Saint-Cyr, to aid Marmont in this operation, or, which would be better, to endeavour to gain the Péterswalde causeway by a side road, so as to effect a junction with Vandamme.

In the meantime, the allies were far from being occupied with such vast plans as these, being only anxious to escape from the perils to which they had exposed themselves by imprudently descending upon the rear of Dresden. Desirous before all things to hold Vandamme in check, they carried to the left all the Prussian and Austrian troops which arrived at Tœplitz by the Altenberg road, and posted them behind Priesten and Karbitz, hoping, by that means, to prevent the French general from debouching from Kulm, and so to procure time for the safe passage of their columns across the mountains. There was great cause for anxiety, however, in respect of the Prussian corps under Kleist, which was to have followed the Austrian corps in the first movement of retreat, and was to have passed with it by Dippoldiswalde, but which had been prevented from executing this movement by the transversal movement executed by Barclay de Tolly, who had abruptly fallen back from the Péterswalde causeway upon the Altenberg road, for the purpose of avoiding Vandamme. Delayed in its march, and forced to wait until the road was free, this corps was still on the evening of the 29th on the other side of the Geyersberg, and was considered to be in a position of extreme peril. The King of Prussia, therefore, after having conferred on the matter with the Emperor Alexander, sent Colonel Schœler, one of his aides-de-camp, to General Kleist, to inform him of the presence of Vandamme at Kulm, to give him liberty to choose by which road he would endeavour to release himself from his perilous position, and to promise him that the enemy would be energetically opposed before Kulm on the following day, for the purpose of affording him leisure to traverse the mountain and debouch in the basin of the Eger.

On the morning of the 30th of August, the two armies found themselves occupying the same positions as on the previous evening; the allies facing Vandamme, with their left, composed of Russian troops, close to the mountains, their centre, also composed of Russian troops, in advance of Priesten, and, *vis-à-vis*, with Kulm, and their right, consisting of Austrians and the cavalry of the allied army, in the Karbitz grass lands.

Anxious as they were to assume the offensive for the purpose of favouring General Kleist's passage across the moun-

tains, and supposing, as they did, that Vandamme had only 30,000 troops at his disposal, they resolved to attack him without further delay.

The French general, on the other hand, having perceived from daybreak the disproportion between the enemy's forces and his own, and expecting every instant the appearance of General Mortier in his rear, and that of Marshal Saint-Cyr on his right, was desirous of remaining on the defensive until the arrival of his reinforcements. At 8 o'clock, the enemy's sharpshooters opened their fire, and ours replied; but no proceeding on either side foreboded the imminence of a serious engagement, until, suddenly, on our left, the Russian horse, under General Knorring, were perceived crossing an eminence which commanded the grass lands, and rushing upon a battery of field guns, which was somewhat in advance of our line of cavalry. Three pieces were taken, and a battalion of the 13th leger, which attempted to defend them suffered severe loss. The light cavalry brigade of General Heinrodt, led by the gallant Corbineau, then charged the Russian cuirassiers and repulsed them; but Colleredo's Austrian infantry, moving up to the support of the latter, Heinrodt's chasseurs were compelled to fall back, General Corbineau, who was wounded in the head, having to quit the field.

Vandamme now advanced the brigade Quayot from the centre towards the left, where it had scarcely arrived when it was attacked by the whole of General Knorring's cavalry, and supported during more than an hour, formed into squares, the enemy's attempts to break them. At length, upon the enemy's cavalry attempting to turn our squares and approach Kulm, it was charged in its turn by the cavalry brigade of General Gobrecht, and thrown back upon the Austrian army. The enemy's object evidently was to throw us back upon the Péterswalde route by outflanking us, but his efforts had as yet been unsuccessful; and as we still remained in possession of the plain on the left, and were firmly posted in the centre and on the right, where the enemy appeared to be afraid of attacking us, we had, apparently, nothing to fear.

Suddenly, however, about ten o'clock in the morning, heavy firing was heard in our rear, and dense columns made their appearance in that direction, believed by Vandamme to be Mortier's troops arriving from Pirna. Terrible was his surprise, however, when, on running up, he perceived the Prussian uniform, and found that they were the troops of General Kleist, which had descended by the Péterswalde causeway. Let us turn our attention to the

accidental but fortunate and despairing movement which had released them from a position of frightful peril, and thus thrown them on our rear. At Kulm it had been apparent to General Kleist that, as he was between the Péterswalde route on the left, which was occupied by Vandamme, and the Altenberg route on the right, which had been encumbered all the day by the Russians and Austrians, and which was at that moment intercepted by Marmont's corps, it only remained to him to follow the foot-paths right before him, leading across the mountain, with the risk of meeting with Vandamme on his road. Moreover, as Saint-Cyr's corps was close on his rear, if he were now to hesitate for even a moment, his force might very probably be attacked and destroyed. In the presence of this triple danger, then, the Prussians, possessed by a transport of enthusiasm, climbed the mountain paths before them, prepared, should they lead them into the midst of the forces of Vandamme, to cut their way through them or perish in the attempt. And when they found themselves, thirty thousand strong, on Vandamme's rear, and discovered that the French General was assailed in front by a hundred thousand of the allied troops, they hastened to attack him, with the confident hope of obtaining some important result.

Vandamme immediately perceived that the only course now open to him was to reascend the Péterswalde causeway and to pass through the midst of the Prussian columns; abandoning his artillery for the purpose of saving his army. He lost no time in giving the orders necessary to the carrying out this resolution; and the brigades Quytot and Reuss forthwith quitted the plain on the left for the purpose of regaining the Péterswalde causeway, whilst Philippon and Mouton-Duvernct slowly fell back. At this sight the sixty Russian battalions which were opposite our right and centre, sent forth shouts of delight, and followed us. Mouton-Duvernct and Philippon held them in check, and they also suffered severely from the fire of our cannon posted on the heights of Kulm. But on the left in the plain, where there now remained only the brigade Dunesme, this brigade was beset by a formidable mass of enemies. In the rear, the brigades Quytot and Reuss, attempting to regain the Péterswalde route in close column, made a vigorous charge upon the Russians; at the same moment a brigade of cavalry, that of Montmarie, followed by many *soldats du train*, threw itself upon the Prussian artillery and took it. General de Fezensac, summoned to this point by Vandamme, contributed with the remnant of his brigade to the common effort. And this effort, as Kleist's first line had been broken

through, for a moment appeared likely to be successful, if Mouton-Duvernet and Philippon, falling back in time and in good order, should aid in forcing the Prussians' second line. But a strange accident now took place, and overthrew all the calculations of the unfortunate Vandamme; for our cavalry being charged by the enemy on the left of the route, and thrown back upon the right, precipitated itself in that direction, followed by a multitude of artillerymen who were separated from their pieces; and this body of fugitives, rushing upon the troops of Mouton-Duvernet and Philippon, threw them into a state of confusion, which ended in a general movement of retreat towards the woods. Dunesme's brigade alone remained on the plain, assailed in every direction, and defending itself with the utmost heroism, but ultimately broken and overwhelmed, a portion of its troops being killed or taken prisoners, and the remainder flying for refuge to the woods. Vandamme and Haxo, wounded and lingering last of all in the midst of peril, were made prisoners.

Such was the unfortunate affair of Kulm, which cost us five or six thousand men killed or wounded, seven thousand prisoners, forty-eight pieces of cannon, and two generals, and which, whilst costing the allies some six thousand men, relieved them from their position of defeat, re-inspired them with the hope of victory, and effaced from their minds the remembrance of the disasters they had suffered on the 26th and 27th of August.

Where can we look for the cause of this singular catastrophe? Shall we attribute it to Vandamme, saying that he ventured too much? or to Mortier and Saint-Cyr, complaining that they failed to afford him timely succour? or to Napoleon, on the ground that he trusted too much to the favourable progress of affairs? or shall we rather regard it as the legitimate consequence of the military skill displayed by the generals of the allied armies? The facts above narrated almost of themselves sufficiently answer these questions, and account for one of the greatest reverses of fortune of which the pages of history retain any record.

Vandamme, whose many faults were counterbalanced by many fine qualities, is certainly not blameable for the unfortunate results of these days; for if, after having wisely established himself at Kulm, it was General Kleist instead of Marshal Mortier who appeared in his rear, this was an extraordinary accident, to hold him responsible for which would be a crying injustice. During the catastrophe which followed, Vandamme preserved all his presence of mind, and took the only resolution which offered a chance of escape.

namely, that of retracing his steps and passing through the midst of the Prussian troops. He is not fairly open to reproach, and the supposition that he lost himself in a too eager pursuit of that Marshal's baton which, far more than others, he deserved for military services already performed, is a calumny upon a man whose misfortunes render him an object for pity rather than blame.

If it be admitted, however, that Vandamme is not to be blamed, having been unfortunate only in the fact that a Prussian corps appeared in his rear instead of the French one which he expected, what are we to say of the French generals who might have supported him, and more particularly of Marshals Mortier and Saint-Cyr, the only ones posted within reach of Kulm? Marshal Mortier established at Pirna, liable to be dispatched thence either to Dresden, on the one hand, or to Tœplitz on the other, might certainly, had he acted with more self reliance and vigilance, have hastened up to Vandamme's aid; but it was, at the same time, perfectly natural that, in the strict fulfilment of the orders he had received, he should await in complete immovability the expression of Napoleon's will; and with respect to the precise order given to him to aid Vandammé with two divisions, it is sufficient to state that this order did not reach him until the catastrophe had already taken place.

It would be well if we could say as much with respect to Marshal Saint-Cyr; but the fact is that, directed as he was to keep constantly on the track of Kleist's corps, he should never have lost sight of him for an instant, and had he fulfilled this positive duty the necessary result would have been, that when Kleist's corps fell upon Vandamme, it would itself have been attacked by a French corps in the rear, and would probably have been itself broken and routed instead of helping to break and rout the army of Vandamme. But unfortunately Marshal Saint-Cyr, never zealous for the success of any operations but those with the execution of which he was himself directly charged, and ever inclined rather to seek difficulties than to seek to overcome them, employed the 28th in moving to Maxen, and on the following day, the 29th, only advanced to Reinhardt's Grimme, thus making a movement of no more than a league and a half on the very day when it was important that the enemy should be pursued with the utmost vigour, and allowed Kleist to disappear from before him and fall upon Vandamme's rear, whilst he employed himself in inquiring of the staff whether he should not follow Marmont on the Altenberg route. On the following day, the 30th, when he received the order directing him to endeavour to effect a junction with Van-

damme by a lateral route, he at length aroused himself, and by the road which had led Kleist upon Vandamme's rear, and which should have conducted himself upon Kleist's rear, arrived just in time to hear the cannon which announced our disaster.

As for Marshal Marmont, he pushed the enemy as vigorously as he could, and engaged in several skirmishes which resulted to his advantage, but he was too far from Vandamme to be able to move up to his support. Posted decidedly on the right, he could not attempt to cross the mountains in advance of Saint-Cyr without exposing himself to falling alone amidst a crowd of enemies; and the catastrophe is not, therefore, to be attributed to any error of his. With respect to Murat, it is sufficient to say that it was impossible that he should have had any share in the deplorable event which took place at Kulm, since he and his squadrons were traversing at the time the great Freyberg route.

Of the persons who may be considered the responsible actors in this catastrophe it remains, finally, to speak of Napoleon himself, who, by sedulously following his lieutenants, might have made them converge towards a common point, and by his presence would certainly have obtained what he hoped and expected. But he was turned aside, on the 28th, from this duty, by the news which reached him from the neighbourhood of Lowenberg and Berlin, and also, it must be added, by the confidence he felt that the orders he had given were of themselves sufficient to secure the results he desired. Ever recurring to past experiences, Napoleon believed that he had done sufficient to render him certain of obtaining the most splendid triumphs. But unfortunately times were changed, and to have accomplished the destruction of the grand army of Bohemia would have required, at least, Napoleon's incessant superintendence of the execution of his designs. But now, distracted as he was by the passionate desire of obtaining all results at once, Berlin and Dantzic were as much means of leading him into error as Moscow had been during the previous year. Indeed, that he might strike a serious blow at Prussia and Germany, at Berlin, and be able to boast that his power extended from the Gulf of Tarentum to the Vistula, he had entertained the idea from the very commencement of this campaign of sending one of his corps to the Prussian capital, and keeping a garrison at Dantzic; and for the sake of these objects he had, as we have seen, allowed an error to creep into the finely-conceived plan he had formed for the conduct of the campaign, giving an excessive extent to the circle of operations, the central point of which was to be at

Dresden, placing Macdonald at Lowenberg instead of at Bautzen, and sending Oudinot against Berlin instead of establishing him at Wittenberg. And as the same cause continued to produce the same effects, he was anxious, on learning the misfortune which had happened to Macdonald, to succour him as soon as possible; and being also anxious to lead in person Oudinot's army to Berlin, he turned from Pirna and Kulm, where he ought to have been with his guard, and neglected to achieve victories, the consequences of which would have been of the utmost advantage to him, for the purpose of running after others, and thus exposed himself to the danger of losing everything from an over anxiety to obtain everything at once.

But for this catastrophe at Kulm alone must he be blamed, for in the details of the several manœuvres he had committed no fault. And at the same time it must be observed that the actual results were but little due to the merits of his enemies; a sentiment of despair rather than calculation having led them to carry into execution a combination which had the most unexpected and important consequences, and which was certainly due, not to the skill of the Emperor Alexander, to whom its merit has been attributed, but to the determination of the Prussian troops either to cut their way out of their perilous position or perish in the attempt. We must look, then, not so much to the military skill of the allies, although they were far from being deficient in this, as to the passionate spirit of patriotism which inspired them, and which rendered them comparatively indifferent to defeat, for the cause of their seizing with such promptitude the opportunity offered them at Kulm. Another important moral lesson to be drawn from these great events is, that care should ever be taken not to drive men to despair, since to do this is to endow them with a supernatural strength which may enable them to overthrow the best calculations, and to frustrate the plans of the most consummate skill.

The allies who, when they abandoned the battle-field of Dresden, regarded themselves as completely vanquished, and sadly questioned whether, in attempting to vanquish Napoleon, they had not undertaken an enterprise against destiny itself, suddenly, at the spectacle of the defeat and capture of Vandamme, regarded themselves as being once more in an excellent position, and believed that the balance of fortune between themselves and Napoleon was at least in equilibrium. It is true that the two days' fighting at Dresden, and the pursuit during the 28th and 29th, had cost them in killed, wounded, or prisoners, some forty thousand men, whilst the defeat of Vandamme had, at the most, cost us no more than

twelve thousand. But, nevertheless, the result was that a feeling of confidence had re-entered their hearts, and they resolved to close with Napoleon at every opportunity, and leave him not a moment in repose. For the allies, not to be vanquished was almost to be victorious; whilst for Napoleon, on the contrary, to have failed to annihilate his adversaries was to have done nothing. On such extreme and almost impossible conditions had he based his hopes of safety.

Let us conclude this sad story by mentioning that the only man who had for a moment been opposed to Napoleon, Moreau, died very near him at Tann. Both his legs had been cut off, and he had borne the operation with that tranquil courage which was his distinguishing characteristic. But his sufferings were terrible, and he had had to undergo a journey of twenty leagues, carried on the shoulders of men, the foes of his country, in a state of extreme bodily anguish. On the other side of the mountains, all the allied sovereigns, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor Alexander, had hastened to his side, and overwhelmed him with marks of esteem and regret. The most exalted personages, M. de Metternich, the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and the generals of the coalition, paid him visits; and the Emperor Alexander, who had conceived for him a genuine friendship, even clasped him in his arms. But Moreau, whose impetuous spirit had ever been an honest one, was rather embarrassed by than proud of these demonstrations, and asking himself what had been the real nature of the course he had pursued, repeated incessantly, "And yet I am not to blame! I only desired the good of my country. . . . I wished to free her from a humiliating yoke." Another exclamation which frequently escaped his lips was, "That Bonaparte is always fortunate!" He had uttered these words at the moment when the bullet struck him, and he repeated them many times before he expired. Bonaparte fortunate? He had been, and he might appear to be so to the eyes of a dying rival, but Providence was soon to pronounce its will respecting him, and to inflict upon him a fate sadder, perhaps, than that of Moreau, if indeed any fate can be sadder than that which makes a man die in the ranks of the enemies of his country.

BOOK L. .

LEIPZIG AND HANAU.

THE course of events in Silesia and the environs of Berlin, during the operations of the belligerent armies around Dresden—The forces and instructions left with Marshal Macdonald when Napoleon returned from the Bober to the Elbe—Anxious to execute his instructions, and fearing to lose the advantages of acting on the defensive, this Marshal sets his troops in motion on the 26th of August—General Blücher attacks the division Charpentier and Sebastiani's cavalry, and drives them from the Janowitz plateau—This accident compels the whole army to make a retreat, which a heavy fall of rain lasting during several days, renders almost disastrous—Capture and destruction of the division Puthod—Marshal Macdonald's troops reduced from seventy thousand men to fifty thousand—His retrograde movement upon the Bober—Events on the side of Berlin—March of Marshal Oudinot at the head of the 4th, 12th, and 7th corps—Composition and strength of these corps—The army of the Prince Royal of Sweden—Arrival in front of Trebbin—The first positions of the enemy taken during the 21st and 22nd of August—Isolation of the three French corps during the 23rd, and disastrous combat engaged in by the 7th corps at Gross-Beeren—Retreat of Marshal Oudinot upon Wittenberg—Many soldiers desert their ranks, especially from those of our Allies—It is the knowledge of these serious checks which induces Napoleon on the 28th, to withdraw from Pirna upon Dresden, and turns his attention from Kulm—Being in ignorance as yet of what had happened to Vandamme, he forms the project of changing the theatre of the war, and transferring it to the north of Germany—Important results which might have proceeded from the execution of this project—On receiving information of the disaster at Kulm, Napoleon, compelled to restrict his scheme of action, reorganizes Vandamme's corps, confides it to the Count de Lobau, sends Marshal Ney to replace Marshal Oudinot in the command of the three corps moved back upon Wittenberg, and proposes to post himself with his reserves at Hoyerswerda, for the purpose of sending from the one side, Marshal Ney upon Berlin, and of taking on the other, a threatening position on the flank of General Blücher—Departure of the guard for Hoyerswerda—Macdonald turns Napoleon by fresh disquieting suggestions from the execution of his last project, and induces him to advance immediately upon Bautzen—Arrival of Napoleon at Bautzen on the 4th of September—Blücher's prompt retreat during the 4th and 5th of September—Napoleon has scarcely re-established Marshal Macdonald upon the Neisse, when a

second appearance of the army of Bohemia on the Chaussée de Péterswalde draws him back to Dresden—His interview at the advanced posts, with Marshal Saint-Cyr, on the 7th—Plan of action for the following day—In the meantime, Napoleon receives information of a fresh disaster, which has happened to his troops on the Berlin route—Marshal Ney, having received orders to march upon Barutte, had made a flank movement on the 5th of September, in front of the enemy, which leads to the calamitous battle of Dennewitz—Retreat on the 7th of September, upon Torgau—A portion of the Saxon troops disband—Napoleon receives this news with calmness, but begins to entertain feelings of anxiety with respect to his position—Indirect instructions given through M. de Bassano to the minister of war, to arm and provision the fortresses of the Rhine—In conformity with the plan agreed on with Marshal Saint-Cyr on the 7th, Napoleon, during the 8th, acts vigorously against the Prussians and Russians, for the purpose of driving them back into Bohemia—In accordance with the advice of Marshal Saint-Cyr, the French troops follow on the 9th and 10th, the old Bohemia route, being that of Furstenwalde, by which there is hope we may be able to turn the enemy—The impossibility of carrying the artillery across the Geyersberg, prevents the completion of this movement—Unaware that at that moment the Austrians were separated from the Prussians and Russians, and eager to repair the checks suffered by his lieutenants, Napoleon ceases to advance, and returns to Dresden—The plan of action adopted by the allies, and its too successful execution—Napoleon's forces reduced from three hundred and sixty thousand active troops on the Elbe, to two hundred and fifty thousand—In consideration of this state of things Napoleon contracts the circle of his operations, moves Macdonald with the 8th, 5th, 11th, and 3rd corps close to Dresden, posts the Count de Lobau behind excellent field works, sends a strong detachment of cavalry to disperse the bands of partisans in his rear, reorganizes Ney's corps on the Elbe, places Marshal Marmont and Murat at Grossenhayn for the purpose of protecting the arrival of his commissariat stores, and takes up his own position in the midst of his guard at Dresden—Third appearance of the Prussians and Russians at Péterswalde—The works, the construction of which he had ordered between Pirna, Gieshubel, and Dohna, not being completed, Napoleon is compelled to march yet once more, along the Péterswalde route, for the purpose of driving back the enemy into Bohemia—Prompt retreat of the allies—Napoleon's return to Pirna, and anxiety to establish himself well in his position, so as not to have to exhaust his strength in useless excursions—His resolution to establish his troops on the Elbe, from Dresden to Hamburg during the winter—Projects of the enemy—Blucher prevails on the Allied Sovereigns to employ General Benningsen's reserve in Bohemia, and after having thus reinforced the Grand Army of the allies, to march it upon Leipzig, whilst he should himself join Bernadotte, cross the Elbe with him in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg, and reascend to Leipzig with the armies of the north and of Silesia—First movements in execution of this design—Napoleon immediately perceives the enemy's intention and makes all his troops repossess to the left of the Elbe—Leaving only Macdonald with the 11th corps on the right of this river, Napoleon immediately discovers the intentions of the enemy and makes the whole of his troops pass over to the left of the Elbe—Leaving Macdonald only on the right of this river, he marches Marmont and Souham, the one by Leipzig and the other by Neissen, upon the Lower Elbe, for the purpose of affording support to Ney—He sends Lauriston and Poniatowski to the route running from Prague

to Leipzig, for the purpose of supporting Victor against the army of Bohemia—A pause of some days to allow time for the development of the enemy's plans—Blucher having stolen away for the purpose of joining Bernadotte, and crossing the Elbe at Wurtembourg, Napoleon quits Dresden on the 7th of October with the guard and Macdonald, and descends upon Wittenberg with the intention of fighting Blucher and Bernadotte first, and then falling back upon the grand army of Bohemia—Excellent plan formed by Napoleon for the purpose of driving back Blucher and Bernadotte upon Berlin, and surprising Schwarzenberg—A decided movement made by Blucher and Bernadotte upon Leipzig, changes all Napoleon's plans—Finding that the allies are on the point of concentrating themselves upon Leipzig, Napoleon hastens to arrive there before them for the purpose of preventing their junction—Return of the grand French army upon Leipzig—A terrible battle, the greatest of the age, and probably of any age, fought during three days under the walls of Leipzig—Napoleon retreats upon Lutzen—Destruction of the bridge of Leipzig, which causes the destruction or captivity of a portion of the French army—Death of Poniatowski—March upon Erfurt—Defection of Bavaria and arrival of the Austro-Bavarian army in the environs of Hanau—Rapid movement of the French army and the battle of Hanau—Humiliation of the Austro-Bavarian army—Return of the French to the Rhine—Their deplorable condition on arriving at Mayence—Operations of Marshal Saint-Cyr on the Elbe—The capitulation of Dresden—Situation, strength, heroic conduct, and misfortunes of the French garrisons uselessly left on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe—Character of the campaign of 1813—Ominous presages to be drawn from it.

BOOK L.

LEIPZIG AND HANAU.

The serious and unexpected events which, suddenly engrossing Napoleon's attention, withdrew him from Kulm, had taken place on the Katzbach in Silesia, and at Gross-Beeren in Brandenburg. Marshal Macdonald, whom Napoleon had left in pursuit of Blucher, had met with a species of disaster, and Marshal Oudinot, whom Napoleon thought to be on the point of entering Berlin, had had to fall back in consequence of an unfortunate engagement with the enemy, under the cannon of Wittenberg. And the manner in which these events had been brought about we must now examine, if we would form an accurate idea of the situation of affairs, and be able to comprehend the plans which had absorbed Napoleon's attention during the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, and had prevented him from hastening up with all his reserves to the aid of the unfortunate Vandamme.

After he had thrown back the army of Silesia from the Bober upon the Katzbach, Napoleon had left Marshal Macdonald to march in pursuit of it at the head of a force of eighty thousand men, consisting of the 3rd, 5th, and 11th corps, and ten or eleven thousand Poles under Prince Poniatowski, posted on the Bohemian frontier in the rear and on the right of Marshal Macdonald, for the purpose of guarding the Zittau débouché. The instructions he had given to Macdonald, were to the effect that he was to drive Blucher back beyond Jauer, then to establish himself strongly upon the Bober, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, in such a manner as to keep the army of Silesia at a distance from Dresden, and to prevent the army of Bohemia from throwing detachments in the direction of Berlin.

An incident, however, which at first sight appeared to be of but little importance, had the effect of producing a most

disastrous change in this apparently advantageous state of affairs. Napoleon, at the moment of his departure, had ordered Marshal Ney to follow him to Dresden; and as this order did not express with sufficient explicitness that it referred to the Marshal only, and not to his troops, the 3rd corps itself had been set in motion on the Dresden route, and the result had been that the left wing of the French army had appeared to be in retreat. Blucher, whose character and position rendered him anxious to resume the offensive, had concluded from the retrograde movement of a portion of our line, that Napoleon was no longer present, and that the moment was an opportune one in which to return once more to the attack of the French army. At the same time, Marshal Macdonald, equally anxious to restore to his troops the attitude they had appeared to lose, hastened without due thought to carry them forward, and thus exposed them to a violent and immediate check.

The 3rd corps, (General Souham's) having first made a march backwards, and then a march forwards, in order to return to Liegnitz, had resumed on the 25th of August its original position. The 11th corps (General Gérard's) forming the centre, had not quitted Goldberg, and the 5th (General Lauriston's) forming the right, had also remained in its position. Having all his troops in line then, Marshal Macdonald resolved to advance on the following day (the 26th) upon Jauer, the position which Ney had in obedience to his instructions to occupy. Although Napoleon did not wish to establish his army of Silesia at any point more distant than the Bober, he yet desired that it should have its advanced posts on the Katzbach, from Jauer to Liegnitz, in order that it might the more readily obtain provisions, and the more surely intercept any detachment that might be sent from Bohemia to Berlin.

Although at Goldberg, Marshal Macdonald was on one of the arms of the Katzbach, and, consequently, very much beyond the Bober; there was a point of this river on his right which still remained in the possession of the enemy, being that of Hirschberg, in the mountains. He detached, therefore, a division of the 11th corps (General Ledru's), and ordered it to ascend the river on our side, that is by the left bank, whilst the division Puthod, of Lauriston's corps, should ascend it by the right bank, and thus surprise Hirschberg by both banks.

Macdonald resolved to march himself upon Jauer, with the corps of Lauriston and Gérard; and as he would have to cross on his way to Jauer no watercourse of any considerable size, but only a few ravines more or less deep, on which the enemy would probably be found posted in strength,

he flattered himself that he should be able to drive them from their position either by the direct attack of the troops under Gérard and Lauriston upon Jauer itself, or by a flank movement upon Liegnitz, to be executed by those under Generals Souham and Sebastiani.

He ordered, in fact, General Souham to set out from Liegnitz with the 3rd corps, and to take the route from this town to Jauer, which would lead him across the Janowitz plateau to the very flank of the enemy's position there; and he hoped that the appearance of twenty-five thousand French troops in this direction would take from the enemy any idea of resisting the attack in front which was to be executed by Generals Lauriston and Gérard. But unfortunately there was a considerable distance between the road which General Souham was to follow on the Janowitz plateau, and the route which Generals Gérard and Lauriston would have to traverse for the purpose of marching directly upon Jauer. General Gérard, the least distant of the two, would ascend the deep ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, a small and rapid stream falling from Jauer into the Katzbach, after turning the Janowitz plateau. For the purpose of establishing some connection between the two principal masses of his troops, Marshal Macdonald assigned to General Sebastiani an intermediate route, that from Buntzlau to Jauer, which, following at first the Wutten-Neiss ravine, and then crossing that river, terminated in the Janowitz plateau.

On the 26th it was found that a storm of rain, which had lasted during the whole night, had swollen all the rivers and rendered the roads almost impassable. In his eagerness, however, to resume offensive operations against the enemy, Marshal Macdonald refused to take into account the inclemency of the weather, and demanded that his orders should be immediately carried into effect; and accordingly, whilst the divisions Puthod and Ledru ascended the two banks of the Bober on their way to Hirschberg, Lauriston's and Gérard's corps marched upon Jauer; our active skirmishers succeeding, in spite of the difficulties of the nature of the ground and the weather, in dislodging those of the enemy, and compelling them at every point to fall back. On the left, however, matters did not proceed quite so satisfactorily.

General Sebastiani, who had set out somewhat tardily, had not reached the entrance of the Wutten-Neiss ravine when General Gérard had already penetrated it, and when Lauriston, who was marching parallel to him, was very much in advance. General Souham, in the meantime, having found the Katzbach overflowed at Liegnitz, had endeavoured to find a passage above it, and had thus entered upon the same

route as that pursued by General Sebastiani. The consequence was, that there were twenty-three or twenty-four thousand infantry, and five or six thousand cavalry, and more than a hundred pieces of cannon ingulphed in the Wutten-Neiss ravine at the very moment that the Prussian cavalry, reconnoitring, had descended the Janowitz plateau, and not perceiving our troops, had advanced into the ravine a considerable distance. General Gérard, perceiving from the opposite bank of the Wutten-Neiss, the Prussian squadrons, opened fire on their rear; the effect of which was to lay many of them low, but at the same time to warn them of the danger of their position, and to cause them to retrace their steps with the utmost speed.

This incident suggested to Marshal Macdonald the idea of throwing some battalions of the division Charpentier, one of General Gérard's two, upon the Janowitz plateau, to take possession of it, and thus aid Generals Sebastiani and Souham to deploy there; General Charpentier, accordingly, with one of his brigades and a field battery, forthwith crossed the Wutten-Neiss at Nieder-Krayn, and ascending to the Janowitz plateau deployed upon it in spite of the Prussian advanced posts. He was immediately joined on his left by General Sebastiani's cavalry; and General Souham proceeded to follow him as fast as the weather, the nature of the ground, and the accumulation of troops in the narrow defile through which he had to pass would permit.

At this moment, Blucher came up to this same point with the greater number of his troops; for, relying upon the strength of the Jauer position, he had left there only Langeron's corps, and had moved up both York's and Sacken's to the Janowitz plateau for the purpose of meeting the flank movement by which he was threatened. On beholding our troops climbing up the brink of the ravine for the purpose of establishing themselves on the plateau, he sent forward a strong field battery, and when this had played on the brigade of General Charpentier for some time, hurled upon it a mass of ten thousand cavalry, the assaults of which our infantry bravely checked, not with the fire of their muskets, which the rain had rendered useless, but with the points of their bayonets. General Sebastiani charged this body of cavalry in its turn, and succeeded for a moment in driving it back, but he was ultimately compelled to give way, being unable to resist, for any time, forces treble his own, and was forced to make a retrograde movement, thereby leaving exposed the left of the brigade Charpentier, which Blucher then attacked with twenty thousand infantry, and, in spite of its heroic resistance, drove back into the Wutten-Neiss ravine, where it became mingled

pêle-mêle with Sebastiani's cavalry, which had also fallen back, and with the head of Souham's corps which had then arrived. The consequence being that in a state of the greatest confusion and with the loss of many cannon, the horses of which were destroyed by the enemy's fire, our troops had to retreat as far as the village of Kroitsch, where the Wutten-Neiss joins the Katzbach, and beyond which Blucher dared not pursue us.

The result of this check at a single point, which cost us at the most but a thousand men, had the effect of converting into a species of general rout, an operation which along all the other portions of our line had been successful. In fact, Generals Gérard and Lauriston, attacking with great energy the positions which Langeron had successively occupied and abandoned, had already arrived within sight of Jauer in spite of the inclemency of the weather, and were about to take possession of it, when they were stopped by the news of what had taken place on their left, and being compelled in common prudence to retrace their steps, they went back as far as Goldberg, which they reached about midnight, in a very deplorable state, having on their way fallen in with the débris of the troops which had been defeated on the Janowitz plateau, and having had to traverse a road choked up with baggage waggons and crowds of wounded. They had to bivouac in the midst of torrents of rain as well as they could, some in Goldberg and some outside of it, for the most part without either provisions or shelter, and altogether in a condition as deplorable as any could well be.

On the following morning, the skies still continued to pour forth a torrent of rain; but, fortunately, the Katzbach, which our troops had passed on the previous evening, had become so swollen as to serve as a protection against the impetuous pursuit of Blucher, whose infantry could not cross it. Nevertheless, our retreating troops were pursued by a cloud of Russian and Prussian cavalry, whose repeated attacks, although bravely held in check by our bayonets, rendered it necessary to leave on the road a great portion of our artillery, and many of our troops who had scattered themselves amongst the villages in search of food. General Souham's corps, being covered by General Sebastiani's cavalry, was able to retreat in safety across the plain and reach Buntzlau; but the corps of Generals Gérard and Lauriston, more closely pursued, and having no heavy cavalry with which to cover their retreat, found shelter in the woods which separate the Katzbach from the Bober, where they passed the night much as they had passed the preceding one. On the 28th, they were once more opposite Lowenberg, and were desirous of

crossing the Bober there, but in vain, for although the bridge still stood, the troops would have had to pass across an inundated tract of country three quarters of a league in extent to reach even the river side, and they had, therefore, to re-descend its right bank for the purpose of crossing it, at Buntzlau, where Souham and Sebastiani had already arrived.

When he had re-entered Buntzlau, Marshal Macdonald was far from considering the cruel fatality which appeared to pursue him as at an end, for he had still to tremble for the safety of the division of Puthod, which was evidently in a most dangerous position. Should it not have taken advantage of the Hirschberg bridge, to cross to the other side of the Bober? The fact was, that this division, which had ascended one bank of the Bober whilst the division Ledru ascended the other, had neglected to make use of the Hirschberg bridge whilst it was yet time, and had found itself separated from its companions-in-arms by an immense tract of water. On the 29th, it descended by the right bank to a point opposite Lowenberg, near Zopten, and there, when reduced by fatigue, hunger, and the cold of the nights, from six thousand men to three thousand, it was attacked by Blucher's troops, and after a valiant defence, completely broken up.

On the 30th, Macdonald's troops were once more collected on the left bank of the Bober, but reduced from seventy thousand men to fifty thousand, and after having left behind them in the marshes a hundred pieces of cannon. Of the twenty thousand troops wanting, not more than three thousand had fallen before the enemy's fire, seven or eight thousand of the remainder having been taken prisoners, and nine or ten thousand having deserted from their ranks; a too sudden experience of the sufferings of war having excited anew in the breasts of these latter the sentiments of hatred they had felt six months before on quitting their cottage homes, for the man who sacrificed them whilst only on the threshold of manhood to his inordinate ambition.

In the meantime, our arms had suffered a reverse on the Berlin route, which, although of a less startling character than that above described, was succeeded by equally disastrous consequences.

We have seen how important Napoleon considered it that one of his corps should march upon Berlin, for the purpose of driving the army of the north far from the theatre of the war, humiliating Bernadotte, startling the minds of the Germans by entering the chief of their capitals, inflicting a severe wound on the Tugend-Bund, dissolving the scattered elements, of which he believed Bernadotte's army to be composed, and finally, to succour our garrisons on the

Oder and the Vistula. To attain these various ends she had placed at Marshal Oudinot's disposal, besides the 12th corps, which the Marshal commanded in person, the 7th, which was under the immediate command of General Reynier, and the 4th, which was confided to General Bertrand. The 12th, comprising two good French divisions and a Bavarian one, and numbering some eighteen thousand men, the 7th, formed of the French division Durutte and two Saxon divisions, and numbering twenty thousand men, the 4th, consisting of one French division (Morand's) and two foreign ones, (the Italian division Fontanelli and the Wurtembergian division Franquemont) and consisting altogether of twenty thousand men, and lastly, a cavalry reserve of six thousand men under the Duke of Padua. This army, which consisted of only sixty-four thousand men instead of the seventy thousand, which Napoleon had hoped it would have comprised, and contained, besides, many foreign troops, which were not only very indifferent soldiers, but also, in many instances, very ill-disposed towards us, was far from being as well commanded as could have been wished; for Marshal Oudinot, who was as brave and resolute on the field of battle as any one could be, was endowed with a noble modesty of nature which rendered him distrustful of himself, and unwilling to enforce the adoption of his views by his lieutenants, Generals Reynier and Bertrand. Now General Reynier, skilful and valuable officer as he was, was unfortunately full of a self-conceit, which led him to believe himself superior to most of the marshals, and to be somewhat too impatient to obtain a dignity for which he had already had to wait, he thought, too long, whilst General Bertrand, who was honoured by Napoleon's favour, and justified the honour by the most zealous application to his duties, but who was better qualified for the conduct of engineering works than the command of troops, was accustomed to display a deference which was more apparent than real, and was of a character rather obsequious than submissive. The consequence was, that Marshal Oudinot, much embarrassed by having to overrule the several pretensions of his lieutenants, only ventured to do so with an excess of delicate precaution incompatible with the prompt and vigorous exercise of a military command. Posted, however, nearer the field of action than Napoleon, and able to gather information from the rumours flying about the country, he did not allow himself, as did the latter, to entertain false news respecting the strength of the enemy and the difficulties which would be thrown in the way of the French troops by the nature of the ground. He knew that Bernadotte was at the head of a force numbering some ninety thousand excellent troops, posted in

advance of Berlin, that the Prince of Sweden had detached under General Walmoden twenty thousand troops, of various nations, to make head behind the numerous Mecklenberg canals, against the corps d'armée which had marched from Hambourg, under Marshal Davoust, and that the remainder of the one hundred and fifty thousand under the command of the Prince of Sweden, had been devoted to the blockade or siege of the fortifications on the Oder and the Vistula. Nor did the nature of the ground lessen the difficulties of the task which he had to perform. In his march upon Berlin by a route between the Elbe and the Spree, he would have to proceed between a double line of waters, which may be instanced in the one case, by the river of the Dahne, which falls into the Spree above Berlin, and in the other, by the river of the Nuthe, which falls into the Havel at Potsdam. In the bosom of the angle formed by this double line of waters, was the army of the north, established in a good position, that of Ruhlsdorf, covered with powerful artillery, and protected by an innumerable cavalry. It would be impossible for our troops, therefore, to attempt to traverse this labyrinth of woods, sands, marshes, and rivers, without incurring the twofold danger of being outflanked or turned should they proceed by a single route, or, should they proceed by several, of being so separated as to be incapable of affording to each other mutual support.

Distrusting, as he did, the promises which Napoleon had written to him to the effect that there would be within a few days, more than a hundred thousand French troops concentrated upon Berlin, Marshal Oudinot felt an extreme repugnance for the task he had been required to undertake, and which obliged him to march through a most difficult country with sixty-four thousand troops against Berlin protected by ninety thousand. On the 18th, however, he executed a transverse movement from right to left, and advanced from Baruth to Luckenwalde, from whence he resumed his route northwards, advancing between Zossen and Trebbin, through the midst of that double line of waters which has been above described.

On the 21st he had reached a position opposite Trebbin, only a few leagues from the enemy's army, which began to concentrate in proportion as the ground became contracted, and we approached. Between the two lines of waters arose a series of wooded hills, and on the side of these hills ran the two roads by which it was possible to reach Berlin. One of these two roads, that on the left, leading to Trebbin, ran across a brook and up a hill, whence it issued on Gross-Beeren. That on the right, entirely separated from the preceding, after

having also ascended some hills, proceeded to debouch by Blankenfelde on the right and at some distance from Gross-Beeren. Marshal Oudinot determined to advance by both these routes at once, in the first place as a measure of precaution, since he was unwilling to incur the risk of being turned by neglecting either of them, and in the next place because his lieutenants preferred to march separately, and he flattered himself that, divided for a time, they might afterwards easily unite for the purpose of attacking the enemy en masse.

On the 21st, he attacked Trebbin with the 12th corps, threw the 4th (General Bertrand's) upon Schultzendorf, and marched the 7th (General Reynier's) between the two towards a village named Nunsdorf. The little town of Trebbin, which was well entrènced, was occupied by a detachment of Bulow's troops, whilst Taunzien's corps guarded the Blankenfelde route, which lay to the right. Marshal Oudinot began the attack by a cannonade upon the town, and then sent against it a brigade of the division Puthod, whilst the 7th corps threatened to turn it by Wittstock. These combined movements produced their effect; for the Prussians, finding themselves already outflanked by the 7th corps, whilst the division Puthod attacked them in front at the bayonet's point, repassed the stream which it had been their task to defend, and fell back on the hills in the rear. In the meantime, on the right, General Bertrand had entered Schultzendorf with the 4th corps.

On the following day, (the 22nd) Marshal Oudinot had the enemy's position on the brook Trebbin attacked at two points, and succeeded in forcing the troops of Bulow's corps to retire definitively to the central position chosen by the Prince Royal of Sweden. On the opposite side, General Bertrand, after exchanging with the enemy a vigorous cannonade, reached the Juhnsdorf position leading to Blankenfelde; and thus we had made a fresh step into this species of jungle, where our troops were forced either to separate into two portions and follow two routes, which although running parallel to each other were almost without any means of communication from one to the other, or else, in a single body, to pursue one route, and be unprotected against the danger of a flank attack by the enemy. It would, doubtless, have been possible to obviate this inconvenience by marching with the bulk of the troops along one route, and moving along the other only some detachments of light troops; but such a course would have rendered it necessary to break up the various corps, and to exercise over their several commanders an authority which Marshal Oudinot did not venture to assume.

Hoping that the enemy would not be met until after our

troops had passed Gross-Beeren, and until they should have had time to effect a junction, he appointed, with an excess of complaisance, a separate task to each of his lieutenants, deciding that General Bertrand should proceed by the right route to take possession of Blankenfelde; after which he was to advance to Gross-Beeren; and that General Reynier should proceed to the same place by the route on the left, marching on the side of the hills, and following the skirts of the woods. As for himself, he resolved, instead of marching with the 12th corps, which was under his own more immediate command, behind General Reynier, so as to afford him support should he require it—he resolved, we say, to proceed on the other slope of the hills along which the general was to pursue his march, as though he were afraid that even his mere presence might inflict upon his lieutenants a disagreeable feeling of restraint.

On the morning of the 28th of August, the several generals entrusted with the execution of the above arrangements began to carry them into effect. On the right route, General Bertrand advanced to the front of the Blankenfelde height, and finding General Tauenzien strongly posted there, was compelled to exchange a furious cannonade with him. In the meantime, General Reynier advanced without difficulty along the hills on the other side of which marched Marshal Oudinot, and débouching before Gross-Beeren, immediately attacked that village and took it. With ill-judged impatience, however, he then, instead of establishing himself in the position he had taken, advanced beyond it, and forthwith found himself with only eighteen thousand men, of whom but one-third were French, in the presence of fifty thousand of the enemy; the whole army of the Prince of Prussia being in position in front of him at Ruhlsdorf, whilst on the right was the division of General Borstell, which had fallen back on Bulow's Prussian corps, situated at the centre, but yet somewhat to the left of the Swedish army, whilst the Russian troops were decidedly on the left.

Oudinot was far from anxious to measure his strength with the force now opposed to him; but it was scarcely probable that he would now be able to avoid a contest, and the Prussian troops, under General Bulow, were, in fact, excessively eager to be permitted to post themselves on the route by which he was attempting to reach Berlin. Bernadotte, however, hesitated; not only fearing that the events of a single day might destroy the prestige with which he had endeavoured to surround himself in the midst of strangers, by declaring that it was to him Napoleon owed the greater part of his success; but also shrinking from compromising

the safety of the Swedish army, which he knew not how to replace should it be destroyed. General Bulow, on the other hand, distrusting, in common with all the Prussians, Bernadotte's loyalty even more than his valour, did not await his commands, but immediately advanced against General Reynier with the thirty thousand men under his command. This step rendered it impossible for Bernadotte any longer to hesitate, but still being unwilling to engage all his forces, he contented himself with directing his cavalry together with a large number of cannon against Reynier's left, his right being threatened by the division of Borstell. General Reynier, who in the actual presence of danger displayed all the valour proper to an old officer of the army of the Rhine, held his own against the forces which now beset him, but made a retrograde movement for the purpose of taking up a better position, in which his right rested upon Gross-Beeren, and his left on a height from which his cannon could direct a plunging fire upon the enemy. The Prussians, however, inspired by the desire of saving Berlin, and also of seizing a prey which they regarded as almost within their grasp, advanced with great resolution; and the Saxon troops, who formed the bulk of his force, giving way, and leaving his French troops unsupported, Reynier was compelled to retreat; doing so, however, in good order and in such a manner as to deprive the enemy of any wish to pursue him. Marshal Oudinot, who had hastened up to the scene of contest with the utmost expedition, arrived too late to charge the fate of the engagement, but nevertheless performed good service in checking the enemy's pursuit, and many times sustained unbroken the shock of the Russian cavalry. Ultimately each of our corps returned to the position it had occupied in the morning; the 7th corps in a state of disorganization from the complete route of the Saxons, more than two thousand of whom had been taken prisoners, together with fifteen pieces of cannon, whilst many others had deserted their ranks, some to join the Swedes and some simply to fly to the rear. In the meantime, General Bertrand had made great but ineffectual endeavours to overcome the resistance offered to his progress by Tauenzien at Blankenfelde, and had refrained from pushing his efforts to the utmost point, because he believed that the success of the chief corps at Gross-Beeren would be sufficient to compel Tauenzien to leave the position he then occupied.

Had the troops at our general's disposal been entirely composed of Frenchmen, and such as could have been relied on, the check they had now suffered need not have been followed by any great consequences, for our loss, after all,

only amounted to two thousand men. But, consisting, as these troops did, half of Italians and Germans, who were ever ready to desert our ranks, and half of young French troops, who had at first been too confident of victory and were now too dispirited by defeat, it was difficult indeed to continue to march upon Berlin in the presence of ninety thousand men. Already more than ten thousand of the Saxon and Bavarian troops had quitted us, crying *sauvé qui peut*; and altogether the state of affairs was such, that Marshal Oudinot considered that it was advisable to retreat in the direction of the Elbe. On the following day, the 24th, he commenced his retrograde movement, and executed it in good order in spite of the vigorous pursuit of the Prussians, who were intoxicated with joy and pride, and believed us to be more completely vanquished than was really the case. Marshal Oudinot might have stopped and given a check to their ardour; but as the result of a successful engagement would only have been to enable him to maintain a position between Berlin and Wittenberg, in a country which offered neither support nor resources, he considered it more prudent to fall back under the cannon of the latter place, where he would be secure from danger, would cover the Elbe, and be able to procure an abundant supply of provisions.

He arrived there on the 29th and 30th of August. In the meantime, the active Magdeburg division had sallied from this place under the command of General Gérard, and after an engagement with General Hirschfeld and Czarnicheff's Russian skirmishers, had been compelled to retreat before overwhelming numbers, and to re-enter Magdeburg with the loss of a thousand men and several cannon. In the neighbourhood of Hambourg, Marshal Davoust had advanced with thirty thousand troops, of whom ten thousand were Danes, in the direction of Schwerin, and having forced the Anglo-German legion, which was before him, to fall back, he was ready to continue his movement as soon as he should receive information of Marshal Oudinot's success in the environs of Berlin. In the meantime, however, he was compelled to act with much circumspection.

As soon as it became a fact that Marshal Oudinot could not reach Berlin, the concentration which Napoleon had hoped to be able to effect of more than a hundred thousand men on that capital became nothing more than an idle dream. And although the failure of this scheme was certainly in some degree due to the error of Marshal Oudinot and his lieutenants, it was principally the result of Napoleon's own fault, in despising over much what he called Bernadotte's ragged regiment, and in relying too confidently on the junction at Berlin

of corps setting out from such widely separated points as Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Hambourg.

It was the consciousness of those serious miscalculations, and not a malady invented by flatterers, which had surprised Napoleon on the morrow of his victories on the 26th and 27th of August, and which, having drawn him from Pirna to Dresden, retained him there during the 29th and 30th of August, whilst Vandamme remained unsupported at Kulm. These miscalculations were of extreme importance—for to have, instead of Macdonald victorious in Silesia and pursuing Blücher, Blücher victorious and Macdonald routed; and to have, instead of a hundred thousand of his troops in Berlin, Oudinot fallen back upon Wittenberg, with the loss of ten thousand men, Gérard driven back into Magdebourg with the loss of a thousand, and Davoust compelled with his thirty thousand troops to hesitate in the midst of the Mecklenbourg marshes, was a state of things very different from that which Napoleon had hoped to bring about when he attempted to extend his scheme of operations from the Elbe to the Vistula. On the 30th, when he was still ignorant of Vandamme's defeat, which he only learned on the following morning, he had conceived a new and vast plan of operations. He had already frequently entertained the idea of a plan of operations, a new element in which consisted of a march upon Prague, for the purpose of striking a blow at Austria by the capture of one of its capitals, and, to a certain extent, crushing the coalition at its chief head quarters. But there were serious objections to this plan; for it would be necessary in carrying it out to cross the mountains of Bohemia, and thus incur the danger, should we be vanquished beyond them, of having to retreat through a series of frightful defiles, and would, also, even if the capture of Prague could be effected, cause a prolongation of his line, already too long, to the amount of all the distance which divides Dresden from Prague. But even had not these difficulties been sufficient to remove from his mind any idea of carrying this plan into execution, the reverses suffered by Macdonald and Oudinot would at once have done so; and he now, on hearing what rendered it impossible to entertain the idea of withdrawing to any distance from those marshes, and made him only anxious to approach them, forthwith conceived, with that inexhaustible fertility of genius which was one of his attributes, a plan in accordance with which Berlin instead of Dresden would be the centre of its operations.

The plan which Napoleon now proposed to carry into execution was, to march upon Berlin with his Guard and half the cavalry reserve, that is, with 40,000 men, to effect

a junction between Oudinot's troops and his own, *en route* to vanquish Bernadotte, to enter Berlin, to summon thither the division Gérard and Davoust's corps, to concentrate by this means on the Prussian capital the 100,000 men, on whose presence there he had so much relied; and after taking measures for the re-victualling and reinforcement of our garrisons at Stettin and Custrim, and those on the Vistula, to return to Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, ready to fall upon Blücher's flank, should the latter venture to march upon the Elbe.

To cover Dresden during his absence he resolved to leave there Vandamme with the first corps (for, on the morning of the 30th, when he formed these projects, he was unacquainted with the disaster at Kulm), and besides Vandamme, Saint-Cyr, Victor, and Marmont, with a portion of the cavalry reserve. He proposed to place those forces, which would amount to 100,000 men, under the command of Murat, who, he hoped, would be able to maintain himself against any attack of the enemy, until his own return from striking a decisive blow at Berlin, should render such an attack altogether unlikely.

When the expedition to Berlin should have been concluded, it was Napoleon's intention to establish himself at Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, to summon thither Marmont's corps, and all the cavalry reserve, to leave at Dresden and in the Camp de Pirna 60,000 men, to post 60,000 at Bautzen, and with 60,000 others to be ready to throw himself either upon Berlin, or Bautzen, or Dresden, as circumstances might render advisable. In this position it was certain that he would be able to meet any occasion that might arise, for, posted at three marches from Berlin, he would be on Blücher's flank, and sufficiently near to Dresden to reach it in time, should the army of Bohemia present itself before it.

Such was the plan which he formed on the morning of the 30th August; a plan, for the execution of which he had already issued the necessary orders, when the news of the disaster at Kulm arrived to destroy the whole fabric of its vast conception. He was much distressed by this news of the disaster suffered by Vandamme, and for the first time entertained the idea that he had probably presumed too much on his strength, when he rejected the conditions offered him at Prague. But although he remained for a day dismayed, so to say, by those redoubled strokes of misfortune, his spirit recovered its energy, and even its illusions on the morrow, and he then formed a new plan, which, although less vast than the preceding one, was quite as finely

conceived. In the first place he resolved to appoint another commander-in-Chief to the three corps which were to march upon Berlin, and selected Marshal Ney, who was inferior to none in courage on the field of battle, but who had never as yet directed the movements of great armies. Napoleon chose him, however, because his intrepid and confident spirit had not as yet suffered the chill of discouragement, which had already visibly affected our other generals, and sent him to Wittenberg, dismissing him with the most encouraging words and the most precise instructions.

Having ordered Ney, after he should have rallied and reorganised the 7th, 4th, and 12th corps (Marshal Oudinot was to retain the direct command of the latter), to proceed to Baruth, situated two days' march from Berlin, and there await further orders from head-quarters; Napoleon resolved to proceed himself to Hoyerswerda, distant three days' march from Baruth, and two from Dresden, together with the guard, the greater portion of the cavalry reserve, and Marmont's corps. Posted there in Lusatia, between Berlin and Gortitz, he would be able at will to move to the left upon Berlin, and assist Ney to enter that city, or to throw himself upon the right upon Blucher's flank, should the latter, continuing to press Macdonald, become a source of anxiety on account of Dresden. Certainly, no combination could have been devised more skilful or more appropriate to existing circumstances than this, every element of which was profoundly calculated, true, and just, and which was such an one as could not have failed to succeed ten years earlier, when our soldiers had maintained unscathed the severe chances of war, when our generals were full of confidence, when Napoleon had as much reliance on others as on himself, and when his enemies, less firmly resolved to vanquish or to die, were not so determined as they now were to persevere in spite of the most disastrous defeats. But, at the time of which we now treat, such was the moral state of ourselves and our enemies, that everything was uncertain, even although our generals and soldiers were still heroes.

Having given the requisite orders Napoleon made the most skilful arrangements for the protection of Dresden during his absence; and in the first place set himself to re-organise Vandamme's corps, of which, besides the 42nd division, which had been restored to Saint-Cyr, and had suffered but little, about fifteen thousand men of all arms had returned to their ranks. But all its artillery had been lost, together, unfortunately, with some of its most distinguished officers. Nothing was known of the fate of Vandamme and Haxo, and they both were believed to have perished. When

Vandamme's secretary re-appeared, Napoleon had the general's papers seized that he might extract from it all his military correspondence, and thus remove all proof of the orders which this unfortunate officer had received from him. Napoleon had even the weakness to deny that he had given him orders to march upon Tœplitz, and wrote to all the commanders of corps, that this general having received instructions to halt upon the heights of Kulm, had been carried away by a too ardent spirit, and been destroyed through an excess of zeal. The authentic narrative which we have given of the actual facts, proves the falsity of these assertions, which were devised by Napoleon for the purpose of aiding him to preserve that influence over the minds of his generals, which at that moment it was so important he should possess.

Napoleon's first care was to find for Vandamme's corps a commander who should be as brave as himself, but more circumspect; and he selected for this purpose the Count de Lobau, an officer who possessed and deserved his entire confidence, and who united to great address and rare courage the talent and taste for the organisation of troops. Having thus given to the first corps a general so well qualified to restore to it the military spirit it might have lost through the disaster it had suffered at Kulm, Napoleon distributed it into three divisions, of ten battalions each; and having restored to it the half of the division Teste, which had been temporarily borrowed from it, and taken from it the brigade Reuss which had been temporarily lent to it, raised it to an effective force of eighteen thousand men, whom he had supplied from the Dresden arsenals with muskets and sixty-four pieces of cannon.

For the defence of Dresden in his absence he left the 14th corps (Marshal Saint-Cyr) at the Camp de Pirna, the 2nd (Marshal Victor's) at Freyberg, and lastly, the 1st (Count Lobau's) in Dresden itself. In case the army of Bohemia should again make its appearance, Marshal Saint-Cyr and Marshal Victor (between whom Pajol's cavalry was to execute an active surveillance) would be able, Napoleon considered, to retard its progress sufficiently long to give Dresden ample notice of its approach. As, however, these corps would ultimately have to fall back upon Dresden, Napoleon ordered that Saint-Cyr should post himself upon the left at the entrenched camp, where he had already fought valiantly on the 26th August, and Victor on the right, where he had decided in our favour the issue of the battle of the 27th. Should the enemy attack them seriously in these positions, they were to retire behind the redoubts, which

were increased from five to eight, and were much better armed. Napoleon nominated an officer to the special command of each redoubt; and also directed that reserve troops should be stationed behind each for the purpose of retaking it immediately should it fall into the enemy's hands. Lastly, he directed that, during an attack, Lobau's corps should be posted in reserve, behind those of Saint-Cyr and Victor, for the purpose of debouching at the last moment, as the Guard had done on the 26th August, on the enemy, at the very instant it believed itself victorious. These arrangements were, it will be observed, a repetition with many improvements of those made on the 26th August, and promised to bring about the same successful results, for the three corps of Saint-Cyr, Victor, and Lobau, numbered altogether sixty-thousand men, which was a larger force than Napoleon had had at his disposal, when he had had to resist on that day the two hundred thousand troops of the army of Bohemia. Napoleon felt, therefore, that he need entertain no fear for the safety of Dresden in his absence should the army of Bohemia, repeating its recent manoeuvre, operate on the left bank of the Elbe. And should it, on the other hand, changing its line of march, attack Poniatowski and Macdonald by the right flank, he himself falling back upon it, would be in a position to crush it. Having made these arrangements, he sent to Königsbrock, on the left of the Bautzen route, in the direction of Hoyerswerda, a portion of the cavalry and infantry of the Guard, under Nansouty and Curial respectively; determining to send the remainder in the same direction on the following day. He resolved to set out for Hoyerswerda in person on the 4th, leaving M. de Bassano at Dresden for the purpose of transmitting to him information of all that might take place, and giving his orders to the several generals whom they might concern.

On the morning of the 3rd, Napoleon received despatches from Marshal Macdonald, who was, to quote Napoleon's own expression, utterly disconcerted by the vehement manner in which he had been pressed by Blücher, who had hastened to advance, as soon as the waters had somewhat subsided, for the purpose of reaping as much advantage as possible from the affair of Katzbach, and constantly outflanking Marshal Macdonald's left wing, had compelled him to retreat from Lowenberg to Löbau, from Löbau to Górlitz. And now, according to him, if he were not immediately succoured, he would very probably be driven from Górlitz to Bautzen, or even to Dresden.

Napoleon immediately perceived that it was not the time to put into execution his intended movement upon Hoyers-

werda, and that to succour Macdonald by the speediest method possible was the only course suited to the circumstances at the moment. He determined, therefore, to join him at Bautzen, and uniting his forces with his own, to advance and drive Blucher before him beyond the Neisse, the Gneiss, and all the rivers which he had passed. Having taken this resolution, he rescinded the command which had been given on the previous evening to portions of the infantry and cavalry of the guard, changing the direction of their march from Königsbruck to Bautzen by Camenz. At the same time he made arrangements for the arrival at Bautzen on the 4th of the remainder of the guard, of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry reserve, and Marshal Marmont's infantry. He sent word to Macdonald of the important movement he was effecting towards Bautzen, but recommended him to keep the matter secret, in order that Blucher being unwarned might have to encounter the bulk of the French army. Finally, he sent orders to Marshal Ney to change the direction of his march for the present from Hoyerswerda towards Bautzen.

On the evening of the 3rd of September, Napoleon set out from Dresden, and after a halt of some hours at Harta, arrived on the following day at Bautzen, where he received Marshal Macdonald with much kindness, openly acknowledging the difficulties he had had to encounter; and where he endeavoured to remain incognito until the arrival of the guard and Latour-Maubourg should enable him to throw himself upon Blucher with sufficient forces. But, unfortunately, the Prussian General had already been informed of the movements made by the guard on the morning of the 2nd, a sufficient indication to him of Napoleon's intentions, and faithful to his plan of falling back as soon as Napoleon should appear, he immediately halted the main body of his army at Górlitz, and took up his own position on the height called the Land's-Crown, from whence a view could be obtained of the whole country from Górlitz to Bautzen.

On the 4th of September, towards the middle of the day, Latour-Maubourg and Nansouty having arrived, Murat placed himself at the head of their squadrons, and galloping down upon Blucher's advanced guard, which they encountered towards the close of the day at Wittenberg, compelled them to retreat with the loss of some hundreds of men. Blucher immediately resolved to repass the Neisse on the following day, leaving at Górlitz only a rear guard to occupy the portion of the town situated on one side of the river, whilst preparations were being made for the destruction of the bridges.

On the following morning, Napoleon set out at the head

of his advanced guard, hoping to inflict such a blow on the Prussians as should render them disinclined to make a very speedy return ; but, on entering Gorlitz, where he took or slew a thousand of the enemy's troops which still remained there, he found to his disappointment that Blücher was in full retreat, and that to pursue him would only be uselessly to fatigue his own troops and to remove himself to an imprudent distance from Dresden. He resolved therefore to halt at Gorlitz, spending two or three days there for the purpose of repairing the bridges, refreshing his own troops, and reanimating those of Marshal Macdonald. But, on that very evening, he received despatches from Dresden which made him change his plan ; for they announced the reappearance of the army of Bohemia on the Péterswalde route,—that is, in the rear of Dresden, precisely as it had formerly appeared at the period of the battles of the 26th and 27th of August. Napoleon himself believed that it was a mere demonstration for the purpose of withdrawing him from the pursuit of Blücher, and if he had had any hope of coming up with the latter, he would not have allowed himself so readily to be turned back. As, however, Blücher was already out of reach, and there was no useful purpose to be gained by his remaining at Gorlitz, he immediately returned to Bautzen, where, by travelling during the whole evening and night, he arrived at two o'clock on the following morning. Finding, on his arrival there, that the threatened attack of the army of Bohemia appeared to be a serious one, he sent word to Dresden that he would himself be there by the evening of that same day (the 6th), together with the whole of his guard. As, however, he was not thoroughly convinced in his own mind of the seriousness of this demonstration on the part of the enemy, and was unwilling to give up his projected march upon Hoyerswerda, from whence he would be able at one and the same time to support Ney towards Berlin, and to hold Blücher in check towards Gorlitz, he only sent back towards Dresden the forty thousand men of his guard. At the same time he directed Marmont, who was marching to rejoin him, to proceed towards Camenz and Kœnigsbruck, from whence he might readily be recalled to Dresden, or pushed forward upon Hoyerswerda. He added to the troops already under his command a strong detachment of cavalry, for the purpose of enabling him to pursue the Cossacks, and to form and to maintain communications with Ney and Macdonald. He desired Marshal Macdonald, after he should have replaced Poniatowski at the Zittau débouché, to establish himself at Bautzen, and to endeavour at least to preserve the line of the Spree. Marshal Macdonald,

with a modesty which does him honour, entreated Napoleon with much earnestness to relieve him of the command-in-chief, offering to remain simply as a chief of division at the head of the 11th corps; but Napoleon had no longer any choice of generals; for they disappeared as rapidly as his troops, and he therefore used his utmost exertions to reanimate Macdonald's courage, consoling him and treating him as he would have treated him had he been victorious. He then set out for Dresden, where he arrived on the morning of the 7th.

Having stayed a day or two at Dresden, he departed for Pirna, and halted near Muehlen, where he found Marshal Saint-Cyr's rear guard. Let us now direct our attention to what had been taking place in this direction. The Prussians and Russians, without the Austrians, had débouchéd by the great Péterswalde route, already described, had attempted to obtain possession on the one side of the Pirna plateau, on the other of the Gieshübel plateau, and had driven before them the four divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, who occupied these several positions. Another corps, under Count Pahlen, débouching by the Furstenwald route, which Kleist had followed since the affair of Kulm, had come towards Borna, where the mountains begin to lose their elevation and sink into the plain. An immense body of cavalry thrown by the enemy in this direction had caused considerable anxiety to ours under Pajol, and would, but for this officer's energy and skill, have inflicted upon it heavy loss.

Saint-Cyr, finding himself thus pressed, had withdrawn from the camp at Pirna upon Pirna itself his 42nd division, leaving some battalions in the fortress of Koenigstein, at the same time removing the 43rd and 44th from Gieshübel to Zehist, and the 45th, which supported Pajol, from Borna to Dohna.

It was in this position that Napoleon found Saint-Cyr, and he did not neglect the opportunity of consulting with him with respect to this fresh appearance of the enemy, which he himself was strongly inclined to regard as having no serious object, and as being one of those mere manœuvres which at this time appeared to form the whole system of the enemy's tactics. Marshal Saint-Cyr, however, appeared to be of a different opinion, considering that the vigour with which the Prince of Schwarzenberg had pushed the divisions of the 14th corps during the last two days proved that he was resolved upon making a serious attack, and that he would not have advanced so close to Dresden had his object been a simple demonstration. Notwithstanding this dif-

ference of opinion, however, both Napoleon and Saint-Cyr were agreed as to the course to be pursued, since they each of them considered it advisable to engage the army of Bohemia, should it be willing, in a pitched battle. Napoleon quitted Marshal Saint-Cyr to return the same day to Dresden, where he had orders of all kinds to give to his various corps d'armée.

To understand properly the difficulties surrounding the Commander-in-Chief of our forces at this time, we should turn our attention to what had been taking place on the side of the allies. Immediately on receiving information of Napoleon's march into Lusatia, the Austrians had executed a retrograde movement, recrossing the Elbe between Tetschen and Leitmeritz; this movement being made with the double object in the first place of providing against unforeseen events, such as the prosecution by Napoleon of operations against Prague, and in the next place of affording the Austrian army the opportunity of recovering in some degree from the rude shock it had suffered in the battle of Dresden. The Russian and Prussian troops had been left on the great Péterswalde route, in order to withdraw Napoleon in that direction by means of extensive demonstrations, and thus free the army of Silesia, against which he was marching, from his attack. And Wittgenstein and Kleist, who commanded the Russian and Prussian troops under Barclay de Tolly, had not been slack in executing the demonstrations with which they were charged, having fallen upon the four divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, and put all his strength and skill to the proof. At the same time Klenau, who was posted between Commotau and Chemnitz, occupied in obviating as far as possible the effect of the blow his troops had received before Dresden, sent *partisans* to Zwickau and Chemnitz, preparing for that decisive operation which the allies ever meditated carrying into execution on our rear; but this time in the direction of Leipzig instead of in that of Dresden.

In the meantime, a great series of events had been taking place on our wings. It will be remembered that on setting out for Dresden in the first place to proceed to Hoyerswerda, and then to turn back towards Bautzen, Napoleon had arranged to meet Ney at Baruth, with the intention of either supporting Ney in a march upon Berlin, or of marching upon that city himself. Marshal Ney had accordingly set out, and arriving at Wittenberg on the 3rd, had immediately received the three corps d'armée of which he was to have the command-in-chief in the place of Marshal Oudinot, and which, since the check they had suffered at Gross-Beeren,

were much weakened not only in point of numbers, but also in respect of matériel and spirit. Ney, however, who had scarcely ever held a command-in-chief, although he frequently had had under his direct orders large assemblages of troops, thought little of the real nature of his instruments in his eagerness to employ them, and reviewing his troops on the 4th, announced his intention of putting them in motion on the following day (the 5th).

The French army was posted in a semicircle before Wittenberg, the 7th corps (that of General Reynier) on the left, the 12th (that of Marshal Oudinot) in the centre, the 4th (that of General Bertrand) on the right; the army of the north pressing them so closely that the advanced posts were engaged in perpetual skirmishes. Acting in this case with much address, Marshal Ney left his right, formed by the 4th corps, in the presence of the enemy during the whole morning of the 5th, and commenced his projected movement with the centre of his army, composed of the 12th corps, which he carried behind his right in the direction of Zahne, which place he took from the enemy, crossing a little stream which ran through it in spite of considerable resistance. The 7th, which formed the left, followed the 12th, supporting it in its movement on Zahne, and when they had both defiled, the 4th, having sufficiently occupied the enemy's attention, raised its camp in its turn and joined the rest of the army, which thus, in one day, found itself brought back to Seyda, five leagues to the right of Wittenberg. This movement, which was executed with both skill and courage, had cost us a thousand men; the loss on the side of the Prussians being double that number.

On the 6th, it was necessary to proceed to Interbock, from whence a single march would bring the army to Baruth. Marshal Ney decided that General Bertrand, who continued to form the right wing, and whose troops had been less directly in contact with the enemy on the previous day, should commence the march towards Interbrock on the following morning at about eight o'clock, General Reynier following with the 7th, and Marshal Oudinot with the 12th. Close as the enemy were, it would have been easier to have marched en masse, especially during the execution of a flank march with fifty thousand men, who were opposed to an enemy numbering eighty thousand. But the fact was, that the three corps were at a distance of two hours from each other; an inconvenience which was much increased by the circumstance that the line of march lay over a sandy plain, from which a high wind raised clouds of thick dust, which rendered it impossible to see to any distance.

From eight o'clock to noon the army continued its march, constantly harassed by the enemy's cavalry, which ours had great difficulty in holding in check, and whose movements rendered it impossible to doubt that Bernadotte was aware of our plan, and was hurrying forward *en masse* to bar against us the Interbock road. However, it was still very possible for our troops, should they reach the Dennewitz defile before the enemy had arrived at it in any force, to force the passage, and be the first to reach Interbock, where the French army would be out of danger, and the Prince of Sweden compelled to follow without hope of reaching us.

About noon our troops were suddenly assailed by a fire of musketry, and found that they were in the presence of Tauenzien's corps, which on the previous day they had driven before them, and that they were close to the Dennewitz defile, which was the only obstacle of any difficulty which had to be surmounted on the whole of this vast plain. It will be well to give here some description of this defile.

Transversely in front of our army flowed a stream, which was somewhat shallow, but flowed between very marshy banks, and was only fordable at two places, namely, Dennewitz and Rohrbeck. This stream, after having flowed from our left towards our right, changed its direction at Rohrbeck, from which place it flowed right before us as far as Interbock, a little town, in front of which it passed with many windings. As the road, which it was absolutely necessary we should follow, for the sake of the conveyance of our park of artillery through this ocean of sand, traversed Dennewitz, we had no alternative but to force our way at this place; and Marshal Ney issued accordingly immediate orders to that effect.

The Italian division Fontanelli took the lead; its general at the head of some battalions entering Dennewitz, and crossing the stream, in spite of a Prussian detachment which attempted to oppose him. But it was not at the village of Dennewitz, but beyond it, that the enemy, posted in favourable positions extending opposite our left, was prepared to resist our progress with his whole force. Fortunately there was only present Tauenzien's corps; Bulow's corps, the Swedes, and the Russians, being still far distant.

The Italian division had scarcely passed the village of Dennewitz, when the enemy threw upon it a cloud of cavalry and a heavy fire of artillery; it nevertheless remained unshaken. On issuing from Dennewitz our troops found themselves on a plain, bounded in the distance by woods, on the left by some hills surmounted by a mill, and at some distance on the right by Interbock. On the left, close to the Den-

newitz mill, Ney placed the division Morand, the efficiency of which was doubled by General Morand's own presence with it, in the centre, the Italian division, and the Württemberg division on the right, in the direction of Interbock. Our artillery, posted on the more prominent slopes, dominated Tauenzien's, and even succeeded in silencing it. The enemy's cavalry, however, charged, and drove back our own so vigorously, that some of our squadrons precipitated themselves across the spaces between the Italian battalions, which dared not fire lest they should fire on their own friends; in consequence of which two of these battalions were broken by the enemy's cavalry, and caused some confusion in our line. Perceiving this, General Morand carried forward two battalions of the 13th on the left, and covering our broken line gave it time to re-form. The whole of the Prussian cavalry poured down upon him, but he received them in square, and repulsed all their efforts. In the meantime, however, Bulow's corps, consisting of fifty-five thousand Prussians, was already appearing towards our left, debouching from Niedergorsdorf, whilst Reynier and Oudinot, on the other hand, were as yet nowhere to be seen. As Bulow's columns debouched from Niedergorsdorf they encountered two battalions of the 13th, which Morand had posted on an eminence on the left, to serve as a point d'appui to our line of battle, and compelled them to fall back. Ney, however, advancing with two battalions of the 8th, which also belonged to the division Morand, recovered the ground which the two battalions of the 13th had been compelled to yield. At the same time, he sent officers to Reynier and Oudinot with messages hastening their arrival. The whole of Bulow's corps deployed, but Morand's division still contrived to make head against it, and to support with fifteen thousand men the assaults of almost forty thousand.

For three hours this unequal struggle lasted with varying chances of success; the enemy, however, being unable to compel us to abandon the débouché which we had gained beyond the Dennewitz brook. In the meantime the Russian and Swedish army was perceived advancing rapidly upon the village of Gölsdorf, situated on our left, at right angles with the stream which we had passed, and threatening to cut off the communications between our troops, which were engaged, and the 12th corps, which was still en route.

In accordance with Ney's orders, Reynier, as soon as he had come up with the 7th corps, sent forward Durette's division, and posted it behind Dennewitz, on the hither side of the stream, where it seized the opportunity offered by a gentle eminence to make good use of its artillery. At

the same time he threw the Saxon division Lecoc upon Gölsdorf; holding the second Saxon division (Lestoc's) in reserve. As soon as these arrangements had been made, General Durette, advancing to the top of the angle described by our line, stopped short the progress of the Prussians, who were debouching from Niedergorsdorf; whilst the brigade Mellentin, of the Saxon division Lestoc, forced its way into Gölsdorf, and, driving out the Prussians, prevented them from establishing themselves on our left. The combat continued to be carried on with a species of desperation on each side in the midst of clouds of dust, which hid from the view of the combatants every object but the troops to which they might be directly opposed.

At length Oudinot came up, passed behind the corps which had preceded him, and piercing the storm which threatened our left, on which side forty thousand Swedes and Russians were marching upon Gölsdorf, placed two of his divisions behind Lestoc's Saxons, and held the third in reserve.

But at this moment, when the arrival of Oudinot rendered it quite possible that Ney might still be able to make head with his fifty thousand troops against the eighty thousand of the enemy, and succeed in reaching Interbock without a check; at this very moment a combined attack made by Tauenzien's corps and half that of Bulow, upon the troops of General Bertrand, already thinned by the long conflict, in which they had been engaged, compelled them, about four o'clock, when they had already lost more than three thousand men, to fall back a little to the right in the direction of Rohrbeck. Ney, too much engrossed with what was taking place immediately under his own eyes, and neglecting to take a sufficiently broad view of the general aspect of the field of battle, feared that Dennewitz would be left uncovered by Bertrand's movement, and ordered Reynier to post the division Durutte at Dennewitz itself. At the same time he ordered Oudinot to proceed from Gölsdorf, where he served as a support to the Saxons, to Rohrbeck, for the purpose of forming a reserve behind Bertrand. An arrangement in which there was a double fault, for our right, since Bertrand's approach to Rohrbeck, was in less danger than our left, which was threatened by forty thousand of the enemy, and which had no sooner been carried into execution than the Russian division Borstell, supported by a cloud of cavalry, and the whole of the Russian and Swedish artillery, attacked Gölsdorf and wrested it from the Saxon division Mellentin, by which it was occupied, and which, perceiving the mass of the Swedish and Russian troops advancing

towards them, commenced a movement of retreat, which was turned into a flight by a rumour propagated by perfidious alarmists, that the clouds of dust raised by Oudinot's troops in their movement from Gölsdorf towards Rohrbeck, were evidence that the French army had been turned by the enemy's cavalry. Flying precipitately at this rumour in spite of all Reynier's efforts, the Saxon troops deserted Gölsdorf, left our left entirely uncovered, and rushed in confusion through the midst of the ranks of the 12th corps. Unfortunately all the artillery and baggage-waggons were accumulated in the interior of the angle formed by our line of battle, and a scene of frightful confusion ended in what was a complete rout. The division Durutte, Oudinot and Bertrand, did, indeed, retreat in good order, but the battle, was nevertheless completely lost, for we had been compelled to give way, and the Interbock route being now closed we had entirely failed in the object we had had in view. Six or seven of our own, and eight or nine thousand of the enemy's troops, strewed the plain; but ten or twelve thousand of ours, chiefly Saxons and Bavarians, were in precipitate flight, about to proclaim on the Elbe that the French army had been routed and even destroyed.

As it was impossible to fall back upon Wittenberg, which our army had left seven or eight leagues to the left on its march towards Interbock, the only possible line of retreat was in the direction of Torgau, and thither accordingly Ney retreated with the thirty-two thousand men of which his force now consisted, and arriving there on the 8th September found what he called a *species of hell*. For, besides the discontent which widely prevailed amongst the troops, the recriminations which freely passed between himself and his lieutenants, the crowd of fugitives which had to be reduced into something like order, and difficulty of supplying the necessities of the troops at a time when the enemy was almost at the very gates of Torgau, there was great fear that the Saxons might at any moment rise in insurrection. Open acts of disaffection had already been committed by them, and indeed, considering the circumstances of the last twelve days, it would have been wonderful, perhaps, if the case had been otherwise. Finding things in this state, Ney, as Macdonald and Oudinot had done, wrote to the Emperor, entreating him to release him from his command: "I would rather," he said, "be a simple grenadier than a general on such conditions. I am perfectly ready to shed the last drop of my blood, but let it be for some useful end."

Whilst these events had been taking place, Napoleon had entered Dresden on the evening of the 7th, and had been

recalled to Pirna on the morning of the 8th, to support Marshal Saint-Cyr against the Russians and Prussians, who appeared resolved to make their demonstration against him a serious attack. The enemy having failed to perceive the guard and the cavalry reserve, the presence of which was always a sign of Napoleon's own, had persisted in the aggressive movement; and Saint-Cyr, having fallen back as far as the little river, the Müglitz, near Mugeln, was unwilling to retreat any farther, since to repass this river would be definitively to abandon the heights, and to be altogether driven into the plains. When Napoleon himself arrived on the ground, he thought with Marshal Saint-Cyr that, with the certainty of being speedily supported, the 14th corps might venture to march en masse against the enemy; and, accordingly, the three divisions of this corps being immediately formed into columns of attack, prepared to pour down upon the columns of Wittgenstein and Kleist, whereupon the latter fell back with a precipitation which gave cause for much doubt respecting what would be the course of action on the morrow.

In the course of the evening, however, an aide-de-camp arrived with the news of the loss of the battle of Dennewitz on the 6th, which formed the fourth misfortune which had happened to our arms since the two great victories of Dresden, the other three having occurred at the Katzbach, Gross-Beeren, and Kulm. This last disaster was an especially serious one; for, besides the unfortunate moral effect which must necessarily be its result, it was calculated to place in peril the lower part of the Elbe, exposing us to the danger of seeing this river crossed by the enemy on our left, whilst the army of Bohemia, descending from the Erzgebirge on our right, should threaten definitively to turn us, and effect a junction with the corps which should have passed the Elbe at Wittenberg. Napoleon at once perceived all the serious consequences that might result from this event, but nevertheless remained perfectly calm, and would permit the maliciously watchful eyes of Marshal Saint-Cyr to observe no trace of distress or anger against Marshal Ney. He seemed, on the contrary, to regard the position of affairs only in the light of a curious point of military art; and in familiar conversation with Marshal Saint-Cyr, explained with admirable critical precision, and without severity, the faults which had been committed in the short campaign of three days, begun at Wittenberg and concluded at Torgau. At the same time, he appeared eager to regard these faults simply in the light of a proof of the difficulties which had had to be contended with, and displayed, with respect to this matter, a marvel-

lously equitable spirit, as though a supernatural presentiment had warned him that he would himself have need of that just judgment which he was now invoking in behalf of his unfortunate generals. Carried away by the heat of conversation, he said, that generals were too hasty in their operations, and that he would some day write a book, in which he would lay down the principles of war so clearly as to make them easy of application by all persons. Marshal Saint-Cyr, on the other hand, giving rein to his spirit of contradiction, declared that neither science nor experience had anything to do with the art of war; that great generals were born such, and gained no additional skill by the exercise of their profession; and that Napoleon himself had fought his best campaign when he was twenty-six.

But, although Napoleon thus passed the evening on which he had received the news of an event which so grievously changed his position, in a discussion on the art of war, he did not forget that all his arrangements had hitherto been made in the expectation that his arms would be victorious, and that preparations for the defence of his vast empire still remained to be made. He was anxious, therefore, that the fortresses of the Rhine should be immediately properly garrisoned; and as for himself to write to the Duke de Feltre that he began to doubt the possibility of maintaining his position in Germany would be a painful and even dangerous avowal, he determined to send to the minister Clarke, by M. de Bassano, a letter, written in cypher, to the effect—that the state of affairs was such as to promise a brilliant success to Napoleon's arms, but that it would, nevertheless, be prudent to provide for the contrary; that it was not the Russian army from which we had most to fear, but the Prussian army, this latter being considerable in numbers, whilst the spirit with which it was animated was in the highest degree ardent; that our army, notwithstanding the losses it had necessarily suffered in the victories it had already gained, was still in excellent condition and of great strength, but that the generals and officers, weary of the war, were no longer inspired with that ardour which had enabled them to perform the great deeds they had already performed; that the theatre of the war was of too wide an extent; that the Emperor was victorious wherever he was himself actually present, but that he could not be everywhere; that those of his lieutenants who held isolated commands rarely answered his expectations; that after what had happened to General Vandamme; after the disasters suffered by the Duke of Tarentum in Silesia, and the Prince of Moskowa in his march on Berlin, it would be as well, whilst refraining from

any excessive degree of fear, to neglect nothing which might be suggested by prudence. "You will do wisely, therefore," the note continued, "to see that the fortresses are put in a good state of defence, and to arrange with the director-general of provisions that they shall be provided with an extraordinary supply of them, so that should unexpected circumstances arise, his Majesty may not experience fresh embarrassments in this direction, and that you may not be found unprepared. You will understand that in writing this I have not failed to reflect well upon all that has come under my observation, and that I am strongly convinced that in so doing I am only acting as his Majesty would approve."

At an early hour on the morning of the 9th, Napoleon proceeded to reconnoitre with his own eyes the movements of the enemy, and to give such orders as circumstances might render necessary. He had at this time under his immediate command the 1st corps, posted in advance of Zehist, on the Péterswalde route; the 14th, under Marshal Saint-Cyr, in position on the Furstenwalde route, in advance of Dohna. Somewhat in the rear, at Mugeln, but still near enough to perform effective service, were three divisions of the Young Guard, under Marshal Mortier, and the light cavalry of the guard, under Lefebvre-Desnoëtte. The remainder of the Young Guard, the Old Guard, Marmont's corps, and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, were at Dresden, ready to meet any unforeseen emergency. At some distance to the right, on the Freyberg route, Marshal Victor watched with his corps d'armée the Bohemian débouches opening upon Leipzig. The 1st and 14th corps, and the three divisions of the Young Guard, numbered altogether about fifty thousand men, a force sufficient to overwhelm the enemy then visible; but it was impossible for the French staff to be acquainted with the fact, that the Austrians were committing the fault of retreating into Bohemia, as far as Tetschen and Leitmeritz, and it was a subject of anxious inquiry where this portion of the enemy's force could be.

Napoleon's troops being at Zehist and Dohna, were on two routes, that of Péterswalde, which offered an excellent road for the transit of artillery, and that of Liebstadt, which was only practicable for artillery as far as Furstenwalde, by which place it passed, and which from this point was continued across the lofty mountain of Geyersberg by paths impassable by heavy vehicles. This being the case, Marshal Saint-Cyr now proposed that the 14th corps and the Young Guard should be carried rapidly along the latter route upon Liebstadt and Furstenwalde, then thrown on the enemy's column

which had taken the Péterswalde route, so as to cut off a larger or smaller portion of it, and afterwards carried across the Geyersberg for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's retreat towards Bohemia.

Napoleon immediately approved of this ingenious plan, although he was by no means sure that it would be possible to cross the Geyersberg with artillery; for even if it were not there would always be more chance of injuring the enemy on a line of march parallel to their own, than by attacking them directly by the Péterswalde route. Whilst, therefore, the Count de Lobau advanced with the 1st corps from Zehist to Gieshübel, and from Gieshübel towards Péterswalde, driving the enemy before him, Napoleon himself proceeded in a lateral direction with the 14th corps and the Young Guard.

In the meantime, Kleist and Wittgenstein having become informed of Napoleon's presence, although they were still in ignorance of the arrival of the reinforcements he had brought with him, had begun to retreat, although without any great precipitation; Napoleon marching parallel with them, and hoping that on the following day he would be able to throw himself from the route he was himself following upon theirs and take them in flank should it be possible to convey his artillery across the mountains.

On the following morning (the 10th of September), our troops arrived at a hill from whence could be surveyed the sad scene of the events which had happened at Kulm; and where they had on their right the heights of Geyersberg, and on their left those of Nollenberg, along which ran the great Péterswalde route, just before descending into Bohemia. Napoleon crossed this hill accompanied by Marshal Saint-Cyr and his light troops, and perceived at some distance off the enemy's troops hastening to repass the mountains, being in danger, should we succeed in carrying our artillery across the hill, of being compelled to make, through almost impracticable passes, a retreat which should be so disastrous as to afford us a brilliant revenge for the affair of Kulm.

But when the attempt to effect the passage of the artillery had commenced, it immediately became apparent that, despite the ardour with which the troops engaged in the work, it would be impossible to accomplish it under twenty-four hours, a time quite sufficient for the enemy to defile into the plain; and, consequently, as the absence of the Austrians was only a matter of conjecture, and as even without them Kleist's and Wittgenstein's corps, including the Russian and Prussian guards which remained beyond the mountains, numbered some seventy thousand men, Napoleon considered that it

would be imprudent to descend into the plain in pursuit of them; especially as many serious motives recalled him to Dresden. As soon as he found that it was impossible to cross the Geyersberg in two hours, he resolved to bring his movement in that direction to an end; but at the same time, as he was frequently assailed by the news of the irruption of the *Partisans* into Saxony, he resolved that his troops should remain in the position they then occupied—Marshal Saint-Cyr at the Geyersberg, and the Count de Lobau at the Nollenberg. His intention was, should he find these partisans to be only the avant-courier of a more considerable body now commencing the execution of a movement at Leipzig, which he had always considered probable, to hold them in check for some days by remaining above Kulm, and by this means to gain time for the execution of manœuvres proportioned to this new danger.

In accordance with this resolution, Napoleon took Marshal Saint-Cyr aside, and telling him that he had given up the undertaking on which he had entered, without explaining all his motives, the details of which would have occupied too much time, and could not be prudently confessed, he ordered him to remain two days at least in a threatening position above Tœplitz. Leaving the marshal in a state of great astonishment and discontent at the abandonment of an attempt from which he had expected such great results, Napoleon proceeded by Breitenau to Hollendorf, for the purpose of giving similar instructions to the Count de Lobau, and then returned to Brietenau, where he devoted the following day to an inspection of the several military positions of the surrounding country. On the next day, the 12th, he returned to Dresden.

Napoleon found himself on his return to the Saxon capital furnished with matter for serious thought, and even began to be in some degree oppressed with anxiety. The plan which had been adopted by the allies at Trachenberg of marching vigorously against his lieutenants, and of retreating from before himself, so as to exhaust him in fruitless expeditions, and then to surround and crush him, had become terribly apparent, and had been carried out with fearful determination. With marvellous clear-sightedness Napoleon discerned the plan in all its extent, and without being discouraged perceived the formation around him of the circle of iron in which his enemies hoped to crush him. The situation in which he was now placed revealed the only defect of the plan which he had formed for the conduct of the campaign in a circle around Dresden, and which was, that he had made the radius too long, having carried it on

the left as far as Berlin, in front as far as Lowenberg, and on the right as far as Peterswalde, the result being that he was too distant from his lieutenants to be able to direct and support them, and that he was compelled to execute long marches, now in one and now in another direction, wasting his own time, and wearing out not only the strength, but also the spirits of his young soldiers. And of this defect Napoleon himself now became so conscious, that he determined to curtail the extent of his operations so as to be in closer connexion with his lieutenants.

On the resumption of hostilities, Napoleon had had about three hundred and sixty thousand active troops on the Elbe, from Dresden to Hambourg, without counting the garrisons of the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, or the troops of Augereau's corps, or of that of Prince Eugène, and of these there now remained available for service in the field, no more than two hundred and fifty thousand, above a hundred thousand having been lost, not only by the ordinary chances of war, but also by desertion, which went on to an enormous extent in the ranks of our allies, and to a less extent also in our own. That disastrous disposition to disband, which fatigue, cold, and hunger had developed to such a calamitous degree in the army which had made the expedition into Russia, began to reappear amongst our troops, which were now making the campaign in Germany, in a manner which gave rise to serious anxiety.

Whilst this deplorable tendency existed amongst our own soldiers, the allies on the other hand, so far from having suffered any loss by the defection of their troops, were constantly receiving fresh additions of strength by voluntary levies as well as by those which Russia was now procuring by great administrative efforts; the result being, that their effective force, instead of having fallen below five hundred thousand men, numbered nearly six hundred thousand, a formidable mass, to meet which Napoleon had only some two hundred and fifty thousand young and exhausted troops, who began to have somewhat less confidence in the good fortune of their leader, although they had as much trust as ever in his genius.

Unwilling as he was as yet to change the line of his operations from the Elbe to the Rhine, and impossible as it now was to make Berlin the centre of them, it remained to him only to contract the circle of his movements around Dresden, so that he might have a less distance to traverse when it might be necessary for him to advance to any point of its circumference, and also that, the extent of ground to be occupied by his troops being narrowed, he might keep on hand a stronger reserve.

Marshal Macdonald having been compelled to leave the Spree and Bautzen by a movement which Blücher executed against Poniatowski, driving him from Zittau to Rumburg; Napoleon had given him a new position in advance of Dresden, along a little stream named the Wessnitz, which falls into the Elbe *à la hauteur*, of Pirna; placing Poniatowski at Stolpen, Lauriston at Dröbnitz, Gerard at Schmiedefeld, and Souham at Radeberg. From any of these points Napoleon could receive news in one hour, and could reach them himself in two hours, or with forty thousand men in six.

At the same time Napoleon took pains to connect the position of Marshal Macdonald, which was beyond the Elbe, with that of Marshal Saint-Cyr, which was on this side of it, having all the accessible points of the plateaux of Pirna and Gieshübel, by which the enemy must necessarily pass on their way from Peterswalde, strongly entrenched, and posting the 42nd division of Saint-Cyr's corps at the former, and the three divisions of the 1st Corps under the Count de Lobau at the latter. At the same time, as a precaution, in case the two plateaux should be forced towards their exterior edge, Napoleon had the Château de Sonnenstein entrenched at the extremity of the Pirna plateau, and similarly the Kohlberg, at the extremity of that of Gieshübel. Finally, on the right of these two positions, opposite the old Töplitz route, which ran by Liebstadt towards Bornä, Napoleon posted Marshal Saint-Cyr, with the three other divisions of the 14th corps, ordering him to raise strong redoubts, and to arm them with powerful batteries. He also placed, as a reserve for the divisions placed in these positions, two divisions of the Young Guard in the town of Pirna itself.

In addition to these precautions he had a bridge thrown across the Elbe at Pirna, so that the Young Guard and a portion of Saint-Cyr's corps might at any moment cross the Elbe, and fall upon the left of any army which should attack Macdonald; and, that on the other hand, Poniatowski might be able to rush down with a portion of Macdonald's troops upon the right of any army that should assail Saint-Cyr.

Marshal Victor was to remain at Freybourg, where it would be his task to watch the other débouchés which, still further in the rear of Dresden, might afford opportunities to an enemy to move upon Leipzig by the Commotau and Chemnitz route. He did not precisely intercept this route at Freyberg, but could readily do so in one or two marches; and his position at this place had also the advantage that it was not so advanced as to prevent him from falling back to

the position of Marshal Saint-Cyr, should the enemy débouche by Tœplitz upon Péterswalde or Altenberg.

At the same time as there were a great number of *partisans*, not only on the grand route from Commotau to Leipzig, but also on that from Carlsbad to Zwickau, Napoleon detached Lefebvre-Desnoëtte, with a force of three thousand cavalry, which was to be increased to one of seven or eight thousand horse and two thousand infantry, by draughts drawn from the several forces of Victor, Ney, and Margaron, for the purpose of making a vigorous pursuit of the *partisans* who infested Saxony, and had intercepted some of our convoys.

With respect to Marshal Ney, who had fallen back upon Torgau, Napoleon ordered him to give more concentration to his army, and declaring the 12th corps dissolved, recalled to his side Marshal Oudinot, who had had it under his special command. In the next place he divided the two French divisions of this corps between the 4th and 7th, and devoted what remained of the Bavarian division to the convoy of the great parks of artillery, since it could no longer be relied on in the face of the enemy. To compensate Marshal Ney for the three or four thousand men which he lost by this arrangement, he gave him the excellent Polish division Dombrowski, which had acted and was still to act with so much heroism; and now, posted between Torgau and Wittenberg with some thirty-six thousand troops, none of whom were Germans, with the exception of a few thousand Saxons, well surrounded, there was every probability that he might check a hostile army in an attempt to cross the Elbe sufficiently long to enable other troops to be moved up to his support. And to secure him this support, Napoleon, in this instance again yielding to his tendency to aim at many things at once, posted Marshal Marmont, with eighteen thousand infantry, and General Latour-Maubourg, with six thousand cavalry, at Grossenhayn, a little beyond the Elbe and half way from Dresden to Torgau, where, besides being ready to afford support to Marshal Ney, they would also protect the navigation from Hambourg to Dresden.

From the former of these cities we drew our principal supplies of provisions; for the fine of fifty millions of francs, to which it had been condemned, had been paid for the most part in corn, rice, salted meats, spirits, leather, and horses. A portion of these provisions had already been received at Dresden and consumed, and another portion, which was at Torgau, was already required to supply the necessities of our troops; for, despite the constant care and skill displayed by M. Daru in providing for the maintenance of the army, he

had scarcely succeeded in doing so,—principally because the *partisans* intercepted the routes from Leipzig to Dresden, and prevented the fulfilment of the contracts entered into with the inhabitants. It would be an important advantage, therefore, of the establishment of the troops under Marmont and Latour-Maubourg at Grossenhayn, that it would secure the safe arrival of convoys by the Elbe.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements on his return to Dresden towards the middle of September. With four corps under Macdonald in advance of the Elbe, with the corps of Lobau, Saint-Cyr, and Victor in the rear of this river, well entrenched and connected with each other by several bridges; with Ney guarding the lower Elbe in the environs of Torgau; with Marmont and Latour-Maubourg posted between Torgau and Dresden, for the purpose of protecting the shores of the stream and flanking Macdonald, or of descending to the support of Ney; and, lastly, with the whole of the guard concentrated at Dresden, and ready to furnish a reinforcement of forty thousand men to that one of our generals who might be endangered, without counting the seven or eight thousand cavalry who were scouring the country in our rear in pursuit of the *partisans*—with these arrangements, we say, Napoleon believed that the circle of his operations had been sufficiently reconstructed, and flattered himself that his troops would be able to pass the winter in their present positions without being compelled to exhaust themselves in useless expeditions in answer to mere demonstrations on the part of the enemy. And in this new arrangement there was but one serious inconvenience, and this was, that it would probably result in the loss of the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula, the numerous garrisons of which had now been blockaded during more than eight months, and would certainly be incapable of holding out beyond the autumn. These garrisons had been left in their positions in accordance with the hope which Napoleon had entertained that a battle won would enable him to return to the Vistula; and now that he could no longer rely on the fulfilment of this hope, he saw with regret that they must be lost. At the same time, so long as he could maintain his position on the Elbe, there would still be a possibility that they might be preserved; and there was fair reason to suppose that any success obtained by our arms might be followed by an armistice, one of the essential conditions of which would be our being at liberty to revictual the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula.

Whilst he was engrossed at Dresden with these reflections, a fresh act of the enemy suddenly recalled him to Pirna. The Austrians had only separated for a short time from the

Russians and Prussians for the purpose of refreshing and re-organising their troops somewhat in the rear of the theatre of war, and had now returned to Tœplitz, having perceived that it was a serious fault to leave Kleist and Wittgenstein alone in front of the grand French army. As soon as Wittgenstein had become informed of their return, he resolved, on the morning of the 13th of September, to repass the mountains and to appear once more in front of the camp of Pirna and Gieshübel.

Having persuaded, without much difficulty, the Prussian general Kleist to adopt his own views, they returned to the charge against Saint-Cyr and Lobau, and especially the latter. Unfortunately, the works which Napoleon had directed to be executed on the 11th at Langen-Hennersdorf, Gieshübel, and Borna, could not be completed by the 13th, and the Count de Lobau was consequently compelled to fall back upon Gieshübel, as he had so often done before. This being the case, it only remained for Napoleon to make a fresh movement towards the mountains of Bohemia, for the purpose of once more driving back beyond them the troublesome visitors who were so repeatedly making their appearance.

On the 15th, therefore, placing himself at the head of his troops, he drove the enemy from Gieshübel to Péterswalde in great disorder. But the only result of the affair in our favour was, the capture or destruction of some five hundred of the enemy's troops, who, with a determined air, took up a position in front of the Hollendorf defiles, at the foot of the ridge which separates Saxony from Bohemia.

On the following day, Napoleon, in spite of the terrible weather, resumed his march towards the Hollendorf defile, Marshal Saint-Cyr at the same time moving from Furstenwalde across the Geyersberg. During the whole of the day, the pursuit of the Russians and Prussian troops was energetically continued by our troops, and on arriving towards the close of the day in the environs of Kulm, they found the whole army of Bohemia established in strong positions, upon which it would be difficult to make a successful attack. The numbers of this army, since the return of the Austrians, amounted to at least one hundred and twenty thousand men, whilst the force accompanying Napoleon was no more than sixty thousand. This being the case, and a frightful storm exposing our soldiers to great sufferings, on the following morning, Napoleon recrossed the mountain chain, and bidding a final farewell to the Bohemian plains, took up a position at Pirna, close to the bridge which he had had constructed secretly, so that the enemy might not form any idea of the mass of forces which might within a few hours débouch upon the one

or the other bank. He concentrated the whole of his guard on this point, and held himself in readiness to lead forty thousand men to the succour of either Macdonald or Saint-Cyr. In the meantime, Marshal Macdonald observed somewhat singular movements taking place on the part of the enemy; one portion of their new troops ascending from left to right for the purpose of entering Bohemia by the Zittau débouché, whilst another portion, moving from right to left, quitted Blücher for the purpose of joining Bernadotte. As, however, it appeared that the most important events would probably take place in Macdonald's front, Napoleon considered it advisable to remain in his position at Pirna; for, in case it should be necessary for him to throw himself upon any army that might attack Macdonald, he preferred to cross the Elbe at Pirna or Königsstein rather than at Dresden.

But skilful as were all Napoleon's manœuvres, they could not prevent the war from being protracted to a disastrous length, which exhausted his young soldiers, and was wanting in those decisive actions with which Napoleon had been wont to startle France and Europe, and which were now necessary to support the spirit of his army, and to disconcert the ever increasing hate of his enemies. In the meantime, his officers, instead of boldly condemning his inordinate ambition, committed the error of finding fault with his admirable tactics; the idea most generally entertained by his staff being, that he should have fallen back upon the line of the Saale, a line which, as we have said, could not have been defended longer than a week, and a retrograde movement upon which would necessarily have involved the general retreat of our forces upon the Rhine and the immediate abandonment of all the pretensions, for the maintenance of which he had continued the war, and of which the abandonment, happy as it would have been two months since, was now almost impossible.

In the meantime, the allies resolved to terminate the campaign by a direct encounter with Napoleon. The plan they had pursued of avoiding himself, and closing only with his lieutenants, having already had the effect of reducing his forces to an amount which was no more than half, and was soon to be no more than one-third, of their own. There were some difficulties, however, in the execution of this resolution; for whilst the grand army of Bohemia was disposed to attempt a fresh descent from Bohemia into Saxony, on Napoleon's rear, and to march, as originally proposed by Comotau and Chemnitz, upon Leipzig, in combination with the army of Silesia, and whilst Blücher and his associates were no less eager than the staff of the army of Bohemia to bring the campaign to an immediate and decisive result, they were too

strongly imbued with the love of independent action to be willing to place themselves under the direct authority of this staff. As, however, it was necessary to bring forward some better reason than their mere love of independence in opposition to the plan proposed, they represented, in the first place, that it would be a matter of great difficulty for the army of Silesia to conceal its march so completely from Napoleon as to enable it to ascend into Bohemia, cross the mountains, and proceed at their foot as far as Tœplitz, without incurring at his hands some serious blow; and that, in the second place, the news received from the army of the north was far from satisfactory. The Prussian and Russian generals, and especially the Prussian generals, placed under the orders of the Prince of Sweden, complained of his inaction during the battles of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, formally accusing him of being guilty of a prudence which was in reality mere madness, or of an infidelity approaching treason. And of these two suppositions, the former was the right one, for he trembled to put in jeopardy his undeserved reputation; and at this very moment, when he had before him only Ney's army, now reduced to thirty-six thousand men, he remained under the protection of the cannon of Magdebourg, and was engaged in making pretended preparations for a passage of the Elbe, which he had no intention of executing. This being the case, then, Blücher proposed that, instead of displacing the army of Silesia, for the purpose of making it co-operate with that of Bohemia or that of the north, it should be united with the latter, which certainly would never act until it should be in this way constrained to do so. He proposed, then, that instead of proceeding to Bohemia himself, the army under Benningsen should be sent thither to join Prince Schwarzenberg at Tœplitz. When this movement should have been executed, his own troops would, he further proposed, execute a feigned attack upon the entrenched camp at Dresden; and then, having left some cavalry troops to deceive the French, descend sixty thousand strong upon the lower Elbe, to force Bernadotte to cross this river in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg, and to ascend with him the course of the Mulde as far as Leipzig, at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand or one hundred and thirty thousand men, whilst the Prince of Schwarzenberg, reinforced by Benningsen, should descend to the same point with a force of more than two hundred thousand. By this plan three hundred and twenty thousand men would be assembled in Napoleon's rear, and the allies would be able to compel him to accept a general engagement, which the superiority of their forces must almost certainly render advantageous to them.

This plan being regarded very justly as superior to that which had been formed in Bohemia, and the intense desire for victory with which the allies were possessed having dominated their feelings of jealousy, it was ultimately adopted, and forthwith carried into execution. General Benningsen penetrated, on the 17th, into the Zittau gorges, and on the 23rd September arrived at Tœplitz. In the meantime, Blücher, having secretly informed the Generals Tauenzien and Bulow of his projects, and urged them to keep the French constantly engaged in front at Wittenberg, Torgau, and Grossenhayn, himself executed incessant manœuvres around Dresden, for the purpose of veiling the great movement which he was preparing to carry into effect on his right, in the direction of the lower Elbe.

The incessant movement of the enemy's troops in our front, the appearance of Thielman's and Platow's light horse on our right and in our rear, the preparations which were being made in the direction of the lower Elbe (by which we mean that portion of the Elbe below Torgau), and, finally, the advanced period of the season, were signs more than sufficient to lead Napoleon to conclude that events were about to take place of the most important character; and whilst expecting with the utmost eagerness a decisive battle, which he believed could not but be decided in his favour, he held himself constantly on the alert, so as on the one hand to avoid being in any way surprised, and on the other to be ready at the right moment to fall upon the rash individual amongst the hostile leaders who should first venture to risk an aggressive movement on his rear.

On the 22nd September, a series of small events strongly excited his attention. Marshal Marmont, reinforced by the cavalry reserve of General Latour-Maubourg, had been posted, as we have seen, at Grossenhayn, for the purpose of protecting the convoys of provisions which were ascending towards Dresden and the groups of wounded soldiers who were moving down from it; and this precaution had for a time been successful, but suddenly the light cavalry of General Chastel was attacked by the heavy cavalry of General Tauenzien, and vigorously driven back; whilst at the same time General Bulow, who was bombarding Wittenberg, showed signs of being about to throw a bridge across the river in the environs of this place, and whilst, at a somewhat higher point, the Russian General Sacken, who formed Blücher's right in front of the Dresden camp, executed several very apparent manœuvres. Napoleon immediately hastening to Dresden, directed Macdonald to execute with his three corps a reconnaissance *à fond*, and to push the

enemy vigorously upon Harta, or even upon Bautzen, so as to discover whether Blücher were really there or not. He at the same time intimated to Macdonald that he would himself follow in his track, with a portion of the Guard, prepared to act vigorously against the army of Silesia, should it still be in the same position.

A reconnaissance, accordingly, conducted by all the French troops composing Macdonald's army against the various corps forming that of Blücher, was begun on the 22nd of September, and carried on the 23rd as far as Bischofswerda, when Blücher was discovered to be in the same position with the same forces; from which circumstances Napoleon concluded that he had too hastily attributed to his enemies bold designs. At the same time, Blücher employed an utterly useless feint to deceive him; sending to our advanced posts by the bearer of a flag of truce a letter for his son, who was a prisoner of our lines, signed by himself, and dated from Bischofswerda; by which means he hoped the more certainly to convince Napoleon that the dispositions of the allied troops had undergone no change and would undergo none. It was not this letter, however, to which no one attached the slightest weight, but the more serious circumstance of the presence at Bischofswerda of the three corps forming the army of Silesia, which, without precisely deceiving Napoleon, inclined them to suppose that the execution of the plan which he had discovered to have been adopted by the allies was less imminent than he had originally imagined. The consequence was, that he made the arrangements on which he had already resolved, but made them somewhat less promptly.

Having left before Dresden only the 11th corps, and relieved its chief, Marshal Macdonald, from the command of the 3rd, 5th, and 8th, he sent the 3rd (General Souham's), to Meissen, a little town situated on the Elbe, below Dresden, to which point he also moved Marmont with the 6th corps, and Latour-Maubourg, with the heavy cavalry, that they might be ready to support Ney, should the enemy attempt to effect the passage of the stream, in the direction of Torgau or Wittenberg. At the same time he carried Lauriston's corps (the 5th) to Dresden itself, and marched Poniatowski's (the 8th) along the Waldheim and Leipzig route, for the purpose of assisting Lefebvre-Desnoëttes against Thielman's and Platow's light horse, and forming the *tête de colonne* of the army, should it be necessary to fall back on the masses of the enemy coming from Bohemia.

To these measures Napoleon added some others, which prove that he felt a vague presentiment that the war would

speedily be waged on the Rhine, or at least on the Saale. In fact, he ordered General Rogniat, who was engineer-in-chief of the Grand Army since the captivity of General Haxo, to reconstruct the fortifications of Mersbourg on the Saale, and to throw bridges across this river, so as to secure for the army a certain line of retreat. At the same time he had the wounded moved in the direction of Mayence; and, foreseeing that the war would be both long and desperate, drew up a decree for the levy of twelve thousand men of the *classes antérieur* of 1812, 1811, and 1810, and another for the levy of one hundred and sixty thousand men of the conscription of 1815, which would thus be anticipated two years. That of 1814 was already at the dépôts, and he hoped that when the refractory recruits were brought in, it would amount to three hundred thousand troops, who would be ready for active service in the spring. He drew up with his own hand the address which the Empress was to deliver before the senate on the occasion, and, lastly, gave direct orders to the minister of war to put the fortresses of the Rhine, and more especially those of Italy, into a state of defence. But whilst taking those prudent measures, he at the same time countermanded the collection of the vast supplies of provisions which had been ordered by the Duke de Feltre, in accordance with the terms of M. de Bassano's letter, previously cited, lest the populations should be overmuch alarmed by preparations which he considered to be, at present, at least premature.

Whilst Napoleon was thus engaged, the allies executed somewhat earlier than he had expected their double movement upon Leipzig by Bohemia and the lower Elbe. The Prince of Schwarzenberg, preceded by an Austrian column, marched from Tœplitz upon Commotau, and Blücher, after having remained motionless in Napoleon's presence during the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of September, suddenly withdrew, for the purpose of descending the Elbe from Dresden to Wittenberg, covering his movement by an attack on the advanced posts of Macdonald and Marmont, executed by his right, under General Sacken, and leaving before Dresden, for the purpose of still further concealing his operations, Sherbatow's Russian corps and Bubna's light Austrian division, which together formed a body of some eighteen thousand men.

But, well calculated as these measures were to deceive even the most experienced eyes, General Blücher's march, concurrent as it was with the other movements of Generals Tauenzien and Bülow, and the Prince of Sweden himself, could not escape the vigilance of Marshal Ney, against whom these various operations were directed. He had seen Bülow construct a bridge at Wartenbourg, and maintain

his position there during several days; and having also perceived the other corps of the Prince of Sweden's army preparing means of effecting their passage to the opposite bank of the river, either at Barby or Roslau, he had not ventured to take any measures calculated to bring down upon his army of 36,000 men the 80,000 of the enemy, and had contented himself, accordingly, with resisting them, more especially at the point where they were preparing to effect the passage of the river near Wartenbourg, because it was the nearest to Dresden, and therefore the more diligently to be guarded. He lost no time in writing to Napoleon to inform him of the state of affairs, and to announce to him that the enemy were on the point of effecting a passage of the Elbe between Wittenberg and Magdebourg, with a considerable body of troops.

Nor were the events which had taken place on the side of Bohemia less significant. General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had proceeded with some thousands of cavalry in pursuit of Thielman, who, having entered Saxony by a road leading from Carlsbad to Zwickau, had moved in the direction of Weissenfels, as though he purposed to cut off our communications with the Saale. General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, after having obtained several successes over the enemy, had ultimately been compelled, by the appearance of Platow with his Cossacks, and 5,000 Austrians in his front, to fall back upon Leipzig, with a loss of some hundreds of men. This check, however, had been speedily atoned for by Prince Poniatowski, who, having repassed the Elbe, and fallen back as far as Frohbourg with the 8th corps, and the 4th of the cavalry, had fallen in his turn upon Thielmann and Platow, and inflicted upon them, a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of seven hundred men. These various encounters, sometimes resulting in our favour, and sometimes turning against us, were altogether advantageous to us, as serving to keep us thoroughly informed with respect to the movements of the enemy. And, indeed, the information which was now received made it sufficiently evident that, on Napoleon's left the army of the north, reinforced probably by Blücher and his troops, was traversing the lower Elbe, with the intention of ascending towards Leipzig along the Mulde, and that these several armies, after having crossed over to the left of the Elbe, would endeavour to take him in flank.

Declining, then, to be deceived by the enemy's feigned manœuvres, Napoleon forthwith directed his forces on the two points which were being simultaneously threatened, in such a manner as to place himself with his reserves between

the two allied armies, ready to fall on the one of them which should appear most accessible to his attack. He had already sent Prince Poniatowski in the rear of Dresden, along the Leipzig route, by Waldheim and Frohbourg, from whence this officer had been able to check the progress of Thielmann and Platow; and he now also moved the 5th Corps in the same direction, upon Mittweyda, for the purpose of affording him support. The 2nd corps, which had been for some time at Freyberg, watching the passes leading from Bohemia into Saxony, Napoleon now moved still farther, to the environs of Chemnitz. These three corps, to which were annexed the 4th and 5th cavalry, were to fall back towards Thuringia, along the foot of the Bohemian mountains, taking care to be always between the Grand Army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg and Leipzig. At the same time Marshal Marmont was ordered to fall back with the 6th corps and the 1st cavalry upon Leipzig, where he would be only one march distant from Murat, and not more than two from Ney.

As soon as the enemy's movements, which had hitherto been much confused, should manifest some decided plan, Napoleon determined that, leaving Saint-Cyr and the Count de Lobau at Dresden, he would himself fall back with the forty thousand men of the Guard, with Macdonald and Souham, who would join him at Meissen, and going up to the support of either Murat or Ney, as the one or the other of them might appear to be in more immediate danger, raise the army of one of them to a force of one hundred and forty-five thousand men, which would be quite sufficient he believed to vanquish first the one, and then the other of the two armies of the allies.

The corps of Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Victor, with the 4th and 5th cavalry corps, having been marched in the direction of Mittweida and Frohbourg, under the command of Murat, and the corps of Marmont and Latour-Maubourg, marched in the direction of Leipzig, Napoleon held himself in readiness at the first signal to proceed either in the one direction or the other, with 75,000 men. In the meantime a column of battalions and squadrons *de marche* having arrived at Leipzig, he ordered that it should remain there to garrison that city in conjunction with the detachments which General Margaron had already left there, and also ordered thither for the same duty the corps d'Augereau, with which he had at first intended to overcome, as well as to defend, Bavaria, but which now, perceiving that the whole fate of the war was to be decided on the plains of Leipzig, he did not hesitate to summon thither.

In the meantime the allies proceeded to carry out their plans. Blucher having arrived on the 30th September in

front of Wittenberg, replaced Bulow's corps there, and then hastened to make his preparations for effecting the passage of the Elbe. As Wittenberg was still in the hands of the French, he could not hope to be able to cross the river at that point, and therefore proceeded to throw up a bridge across it, somewhat higher up, at Elster, where he succeeded in passing over to the left bank on the 2nd October. But it still remained for him to carry the Wartenbourg position, which was no means an easy task, Bulow having already attempted it, and failed.

Marshal Ney, having learned by means of his reconnaissances, the presence of the enemy on the left of the Elbe, lost no time in sending General Bertrand thither to frustrate the objects for which this movement had been attempted. The 4th corps consisted only at this time of the French division Morand, the Italian division Fontanelli, and the Wurtemberg division Franquemont, and numbering altogether no more than 12,000 men, a very small force with which to contend with 60,000 enemies, but which was to find compensation for smallness of numbers in advantages of ground, skill, and coolness.

The Elbe as it approaches Elster, forms a very decided arc, within which it envelopes on its left flank a tract of lone and marshy ground, on which stands the Chateau de Wartenburg. To protect it against inundations a dyke had been dug, extending in the manner of a cord from one extremity of the arc formed by the Elbe to the other, and on one of the extremities of this dyke is situated the chateau, the village of Bleddin being on the other. If the enemy's troops, which had crossed the Elbe at Elster, wished to continue their progress in a direct line, they would pursue a course which must lead them to the middle of the dyke. General Morand had consequently posted the French division at this point, where the most difficult task would have to be performed; the Italians being a little to the right, and quite to the right, at the village of Bleddin, the Wurtembergians. Having made these arrangements, and ranged his artillery on the sandy height of the Chateau de Wartembourg, he awaited the Russians, who made their appearance on the third; boldly advancing without any idea of the terrible reception which was in reserve for them. Our troops allowed them to advance to within very short musket range, and then poured upon them from every point of the dyke, a sudden and unexpected fire, which completely enveloped and decimated them, and the fire of a murderous artillery being at the same moment added to that of the musketry, they were compelled to give way and to fall back in disorder upon the bridge. Again and again they returned to the charge, and

each time were forced to retreat with considerable loss. In vain Blücher had a battery established for the purpose of dismounting our artillery on the Wartenbourg height. Our artillerymen, in nowise disconcerted, turned a portion of their pieces against the Prussian battery, and having speedily reduced it to silence, redirected them upon the route, which had now become a fearful scene of carnage.

The contest had lasted for four hours, and nearly five thousand of the enemy were stretched, dead, or wounded on the marshy ground, when at length General Blücher hit upon the idea of directing a vigorous attack on our right, upon the village of Bleddin, which was defended by the Wurtembergians, who numbered only two thousand, and from whom, after a furious assault, he succeeded in taking it. On seeing this, General Bertrand threw the brigade Hullof of the division Morand on the flank of the enemy's column, but it was too late to save the village, in which the enemy had already established themselves, and after having encountered and broken three of their battalions, it was compelled to return behind the dyke, and rejoin the division Morand.

Costing the enemy, as it did, some five or six thousand men, whilst our own loss was at the most no more than five hundred, this brilliant affair may be considered one of the most remarkable of any that occurred during the whole course of our protracted wars; but it could not, nevertheless, Bleddin being taken, prevent the army of Silesia from debouching. It would be necessary, therefore, for General Bertrand to retreat upon Kemberg, for the purpose of rejoining General Reynier and the division Dombrowski, posted along the Mulde, from Düben to Dessau. From prisoners whom we had taken, it was learned that the whole army of Silesia had crossed the Elbe, and was on Ney's right, and our reconnaissances informed us that the army of the north had begun to cross the Elbe below Wittenberg, from Roslau to Barby, and was consequently on Ney's left. Let us glance at the features of the country across which these two armies were now advancing for the purpose of effecting a junction, and making a combined movement against the corps of Marshal Ney.

The Elbe, which from Dresden to Wittenberg flows obliquely from the south-east to the north-west, from Wurtenbourg to Roslau, and almost as far as Barby, flows from east to west, that it is to say, with reference to the position of our troops, from our right to our left. In its course from Wittenberg to Barby, the Elbe receives, first, the Mulde, which falls into it in the neighbourhood of Dessau, and then the

Saale, which joins it near Barby. Thus Marshal Ney had on his right and in front of him the Elbe, which flowed parallel to his position as far as Wittenberg, and then making a bend passed before him, and on his left the Mulde. He was, consequently, between Blucher, who had crossed the Elbe on his right at Wartenbourg, and Bernadotte, who, having crossed the Elbe below the point of its confluence with the Mulde, was re-ascending the course of the latter river on his left. He possessed the advantage, it is true, of having all the bridges of the Mulde in his hands, of being able, therefore, to cross to the one or the other of the banks of this river at his will, and of thus covering himself against the advance of either Blucher or Bernadotte. But unfortunately his force consisted of but 40,000 men, whilst Blucher's numbered 60,000, and Bernadotte's even more. The manner in which he manœuvred between those two armies was highly prudent, and was founded on the twofold object of keeping them separate, and of leading his own troops towards Leipzig. In the meantime, Blucher and Bernadotte had an interview, in which they agreed upon a plan of operations, to the effect that as soon as they could leave the banks of the Elbe without danger, they should carry their forces behind the Mulde, and ascend its course as far as Leipzig. But they were, at the same time, equally anxious to provide for a change of fortune against the arms of the allies, by preparing a means of retreat in the shape of reliable *têtes-de-pont* at Wartenbourg and Roslau, the construction of which would occupy at least three or four days.

Whilst these events were taking place between the Elbe and the Mulde, Marshal Marmont, whose instructions authorized him to proceed where the danger might appear to be greatest, had hastened, at the first summons from Marshal Ney, to leave Leipzig and to descend the Mulde with his corps d'armée and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and had halted at Eilenbourg, behind Marshal Ney, who had fallen back upon Düben.

Murat, entrusted with the duty of watching the gates of Bohemia, advanced with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th cavalry, from Mittweida to Frohborg, traversing the foot of the Erz-Gebirge, and covering Leipzig. The heads of the columns of the army of Bohemia were now plainly visible, debouching in two principal masses from Comotau upon Chemnitz, and from Carlsbad upon Zwickau.

On the morning of the 5th October, Napoleon received information of the battle of Wartenbourg, and in the course of the same day the detailed account of all the movements effected by the various corps. But the state of things which

he now knew to exist neither excited nor disturbed him ; for it did but announce to him the imminence of what he ardently desired, a general engagement, and his only fear was that the allies might even now lose their courage and endeavour to retrace their steps. That it was necessary to march upon them there could be no doubt ; the only question being as to which of the two masses of the enemy's troops he should first attack, and with respect to this point he did not hesitate a moment. The army of Bohemia was still at a considerable distance from Leipzig ; and moreover, Murat, whose force would be raised to 60,000 men by the addition of the 12,000 who were at Leipzig, and the 12,000 of Augereau's corps, would be able to take up successive positions for the purpose of covering Leipzig, and thus gain a few days, during which Napoleon, whom three marches would carry to Düben on the Mulde, would have time to throw himself between Blücher and Bernadotte, and after defeating them one after the other, to march upon the army of Bohemia, vanquishing it in its turn. But should this latter army hasten to re-enter Bohemia, he would decline to pursue it thither, preferring to chase the vanquished troops of Bernadotte and Blücher, following them sword in hand even to Berlin, and thus realise his favourite project of rescuing the garrisons of the fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, besides transferring, probably, the theatre of the war to the lower Elbe, where he had the two strong points of support, Magdebourg and Hambourg.

But although Napoleon was full of confidence with respect to the successful result of his plans, he did not fail to admit the possibility that his expectations might be frustrated, and had, therefore, prudently sent General Rogniat to Mersebourg to secure a safe retreat to the Saale, upon which river he proposed, should circumstances prove disastrous, to fall back, making it the basis of a new series of operations.

The evacuation by our troops of Dresden, and the portion of the Elbe comprised between Königsstein and Torgau, were evidently necessary incidents of the existing posture of affairs ; and accordingly, on the morning of the 6th, Napoleon set out with the whole of his guard, young and old, for the lower Elbe, directing his march upon Meissen. As the 3rd corps (Souham's) had moved upon Torgau at the first rumour of the battle of Wartenbourg ; and as Napoleon now ordered Macdonald also to proceed towards Meissen, a force of seventy-five thousand men, formed by the Guard, and the corps of Souham and Macdonald, would be in two days close to Ney, and in three in the very presence of the enemy. There still remained at Dresden the corps of the Count de

Lobau (the 1st), of Marshal Saint-Cyr (the 14th), reckoning seven divisions, and numbering together some thirty thousand men. Summoning Marshal Saint-Cyr, who had the command of these two corps, to his presence, Napoleon caused him to feel great satisfaction by the exposition of his views; for he on the present occasion thoroughly entered into the spirit of Napoleon's plans, and had been apprehensive that he should be left behind in Dresden. Napoleon directed him to evacuate in succession Kœnigstein, Lilienstein and Pirna, destroying the bridges which had been established at these various points, and employing a portion of the boats of which they were composed, in the conveyance of stores and wounded soldiers to Torgau. Whilst executing these measures the marshal was to take pains to persuade the inhabitants of Dresden that no intention was entertained of abandoning it; but as soon as they should be completed he was to hold himself in readiness to set out with his thirty thousand troops to join Napoleon at Meissen.

It remained to come to some explanation with the Saxon Court, to which Napoleon could only offer the cruel alternative of remaining at Dresden and enduring the chances of a formidable attack by the enemy, or of accompanying our army in its march, and thus being involved in the horrors of such a battle as the world had never yet seen. The good king Frederick-Augustus finding himself in a position in which he could only trust his fortunes with those of Napoleon, preferred to accompany the latter rather than one of his lieutenants, and declared to him his desire to follow him wherever he might go. A decision which imposed upon Napoleon the task of dragging in his train a whole court, consisting of old men, women, and children, who had always been accustomed to the most luxurious and tranquil mode of life, and who displayed all that simplicity and ignorance which characterized the Bourbons of Spain.

Having set in motion a portion of his troops on the 6th of October, and another portion on the 7th, Napoleon set out in person on the latter day, and after a halt of some hours at Meissen pushed on to Seerhausen, on the Wurtzen road. His great experience in warfare had taught him that the most important despatches usually arrived about midnight or one o'clock in the morning, because the generals who might be posted some ten or fifteen leagues distant, sent off in the evening information of what had taken place during the day. Should the orders required by the state of circumstances disclosed in this information be immediately dispatched, they would reach their destination in time to be executed on the following morning; and these corps posted at a considerable

distance from each other, would act as though under Napoleon's own immediate command. But this could only be the case on the condition that the Emperor should be awake and ready at the moment when the orders in question had to be despatched; and accordingly, it was his usual habit during this last campaign to go to rest at about six or seven o'clock in the evening, and rising at midnight to dictate his correspondence during the whole of the night.

Having halted at Seerhausen a short time to snatch a brief repose, Napoleon set out the same night for Wurtzen, where he arrived on the 8th, sufficiently early to despatch his orders for the day. At Wurtzen he was on the Mulde, and in a position from which he could reach either Leipzig or Düben in the same space of time. His intention on quitting Dresden had been to determine at Wurtzen itself upon his final resolution, and from this point either to throw himself upon Leipzig, should Murat be unable any longer to make head against the army of Bohemia, or, should Murat be able still to maintain his position for a few days, to descend the Mulde as far as Düben, and free himself from the armies of Silesia and the North, by driving them beyond the Elbe. All the information he had received en route concurred in showing that the greatest danger threatened in the direction of Ney, and an unfortunate misunderstanding which had arisen between this marshal and Marmont was an additional reason for his presence in that quarter. The misunderstanding alluded to had arisen from the following circumstances. Ney having fallen back after the battle of Wartenbourg as far as Düben, and having urged Marmont to come to his assistance, which the latter had done by advancing to Eilenbourg, had suddenly quitted his position, and passed behind Marmont for the purpose of approaching the Elbe in the direction of Torgau. By this proceeding Marmont was driven from his position *en appui* into one in which he was *en tête* and gravely compromised; Leipzig being at the same time exposed by the movement which Ney had required him to make, to any enterprise that Bernadotte and Blücher might undertake against it. Marshal Ney had been induced to take this extraordinary step by his desire to reinforce his army by the 3rd corps (Souham's), which he had long commanded and on which he had placed great reliance. Marmont, however, not knowing what to think of Ney's conduct, and fearing for the safety of Leipzig, had in his turn fallen back as far as Taucha.

Having formed his plan of action without loss of time, Napoleon resolved to march from Wurtzen upon Eilenbourg; in other words, to descend the Mulde with the seventy-five

thousand men he brought with him, pushing forward Ney and Marmont in advance, with the hope of being able to overtake Bernadotte and Blucher before they should have time to re-pass the Elbe. As soon as Blucher and Bernadotte should have been vanquished, he proposed to turn back upon the Prince of Schwarzenberg, should he have continued to advance with the army of Bohemia, or, should he have retreated at the news of a disaster to the arms of the allies, to continue to pursue Blucher and Bernadotte as far, perhaps, as Berlin itself.

Having ordered, in pursuance of this plan, Ney and Marmont to advance, the former by the right bank, and the latter by the left bank of the Mulde, Napoleon followed them with the whole of his guard and Macdonald. At the same time, he communicated to Murat the measures he had projected against the united armies of the North and of Silesia, and directed him, whilst avoiding any collision with the enemy, to keep constantly between him and Leipzig, where he would find a reinforcement of twenty or four and twenty thousand men, which would raise the force under his command to some sixty and odd thousand combatants. Napoleon had, in fact, posted the Duke of Padua at Leipzig, with a portion of the 3rd cavalry corps (detached from Ney's army, for the purpose of pursuing the *partisans*), together with some *bataillons de marche* which had arrived from Mayence, and the old division Margaron. These troops when joined by those under Augereau, which were on their march towards them, would form a force of twenty-four thousand men; and Napoleon gave orders that they should keep an active watch, especially on the side of the lower Elbe, against any attack which Bernadotte might possibly make upon Leipzig. Unfortunately, added to these judicious orders was one which, although quite justified by the state of circumstances at the time, cannot but be much regretted. By this order he countermanded, or rather deferred the evacuation of Dresden, for which Marshal Saint-Cyr had made every preparation; the reason being, that he believed that a decisive battle was imminent, and that he desired to be able, after the victory which he did not doubt he was about to gain, to make Dresden once more his head-quarters.

Having passed at Wurtzen the evening of the 8th and the whole of the 9th, for the purpose of affording time for the arrival of his troops in line, Napoleon set out before daybreak on the 10th for Eilenbourg, where he arrived about four o'clock in the morning. Placing himself at the head of the light cavalry of the guard, he marched upon Düben, in the midst of his troops, which were arranged in the following

order :—Ney occupied the foremost place with what remained of the Duke of Padua's cavalry and Sebastiani's corps, having Reynier on the left beyond the Mulde, whilst Dombrowski and Souham were in the centre on the Mulde itself, and Bertrand marched on the right at an almost equal distance from the Mulde and the Elbe. Napoleon followed with the cavalry of the guard and that of Latour-Maubourg *en tête*, the troops under Marmont forming the left on one side of the Mulde, the whole of the guard forming the centre on the Mulde itself, and Macdonald's troops forming the right between the Mulde and the Elbe. At two days' march in the rear followed the grand *quartier general* with all the baggage, artillery, and munitions of war, and with the worthy princes of the Saxon Court, who journeyed in a fashion corresponding to the habits of their lives. In the meantime, the enemy were perceived falling back in all directions, and yet once more Napoleon had reason to fear that the allies, resuming their old tactics, would evade his onslaught.

Believing that they would have to encounter only Marshals Ney and Marmont, Blucher and the Prince of Sweden had agreed on the 7th to march together upon Leipzig on the 9th ; however, secret information reached Bernadotte and Blucher of the approach of Napoleon in person, and the former had thereupon hastened to declare that he would immediately fall back behind the Elbe for the purpose of saving himself from disaster, unless the army of Silesia should join him beyond the Mulde, and thus unite the armies of the North and of Silesia in one single mass. This plan was a prudent one, and Blucher hastened to conform to it, although the proposed movement would involve the inconvenience of forcing him to lose his bridge at Wartenbourg. It was then arranged that on the 10th General D'York, whose troops really formed the right of the army of Silesia, should pass the Mulde at Jesnitz, that General Langeron's, which formed the centre, should pass it at Bitterfeld, and finally that General Sacken's, which had become its left, should pass it at Düben. Thus all the corps of the army of Silesia were in motion defiling before us in a direction from our right to our left along the line described by the Mulde in its course from Düben to Bitterfeld. The corps of General D'York was but a short distance from the point at Jesnitz at which it was to pass the Mulde, and that of Langeron was but four leagues from Bitterfeld ; but Sacken, who was at Mokrehna, between the Mulde and the Elbe, had on the contrary a considerable distance to traverse before he could arrive at Düben, and also had to execute this movement in close proximity to the French, a circumstance which rendered it an extremely perilous proceeding.

Whilst Blücher was defiling in a direction from our right to our left for the purpose of crossing the Mulde, Marshal Ney fell upon Langeron's corps, which had remained in the rear for the purpose of awaiting Sacken's corps and delivering up to it the Düben bridge, and driving it back with considerable vehemence, took from it three hundred baggage waggons. The consequence was that Sacken, who was hotly pressed by the troops of General Bertrand, was compelled to make a great circuit for the purpose of crossing the Mulde at Raguhn.

Napoleon entering Düben about two o'clock in the afternoon, learned from the statements of prisoners that he was in the presence of the whole army of Silesia, and at once resolved to pursue it in every direction; and having ordered his marshals and generals to execute the measures which he considered would have the effect of rendering it impossible for the enemy to effect the passage of the Mulde and the Elbe, he remained at Düben with the guard, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry and the corps of Marshal Marmont, for the purpose of developing there his ulterior movements.

And now, knowing that the army of the North was on his left behind the lower Mulde, and that the army of Silesia, after having crossed the Elbe at Wartenbourg on our right, was defiling along our front for the purpose of crossing the Mulde on our left and joining the army of the North, and having great reason to suppose that they were about to resume their evasive tactics, and to re-pass the Elbe at our approach in the neighbourhood either of Acken or Roslau, he resolved to pursue them with the utmost vehemence in the direction of Berlin, and as it was of great consequence that he should possess the power of returning at a subsequent period against the army of Bohemia, he almost instantaneously devised a project as audacious as it was skilful, and which the vast proportions of the forces with which it was to be executed enveloped with an attribute of almost unheard of grandeur. Napoleon resolved, then, to pursue with the utmost vehemence the armies of Silesia and of the North, passing the Mulde and the Elbe in their track, destroying all the bridges except those which were in our own hands, and ultimately putting these two armies to complete route. When this should have been accomplished he would reascend the Elbe by the right bank as far as Torgau or Dresden, and crossing it at one of these points, throw himself upon the army of Bohemia, which, having continued to descend the course of the Mulde in pursuit of Murat, would be then taken in a species of trap between the Mulde and the Elbe, the bridges of which would be in our hands,

Napoleon lost no time in giving the orders necessary for the execution of this plan, and gave them in cypher, at the same time desiring all those who became the depositories of his secret to keep it well, declaring, that for three days it would be *the secret of the army and the salvation of the empire*. He ordered Murat to act with extreme caution, holding the enemy in check and yet enticing him on, and to fall back upon Leipzig, where he would meet with the Duke of Padua, and probably Augereau also, to maintain his position there as long as possible, but rather than expose himself to an unequal struggle to fall back upon Torgau or Wittenberg, where he would find an asylum behind the Elbe. At the same time, he ordered the Duke of Padua to take measures in concert with General Lefebvre-Desnoette for the transfer of all the valuable military stores in Leipzig to Torgau; and directed him to write to Erfut and Mayence to the effect that the French troops were in full manœuvre, that the movements in which they were engaged were of a very complicated character, and that no alarm should be felt, should news be received of the occupation of Leipzig by the enemy, for that although such an event might very possibly take place, the result of the combinations which were now being carried out would be, as it were, a thunderbolt hurled in our favour.

But attendant on this finely conceived combination there was one inconvenience, and that a very serious one; being the necessity which it involved of refraining from carrying out the proposed evacuation of Dresden; for as one of the main portions of this new plan was that, after having crossed the Elbe in pursuit of Blucher and Bernadotte, Napoleon should recross it for the purpose of surprising the army of Bohemia, and it might possibly be necessary for him in pursuance of this design to ascend it, not only as far as Torgau, but even to Dresden itself, the preservation of this city was absolutely necessary. Napoleon accordingly sent orders to Marshal Saint Cyr to maintain his position at Dresden, adding that he would probably reappear in person very shortly under its walls, after having accomplished great designs, and in pursuit of others still greater. But, unfortunately, should these designs not be realised, and should our troops be forced to meet the enemy in the position they then occupied between Düben and Leipzig, this new plan with respect to the continued occupation of Dresden would have been the means of depriving us of thirty thousand men, who might have turned a doubtful scale of victory in our favour, and who, should we be obliged, after a defeat or drawn battle, to recross the Saale, would be thirty thousand more troops added to all

those which, shut up in the fortresses of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, could not return to France, and would consequently be compelled to capitulate.

After having formed these vast plans, Napoleon resolved to spend a day or two at Düben, for the purpose of awaiting the arrival of information respecting Murat, and the various corps sent in pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte, since he was desirous of knowing whether he should have to seek the armies of Silesia and the North behind the Mulde, passing this river between Düben and Dessau, or to seek them beyond the Elbe, passing this river at Wittenberg. The weather was frightful, and Napoleon was forced to await the result of his reconnaissances, in a little villa surrounded by floods, and in the midst of woods, which an unpropitious autumn had already smitten with decay. The forced inaction to which he now had to submit he found excessively irksome, and although still very confident in his ultimate success, he could not always resist the invasion of certain vague presentiments. His only resource was conversation with Marshal Marmont, whose equable, open, and cultivated mind pleased him much, and with whom he had formerly been on the familiar terms proper between a general and his aide-de-camp.

On the 11th the reports of his lieutenants announced to Napoleon the following results. General Bertrand had advanced to Wartenbourg with the 4th corps, and had set himself to work to destroy the grand *tête-de-pont* which Blücher had begun to construct there. Generals Dombrowski and Reynier had driven away from the environs of Wittenberg the troops which blockaded that place, and having entered it, debouched upon the right bank of the Elbe, and proceeded in pursuit of the Prussian detachments. Marshal Macdonald had taken up a position at Klemberg, behind Wittenberg, for the purpose of supporting Dombrowski and Reynier; and finally, Ney had approached Dessau, and driven back all the detachments of the enemy's troops upon the right of the Mulde. In the meantime, the statements received from prisoners, and the apparent movements of the enemy, were of a nature to throw Napoleon into a state of the greatest uncertainty. In fact, at Wartenbourg on our right, at Wittenberg in our front, and at Dessau on our left, not only had detachments of the enemy been perceived, but even entire corps and immense convoys; rendering it quite impossible for our generals to decide whether the enemy re-passed to the right bank of the Elbe on our approach, or halted behind the Mulde, ready to give us battle as soon as we should venture to cross the river in his presence. It

might also be the case that the armies of the North and of Silesia, united behind the Mulde, reascended the course of this river for the purpose of effecting a junction with the army of Bohemia in the neighbourhood of Leipzig—a movement on their part which would expose us to the very serious peril of having the whole of the forces of the coalition upon us at the same moment. It was necessary, therefore, that our manœuvres should be conducted in such a manner, as to keep us always between the forces of Bernadotte and Blucher, and those of the Prince of Schwarzenberg; in other words, between the mass of the enemy's troops which was ascending from the lower Elbe, and that which was descending from Bohemia. Having this object in view accordingly, Napoleon sent Marmont, to whose troops he added a strong cavalry division, to the left of the Mulde towards Dolitzsch, where he would be behind a detached arm of the Mulde which flows from Leipzig to Jesnitz, and from whence, should he find that the army of Silesia, or that of the North were moving in the direction of Leipzig, he might easily march thither himself in a few hours, and arrive there before them.

Having taken this wise precaution, Napoleon proceeded to carry out the measures necessary to enable him to develop his grand design, should it be the case, as he hoped, that the fear of a movement by Blucher and Bernadotte upon Leipzig was but a chimera. Ordering Dombrowski and Reynier to descend along the right bank of the Elbe, for the purpose of destroying all the bridges Bernadotte might hold on that river from Roslau to Barby, and ordering Ney to seize the bridges of the Mulde at Dessau, he left Macdonald and Klemberg to give such support to Reynier and Dombrowski as they might require, and Bertrand at Wartenbourg to complete the destruction of Blucher's *tête-de-pont*. Finally, he concentrated the troops of Latour-Maubourg and the Guard around Düben, whence they would be ready to follow Ney to Dessau, to fall upon the armies of the north and of Silesia upon the other side of the Mulde, or to proceed in the direction already taken by Marmont. And this was the manner in which—struggling with grave perplexities, and plunged in profound calculations—Napoleon passed a day many of his critics have declared him to have lost.

Rising, as was his custom, somewhat before one o'clock on the morning of the 12th, he hastened to make himself master of the information that had come in from all directions, and found that whilst one of the two armies of the lower Elbe, that of Bernadotte, had repassed to the right bank of the Elbe, the other, Blucher's, had remained on the left bank, and displayed a tendency to reascend towards Leipzig behind

the Mulde. Another piece of information, to the effect that Murat had engaged the enemy with success on the 10th, tended to confirm Napoleon in the resolution to throw himself at once upon the armies of the north and of Silesia.

The engagement just alluded to, in which Murat had been victorious over Wittgenstein on the 10th, had taken place in the following manner. Murat having advanced with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th cavalry, upon Frohbourg, had succeeded in intercepting the route leading to Leipzig by Commotau and Chemnitz, but had not been in time to intercept that leading to this city by Carlsbad and Zwickau. The consequence had been that Wittgenstein had been able to occupy Borna. Being unwilling to remain in this position, and especially anxious that the head of one of the two columns of the enemy should not reach Leipzig before him, the French marshal had resolutely fallen back on his right, and attacking Borna with the utmost vigour, had retaken it at the point of the bayonet. This engagement, which cost Wittgenstein some three or four thousand men, had rendered us masters of the Leipzig route, and replaced Murat in that position in which it was his task to cover Leipzig, against the two columns of Prince Schwarzenberg debouching from Bohemia. Murat, judging from first appearances, in his despatches to Napoleon expressed his belief that the army of Bohemia was in retreat, and urged him to neglect no opportunity of engaging the armies of Silesia and the North.

These details, which Napoleon received on the morning of the 12th, induced him once more to suppose that the allies were anxious to avoid him, and that it was, consequently, necessary that he should at once throw himself upon the armies of Silesia and the North; pursue them beyond the Elbe, and then, ascending the course of this river by its right bank, surprise the army of Bohemia by suddenly passing over to its left bank. But at ten o'clock in the morning the aspect of affairs had suddenly changed; a second letter from Murat, bringing information that instead of being in retreat the enemy was in full march upon Leipzig; that the Austrian column continuing its movement by the Chemnitz route, continued to advance upon Frohbourg and Borna; and that Wittgenstein's column, after having fallen back for a moment on the Zwickau route as far as Altenbourg, had once more boldly resumed its march upon Leipzig. Murat announced that he was himself falling back in the direction of Leipzig, and that he hoped to be able to maintain himself in a good position which he intended to take up some leagues from this city, and in which he promised to devote himself to the

ungrateful and perilous task of struggling with a force three or four times superior to his own. At the same moment, Marmont's reconnaissance discovered Blücher's army quitting the banks of the Mulde for those of the Saale, and ascending towards Halle, with an evident direction towards Leipzig.

On receiving this information, Napoleon, with the promptitude of a superior military tactician, immediately changed his plans, and resolved to advance immediately upon Leipzig. So long as he had been able to hope that he might succeed in maintaining a position between the two masses of the enemy's troops which were coming, the one from Bohemia, the other from the lower Elbe, with the power of throwing himself upon the one or the other at will, his former plan had been in the highest degree skilful and prudent; but now that the tendency of these several masses was evident, whilst he could be neither sure that Murat would be able to hold in check for any time the army of Bohemia, nor that he could himself come up with the armies of Silesia and the North, in time to prevent their reaching Leipzig, his chief object was necessarily to oppose the junction of the three armies of the allies, and for that purpose to proceed to Leipzig, to give battle as soon as possible to the army of Bohemia.

Without losing a moment Napoleon made his calculations, and before noon gave the necessary orders for the concentration upon Leipzig, of the troops under Marmont from Dolitzsch, of the Guard and Latour-Maubourg's troops from Düben, and of those under Bertrand and Macdonald from the environs of Wittenberg. At the same time, as he had reason to suppose that the army of the north had repassed the Elbe, and was anxious to render it harmless by destroying the means by which it might recross this river, he ordered Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani to complete as soon as possible the operations they had been charged to execute against the bridges of Roslau, Acken, and Barby, and with a similar object in view reiterated the orders he had given to Marshal Ney to seize those at Dessau.

Napoleon resolved to await at Düben the execution of his orders, for whilst his presence at Leipzig would be of little value until his troops had arrived there, he would be able at Düben to watch the movements of his corps d'armée, and the accomplishment of the measures which he had planned for the purpose of keeping Bernadotte at a distance. Certain encounters which took place at this time between Dombrowski and Reynier, who had crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, and certain bodies of the enemy, known to belong to the army of the North, together with the fact that the enemy's troops engaged in the action fought by Ney on the same day

at Dessau, and which resulted in our completely routing them with a great loss, were a portion of Tauenzien's corps, which, without absolutely belonging to Bernadotte's army, had usually served with it, confirmed the supposition that the army of the North had remained on the right of the Elbe, for the purpose of covering Berlin, whilst the army of Silesia, having fallen back from the Mulde to the Saale, for the purpose of accomplishing its movement under cover of two rivers, was now moving towards Halle and Leipzig, in order to effect a junction with the army of Bohemia. Such an hypothesis certainly left many contradictions to be explained, for it was difficult to understand why the armies of Silesia and the North had, at great risk, effected their junction and the passage of the Elbe, only to separate immediately afterwards, and why Blücher had not simply proceeded across Bohemia to effect his junction with the Prince of Schwarzenberg, instead of traversing the immense circuit from Bautzen to Dessau, and from Dessau to Leipzig. But this was not the first occasion on which the generals of the allied forces had appeared to execute strange manœuvres, and it was impossible not to trust to the unanimous testimonies to the fact of the separation of the two armies of the North and the South.

As these testimonies received fresh confirmation on the 13th by reconnaissances executed in all directions, Napoleon persisted in adhering to the opinion he had already formed, but which, however, was but of little importance with respect to the measures now to be taken, as in any case the speedy and complete concentration of his forces around Leipzig was absolutely necessary. Marmont, with General Deforge's cavalry, had ascended the Mulde, between the principal arm and the little arm which passes at Dolitzsch, in a line which was constantly parallel with that pursued by Blücher's troops, which were effecting a similar movement along the Saale, and were directing their march upon Halle as we upon Leipzig. On the evening of the 13th Marshal Marmont took up a position in the rear of Leipzig, at Breitenfeld, which was opposite the Halle route, and where he was in a position to prevent Blücher from entering Leipzig. On the same day Murat fell back in good order upon the opposite side of Leipzig, into a position in which he might hold in check the army of Prince Schwarzenberg. Augereau, after having encountered the light troops of Lichtenstein and Thielmann beyond Weissenfels, not far from the plains of Lützen, and routed them with a loss to them of two thousand men, was now at the entrance into Leipzig, towards Lindenau, and thus formed a fresh obstacle to a junction between Blücher

and Schwarzenberg. Thus on the evening of the 13th ninety thousand of our troops were already assembled in the neighbourhood of Leipzig, in such a manner as to keep separate the masses of the enemy.

In the meantime the concentration of our forces was similarly carried out on the Düben route; the guard, and Latour-Maubourg, having followed Marshal Marmont, whilst Bertrand, Macdonald, and Ney, fell back upon Düben, for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Mulde there, and Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani, returned to it towards Wittenberg. The rain pouring down incessantly caused the roads to be in the most frightful state, and unfortunately many of our soldiers, too young to endure such fatigues, loitered in the rear and encumbered the roads. The grand *quartier general*, composed of the Saxon Court, the matériel of the engineers, the artillery, and the pontoon equipages, and comprising at least two thousand vehicles, had followed Napoleon as far as Eilenbourg on the Mulde, and was half way on the road from Leipzig to Torgau; Napoleon had ordered that all the portion of this convoy which belonged to the artillery, should be sent on to Leipzig, and that all the rest should be deposited in Torgau. The Saxon Court had been left free to choose between Torgau or Leipzig, in other words, between the miseries attending a siege at the former place, or the risks of a battle at the latter. Guided by its instinctive confidence in Napoleon, it had chosen the latter, and thus added a fresh embarrassment to the many which attended our march along these encumbered and broken roads.

On the morning of the 14th, after having superintended during the whole of the night the execution of his orders, Napoleon set out in person for Leipzig. At the moment of his departure, a report received from Marshal Ney, caused him to entertain doubts with respect to the position taken by the army of the North; for it now no longer appeared on the right of the Elbe, but on the left, behind the lower Saale, and always careful to avoid any encounter with our troops. It was, consequently, much below Blücher on the Saale, and much farther than he was from Leipzig; but whilst he ascended towards Halle, that is to say, towards Leipzig, it could follow his movement, although at a distance, and in this case it might very possibly happen that we might have it also upon our own hands, and thus have to encounter three armies instead of two. On receiving this last piece of information, Napoleon sent fresh orders to Ney, Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani, who had the longest road to traverse, recommending to them the utmost expedition in

their movements; and then set out in person for Leipzig, which he reached on the evening of the same day (the 14th), and where he took up his abode in a private house, which had been prepared for him in the Reudnitz faubourg, a league and a half on the other side of the city itself, near the position occupied by Murat.

At Leipzig, in the company of Berthier, Murat, and Marmont, and the officers of his household, Napoleon displayed a feeling of thorough confidence, which was not justified by the state of affairs; for whilst he could, at the most, assemble no more than one hundred and ninety thousand troops around Leipzig, it was very probable that the enemy would bring against him from three hundred and twenty to three hundred and fifty thousand. Nor were the political circumstances of the time of a more reassuring nature. The kingdom of Westphalia had suddenly succumbed at the mere appearance of a troop of Cossacks, which Blücher, after the battle of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, had thrown upon Hesse, and which, everywhere, favoured by the population, had reached without difficulty the gates of Cassel. Having at his command only a battalion of grenadiers, two regiments of Westphalian cuirassiers, and a handful of French hussars, King Jerome had found himself in a frightful position; but he had nevertheless braved the storm, and sent to the Duke of Valmy at Mayence, for a reinforcement of three or four thousand French soldiers. In the meantime he ventured to make a sortie with such troops as he had, which was to a certain extent successful, and forced the enemy to fall back. The agitation of the public mind at Cassel speedily rose, however, to a great height, the greater portion of the Westphalian troops deserted, and the Duke of Valmy could not venture in the then serious state of affairs to grant the required reinforcement without a formal order from Napoleon. The result was, that Jerome was compelled to evacuate his capital and to retreat to Coblenz. On the 30th September Czernicheff entered Cassel, and the kingdom of Westphalia was abolished.

The news of this event was followed by that of another no less disastrous, to the effect that Bavaria was on the point of abandoning us; a rumour even being abroad that she had already signed a treaty of adhesion to the European coalition. It had, however, prepared us for this event by the continual complaints of its court, that its army posted on the banks of the Inn, under General Wrède, could not offer any effectual resistance to the Austrian army, and that unless it received an immediate reinforcement of thirty thousand men, it would be compelled to yield to the injunctions of the allied powers,

the spirit of dissatisfaction prevalent amongst its troops, and the unanimous opinion of its people. The departure of Marshal Augereau for Leipzig had been the signal for its defection, and it had signed a treaty of alliance with our enemies. The consequence was, that should we be compelled to retreat, we should have to encounter in our rear an army of thirty thousand Austrians, and thirty thousand Bavarians, ready to bar our path. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, that we should be victorious at Leipzig, if we would avoid a disaster which, if not more tragic, would nevertheless be more irremediable than that of Moscow.

In the meantime, in spite of the gloomy aspect of affairs, Napoleon maintained his feelings of implicit confidence in his own skill and the courage of his troops, hoping to vanquish Schwarzenberg on the first day, and Blücher on the second, and thus to escape from the species of net in which the allies were attempting to enclose him. As, however, his infantry were considerably inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, he resolved to range his own in two ranks instead of three, asserting that the third rank was useless either for firing upon the enemy or charging them with the bayonet, and choosing to forget that if useless for these purposes, it was nevertheless highly valuable as a support to the two others, and of supplying the vacancies which might occur in them during an action.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged during the evening in a discussion with Berthier, Murat, and Marmont, and others of his generals, respecting this new method of arranging his troops, his attendants suddenly announced Marshal Augereau, whom he had not yet seen, this marshal having only lately joined head quarters. "Ah! you have come at last, then, my old Augereau," he cried, "but we have been long expecting you!" And then, in a tone which had no trace of bitterness or alarm in it, but was both friendly and sad, he continued, "And so you are no longer the Augereau of Castiglione!" "Nay! I should still be Augereau of Castiglione if you would only give me back the soldiers of Italy!" replied the marshal; and then Napoleon, without being irritated by this repartée, began to complain of the general spirit of despondency which he found prevailing around him, and went on to dilate, but without acrimony, on the faults committed by his brothers. "Why! you, yourself," he said at length, addressing Murat, with a frankness of language which only the complete absence of any spirit of ill will in its tone rendered supportable, "you, yourself, have been quite ready to abandon me!" Murat eagerly repelled the imputation, adding that he was well aware that he had

many enemies who were only too ready to slander him to his brother-in-law. "Tush! Tush!" replied Napoleon, in a manner which showed that he either knew or had guessed the truth of the matter, "You have been quite ready to do as Austria has done; but I forgive you. You are good at heart, you have a genuine feeling of friendship for me, and you are a brave man. It is I who have made the mistake in placing you on a throne. If I had been contented to make you a viceroy, as I made Eugène, you would have acted as he has acted; but as a monarch you have thought more of your own crown than of mine!"

On the following morning Napoleon mounted his horse at an early hour, for the purpose of inspecting the field of battle, which it was absolutely necessary that he should do, since this battle-field, which our courage and misfortunes have immortalised, was of such immense extent that it required to be well known, to enable Napoleon to act by means of his orders in those parts of it where he could not be present in person. He commenced his inspection on the south of Leipzig, in the direction of the position in which Murat had established his troops, after falling back before the army of Bohemia.

Flowing a little above Leipzig, rather close to each other, and divided into numerous arms, the rivers Pleisse and Elster form one stream below this city, and turning somewhat to the left, fall into the Saale, which then flows towards the Elbe, in a direction almost parallel with the course of the Mulde. Now the Prince of Schwarzenberg, after debouching from the mountains of Bohemia with the grand army of the allied sovereigns, had reached Leipzig, pursuing his line of march between the Mulde, the Pleisse, and the Elster; whilst Napoleon, on the other hand, having come from the lower Elbe, had ascended these rivers as far as Leipzig itself. The Prince of Schwarzenberg had his left on the Pleisse and the Elster, and his right on the slightly sloping plains in the environs of Leipzig; Napoleon having his left on these plains and his right on the two rivers. Occupying a position which rested strongly on and included Leipzig, Napoleon might reasonably hope to keep Blücher and even Bernadotte entirely separated from Schwarzenberg. Blücher, in fact, being unable to pass through Leipzig, which was in our hands, would have to turn either to the right or the left, for the purpose of joining the grand army of Bohemia; now if he turned to his right he would have to encounter a serious obstacle in the shape of the Pleisse, the Elster, and the Saale, covering with their thousand arms a wooded valley a league in extent, and behind which it was highly probable that he might find a body of French troops;

and if, on the other hand, he should endeavour to effect his movement by the left, he would have to encounter on the vast Leipzig plain the French army returning from Düben, and would be exposed to the greatest perils. It would suffice, then, that Napoleon should hold Schwarzenberg in check on the south of Leipzig, and Blücher on the north, to prevent them from effecting a junction; and it was perfectly possible that he might engage and triumph over each singly, especially as Bernadotte was still at a considerable distance, and there was no sign of his immediate arrival. Knowing, as he did, that Schwarzenberg was the nearest, Napoleon wished to engage him in the first place, reserving the encounter with Blücher for the morrow.

The Pleisse and the Elster, sometimes united and sometimes with separate streams, and embracing a large tract of wooded and marshy ground, flowed, as we have said, from Bohemia to Leipzig, that is, from south to north. Napoleon would naturally make them the support of his right, as Charlottenberg of his left, for not only would it be a matter of great difficulty for the enemy to cross them, but he would also, after having effected this, have to climb a tract of ground of considerable steepness, before he could debouch behind our right on the Leipzig plain. In his front Napoleon had a slightly sloping plain, on which stood a few villages. A slight depression of ground, extending from Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse to Liebert-Wolkwitz, and passing by Wachau, separated our line from that of the enemy, and was a slight obstacle which was to be desperately disputed. On his left, finally, Napoleon had the vast Leipzig plain, studded with large villages, and threaded by a little stream—the Partha—which rising at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, fell, after numerous windings across one of the faubourgs of Leipzig, into the Pleisse. Napoleon was almost without any species of support on this side, but the presence of his columns arriving from Düben would hold the enemy in check, and prevent them from venturing upon any attempt in that direction. Murat having taken up his position on the south, had posted Poniatowski at Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse; Victor at Wachau, Lauriston at Liebert-Wolkwitz, and in the intervals between these several positions the 4th cavalry (Polish cavalry), and the 5th, under Pajol.

On the other side of this species of valley were observed Kleist and Wittgenstein, between Gross-Pössnau, Gulden-Gossa, and Cröbern, with the Russian and Prussian Guards as a reserve; the Austrian army being partly on our right, between the Pleisse and the Elster, in the angle formed by

these rivers, and partly on our left, in front of a wood named University, opposite Liebert-Wolkwitz.

Thoroughly approving of the position taken up by Murat, Napoleon resolved to dispute energetically the line of depressed ground extending from Liebert-Wolkwitz to Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg, and with that object to double Murat's three corps, placing Augereau on the right near Mark-Kleeberg, the Guard and cavalry of Latour-Maubourg at the centre at Wachau, and Macdonald with Sebastiani's cavalry on the left beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz. At the same time, as the Austrians in their position between the Pleisse and the Elster threatened the Dölitz bridge, Napoleon, that he might not be turned by his right, posted there the brigade Lefol, taken from the troops which formed the Leipzig garrison. At this moment the corps of Lauriston, Victor, Poniatowski, and Pajol, amounted to some thirty-eight thousand men, the troops under Augereau and Lefol to twelve thousand, the Guard to thirty-six thousand, Latour-Maubourg's troops to six thousand, and those of Macdonald and Sebastiani to twenty-two thousand, the whole forming a force of about one hundred and fourteen or one hundred and fifteen thousand men, opposed to a force of one hundred and sixty thousand. Napoleon hoped, however, that some of the corps which remained in the rear under Ney, might be made available so as to procure Macdonald a reinforcement of from twenty to thirty thousand men.

Having completed his inspection of the ground, and determined upon his arrangements, Napoleon returned by the left to the Rendwitz faubourg along the bank of the Partha. It was not sufficient, however, that he should have prepared to resist the grand army of Bohemia; for it was necessary to make arrangements, also, for meeting Blücher, who might at any moment appear on the north of Leipzig. Fortunately there was on this side, beyond the Partha, a very advantageous position, which, extending from the village of Möckern to that of Enteritzsh, stretched across the route from Halle to Leipzig, and presented a large and elevated breadth of ground, resting on one side on the Pleisse and the Elster, and on the other on a great ravine. Should our troops be compelled to abandon this position, they would be able to fall back behind the Partha, and to take up a position resting on Leipzig, in front of the Halle faubourg.

It was there that Marmont, who had constantly watched Blücher during the march of our troops, had established himself for the purpose of engaging him, should circumstances render it necessary. Napoleon approved of the position he had taken, and recommended him to retain it,

Ney, with Bertrand, Souham, Reynier, and Dombrowski, whose march was retarded by the destruction of the bridges of the Mulde and the Elbe, would establish himself on Marmont's right, and as his troops should arrive would fall back round Leipzig, from north to south, and effect a junction across the plain watered by the Partha, with Murat's left. When these troops should have arrived, the circle formed by our soldiers around Leipzig would be complete.

For the defence of Leipzig itself and the great Rhine route which, entering the Lutzen plain by Lindenau, passes through Weissenfels, Erfurt, and Mayence, and which it was absolutely necessary that we should guard, as it was our only line of retreat, and as, by occupying it we prevented Blucher and Schwarzenberg from communicating with each other beyond the Elster and the Pleisse, Napoleon left the division Margaron in Leipzig, with orders to defend the Pleisse and the Elster, and the great bourg de Lindenau, which is the point at which the Rhine route enters the Lutzen plain. At the same time, Napoleon directed General Bertrand, who had marched with Macdonald, and now entered Leipzig, to hold himself in readiness to assist either Margaron in the defence of Leipzig and the Lindenau débouché, or Marmont in the defence of the Möckern position.

In the meantime, the allies had not remained idle, having made great efforts to concentrate their troops under the walls of Leipzig. Blucher and Bernadotte had, as we have already observed, fled, at Napoleon's approach, behind the Mulde, and been engaged, since their junction, in incessant disputes with respect to the conduct to be pursued. In the first place, Bernadotte was anxious that the army of Silesia should take up a position above him on the Mulde; in other words, place itself between him and Leipzig, so that he might, in case of a reverse, be able the more speedily and securely to retreat towards the Elbe; whilst Blucher, on the other hand, divining Bernadotte's motives, would have wished to see him in such a position between himself and Leipzig, that he would be forced to march upon the enemy. As Bernadotte, however, absolutely refused to consent to such an arrangement, on pretence of anxiety to maintain communications with Sweden, Blucher was forced to yield for the purpose of avoiding a rupture. After this dispute another had arisen, in consequence of Bernadotte's desire that the allied troops should pursue their march upon Leipzig, not only behind the Mulde, but also behind the Saale, so that there might be two rivers between himself and the French, whilst Blucher, on the contrary, wished to conduct his march by the shortest

route, which was covered by the Mulde only. And on this point, also, the Prussian General had ultimately yielded; but with characteristic impatience had carried only one of his corps behind the Saale, marching at the head of the two others beyond this river, on the Halle road, close to Marshal Marmont. Finally, a third dispute had arisen between the two leaders of the armies of Silesia and the North, and raised the misunderstanding between them to its height. At the sight of the French engaged beyond the Elbe in the destruction of the bridges, Bernadotte, believing that Napoleon was about to march upon Berlin, had been anxious to repass the Elbe, so as to secure himself from being cut off from the north of Germany, which was his base of operations. His whole staff, a great portion of which consisted of Russian and Prussian officers, had, contrary to its usual custom, inclined to his opinion. He had, consequently, made use of the ultimate authority with which he was invested with respect to the army of Silesia, to command Blücher to follow him on the right bank of the Elbe. On receiving this order, Blücher denied that Napoleon was making a movement upon Berlin, and had not only formally declined to obey it, but had also recommended the Prussian and Russian officers connected with Bernadotte's army, to refrain from quitting the left bank of the Elbe. But a fact which was entirely independent of the will of either of the disputants—the destruction of the bridges by Ney and Reynier—put an end to the debate, Bernadotte being compelled by the loss of the means of effecting the passage of the river, to remain on the left bank. However, the divisions Thümen and Hirschfeld, —Tauenzien's corps—had remained on the opposite bank, and had thus caused Napoleon erroneously to suppose that the whole of the army of the North was resolved to maintain its position on the right of the Elbe, and on the route to Berlin.

On the 15th Blücher was on the Halle route, four or five leagues to the north of Leipzig, and vehemently urging Bernadotte to join him, that at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men they might safely effect a junction with the Prince of Schwarzenberg.

In the meantime, the army of Bohemia having for its definite object to descend upon Leipzig, and to effect a junction there with the two armies of Silesia and the North, before Napoleon should have time to overwhelm them, had arrived on the 14th before Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, where it had lost twelve hundred men in a cavalry engagement which it had imprudently ventured upon with Murat.

The 15th was employed in rallying and placing the troops in line, and in deliberating upon the plan of attack. That Napoleon was to be immediately attacked was unanimously taken for granted; but with respect to the manner in which the attack was to be conducted great difference of opinion prevailed between the Austrian Generals on the one side, and the Russian and Prussian Generals on the other; for whilst the latter, who had debouched directly upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, Wachau, and Mark-Kleeberg, in front of Murat, and on the right bank of the Pleisse and the Elster, wished that the attack should be directed upon this point with almost the whole of the allied forces, the Austrians, on the contrary, whilst consenting that a vigorous attack should be made upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, Wachau, and Mark-Kleeberg, demanded that the bulk of the troops should be thrown into the angle formed by the Pleisse and the Elster, and should attempt to gain possession of the Dölitz bridge. Great difficulties would, doubtless, they said, have to be encountered in the execution of this plan, but when these should have been surmounted, it would lead them to the rear of the French, and not only render the position of the latter untenable, but also render it almost impossible for them to retire in safety upon Leipzig. But whilst there were certainly several reasons in favour of this plan, there were two great objections to it, the first being that Napoleon would be able with a comparatively small force to check the advance of a very considerable one in the position at Dölitz, and the second, that when he should perceive how weak was the body of troops charged with the attack upon him in front, he would not fail to throw back his left upon it, and drive it into the Pleisse.

It does not always follow, however, that a plan is renounced because there are excellent reasons against it. The various proposals made were vehemently disputed, and at length the usual course was adopted of a compromise which, beneficial as it may be in matters of policy, is generally very dangerous in those of war. The result was, that it was agreed that the Austrian corps under Giulay, reinforced by the light troops of Lichtenstein and Thielmann, should advance upon Lindenau for the purpose of seizing the French communications with Lutzen, that is, in fact, with Mayence; whilst the bulk of the Austrian army, numbering about forty thousand men, should plunge into the angle formed by the Pleisse and the Elster, and attempt to debouch by Dölitz upon the rear of the French. On the right of the two rivers, on the right of the French, in front of the Mark-Kleeberg, Wachau, and Liebert-Wolkwitz positions, the Prussian and

Russian armies, supported by the whole of their reserves, and amounting altogether to a force of about seventy thousand men, would at the same time throw themselves upon the line occupied by Napoleon, whilst the Austrian General Klenau, at the head of some twenty-five thousand men, including a Prussian brigade and Platow's cavalry, would attempt to turn our left beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, on the Leipzig plain, and to effect communications with the armies of Blücher and Bernadotte.

Such was the plan adopted on the evening of the 15th for execution on the following morning; and the 16th of October was, accordingly, the day selected by the allies for the great and terrible struggle, on the issue of which depended the empire of the world. Napoleon had already posted his troops in their several positions. Macdonald and Sebastiani having arrived, he had directed them upon Holzhausen, to the left of Liebert-Wolkwitz, in order to check the Austrian General, Klenau. As Blücher had not yet appeared on the Halle route, Napoleon supposed that he would probably not be present on the 16th, and moved Marmont, therefore, from his position on the north of Leipzig, to one in the rear of the grand army, for the purpose of taking part in the decisive manœuvre against Schwarzenberg's right, by which he hoped to secure the victory: Ney he ordered to take the place left vacant by Marmont, and to be ready in concert with Bertrand, to hold in check any body of the enemy's forces which might appear to the north of Leipzig. Having given these orders, he took up his own position in the midst of his Guard, on horseback, on some rising ground at the *bergerie de Meusdorf*, which commanded a view of the field of battle, and where he had Liebert-Wolkwitz on his left, Wachau in the centre, and Mark-Kleeberg to the right. The enemy before him numbered some one hundred and sixty thousand men, and to meet them he had at his immediate disposal, including the troops under Macdonald and Sebastiani, about a hundred and fifteen thousand; the remainder of the French army being two leagues in the rear, to be ready for any eventualities which might present themselves in other directions.

At nine o'clock in the morning, three cannon-reports from the line of the allies, were the signal for the commencement of a cannonade of the most terrible description. From Mark-Kleeberg to Liebert-Wolkwitz the troops of the allies advanced upon our line in three strong columns, preceded by two hundred pieces of cannon. On our right, General Kleist, with the Prussian division of the Prince Augustus of Prussia, several Russian battalions, and Leyachoff's cuirassiers,

marched by Cröbern and Crostewitz upon Mark-Kleeberg. In the centre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with the Russian division which had been confided to him, and the Prussian division of General Klenau, marched up on Wachau. On our left (the right of the allies), Prince Gortschakoff, with his own corps and the Prussian division Pirch, marched upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, whilst Klenau, with a fourth column, was attempting to turn by Seyffertshayn. Our artillery, which was very numerous and most advantageously posted, covered these advancing columns with projectiles; but the attempt to check their progress was in vain, and they arrived unbroken at the foot of our positions.

Kleist's column, which was directed upon Mark-Kleeberg, and numbered at least eighteen thousand men, was speedily engaged with the troops under Poniatowski, which did not amount to more than eight or nine thousand, and compelled them to retire from Mark-Kleeberg to some rising ground at the extremity of our line. Upon this Augereau was immediately advanced to Poniatowski's support, and a heavy fire of artillery was directed against Kleist, who was endeavouring to climb the position upon which he had retreated. In the meantime, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with his Russian infantry and the division Klenau, was attempting in vain to enter Wachau, which was obstinately defended by Marshal Victor; whilst on our left, Gortschakoff, who had set out from Störmthal, a point more remote than those from which the other columns had started, was still at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, which Klenau was preparing to outflank with his Austrians.

In the meantime, the cannonade from either line was of so furious a description, that none who witnessed it, even amongst the old generals, remembered to have seen any at all resembling it, and that Napoleon, although occupying a position somewhat in the rear of the *bergerie de Meusdorf*, was surrounded by killed and wounded officers and their horses. With his usual confidence in himself he remained calm, and permitted the opposed forces to become thoroughly engaged before taking any decisive resolution. As, however, Poniatowski's retirement from Mark-Kleeberg had caused our line to be thrown back somewhat on the right, he ordered that the 4th and 5th cavalry corps should advance to check Kleist's infantry, on the slope which they were then in the act of ascending.

General Kellerman, who was this day in command of the 4th and 5th corps, threw himself, accordingly, on the infantry of Prince Augustus, and checked its advance; but was himself immediately encountered and driven back by

Levachoff's cuirassiers, which having crossed the ravine at the foot of our positions, took him in flank. As the latter were in their turn met by a plunging fire which compelled them to fall back, the result was, that things remained in this portion of the field of battle, in an undecided state, the Frussians gaining no more ground than what they had obtained at first, and we being unable to recover Mark-Kleeberg.

In the centre, at Wachau, and on the left, at Liebert-Wolkwitz, the combat continued to be both obstinate and bloody, the former village being taken and retaken five times in the space of five hours, whilst at the latter, Lauriston, who had been attacked in front by Gortschakoff, and on the left by Klenau, had received them in such a manner as to render them by no means anxious to return.

By noon eighteen thousand men of the two armies had fallen on the field of battle, but two thirds of this number belonged to the ranks of the allies, and our line remained unbroken, and apparently proof against any assaults, except on the right, where, as we have said, it had been thrown slightly back.

And now the roar of artillery and the information brought by aides-de-camp, informed Napoleon that on the right of Leipzig Margaron had been attacked at Lindenau by Giulay, who was desirous of cutting off our communications with Lutzen, and that in the rear, or to the north of Leipzig, Marmont was engaged with Blueher, who had hastened from Halle for the purpose of taking part in the battle. Fortunately, Marshal Ney came up at this moment, with the division Dombrowski and Souham's corps, and Napoleon sent him orders that, whilst aiding Marmont to the utmost of his power, he was to send behind Macdonald to the support of the grand army, those of his divisions which he could devote to this purpose.

The battle having become at noon more fully developed, Napoleon resolved to exchange the defensive for the offensive, and to make his troops debouch simultaneously from Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, for the purpose of crushing the enemy's centre, whilst at the extreme left, Macdonald, debouching from Holzhausen beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, would in the first place drive back Klenau, and then, falling back from left to right, precipitate himself on the enemy's centre, already attacked in front from Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau. For the execution of this movement Napoleon made two divisions of the young Guard descend from the one side under Mortier, for the purpose of co-operating with Lauriston's troops in their attack on Gortschakoff, and two other divisions of this same young Guard from the other side,

under Oudinot, that they might throw themselves, together with Victor's troops, on Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. Between these two columns as they advanced was the formidable battery of the Guard directed by Druot, thirty-two pieces of which (twelve pounders) were under the command of the brave Colonel Griois.

On the one side, then, Marshal Mortier, preceded by the division Maison, descended from Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Gortschakoff, and drove him back between the University wood and the marsh-surrounded village of Glden-Gossa; whilst on the other side, Oudinot and Victor, debouching from Wachau, repulsed Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, and forcing him to repossess the species of valley which separated the two lines, drove him back upon the *bergerie* d'Avenhayn, which was situated on the right of the village of Glden-Gossa. In the meantime, Macdonald making a movement on the left, beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Klenau, and forced him to fall back to a considerable distance; driving one portion of his troops upon Klein-Possnau, and the other upon the University wood; from whence, had Macdonald been aided by a reserve moving up from left to right, they might have been driven on the one side upon Gortschakoff, and on the other upon the Prince of Wurtemberg and Kleist, and altogether into the Pleisse. But Marmont was at this moment engaged with Blucher, and Margaron with Giulay; whilst Bertrand remained in reserve between the two, ready to succour the one of them who might appear to be the most hardly pressed. Ney did not dare to dispose of Souham, so long as Marmont should appear to be seriously attacked, and leaving Dombrowski on Marmont's right, to make head against the masses of the enemy which were perceived in the distance, awaited the approach of Rejnier, who had not yet come up.

The enemy having been already driven from the greater portion of the battle-field, were now disputing its extreme limits foot by foot, the allied sovereigns being thrown into a state of the greatest perplexity by the ominous aspect of affairs. M. de Walzogen and General Jomini had already been sent to the Prince of Schwarzenberg, to entreat him to renounce his movement of attack between the Pleisse and the Elster, and to direct his attention rather to the position of the Prussian and Russian armies between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, and the Prince, yielding to the urgent solicitations of the two generals, and perceiving the difficulty which would attend the taking of the Dolitz bridge, consented to move to the right bank of the Pleisse the reserve of the Prince of Hesse Homburg, numbering twenty thou-

sand men. But this reinforcement could not possibly arrive before three o'clock in the afternoon, and in the meantime, therefore, the allied sovereigns determined to bring into action the whole of their reserves, throwing the Russian cuirassiers upon our infantry, whilst they carried one column of Rajeffsky's ten thousand grenadiers upon *Gülden-Gossa*, and the other upon the *bergerie d'Avenhayn*.

Lauriston and Mortier on our left, in the direction of *Gülden-Gossa*, and Victor and Oudinot on our right, towards the *bergerie d'Avenhayn*, received the Russian cuirassiers in square, and with a steady fire which cast them headlong upon the dead bodies of their horses. Rajeffsky's ten thousand grenadiers, in the meantime, ranged themselves as a long wall between the *bergerie d'Avenhayn* and *Gülden-Gossa*, whereupon Drouot, who had remained between the two columns of attack with his formidable artillery, determined, neglecting for a moment the enemy's artillery, to direct the whole of his pieces upon this magnificent infantry; and advancing to a position even closer to the enemy than that which he already occupied, he overwhelmed them with a fire before which they fell in whole files at once. When they appeared to have been sufficiently broken, the division Dubreton detaching itself from Victor's corps on our right, charged the *bergerie d'Avenhayn* at the bayonet's point, and carried it. At the same time General Maison made a desperate attempt to take *Gülden-Gossa*. On the left, Macdonald, turning *Klenau* by *Seyffertshayn*, had driven back upon *Gross-Possnau* the Prussian brigade " Ziethen, the Austrian brigades Spleng and Schaffer, and the Austrian division Meyer; but the Swedish redoubt established on the left of *Liebert-Wolkwitz* had remained inaccessible. Napoleon, who directed his attention to every portion of the field of battle, perceiving the 22nd *leger* at the foot of the redoubt, inquired what regiment it was, and on being told that it was the 22nd *leger*, he exclaimed, " that is impossible!—for surely the 22nd *leger* would not have remained thus exposed to the fire of those guns, but would have at once rushed upon and taken them?" It was not long before the 22nd, led by Colonel Charras, carried the position at the bayonet's point, and thus enabled Macdonald, by removing the obstacle in his path, to continue his movement on our left as far as the *bois de l'Université*.

It was now three o'clock, and the enemy, falling back in every direction, appeared disposed to resign to us the victory which Napoleon was well aware that he must seize, if at all, on this very day. To fail to be victorious now, would be to expose himself not only to defeat, but to absolute destruction.

He took the course, therefore, of throwing his cavalry upon the enemy's line; moving down Murat on the left between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, with ten regiments of cuirassiers; and Kellermann on the right, between Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg, with the Polish cavalry, the Spanish dragoons, and the dragoons of the Guard under General Letort. At this moment, Pajol, who was at the head of the Spanish dragoons, received a terrible shock, which rendered him unable to continue on the field, by the bursting of a shell within his horse's body.

Numbering some twelve thousand troopers, our cavalry advanced in two columns, the one on the left and the other on the right, inspired by the recollection of the victory of Dresden. General Bordessoulle, with his cavaliers, thrown by Murat upon Pahlen's horse, speedily dispersed them, and then poured down upon the Grenadiers and Russian Guards, who, after having become possessed of Gùlden-Gossa, had deployed in front of this village, and completely routed them, taking twenty-six pieces of cannon. On the right, the Spanish dragoons and those of the Guard, charged Levachoff's cuirassiers, and obtained over them the most decided success. This first movement having succeeded, it now remained only to make a vigorous advance against the enemy's centre, and to drive on the right, Kleist and the Prince of Wurtemberg into the Pleisse, and on the left, Gortschakoff upon the bois de l'Université. But it was now past three o'clock, and there were suddenly perceived heavy masses of hostile troops approaching from the other side of the Pleisse. These troops were the Austrian reserve of Hesse Homburg, and the foremost of them taking Kellermann's troops, somewhat disordered by the ardour of pursuit, in flank, broke and scattered them. The enemy's cavalry were charged in their turn by the brave Letort and the dragoons of the Guard, and compelled to fall back; but the result of these encounters was, that the movement of our cavalry on the right had been by no means of a decisive character, as much ground being lost by us as gained. In the centre, Murat after having gained great success, in the expectation of being supported, had committed the fault of sending all his squadrons into action, and of advancing on ground which he had not had the opportunity of reconnoitring. At a distance the village of Gùlden-Gossa had presented the appearance of but a few groups of foliage, but on reaching it our cavalry found the enemy's infantry posted there, behind positions of great strength, and had been compelled to remain before them under fire. At this juncture the Emperor Alexander consented that the whole

of the cavalry not yet sent into action, including the hussars and Cossacks of the Imperial Guard, should be thrown upon our cuirassiers, who were, consequently, compelled to fall back, taking with them but six of the twenty-six pieces of cannon which they had so lately taken. In the course of the encounter the brave Latour-Maubourg had his leg carried away by a cannon-ball.

The battle had not been decided, then, by this general movement on the part of our cavalry, although a large portion of the field of battle remained in our possession, and Napoleon resolved to attempt one final effort. He reformed his columns of attack, ordered Mortier with Lauriston, and Oudinot with Victor, to form their troops in columns, and once more to engage the enemy, and arranged that the ten thousand men of the guard, who were the only reserve now remaining at his disposal, should be ready to advance to their support. But at this moment a great tumult arose on our right, where bodies of the Austrian grenadiers, having crossed the Pleisse, and having advanced to the support of Kleist, at the village of Mark-Kleeberg, had endeavoured to drive back Poniatowski; whilst at the same time a most formidable movement was made upon Dölitz by Austrian troops under General Merfeld. Perceiving the danger of the situation, Napoleon checked the movement of his Old Guard, and directed the division Curial upon Dölitz; at the same time making Oudinot turn to meet the grenadiers who were pressing Poniatowski, but whom the latter, with the aid of the division Semelé (of Augereau's corps), had already successfully resisted.

As the movement of the division Curial was followed by the most happy results, ending in the capture of General Merfeld himself, and two thousand of his troops, Napoleon could not refrain, although it was now five o'clock, and nearly dusk, from once more resolving to attempt a final effort on the enemy's centre. Victor was still at Avenhayn; and it only remained, therefore, to gain possession of Gulden-Gossa. Lauriston, who had maintained his ground under a most terrible fire, had suffered the most enormous losses, but there still remained to him General Maison, who, surrounded by the mere wreck of his division, was, nevertheless, insatiate of perils until he should have taken Gulden-Gossa, and who had re-entered this fatal village, followed by Mortier. His success was on the point of deciding everything in our favour, when Barclay de Tolly, fully appreciating the importance of the danger, threw upon that point the Prussian division Firch, supported by the Russian guard, and succeeded by a desperate effort in once more driving us out

of Gùlden-Gossa. Maison made still another attempt to retake the position, but the darkness of night-fall speedily separated the combatants, and this attempt was the last act of the terrible battle of the 16th, which is known as the battle of Wachau, and at the conclusion of which about twenty thousand of our troops, and thirty thousand of those of the allies covered the ground either dead or dying.

On the same day two other battles had taken place, the one on the west, the other on the north of Leipzig; the one on our right, at Lindenau, the other in the rear, at Möckern. The former having taken place between General Margaron, at the head of eight or nine thousand troops, and Giulay, who, at the head of some twenty-five thousand, had attempted in vain to drive Margaron from the position he occupied at Lindenau. Nevertheless, the contest would probably have had a different result had not the sight of the division Morand and Bertrand's corps, posted between Lindenau and Leipzig, intimidated the enemy.

The battle which had taken place at Möckern, had been of a more serious description. Marshal Blücher suspecting that a decisive action was about to be fought, and unwilling to leave the Prince of Schwarzenberg to support it alone, had set out, as soon as he had heard the sound of the cannon on the morning of the 16th, by the Halle route, towards the north side of Leipzig; at the same time sending officers to Bernadotte to inform him of his position, and to urge him to come up. As, however, the army of the North could not possibly afford him any assistance on the 16th, he advanced with great caution, fearing, although he could distinctly hear the cannon of the Prince Schwarzenberg, who was only three leagues distant to the south, that he might have to encounter the larger portion of the French army unaided. The sight of our columns ascending from Düben towards Leipzig, had caused him to entertain some fears on the subject, and had led him to take the precaution of placing Langeron in observation on the Dolitzsch route. Between the Dolitzsch and the Halle routes, he had posted Sacken's Russian corps, and along the latter, which led direct to the north of Leipzig, he had carried the Prussian corps of General d'York, which being German and Prussian, was of all his troops the most ardent. The time occupied by these precautions was the cause of his not arriving in sight of Leipzig until eleven o'clock in the morning, when he could perceive nothing of the battle which was raging in the south, except the roar of the artillery, numbering some twenty thousand men, was slowly falling back from Breitenfeld and Lindenthal upon Leipzig, in accordance with the order which it received in

the morning to fall back upon Leipzig, and to traverse that city for the purpose of taking up a position where it might form the reserve of the grand army. This order, however, was conditional, and subordinate to that which might take place on the Halle route; since, should the enemy appear in that direction in force, this order was to be null, and make way for the task of resisting the hostile army under Blücher, a task which Marshal Marmont was thoroughly disposed to perform in its full extent.

The position of Marshal Marmont at this moment was a difficult one, in the first place, because he had no more than twenty thousand troops at his disposal, and because, in the second place, the height on which he had taken up his position between Möckern and Enteritzsch, had the serious disadvantage of resting on the Rietschke ravine, which, after skirting one side of the position, passed behind it, as it proceeded to open into the Pleisse at Gohlis. To obviate this inconvenience Marmont would have been glad to have crossed the Partha; but the want of time prevented him from taking this step, and fortunately so, for it would have confined us too closely around Leipzig, and deprived us of all communications with those of our troops which were still on their march.

In the position of Möckern, then, took place the third battle, which was fought between our troops and those of the allies on the terrible 16th October. Induced, as he was, by the sight of the rearmost troops of Souham, and the park of artillery ascending from Dübén towards Leipzig, Blücher had left the whole of Langeron's corps in observation before Breitenfeld, and had marched against Marmont only the corps of General d'York, and a portion of General Sacken's, the whole force numbering about thirty thousand men. Directing his first attack upon the village of Möckern itself, on which rested Marmont's left, and which was occupied by the 2nd marines of the division Lagrange, he succeeded after a desperate struggle in gaining possession of it, only to be almost immediately driven out of it by the 4th marines and the 35th léger, which, executing a furious charge at the bayonet's point, completely broke one of the four divisions of d'York's corps, and retook the village which they had occupied.

Finding that he could gain no advantage at this point, Blücher now threw forward two divisions for the purpose of attacking the sloping plateau on which was posted the division Compans; and the two Prussian divisions had bravely performed the task allotted to them, but had been crushed by the fire poured upon them from our forty-four

pieces of artillery, losing almost a third of their number. A cavalry charge would now have decided the fortune of the day in our favour, and Marmont immediately gave orders for one; but, unfortunately, the Wurtemberg cavalry was but ill-disposed to our cause, and not only executed it in a manner which rendered it of no effect, but in retiring from it managed to fall in with and break one of our bataillons de marine.

The combat had been thus prolonged until the middle of the afternoon, when Blucher, becoming convinced that the bulk of the French army was not, as he feared it might have been, on his left flank, threw Langeron's corps in the direction of Dombrowski to hold him in check, and bringing up the whole of Sacken's corps, attacked Marmont's line with three Prussian divisions, supported by the whole of Sacken's Russian divisions. Upon this Marmont advanced against the enemy with the division Compan, and a struggle ensued, which proved one of the most murderous of any which took place during the war. Marmont himself received a wound in his hand, a contusion on his shoulder, and lost three of his aide-de-camps. Compan's regiment displayed the most heroic firmness, and made a resistance, which, supported as it was by the fire of their formidable artillery, would have been successful, had not a shell which burst in one of our batteries caused a confusion, which gave the enemy an opportunity of taking it, whilst at the same moment several thousands of their cavalry, pouring down upon the right of the division, now much thinned by the fire to which it had been exposed, compelled it to give way. The division Frederich's hastened up to its support, but Möckern, which was the support of our left, being at this moment carried, whilst our right was threatened by Langeron, who threatened to envelop Dombrowski, Marmont considered it more prudent to beat a retreat, which he executed in good order and without misadventure. Dombrowski, who had been succoured by one of Souham's divisions also fell back in safety, after having had the honour of holding in check at Enteritzsch the whole of Langeron's corps. And thus we had held in check with twenty-four thousand troops, sixty thousand of the bravest and most determined of our enemies; the battle having cost the latter, even according to their own account, nine or ten thousand men, whilst our loss consisted of about six thousand troops and twenty pieces of cannon, which were lost by reason of the explosion above alluded to.

Such was this terrible battle of the 16th, which consisting in reality of three distinct engagements, cost us about twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand men, and the enemy about forty thousand. A sad and cruel sacrifice, which covered our

army with immortal honour, but at the same time covered with a cloud of sorrow our unhappy country, whose best blood flowed in torrents to secure, not its greatness, but its ruin.

Although we had had the advantage at every point, as the result of the battle had not been to drive Schwarzenberg and Blücher any considerable distance apart, it might speedily be followed by a disaster ; for whilst Bernadotte was coming up with sixty thousand troops, and Benningsen with fifty thousand more, our only accession of strength consisted in fifteen thousand, of whom two-thirds were ready to betray us. As soon in fact as Napoleon had failed to drive the army of Bohemia to a sufficient distance to leave him free to throw himself upon those of Silesia and the North, his position had become one of extreme peril. Nor could Napoleon himself dissemble his consciousness of its gravity, which however, could only be fully estimated after a close inspection of its absolute details.

On the morning of the 17th, after a few hours' repose, he mounted his horse and proceeded to traverse the field of battle, which even to his eyes, accustomed as they were to terrible spectacles of the kind, presented a frightful aspect. A sullen gloom lowered on every countenance. Murat, Major-General Berthier, and the minister Daru accompanied him. Our soldiers had died at their posts, but so had those of the enemy also, and it was but too evident that another struggle would but result in our maintaining our ground, whilst the allied troops would be surrounding us with an iron circle, from which we might find it impossible to escape. An immediate retreat by the Lützen route, so as to prevent the closing of the way of egress by Lindenau, was, consequently, the only resolution which remained to be taken. Napoleon himself, as he traversed the field on foot in the midst of his lieutenants, pronounced the first word in reference to that retreat which no one had dared to propose, and which was welcomed with evident, although silent approval. A retreat, however, could not but be attended with serious inconveniences ; for in the first place, although the battle had resulted in the triumph of our arms, its practical signification would depend on our attitude on the following day ; for, should we then be in retreat, the battle would have ended in our discomfiture. And in the next place, what was to be done in case we should retreat, with the hundred and seventy thousand French troops left at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, Hambourg, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, of whom from one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand were excellent soldiers, ready

for active service in the field. Would they concentrate into one mass, and open for themselves a road into France by Hambourg and...Wesel? The question was one of grave importance.

To blame Napoleon for having allowed the 17th to pass by without having decided upon some plan of action, would be but to display but a slight knowledge of the movements of the human heart. To declare himself vanquished in a pitched battle, and to abandon the hundred and seventy thousand French troops left in the fortresses of the North, without some hours devoted to meditation and regrets, would be too much to expect of any one, however exalted his character. There were other reasons, however, for some delay on the 17th, since it would afford time for the arrival of Reynier, who had not yet come up; enable us to say we had remained four and twenty hours in front of the allied armies, and having awaited them in vain had fallen back upon a more advantageous position; and grant some brief repose to our over-wearied soldiers.

Although it was thus advisable, however, to defer the retreat for a day, it was not the less necessary that every preparation should be made during the 17th for its commencement at nightfall; but, unfortunately, Napoleon, completely absorbed by the perplexities arising from the difficulty of his position, scarcely gave an order throughout the day, which he passed in a state of gloomy reverie, wandering about, sometimes alone, and sometimes accompanied by Murat, Berthier, and M. Daru, repeating perpetually that a retreat was absolutely necessary, but unable to persuade himself to order it, and indulging in the hope that the enemy, instead of attacking him on the morrow, would act in accordance with the old maxim so much in favour with prudent generals, *to build a bridge of gold for a flying enemy*.

Whilst in this state of mind it occurred to him to have an interview with M. de Merfeld, who had been made prisoner the previous evening at Dölitz, and with whom he had been long intimately acquainted, for the purpose, not only of obtaining some information with respect to the plans of the allies, but also of throwing out in the course of conversation with him certain hints of a pacific tendency. He proposed, even, to give him his liberty, and to send him into the camp of the allied sovereigns, charged with a proposition for an armistice, which would at least have the effect of causing them to lose a day in deliberations, and might even call forth on their part some acceptable proposal.

Receiving M. de Merfeld very graciously about two o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon inquired of him whether the

allies had known, when they attacked him, that he was himself present on the field, and the general having answered in the affirmative, Napoleon rejoined, "You were resolved, then, this time, to give me battle?" M. de Merfeld replied respectfully but firmly, that the allies had, indeed, been determined to terminate the long-continued struggle by a desperate and decisive battle. After some remarks with respect to the relative numbers of his own troops and those of the allies, Napoleon inquired with an air of careless good-humour, "And to-morrow, now, shall you attack me?" To which M. de Merfeld replied that there was no doubt that the allies would renew their attack on the morrow, as they were resolved to purchase liberty at the price even of the last drop of their blood. Dissembling the impression made on him by this reply, he gave a new direction to the conversation, saying to M. de Merfeld, "This struggle is becoming very serious; is it to have no end? Are we absolutely determined never to have peace?" "Would to heaven that your Majesty were willing to have it!" exclaimed the Austrian General, "it is the only result that we require for our efforts, and would have been attained two months since at Prague, had your Majesty been so inclined." Upon this Napoleon had recourse to a series of false excuses, declaring that at Prague the allied powers had not acted with sincerity towards him, that England was averse to a peace, that she had induced Russia and Prussia to adopt her own views, and would prevail upon Austria to do so likewise. If the latter country desired peace, he added, it was for her to secure it. M. de Merfeld, after declaring that he only spoke in his private capacity, maintained in reply that England was sincerely desirous for peace, being in actual need of it, and that were Napoleon but willing to make some sacrifices for the happiness of the world and of France, peace might be forthwith concluded.—"Sacrifices," cried Napoleon, "I am quite willing to make; let England restore my colonies, and I will give up Hanover."—M. de Merfeld, intimating that this would not be sufficient, Napoleon allowed a word to escape his lips which, had it been pronounced at the congress of Prague, might have changed both his own fortunes and ours. "I will restore," he said, "if it be necessary, the Hanseatic towns. . . ." But this concession, unfortunately, came too late, and M. de Merfeld plainly expressed his opinion that, to obtain peace with England it would be necessary that he should consent to give up Holland. Napoleon loudly exclaimed against this, declaring that Holland would become in the hands of England the means of enabling her to establish a maritime despotism, for England, he was well assured,

was anxious to force him to limit the number of his vessels.

The conclusions which Napoleon was able to draw from this interview were to the effect, that whilst two months since he might have obtained peace by the sacrifice only of the Duchy of Warsaw, the protectorate of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, it would now be necessary for him to resign also Holland, Westphalia, and Italy. But whilst Napoleon appeared to admit that at the conclusion of a general peace, it would be requisite for him to make great sacrifices, and manifested more readiness to make them than he really felt, his thoughts were not, unfortunately, occupied so much with the subject of peace, as with the vague hope of obtaining an armistice. "Let us all," he said to M. de Merfeld, "make a retrograde step, the Russians and Prussians to the Elbe, the Austrians to the mountains of Bohemia, the French to the Saale, so as to give a little breathing time to this unfortunate Saxony, and to be able freely to carry on negotiations for peace." M. de Merfeld replied that the allies would certainly decline to accept the Saale as the line to be held by the French troops during an armistice, since they hoped to throw this back as far as the Rhine. Napoleon rejoined that he would never consent, except in case he should lose a battle, to retreat to the Rhine; and then added, "You may go, sir; I set you free on your parole. It is a favour which I grant in consideration of your merits, and of our old intimacy; and if you should think proper to turn our present conversation to the purpose of setting on foot a negotiation, or of procuring, at least, an armistice, you will find me disposed to listen to your propositions.

At the close of the day new and ominous light was thrown upon our situation. Strong columns of the enemy's troops appeared on the Dresden route, and the ranks of Schwarzenberg's army grew continually more formidable. From the belfry towers of Leipzig Bernadotte's army was plainly seen approaching from the north; and we were almost completely shut in by a circle of hostile arms on the south, the west, and the north. The only issue remaining still open to us was that towards the east, lying across the Leipzig plain. And now, at length, making a final struggle with his own heart, Napoleon resolved to order a retreat. But he adopted this plan, unfortunately, too late, and carried it out too incompletely, in his desire to make a retreat which should almost have the appearance of not being one, and should be executed in the open day. He determined that about two hours after midnight, a retrograde and concentric movement should be made upon Leipzig about the distance of a league; that

Bertrand with his corps, and Mortier with a portion of the Young Guard, should proceed by Lindenau to secure the Lutzen route; and that at daybreak the several corps of the army should defile one after the other across Leipzig, energetically repelling any attacks the enemy might venture to make upon them. He believed that he was still sufficiently strong to render the enemy unwilling to attempt to interrupt a retreat conducted in this form.

In the meantime the course of affairs on the side of the allies, had been such as by no means coincided with the illusions which Napoleon had indulged in, as the means of concealing from himself the extent of his misfortunes. Their first intention had been to fight with us incessantly, so as to wear us out by the mere force of numbers; and with this view they would naturally have renewed the combat on the 17th, but having received information of the probable immediate arrival of Bernadotte and Benningsen, at the head, respectively, of about sixty thousand and fifty thousand men, they resolved to defer the decisive attack until the following day. The communications brought by M. de Merfeld in the afternoon affected no one, except so far as they plainly revealed the state of difficulty which must have forced Napoleon to make proposals so alien to his inclinations. Never to halt until he should have been driven back to the banks of the Rhine, was the universal resolution.

The measures taken by the allies on the north of Leipzig, although carried out with less unanimity, did not the less tend to the accomplishment of their purpose. The Prince of Sweden, yielding at length to the remonstrances which assailed him on every side, had set his troops in motion on the 17th, and taken up a position behind Blücher, of whom he demanded an interview. This interview, however, the latter declined, well knowing that the object of the former was simply to induce him to cross the Partha, for the purpose of completing the circle in which the French army was being inclosed, and thus incurring the risk, which was imminent, of incurring some severe check from the enemy's forces. Weary of yielding to the exactions of an ally of whose fidelity and energy he was very suspicious, he declared that his own troops, exhausted as they were by the engagement of the 16th, were far less fit than those of Bernadotte to maintain a difficult position, and demanded that the latter should himself cross the Partha, on the left of the army of Silesia, and incur the risk of a position on the Leipzig plain, face to face with Napoleon. At the same time, however, he intimated to the Prussian and Russian generals who commanded the several corps of the army of the North, his intention of crossing the

Partha simultaneously with them on the morrow, the object of his refusal to Bernadotte having simply been, to force the latter to take a position in which it would be impossible for him to remain inactive.

In the meantime, Napoleon recognizing the real nature of his position, had resolved towards the evening of the 17th to order a retreat; not such a nocturnal retreat, however, as is authorized by the art of war, when it is necessary for an army to withdraw from before an enemy of superior force, but a retreat which was to be conducted in the open day, and in an imposing manner across the long track from Leipzig to Lindenau, which consisted of a multitude of bridges thrown across the arms of the Pleisse and the Elster. At two o'clock in the morning he was up despatching his orders, which were to the following effect. All the corps which had fought on the south, namely, those of Poniatowski, Augereau, Victor, Lauriston, Macdonald, the Guard, and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th cavalry, would fall back the distance of a league, and form around Leipzig, on the Probstheyda plateau, a compact and almost invincible circle. On the north and east Marmont, who, after the battle of Möckern had repassed the Partha, was to concentrate his forces from Schönfeld to Sellerhausen; whilst Marshal Ney, who, with Reynier, arrived on the afternoon of the 17th, formed the prolongation of Marmont's line, would throw back his right until it should meet Macdonald's left across the Lutzen plain, and thus complete the circle which the troops of the French army were to form. On the east and the north, as on the south, our troops would then slowly retrograde, driving back such bodies of the enemy as might press them too closely, and passing through Leipzig by the chaussée de Lindenau, to open which Napoleon had sent Bertrand beyond Lindenau. General Rogniat was ordered to proceed with the engineers of the Guard, to throw fresh bridges across the Saale below Weissenfels. Margaron was entrusted with the defence of Leipzig, and was to establish himself within it; Dombrowski occupying the ground without its walls as far as Schönfeld, where was posted Marshal Marmont, and where, consequently, commenced the line of Marshal Ney. As the troops already under Margaron's command were not sufficient for the task confided to him, Napoleon added to them the division of the Young Guard commanded by Mortier. Orders were given that the parks of artillery and the baggage should be immediately sent forward, so that they might have defiled across the bridges before the troops came up to them.

After he had despatched his orders, Napoleon had himself proceeded to the Reudnitz faubourg, for the purpose of

informing Ney of his plans by his own mouth, and then went on to Leipzig, where he communicated his intentions to the other generals; returning thence at an early hour to his bivouac in the midst of the ranks of the principal army.

As Montfort, the colonel of engineers who had succeeded Rogniat, who had departed for Weissenfels, had been much struck by the difficulty of making the whole army defile by the single bridge of immense length which runs from Leipzig to Lindenau, he had proposed to Berthier to construct additional ones, either above or below this, which might then be reserved for the artillery, cavalry, and baggage. This proposal, however, Berthier had rejected, saying that he knew very well how to execute Napoleon's orders, but that he was not in the habit of anticipating them. And it is probable that Napoleon himself, had the matter been brought before his notice, would not have been very ready to order what must have been a too early announcement of his retreat. However this might be, the result was that the Lindenau bridge remained as our only means of retreat, a fact which might have, in certain circumstances, the most dangerous results.

Napoleon had scarcely returned to Probstheyda, where he had his bivouac, when he perceived three great columns marching concentrically upon his new line of battle; the Prince of Hesse Homburg advancing towards our right, upon Poniatowski and Augereau; whilst in the centre Kleist and Wittgenstein marched from Wachau and Liebert-Wolkwitz upon Probstheyda, where were posted Victor and the Guard; and finally, on the left, Klenau, Bennigsen, and Bubna, advanced upon Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, against Macdonald. This latter column, turning its right around our line, and thus threatening Ney's position across the Leipzig plain.

All Napoleon's columns as they retreated had left strong rear-guards, posted as tirailleurs, which disputed the ground foot by foot, and never gave way until they had inflicted on the enemy severe loss. At Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, where was posted Macdonald's corps, our troops made head against Zeithen's Prussian division and Klenau's Austrians, and only retreated upon Stötteritz after having made considerable havoc in their ranks. When this last position had been taken by Macdonald, our new line of battle formed a continuous line from Dölitz to Probstheyda, where, forming a right angle, it ascended northwards to the bank of the Partha, by Stötteritz, Melckau, and Schönfeld, at which places were Macdonald, Reynier, and Marmont. Probstheyda was, therefore, the point which it would be most important

for the enemy to carry, and which Napoleon was determined to defend to the utmost.

The column of the Prince of Hesse Homburg threw itself upon Dörlitz, carried it, lost it, retook it, and again lost it; the Prince himself being seriously wounded, and having to retire from the field. Falling back for a short distance, our troops now took up a position at Connwitz, behind a line of water alternately stagnant or the reverse, which lay from Probstheyda to Connwitz, and ultimately fell into the Pleisse. At this point Poniatowski and Augereau established themselves in a position of invincible strength, which the Austrians in vain attempted to carry by reiterated and desperate assaults.

It was now midday, and the sound of artillery from the north announced that Blücher and Bernadotte had entered into action, and became the signal for the army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, of a furious attack upon the decisive point of Probstheyda; which was awaited by Druot with the artillery of the Guard, and by Victor with his infantry. In advancing to the assault the enemy had to ascend a piece of sloping ground in the form of a glacis, and it was when they had reached this, that Druot, opening the fire of his guns, overwhelmed them with a storm of missiles, and hurled them back in confusion. Animated, however, by their furious patriotism, they re-formed their ranks, and throwing themselves a second time upon it, succeeded in penetrating it. But again they were driven back by the charge of Victor's infantry, and had to retreat to some distance to reform their scattered divisions.

Whilst our troops thus resisted the enemy in front of them, another appeared on the left in the shape of the Prussian division Ziethen which, having in conjunction with Klenau's Austrians made a fruitless attack upon Stötteritz, had fallen back upon Probstheyda, where, however, they were received by a portion of Druot's artillery posted on the left of the village, and which was of itself sufficient to repulse them.

As, after these attempts, in which he had had some twelve thousand men put *hors de combat*, the Prince of Schwarzenberg could not hope to carry a position which the valour of our soldiers rendered impregnable, he fell back a few hundred steps to some slightly elevated ground which rose opposite Probstheyda, and from thence exchanged with the French one of the most terrible cannonades that had ever been heard.

In the meantime Benningsen, who was opposed to our left, had attacked Melckau, but less vigorously than Schwarzenberg, because he awaited before engaging himself

seriously, the arrival of Blucher and Bernadotte, to whose proceedings we may now direct our attention.

After having refused to see Bernadotte, Blucher had ultimately consented to an interview with him at eight o'clock in the morning, and it had then been agreed that they should cross the Partha, Bernadotte stipulating that Blucher should lend him thirty thousand men. Agreeing to this arrangement Blucher had accordingly placed himself at the head of those thirty thousand men, which belonged to Langeron's corps, and having crossed the Partha in the neighbourhood of Neutzsch, had descended upon Schönfeld, where was established the second division of Marshal Marmont. In the meantime Bernadotte, who executed a long and circuitous movement for the purpose of crossing the Partha at as great a distance from the French troops as possible, effected the passage of this river at Taucha, and had then advanced in the presence of General Reynier, by Heiterblick.

In advance of Sellerhausen, where Reynier was posted, was a village named Paunsdorf, which Ney was anxious to occupy because he thought that it would enable us not only to interpose between but even to prevent the junction of the armies of Bohemia and the North. Reynier, however, was of a contrary opinion for very sufficient reasons. In fact, he distrusted the Saxons, who were continually murmuring and threatening to desert, and to whom he was unwilling to offer any temptation to leave us by pushing them forward. Ney, nevertheless, moved them in column towards Paunsdorf, taking care to place the division Durutte behind them, to keep them in check as well as to afford them support. They had no sooner, however, come in sight of the troops of Bernadotte, with whose staff many of them had been in communication, than they marched towards them, turning their pieces against our troops and firing upon the division Durutte, with whom they had served during two years. Ney hastened up to the assistance of the division Durutte, which, suddenly attacked by Bulow's corps, had the greatest possible difficulty in maintaining its position. After an heroic struggle, in which five thousand men contended during more than an hour against twenty thousand, our troops were forced to fall back upon Sellerhausen. In the meantime Marmont on the left had been supporting a desperate engagement at the village of Schönfeld, which was the essential point of our line, and which Blucher was attempting to carry with the troops under Langeron. Within the space of a few hours, the division Lagrange lost and retook the village no less than seven times. It was on the point of finally giving way, when Ney came up with one of Souham's divisions

(Ricard's), and enabled it once more to drive the enemy out of the disputed village. Between Schönfeld and Sellerhausen Marmont with the divisions Compans and Friedrichs formed in square, resisted all the assaults of the Prussian and Russian cavalry; but twenty-eight thousand men could not for any long time resist the attack of ninety thousand, and they were consequently at length compelled to yield both Schönfeld and Sellerhausen, and to fall back upon Leipzig, lest Bernadotte and Bubna, now united on the Leipzig plain, should penetrate by the breach made in our line by the defection of the Saxons.

Fortunately the cavalry and artillery of the Guard at this moment came up under the command of the Emperor himself. The rumour of the defection of the Saxon troops having reached head quarters, had filled all hearts there with dismay, and Napoleon leaving Murat at Probstheyda, had hastened up to repair this unforeseen misfortune, which put the finishing stroke to our misfortunes.

At this sight Bulow on the one side, and Bubna on the other, formed each a *crochet en arrière*, for the purpose of presenting a flank to our cavalry, which charged them with the utmost desperation, but could make no decided impression on their dense masses. Their advance, however, was checked, and then on the three fronts of this immense field of battle, extending from Leipzig to Schönfeld, on the north, from Schönfeld to Probstheyda on the east, and from Probstheyda to Connewitz on the south, a cannonade of two thousand pieces of ordnance terminated a battle which has been justly called the battle of the giants, and is the greatest of which history makes mention.

Alighting at a simple hotel situated in the centre of the town, Napoleon proceeded to despatch his orders, directing that the various corps of the army should follow the convoys of the matériel, the wounded, and the artillery, across the Lindenau bridge, and that the Guard, as soon as the passage of the bridge should have been effected, should take up a position on the Lindenau plateau, in such a manner as to present to the enemy a formidable rear-guard. At the same time, as an additional precaution against any attack by which the enemy might attempt to harass our retreat across Leipzig, he entrusted to the 7th corps and the division Dombrowski, to the 6th corps and to Souham's division of the 3rd, and to Macdonald, whose corps had suffered less than the others on the 18th, the defence of the several faubourgs of the town, whilst the Guard, the cavalry, and the remaining troops of Victor, Augereau, and Ney should accomplish their retreat. They were then to fall back themselves through an extensive

boulevard that separated the faubourg from the town, and to proceed to the Lindenau bridge, across the Pleisse and the Elster. At the same time he ordered that a mine should be prepared under the arch of the bridge nearest the town, so that it might be destroyed as soon as the last French corps should have passed, and the head of the enemy's column should appear in sight—an order easily given, but which might be of some hazard in the execution.

To these orders relative to the retreat from Leipzig he added others for the corps left on the Elbe, and which must necessarily be reduced to capitulate, unless, by the exercise of almost superhuman energy and presence of mind, they should be concentrated on the lower Elbe under Marshal Davouts, and thus be enabled to re-open the gates of France, now actually closed against them. These orders were to the effect that Marshal Saint-Cyr, who still had thirty thousand men at his disposal, and who might, by making the best use of his time, crush any opposition the enemy might offer on his road, should proceed from Dresden to Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg successively, and having collected the various garrisons, should join Davouts with seventy thousand men. The two marshals being then, as he calculated, at the head of one hundred thousand men, would be able to rescue some of the garrisons on the Oder, and at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men to re-enter France by the Wesel.

On the morning of the 19th of October Napoleon took leave of the Royal Family of Saxony, whose ruin he had, very unwillingly, involved in his own, and to which he had for a moment restored its ancestral dreams by endowing it with the crown of Poland. Expressing great regret at being compelled to leave his ally exposed to the vengeance of the allies, he urged the old king to treat with them, and to separate his fortunes from those of France, declaring that he, Napoleon, would never consider his so doing any cause for complaint. At the same time he stipulated on his own part never to make a peace by which the interests of Saxony should be sacrificed; and then, after reciprocal embraces, quitted this worthy but unfortunate family, which were terrified to see him delay so long in the midst of dangers which threatened him on every side.

In the meantime, a fresh conflict was taking place around Leipzig between our troops and the enemy. The allied sovereigns, who had expected on this fourth day a continuance of the desperate actions which had been fought during the three preceding days, were as delighted as they were surprised, when at eight or nine o'clock in the morning they

perceived the French army moving off across the interminable Lindenau bridge on to the plains of Lutzen. Thanking heaven for a result they had scarcely dared to hope, they ordered an immediate attack on the enceinte of Leipzig, in order to render the retreat of the French army more difficult and disastrous. But on every point the troops of the allies encountered the most determined resistance, for our soldiers had become as irritated as their adversaries, and had resolved, even at the cost of their lives, to exact a severe vengeance for their defeat. The conflict could not be continued on our part, however, for any length of time, not because we were unable to protract our resistance, but because it was necessary that we should concert our movements. Unable as our officers were to communicate from one street of the town to another, they had no means of knowing whether the defence were equally successful in all directions, and whether a too protracted resistance at any one point might not expose those who made it to being cut off by the enemy from the point of retreat. Some Saxon and Baden troops which were in the interior of the town, and fired on our soldiers, added to the confusion. Influenced by the reciprocal fear entertained by each of the several bodies of troops engaged with the enemy on the east, south, and north sides of the town respectively, that it alone had made a successful defence, and that the others had given way, they made an almost simultaneous retreat, debouching from the boulevards which separated the faubourgs from the town, and hurrying towards the bridge in a confused mass, through which even the enemy's bayonets would have been unable to make an opening.

But whilst this terrible evacuation of Leipzig was thus taking place, a sudden catastrophe which might have been but too clearly foreseen, spread despair among the ranks of those who for the common safety had been entrusted with the defence of the Leipzig faubourgs. Colonel Montfort, of the engineers, had been ordered to prepare a mine under the first arch of the bridge along which our troops were now effecting their retreat, and he had, accordingly, done so, and had posted at the spot some sappers with a corporal, who awaited, match in hand, the signal to fire the train. In the meantime, Colonel Montfort, in a state of the most anxious doubt as to what he ought to do, expecting every moment to see the enemy debouch *pêle-mêle* with our soldiers, and unable to obtain any accurate information with respect to the several corps still in the rear, determined to proceed to Lindenau, for the purpose of receiving further instructions from Napoleon's own mouth, and set out towards the other end of the bridge, having first directed the corporal of sappers to fire the mine only in

case he should see the enemy approaching. Whilst Colonel Montfort was struggling in the midst of the mass which encumbered the bridge, unable either to advance or recede, some of Blücher's troops, in pursuit of the remnant of Reynier's corps, appearing close to the bridge *pêle-mêle* with the soldiers of the 7th corps, occasioned cries of "Fire the mine! fire the mine!" and the corporal, believing that the right moment had come, applied the match, and thus in a moment condemned twenty thousand of our troops who were still in the Leipzig faubourgs either to perish or to become the prisoners of an enemy whom the feeling of exasperation with which this war was conducted had rendered inhuman. Believing that they had been betrayed, these men uttered shouts of indignation, and swayed by the impulses of despair now rushed upon the enemy, and now threw themselves into the Pleisse and the Elster and endeavoured to cross them by swimming. Poniatowski, who had been raised to the rank of marshal by Napoleon on the preceding evening, plunged with his horse into the Elster and reached the other side, but there, weakened by many wounds, and unable to climb the steep bank, disappeared beneath the waters, buried in his glory beneath the ruins of our country and his own. Macdonald, making a similar attempt, was saved, but Reynier and Lauriston, surrounded by the enemy's troops before they had time to escape, were taken and carried before the allied sovereigns, when the Emperor Alexander, recognizing Lauriston as the wise ambassador who had endeavoured to prevent the war of 1812, took him by the hand, and had both him and his companion treated with the utmost courtesy; — a courtesy which he was far from displaying towards the unfortunate King of Saxony, who thrice during the morning sent officers to request an interview, which was refused, the one reply to his solicitations being, that he, the King of Saxony, had been taken with arms in his hands, and was, therefore, a prisoner of war; that the allied sovereigns would decide upon his fate, and would inform him of their decision.

In the meantime, the broken ranks of the French army were continuing their retreat across the numerous arms of the Pleisse and the Elster, leaving twenty thousand of their soldiers either prisoners or dying in the streets of Leipzig, or drowned in the blood-stained waters of the Pleisse and the Elster. This last of the four disastrous days of Leipzig raised the loss of the French army in killed, wounded, or prisoners, to the number of sixty thousand men. The enemy had lost an equal number in action, but their wounded had received all the grateful care that German patriotism

could lavish on them, whilst ours had met with, alas! how different a treatment.

Such was this long and tragic battle of Leipzig; one of the most bloody and certainly the greatest ever fought, and which terminated so disastrously the campaign of Saxony, which at Lutzen and Bautzen had commenced so auspiciously. Had Napoleon been a less great general, in a situation in which it would not have been necessary for him to endeavour by a single stroke to re-establish gigantic fortunes, and in which no hundred motives of pride had impelled him to shut his eyes to the truth, and had he, lastly, been less accustomed than he was to seek in bold and complicated combinations the attainment of extraordinary results, he might have succeeded in obtaining, if not victory, at least a position of safety. But the simple course by which he might have arrived at this end Napoleon's character, his pride, and present need of some extraordinary triumph, had now barred against him. If we examine the various circumstances of this campaign, we shall discover the real cause of the disasters with which it was thronged to have been, not in the diminution of our captain's military talents, but in the illusions of which he was made the victim by his pride, in the necessity he was under of regaining by a single stroke the immense prosperity he had lost, in his repugnance to acknowledge sufficiently early that he had been defeated—in all the errors, in short, which are observable in the common gambler, who risks in folly the riches which in folly have been acquired.

After such a series of reverses, to return immediately to the Rhine was the only course Napoleon could now pursue. Of the three hundred and sixty thousand troops he had at his disposal, without taking into account those in garrison, at the commencement of hostilities, there now remained to him at the most but one hundred and ten thousand, and those in a most deplorable condition. The only military weapon which he still possessed in any considerable quantity was his artillery, which was still very numerous and well served; and which, if a source of embarrassment on the road was at the same time a most precious resource on the day of battle.

The night of the 19th of October was passed by Napoleon and the wrecks of his army in the neighbourhood of Lutzen. On the following morning Napoleon hastened to Weissenfels, which was in the hands of Bertrand and Mortier, who had beaten Giulay and thus secured the possession of the Saale. Our object now was, of course, to precede the enemy's troops at the critical points on the line of our retreat. If we followed on the left, the grand route leading from Weissenfels

to Hambourg and Jéna, we should come to the famous Kosen defile where Marshal Davouts had covered himself with glory by the defence of the Awerstädt plain, and where we should be now exposed to the danger of finding Giulay, who, repulsed by Bertrand and Mortier, would probably there seek his revenge. The plan upon which Napoleon determined, therefore, was to make a *détour* to the right, and instead of passing the Saale at Naumbourg, to cross it at Weissenfels, then to proceed to Freyberg for the purpose of there effecting the passage of the Unstrutt, and to debouch from thence upon the Weimar and Erfurt plain; Bertrand in the meantime, advancing by a rapid movement to the left on the Kosen defile, to reach it if possible, before the enemy, and to defend himself there as long as he might be able against the grand army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg.

The orders which Napoleon gave in accordance with this plan were punctually executed; and whilst Bertrand, accompanied by Mortier, who commanded two divisions of the Young Guard, proceeded to Freyberg, took possession of the stone bridge across the Unstrutt, and then advanced to Kosen, which he reached before the enemy, the main body of the army passed the Saale at Weissenfels on the 21st, and pushed on to Freyberg where it employed the whole of the night of the 21st and the following day in effecting the passage of the Unstrutt, which it was enabled to do by the energetic resistance made by Marshal Oudinot on the banks of that river to the Prussian troops of the corps of General d'York.

In the meantime Bertrand, whose arrival at Kosen had anticipated that of Giulay, had fought a desperate battle with the latter, in which he had been completely victorious, successfully defending his position and only abandoning it when he knew that Oudinot had evacuated Freyberg, and that the whole of our columns had defiled upon Erfurt, where, on the 23rd, the entire mass of our army was assembled, and where Napoleon halted two days for the purpose of refreshing and re-organising his troops, and endeavouring to bring back to their ranks a portion of the enormous number of our troops who had scattered themselves over the country, carried away by the marauding spirit which the season, the badness of the weather, and the age of our troops had combined to spread through our army to the most enormous extent.

Napoleon took advantage of these two days of comparative leisure to write to Paris, to make his position known to the principal members of his government, and to require them to provide him with fresh levies of well-grown men in

addition to the two hundred and eighty thousand men already demanded. "I cannot," he said, "defend France with children.... Nothing exceeds the courage of our French youth, but at the first sign of disaster they betray the characteristics of their age." At the same time, he demanded supplies of money, directing that five hundred millions of francs should be raised by means of a war tax, to be added to all the direct or indirect imports already in existence.

To the melancholy circumstances by which Napoleon was at this time surrounded, was added the withdrawal of Murat, who alleged as reasons for his departure the necessity of defending Italy and the hope that he might be able by his personal exertions to furnish Prince Eugene with thirty thousand well-organised Neapolitan troops. Napoleon admitted the force of these reasons, as he also admitted to himself that Murat would not fail to yield to the current that had set in against him, and would follow the example of those German princes, our allies, who after having been gorged by us for ten years with the riches of the German church, now pretended that they had been the victims of France. But whilst he perceived, as he did, that Murat's defection was but too imminent, he forgave him for it beforehand, so to say; and on taking leave of him received his parting protestations of fidelity as sincere, and repeatedly embraced him with a heart overflowing with grief.

It had now become absolutely necessary that the army should continue its march, for the allied troops were advancing in every direction, and the presence was announced of a fresh enemy in our rear, ready to close against us our road to France. This enemy was no other than the Bavarian army, so long our companion in arms, and which was eager to atone for its long alliance with us by a defection which should resemble as closely as possible that of Bernadotte and the Saxons.

The feeble Bavarian king, attached as he was to Napoleon by the numerous benefits which the latter had heaped upon him, and supported in his policy of an alliance with France by an enlightened and ambitious minister, who had sought therein his own aggrandizement as well as that of his country, had been able as long as Napoleon was prosperous, to successfully resist the opposition offered to this policy by his wife, a vain, obstinate-minded princess, sister of the Empress of Russia and the Queen of Sweden, and by his son, who, more addicted to the arts of peace than those of war, had been in Napoleon's service and somewhat harshly treated by him. But although the Bavarian monarch was able to resist this opposition as long as he could point to the substantial benefits he derived from Napoleon's alliance, the disas-

trous character of recent events, the losses sustained by the Bavarian corps in the battle of Dennewitz, and the efforts of the three courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had shaken the fidelity of the Bavarian court to our cause to a great extent when General de Wrède arrived in Munich deeply wounded by the contemptuous treatment he had endured at the hands of Marshal Saint-Cyr, under whom he had served during the campaign of the Dwina, and loud in his complaints against us. After our victories at Lutzen and Bautzen both he and the Bavarian court had become reconciled to us, but Napoleon's refusal to bestow upon him the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour which had become vacant by the death of General des Roys, and which had been requested for him by M. d'Argenteau, had again filled him with discontent against us, and on finding himself in command of the Bavarian army posted on the Inn opposite the Austrian army of the Prince de Reuss, he had seized the opportunity to enter into negotiations with the allies, who offered to him, General Wrède, the command of the two Bavarian and Austrian armies then on the Inn, and to the Bavarian monarch the preservation of his states, an equivalent in territory and revenue being given in exchange for the Tyrol and the districts on the banks of the Inn., M. de Mongelas perceiving that he could only maintain his position by changing his policy, favoured the acceptance of these proposals; and the king, unable to resist the solicitations of his wife, son, people, minister, and general, and terrified at the prospect held out to him, should he persist in rejecting the offers of the allies, of having to evacuate his capital before the Austrian army, had hesitated no longer, but signed on the 8th of October a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the allied sovereigns. As soon as this treaty had been signed, General Wrède, anxious to secure the favour of the chiefs of the coalition, and to ensure his marshal's baton, had hastened to carry the Austro-Bavarian army, which numbered some sixty thousand men, from the Inn to the Upper Danube, and from the Danube to the Main, and had marched with such rapidity that he was said to have already arrived at Wurzburg and to be ready to bar against us the Mayence route in the environs of Frankfort.

On receiving this information, Napoleon resolved to set out immediately from Erfurt by the Mayence route, and after three days passed at Erfurt, marched for Eisenach, in order to precede the allied troops in the passage of the defiles of the Thuringian forest. The total number of his troops actually in their ranks at this time, did not exceed seventy thousand, so widely had the vice of disbandment spread amongst our troops during their progress from Leipzig to Erfurt.

The allied armies, after having passed two or three days in Leipzig, had been distributed in a new manner, and had then proceeded towards their ulterior destination; General Klenau being sent to reduce Dresden, General Tauenzien to continue the siege of Torgau and Wittenburg, and General Benningsen, with the so called Polish army, to blockade, and if possible, gain possession of Magdebourg and Hambourg. The Army of the North had been marched upon Cassel in order to complete, should it not already have been accomplished, the destruction of the monarchy of King Jerome. It was then to return towards Westphalia, Hanover, and Holland. Finally Blucher and the Prince of Schwarzenberg, with about one hundred and sixty thousand men, had hastened in pursuit of Napoleon's army, Blucher being directed upon Eisenach, from whence he was to proceed, not to Frankfort, but to Wetzlar, in order to prevent Napoleon, when he should be cut off from the Mayence route, from throwing himself upon that of Coblenz. The grand army of Bohemia, divided into two portions, was to march, the one part by Eisenach, Fulde, and Frankfort, upon Mayence; the other part by Gotha, Smalkalden, and Schweinfurt upon Wurzburg.

The allied forces having been thus distributed, each portion of them proceeded in pursuit of the French army; and on the 26th and 27th of October Oudinot's and Mortier's rear guard, composed of the Young Guard, was attacked by the impetuous Blucher, the result of the action being a loss of about a thousand men on each side.

On the 26th, Napoleon slept at Vach, beyond the Thuringian defiles. On the 27th at Hünfeld, on the 28th at Schlütern. When we had reached the slope of the Thuringian forest which looks towards the Rhine the enemy's pursuit became much less vigorous, the reason being that Blucher had turned to the right for the purpose of marching by Wetzlar upon the Rhine, whilst the Prussians and Russians had proceeded on the left towards Wurzburg. On the 27th information reached Schlütern that General Wrède was at Wurzburg, which he was bombarding, and from whence he had but a step to take to cut off the route leading from Hanau to Mayence. An advanced guard of our troops was now sent forward with such portions of our baggage train and stragglers as could be collected, in order that the movements of the army might be as free as possible from incumbrance; and during the 27th and 28th of October from fifteen to eighteen thousand of our disorganized troops were enabled by the prudent measures taken by Marshal the Duke de Valmy to reach Mayence. But on the 29th the road was

completely closed, for General Wrède, despairing of overcoming the resistance made by General Thureau, the governor of Wurzburg, had left a simple detachment to blockade this fortress, and had then proceeded to Hanau with sixty thousand men, half of whom were Bavarians, half Austrians. Having arrived there he had moved a division upon Frankfurt, and had posted himself with the bulk of his forces before Hanau in the forest of Lamboy, through which the grand route passes.

On the 29th Napoleon, having arrived at Langen-Sebold learnt that the head of the army had been driven back upon him, and that the Austro-Bavarian troops to the number of fifty or sixty thousand men were pretending to close the Rhine route against him. Indignant at such impudence, he resolved to hasten his march on the 30th, and to proceed himself at the head of his Old Guard to re-open the route. Unfortunately there remained of his army at this time no more than about forty or fifty thousand men under arms, so greatly had disorganization increased amongst his troops during the last marches; and even of these forty or fifty thousand Napoleon had no more than a third at his immediate disposal on the 30th. Nevertheless, he resolved to throw himself upon the Bavarian army and to make it repent its temerity; for it was important that the route should be opened before the obstacle which closed it should have had time to increase and become consolidated. On the morning of the 30th, accordingly, he set out from Langen-Sebold and marched upon Hanau.

When they had advanced some distance our troops fell in with General de Wrède's advanced guard, which was posted at Rückingen, and having driven this back and pursued it with vigour, they came upon the Austro-Bavarian army itself, in front of the forest of Lamboy, through which passes the great Mayence route. Napoleon immediately hastened up in person at the head of his advanced guard to reconnoitre the enemy's dispositions. He had at his immediate disposal at this moment only the cavalry of the advanced guard, and the five thousand infantry still remaining to Macdonald and Victor. Posting on the right under General Charpentier, the infantry of Macdonald's corps, and on the left under General Dubreton, that of Marshal Victor, he ordered them to spread *en tirailleurs* amongst the woods; and then took up his own position with the whole of his cavalry on the grand route. Our tirailleurs speedily gained ground upon the flank of the troops which supported the enemy's artillery, and compelled them to fall back. Soon afterwards a portion of our own artillery having been brought up, directed a vigorous fire upon that of the Bavarian army, and forced it

to retire. In this manner the enemy had been driven into the interior of the forest, the greater portion of which we had traversed in their track, when, the division Curial of the Old Guard having come up, Napoleon threw two battalions of this division upon the enemy's retreating column, and by this means completely drove them out of the forest into the plain. On reaching the outskirts of the wood Napoleon perceived some fifty thousand hostile troops drawn up in battle array in front of Kinzig, resting on one side on the pont de Lamboy, and on the other on the city of Hanau. Napoleon awaited, before debouching from the wood, the arrival of the whole of his artillery as well as of the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard; he then ranged eighty pieces of artillery on the outskirts of the forest, extended to the left the great bear-skin hats of the division Friant, and to the right the cavalry of Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnouette, and Nansouty.

After some moments of a violent cannonade Napoleon threw the whole of his cavalry upon that of General Wrède, and drove it back by a single charge upon the Austrian squadrons. The latter charged in their turn, but the exasperation of our cavalry was at its height, and overwhelming all that came in its way it drove back the left of the Austro-Bavarian army upon the Kinzig and Hanau. At the centre the enemy's cavalry in the course of these repeated charges, threw themselves for a moment upon the eighty pieces of artillery of the Guard; but when our infantry had hastened up to their rescue they found that Druot and his artillerymen had already driven them back.

Driven back upon the Kinzig, General de Wrède could see no other course open to him save that of throwing back his army towards his right for the purpose of making it repass the Kinzig at the pont de Lamboy. To favour this movement and procure the space he needed to effect it in, he attempted an attack upon our left, where were posted Friant's grenadiers, who fully shared the exasperation of the whole of the army, and who, supported by Marmont's troops, which had begun to come up, attacked the Bavarians at the point of the bayonet, and driving them back upon the troops now occupied in effecting the passage of the Kinzig, struck down with their bayonets some seven or eight hundred of them. De Wrède repassed the Kinzig in disorder, leaving in our hands ten or eleven thousand dead, wounded, or prisoners; our own loss in this brilliant action, in which the majesty of the French army was worthily avenged, having been at the most no more than three thousand.

We had no time, however, to lose in counting our trophies, for General de Wrède having fallen back with forty thousand

men behind the Kinzig might easily perceive the smallness of our force, and debouch from Hanau for the purpose of barring our road. On the following day, the 31st, Napoleon set out with Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnoette, Macdonald, and the Old Guard, to open the Mayence route, leaving Marmont on the banks of the Kinzig for the purpose of preventing the enemy from debouching from Hanau.

On the morning of the 31st Marshal Marmont took possession of Hanau, which the enemy in his terror had almost entirely evacuated, and then marched onwards, confiding the guard of this post to General Bertrand, who followed him. On the morning of the 1st of November General de Wrède attempted to debouch from the Kinzig, traversing the pont de Lamboy on our left and endeavouring to retake Hanau on our right. In front of the pont de Lamboy Bertrand had placed the division Guillemot, in the centre the division Morand, and partly in Hanau, partly along the bank of the Kinzig, the Italian division.

At daybreak de Wrède attacked the Italians in Hanau, and entered the town driving them upon the pont de la Kinzig, which he attempted to seize, but in vain, for Morand firing from behind the Kinzig upon his column in flank covered it with projectiles, and the Italians taking courage, returned to the charge, and drove the Bavarians into Hanau; de Wrède receiving a wound of so serious a nature that it was supposed to be mortal.

An attempt made at the same moment on our left by the Austro-Bavarian troops to cross the Kinzig by the half burnt chevalets of the pont de Lamboy, being equally unsuccessful, our cannon were at length free to pass along the Mayence road which was so covered with dead bodies that they rolled, as an illustrious eyewitness (Marshal Gérard) expressed it, in a trench of human flesh.

General Bertrand's corps had been the last to take the Hanau route; for Marshal Mortier, with the Young Guard, having been informed of the difficulties to be encountered on this road had made a détour to the right, and had reached Frankfort in safety. On the 4th of November, the grand army completed its entrance into Mayence, mournfully triumphant!

And thus we returned to the Rhine, which had become so wholly our own, that six months before we should have considered it a great proof of our moderation if we had been willing to permit it to bound our empire! That Rhine which it was now doubtful if we could defend! Napoleon had thought so much of conquest and so little of the defence of his kingdom, that it was almost entirely undefended.

Even the vast preparations which had been ordered by M. de Bassano after the battle of Dennewitz, had been countermanded by Napoleon on account of the expense and of the alarm which he feared they might be the means of spreading through the districts on the Rhine. Of all the fortresses on this frontier which should have been the first object of our care, Mayence alone contained the means of defence. But to have defended it an army would have been necessary, and that which now entered it, although it was the grand army, could not furnish more than forty thousand effective troops.

Napoleon wishing to keep at Mayence the best of his troops, left there the 4th corps under General Bertrand; intending that it should form the advanced guard of the future army which he hoped to form. At this time it only numbered fifteen thousand troops, but within a few days by great exertions it was raised to the number of twenty and odd thousand men. Lefebvre-Desnouette was attached to it with the light cavalry of the Guard and the old dragoons of the 5th corps, comprising altogether some three or four thousand horse. It was also furnished with a good supply of cannon. The defence of the Rhine was divided between the three Marshals, Marmont, Macdonald, and Victor; Marshal Marmont being charged with the defence of so much as lay between Landau and Coblenz, whilst Marshal Macdonald was sent to Cologne, and Marshal Victor was established at Strasbourg.

After having remained a week at Mayence, Napoleon set out for Paris on the 7th of November, that he might at the centre of his government prepare the means for carrying on a new and last campaign. And whilst he was occupied in making unheard of efforts to draw from exhausted France the resources which it still contained, and to hold in check upon its frontiers the enemy whose long continued impression had rendered it implacable against us, he had upon the Rhine and the Vistula, besieged or blockaded by the legions of allied Europe, soldiers sufficient to have formed one of the best armies he had ever assembled. He had left at Modlin three thousand men, at Zamosa three thousand, at Dantzic twenty-eight, at Glogau eight, at Custrin four, at Stettin twelve, at Dresden thirty, at Torgau twenty-six, at Wittenberg three, at Magdebourg twenty-five, at Hambourg forty, at Erfurt six, at Wurzburg two, amounting altogether to a force of one hundred and ninety thousand serviceable troops, (for we have omitted in this enumeration the sick and wounded) and capable of forming, could they only have been concentrated, an army equal to any that had ever followed the French flag. By Napoleon's error, however, in withdrawing from the Elbe without also withdrawing the garrisons,

they had been sacrificed—sacrificed to a blind confidence in victory and to a disastrous desire of re-establishing in a single day the fortunes shattered by the irreparable faults of years.

These garrisons might still have been saved, however, had some bold and fortunate general, finding himself at the head of one of them, sallied forth from his fortress, and cutting his way through the blockading troops rallied the other garrisons in succession, and by this means have enabled himself, probably, considering the small number of troops left by the allies in their rear, to have reached the Elbe and the Rhine, and entered France at the head of a considerable force. And if we examine the circumstances attending each of the several fortresses in question, we shall find that it was at Dresden, by Marshal Saint-Cyr, that a plan of this sort might most reasonably have been expected to be formed. In the first place, Dresden was not a fortress where there could be any hope of making a protracted defence against a besieging force, but rather a mere military post which Napoleon had only expected to preserve for a time, and the evacuation of which he had all but ordered when he directed Marshal Saint-Cyr, should unforeseen circumstances prevent his continuance in Dresden, to move upon Torgau. The natural idea, indeed, on the arrival at Dresden of the information that Napoleon had retreated to the Rhine, would seem to be to evacuate it. An additional reason would be, that this fortress, after the departure of the grand army, had no further importance, since it covered nothing, remained entirely isolated, and was entirely destitute of provisions. In two days' march its garrison might have reached Torgau, where it would have found twenty-six thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were excellent French troops, and together with whom it would have formed a force numbering forty-eight thousand men, superior to all the hostile troops on the banks of the Elbe. Three thousand would have been obtained from Wittenberg, and in two days Magdebourg might have been reached, where there were some eighteen or twenty thousand more. On his arrival at Hambourg, Marshal Saint-Cyr would have found himself at the head of a force of one hundred and ten thousand men; and what, then, could have prevented him from reaching the Rhine? If then the one hundred and seventy thousand French troops, left by a deplorable error of Napoleon's on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, had any chance of being saved, it could only have been, as respects at least one hundred thousand of them, by means of some spontaneous resolution of Marshal Saint-Cyr's. Such a resolution, however, he did not take, and from the

facts themselves must be judged whether he was sufficiently justified in not having taken it.

Napoleon had scarcely quitted Dresden for Düben when incessant movements had taken place of the enemy's troops around Dresden, and they had rapidly disappeared, leaving before this city a force of very insignificant strength. Marshal Saint-Cyr had immediately perceived the disappearance of the enemy's troops and had taken the very legitimate and praise-worthy resolution of inflicting a blow on the feeble blockading corps which had been left before him. Some days afterwards, no information having arrived from the grand army, he and those around him began to be uneasy, and to entertain the idea of leaving Dresden, where, if they remained, they could do nothing but perish. This idea having become widely spread Marshal Saint-Cyr summoned a council of war, composed of the Count de Lobau, General Durosnel, General Mathieu, and some others, in which the Count de Lobau advised a retreat upon Torgau, where they would find a numerous garrison, an abundant supply of provisions, and the Magdebourg route still open. To this the other generals, afraid of assuming the responsibility of a retreat, objected that the time had not come when they could fairly consider themselves abandoned, and take so decisive a step. Soon, however, the undissembled joy of the Saxons, and the communications of the enemy, who were interested in inspiring us with despair, informed our generals of the disaster of Leipzig and Napoleon's forced retreat upon the Rhine; and henceforth, it was evident that there was only one step to be taken, and that immediately, before all the routes should be closed.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, however, still hesitated, and proved on this occasion that the possession of very noble qualities may not necessarily lead a man to pursue the wisest course under certain circumstances, for, instead of adopting some decided plan of action, he sent a messenger to Torgau to enquire whether his troops could be supplied there with provisions should he fall back upon that place; and his agent having succeeded in reaching Torgau, received there an answer in the affirmative, but on attempting to return was stopped. The consequence was, that Marshal Saint-Cyr received no reply, and remained in a state of hesitation not only during the latter part of October, but even during the first days of November. At length, after the lapse of two weeks, all hope of success having vanished, and the line of blockade having been drawn closer, he adopted the plan of sending Count Lobau on to Torgau, by the right bank of the Elbe, with fourteen thousand troops, resolving, if these should succeed

in reaching Torgau, to follow them with the remainder of his army. The Count de Lobau very justly objected, that the enterprise, which would have been certain of success fifteen days before and with the whole of the corps d'armée, would be a very hazardous matter at the present moment with only half of the corps. Nevertheless, he obeyed the orders he had received, and set out from Dresden on the 8th of November, taking with him as his lieutenant the brave and talented General Bonnet. At some leagues from Dresden on the right bank of the river, he encountered the enemy's advanced posts, and having continued his march in spite of these, found farther on a well-defended position which could evidently be carried only at the expense of considerable loss, but which presented no insurmountable obstacle. At the same time the movements of the enemy showed that they were moving upon the rear of our troops for the purpose of preventing their return to Dresden, and that in their desire to effect this object, they were of their own accord leaving open the Torgau route. Had the whole corps d'armée been now together such a movement on the part of the enemy would have been one highly favourable to ourselves, but as one half of the corps d'armée still remained in Dresden it could not but cause our generals considerable anxiety, and they hastened to return to this city lest they should be cut off from the troops which still remained there.

When the Count de Lobau's column had re-entered Dresden the false step which had been taken was considered as sufficient condemnation of any enterprise in the direction of Torgau, and as there was no other which could be for a moment entertained, our troops awaited in a state of the deepest despondency, the issue of the deplorable position in which they found themselves. Provisions began to fail and the frightful contagion which spread from the Elbe to the Rhine raged through the city. The inhabitants, still submissive, but rendered desperate by the long continuance of our stay, entreated us to withdraw from their capital; and on the 11th, no hope remaining to them except that of a glorious death, our troops capitulated on conditions which could not but be regarded as favourable. The garrison were to lay down their arms, and to march back to France, with permission to serve again after they had been exchanged. Those who had signed these terms were able to flatter themselves that they had escaped from the disastrous situation in which they had been involved on conditions very injurious neither to themselves nor to France, which they would soon be in a condition to defend. Our troops set out, therefore, with more hope than despondency; but they had scarcely

quitted Dresden, when General Klenau, to the general consternation, made known to them, with many excuses, that the Emperor Alexander refused to agree to the terms of the capitulation, and demanded that the garrison should regard themselves as prisoners of war, without permission to return to France. Marshal Saint Cyr exclaimed against this conduct with the most indignant vehemence, but the only reply he received was the ironical one, that if he chose to return to Dresden, and place himself in his old position, he was quite welcome to do so. As if such a return were possible into the midst of a city delighted at our withdrawal, and most disinclined to receive us again, and where our means of defence were either destroyed or exposed.

As no measure for effecting their rescue had been set on foot at Dresden, the only point at which there existed any considerable body of French troops, with a general of elevated rank, and recognised capacity, it remained as a necessary consequence that each of our garrisons must perish miserably in its fortress, succumbing either to hunger, typhus fever, or captivity. Torgau indeed, where there were more than 26,000 men, under the brilliant Count de Narbonne, and which was well provided with all kinds of provisions, was in a position to make a protracted defence, for a fall from his horse having compelled General Bernard to remain there for a time, he had joined there Count de Narbonne with the utmost zeal in taking every measure that could enable the garrison to effect a most determined resistance. But the most formidable of enemies had sprung up within the walls, and not only carried off the garrison by thousands, but included in its ravages the Count de Narbonne himself, who died most deeply regretted by his troops and all who had known him. He was replaced as governor of the fortress by General Dutailis, who displayed the utmost valour, but could do but little more than witness the slow agonies of a garrison almost equal to an army.

At Wittenberg General Lapoype being well supplied with provisions, and having but few sick within the walls of his fortress, was prepared with the 3000 men under his command to make a protracted defence. At Magdebourg General Lemarois being in similar circumstances, had taken a like resolution. At Hambourg, Marshal Davoust, who had returned thither when the movement which he had commenced with 32,000 troops upon Berlin had been rendered impossible by the result of the battles of Gross-Bern and Dennewitz, was resolved with the 40,000 soldiers at his disposal, to maintain a long siege, or rather, for such was its

real nature, a defensive campaign calculated to cover lower Germany, Holland, and the Lower Rhine.

On the river Oder the fortresses Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau still held out, but simply for the honour of the French arms, defending themselves against all hope, simply for the glory of the flag under which they fought. And what is thus true of them, is even more so, if possible, of the immortal garrison of Dantzic, which, having been uninterruptedly blockaded since the month of January, had only once received any news from France. On retiring into the fortress in December 1812, after the retreat from Russia, General Rapp had shut himself up there with about 36,000 effective troops, and some thousands of wounded; but of this number almost 4,000 had been speedily carried off by the terrible *fevre de congelation*, which was produced by exposure to cold, as the *hospital fever* was by moisture and bad air. The troops which remained were inured to arms, and well commanded, but insufficient for the defence of the immense works of Dantzic, which consisted of the fortress itself, an entrenched camp, and the citadel of Weichselmunde, situated at the mouth of the Vistula. The first proceeding which General Rapp had found it necessary to take on entering the fortress, was to break the ice on the waters of the Vistula, which surrounded all its works, and which would have enabled the enemy to have advanced up to its walls, and carried it by escalade. Having prepared the preliminary defensive works, the garrison had driven back the enemy, and by a series of adventurous excursions to the isles of the Vistula, procured an abundant supply of every kind of provisions. On the resumption of hostilities after the armistice, it numbered some 25,000 effective troops, thoroughly prepared to undergo the fatigues of a siege. The exterior works, after having been valiantly defended, had been ultimately lost; but General Rapp, assisted by skilled officers of the engineers, had constructed some well planned, and well armed redoubts, which, taking the enemy's trenches in flank, had rendered them untenable. After a series of desperate combats around these redoubts, the enemy, at length, despairing of being able to carry them, resolved to have recourse to a bombardment, and directed against Dantzic the most formidable artillery that had ever been levelled against any besieged place—the fire of a hundred English gun-boats being added to that of the land batteries. During the whole of October the most terrific bombardment ever known continued without pause and without mercy, and on the 1st November, the timber yards of Dantzic having been set on fire, there ensued a fearful con-

flagration, which was not extinguished until three-fourths of the vast depôt of wood which the town contained had been consumed. In the meantime General Rapp, not caring to consider what must be the issue of this war after the disaster of Leipzig, only adhered to the instructions he had received, and which were to the effect that he was only to surrender Dantzic when he should receive an order so to do, written and signed by Napoleon's own hand. Modlin and Zamosa, after having been well defended, had capitulated, and the Polish garrisons had been led away into captivity.

Thus had lived or died on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, the 190,000 troops left so distant from the Rhine which they might have rendered invincible. And thus had terminated this campaign of 1813, by means of which Napoleon had resolved to repair the disasters of the campaign of 1812, and by means of which he might indeed have repaired them, had he only known how to put bounds to his desires.

This great and terrible campaign, which is unequalled in the history of the world, whether we regard the immensity of the struggles, the variety of its combinations, or the terrible effusion of human blood which resulted from it, is marked, as respects Napoleon, by one peculiar and significant trait, which we have already pointed out, which is the fact that it ended in his losing everything, simply because he attempted to regain at a single throw all that he had already lost. If after the victories at Lutzen and Bautzen, when victory had been restored to his arms by his genius and the courage of his young soldiers, he had driven back the Russian and Prussian armies as far as the Vistula, without accepting the armistice of Pleiswitz, he would have separated them from the Austrians, and inflicted a fatal blow upon the coalition. But to have done this effectually, it would have been necessary that he should have given some satisfactory reply to Austria, who pressed him to give some decided explanation relative to the terms on which he would make peace. And what Napoleon's motive was in accepting this armistice, we cannot but too well remember. It was, as has been already described in these pages, that he might have time to prepare an army against Austria, and put himself in a position in which he might safely refuse to submit to any, even the most moderate, conditions she might propose.

We have seen, also, how easy it would have been for Napoleon, even during the armistice, by the sacrifice of the Duchy of Warsaw, which could not possibly survive the Russian campaign, of the Protectorate of the Rhine, which was simply an aimless insult to Germany, and by the restoration of independence to the Hanseatic towns—to have

secured the possession of Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, as French departments, and Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as kingdom vassals of the French Empire. And when he had resolved upon continuing the war, had he only taken advantage of the armistice to withdraw from Zamosa, Modlin, Dantzic, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, the sixty thousand men there was no reason, either political or military, for leaving there, all might still have been well. But in this matter, as in many others, carried away by the desire of re-establishing everything by a single victory on the Oder or the Vistula, Napoleon persisted in making this deplorable sacrifice which involved so many others. In order to keep up communications with his garrisons, he extended the circle of this concentric war, to forty leagues on the side of Goldberg, to fifty in the direction of Berlin, and obtained the glorious victory of Dresden; but at the moment when he was reaping the first fruits of this triumph at Kulm he was called away by the disasters of his lieutenants, left at too great a distance from himself, marched to their assistance, arrived too late, passed two months in exhausting himself and his troops in useless expeditions, and finally, instead of making a simple retreat upon the Elbe, which, by enabling him to collect the troops left upon the Elbe, might still have saved him, being still led away by the desire of restoring his fortunes by some one brilliant stroke, attempted on Düben a series of brilliant manœuvres which, admirably conceived as they were, failed, because the means by which he attempted to execute them, were not proportioned to the boldness of his enterprise. And then, caught as it were in the snare of his own combinations, he was at length forced to succumb on the plains of Leipzig, after the most terrible battle recorded in history, in which, horrible to say, there perished more than a hundred thousand men.

It is very certain that in these disastrous days Napoleon was no less fertile in great combinations, no less energetic, no less imperturbable in the hour of danger than he had ever been, but he was always the ambitious man whose insatiable desires disturbed and perverted the immensity of his genius. In 1812, in consequence of attempting the impossible, he suffered a gigantic check. In 1813, not for the purpose merely of repairing this reverse, but with the object of utterly and instantaneously effacing it, he took steps which led to another as disastrous and more irreparable. And now when a single step further would lead him into the abyss, would Napoleon pause upon the fatal slope? The allies remaining immovable when they had reached the

bank of the Rhine, trembled at the idea of crossing this formidable boundary, and were resolved to offer to Napoleon France, truly so called, the country which the Rhine and the Alps so greatly embrace and protect, and with which, after Marengo and Hohenlinden, he had been contented. Would he be contented with it in 1814? Such was the last question which the Sphinx of destiny was to propose to his pride. According to the answer which he should make to this question, would his career end on the greatest of earthly thrones, or in the depths of human misfortune. Let us forget for a moment that history of 1814 and 1815 which we all know but too well, let us efface the echo which resounded in our ears, young then, of that glorious throne; let us place ourselves in that month of December, 1813, let us endeavour to ignore all that took place in 1814, and put to ourselves the question which was now put to Napoleon. And then? which of us, after having read the recital of the Russian and Saxony campaigns, could doubt what must be the answer? Alas! men have within themselves a destiny which they seek around them, above them, everywhere, in short, except in their own hearts, where it really abides, and which, according as they obey their passions or their reason, either destroys or saves them, whatever they may do, whatever may be their genius. And when they are lost, they exclaim against their soldiers, their generals, their allies, against mankind, against Heaven, and declare that these betrayed them, when, in fact, they betrayed themselves.

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